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Marriage, perhaps more than any other social institution, highlights the 
complexity of violence against women. As this volume demonstrates, both 
marriage and violence are situated in a complex spectrum of practices and 
classifications. Their intersection at the point of forced marriage—and its 
association with violence in armed conflicts on the African continent—
has brought to the fore difficult questions about how sexualized forms of 
harm, as well as their enmeshment in social practices such as marriage, 
should be understood as harms and as wrongs. These questions are diffi-
cult because they require disentangling the complicated relationships be-
tween social structures, particularly those presumed to be essential and 
foundational, and the continuum of violence against women. At what 
point is marriage forced? What constitutes coercion? how do physical, 
cultural, and economic relations structure the ways in which some forms 
of coercion are visible and others are not?
 Feminists have long made the case that violence against women, 
particularly in the context of war, needs to be seen as part of a contin-
uum where the spectacular forms of violence—such as rape in war or the 
targeting of schoolgirls in nigeria, Uganda, or Pakistan—are linked to 
“mundane” daily acts of violence—such as street harassment, employment 
inequality, or intimate partner violence. But the continuum of violence 
is surprisingly difficult to see. This volume highlights some reasons why. 
The chapters assembled here provide close readings of different country 
contexts and varied historical periods to tease out the ways in which “the 
spectacular hides the mundane.” The analyses in these chapters help to 
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reveal the ways in which social structures and norms are positioned as so 
essential and enduring that we lose sight of just how variable, changing, 
and historically contingent they actually are.
 This collection provides the sort of historically informed and finely 
grained analysis needed to go beyond the spectacle of contemporary imag-
inings of forced marriage, to disentangle the very ideas of force and 
marriage and the conditions needed for the two terms to be brought to-
gether in a single sentence. Issues of consent and conjugal union emerge 
here as long-standing preoccupations of colonial rulers; as social dramas 
in which changing expectations about labor and control, both within and 
outside the “family,” are worked out; and as contexts for the contestation 
of different discourses about girls, women, and the meaning of justice.
 A historical focus provides a rich unpacking of consent and conjugal 
union, where both emerge as dynamic, multivalent concepts over multi-
ple country-specific case studies. The complex historical approach also 
insists that we pay attention to the moments of stasis, the legal and social 
dramas where ideas about marriage and rightness seem to fix and cohere. 
If we want to understand specifically how the spectacular hides the mun-
dane, then we need to look at these moments that often appear in the 
form of legal disputes. The “frozen in time” quality of law, for all its limits, 
also provides a productive vantage from which to examine some of the 
currents, tensions, and discourses through which the wrongs of forced 
marriage materialize at some moments and in particular ways. Attending 
to social dramas and their legal contexts provides a basis from which to 
explore the why and why now questions. Why and in what terms are mar-
riage and consent emerging as issues of concern, at this point in time and 
in this way?
 It is significant that international criminal law is a key site where con-
temporary concerns and framings of forced marriage are unfolding. Inter-
national criminal law, though it tends to offer a comparatively ahistorical 
understanding of conflict and its harms, is also an important arena for 
expressing the hopes of a more (gender-) equal future and one that might 
be secured through transitional justice. The various legal and bureaucratic 
institutions built around securing this transition make the task of unravel-
ing the harms of forced marriage particularly urgent.
 naming and officially recognizing gendered forms of harm are es-
sential to any postconflict transition, one where political, social, and eco-
nomic institutions are reconstituted.1 International criminal courts have 
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become prominent sites where this process of recognition (or misrecog-
nition) unfolds.2 Identifying gendered harms is necessarily linked to the 
ways in which the postconflict future is imagined and the terms of public 
life and citizenship established. In this context, it is more imperative than 
ever that we bring a complex, historically informed, close reading to the 
terms by which concepts of force and marriage are understood.
notes
1. Doris Buss, “Performing Legal Order: Some Feminist Thoughts on Interna-
tional criminal Law,” International Criminal Law Review: Special Issue on Women 
and International Criminal Law 11 (2011): 409–23; Fionnuala ní Aoláin, “emerging 
Paradigms of rationality: exploring a Feminist Theory of harm in the context of 
conflicted and Post-conflicted Societies,” Queen’s Law Journal 35, no. 1 (Fall 2009): 
219–44; Aoláin, “Advancing Feminist Positioning in the Field of Transitional Justice,” 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 6, no. 2 (2012): 205–28.
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(Ohio University Press, 2012), coeditors Benjamin Lawrance and richard 
roberts first conceived of a joint project examining the intersection of 
slavery and forced marriage at an annual meeting of the African Studies 
Association in Washington, Dc, in november 2011. In conversations with 
coeditor Annie Bunting, we soon found shared interests and concerns and 
began to plan our collaboration.
 The majority of papers in this volume were assembled from a sympo-
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publication of this volume were made possible with a generous grant from 
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harriet Tubman Institute for research on Africa and Its Diasporas at York 
University; the Avon Global center for Women and Justice at cornell Law 
School; the Susan B. Anthony center for Women’s Leadership at the Uni-
versity of rochester; the Department of history at Stanford University; 
and the Department of criminal Justice, the Program in Women’s and 
Gender Studies, the Program in International and Global Studies, and the 
Department of Sociology and Anthropology, all part of the college of Lib-
eral Arts at rIT. Maps and photographs were made possible with support 
from the Department of history at Stanford University. Proofreading and 
indexing by Meridith Murray were underwritten with a grant from rIT’s 
college of Liberal Arts.
 The editors deeply appreciate the remarkable talents of the staff at 
Ohio University Press, particularly Gill Berchowitz, ricky huard, nancy 
Basmajian, Jeffrey Kallet, Sebastian Biot, Samara rafert, John Pratt, Kristi 
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i n t r o d u c t i o n
Something Old, Something New?
conceptualizing Forced Marriage in Africa
AnnIe BUnTInG, BenJAMIn n. LAWrAnce, AnD rIchArD L. rOBerTS
Forced marriage features prominently in historical and contemporary 
accounts of gender relations throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Forced 
marriage—also known by a variety of other terms, including, but not 
limited to, marriage by capture, servile marriage, forced conjugal associa-
tions, war brides, and marriage in absentia—affects millions of Africans, 
predominantly women and girls. In some popular accounts, forced mar-
riage is depicted as a new and urgent human rights violation demanding 
immediate action from national governments and the international com-
munity. In these accounts, ironically, forced marriage is both a fresh crisis 
and an ancient tradition.1 The accounts of contemporary “marriage with-
out consent” or “enslavement in war for forced marriage” are often put in 
uncritical comparison with historical marriage practices, which were the 
subject of colonial debate, intervention, and regulation. These compari-
sons are often made in the absence of empirical data and knowledge. Such 
uncritical analogous thinking runs the risk of doing a disservice to both 
historical understanding of African marriage practices and contemporary 
advocacy to address violence in marriage. And like other pressing con-
temporary human rights struggles, ranging from trafficking to domestic 
violence, forced marriages in Africa defy many attempts at interpretation 
and analysis.
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 This collection of new research places African forced marriages in 
broader social structures and historical contexts that shape gender, mar-
riage, and human rights. The authors in this volume investigate dimen-
sions of gender subordination, the diversity of sexualities and sexual 
identities, sociolegal regulation, resistance, and liberation in the context 
of conjugal relationships of the past and the present. The collection fo-
cuses on the role marriage plays in the mobilization of labor, the ac-
cumulation of wealth, the prevalence of dependent status, and slippage 
between marriages and other forms of gendered violence, bondage, slav-
ery, and servile statuses. The chapters presented here also investigate the 
continuities, ruptures, and inventions of forced marriage practices of the 
colonial and postcolonial eras and the contemporary period. Although 
forced marriage has, since the mid-2000s, been the subject of scholarly 
inquiry and popular attention, it has received inadequate attention in 
the fields of African studies, law and society, and slavery studies. Where 
scholars do engage with these issues, few speak to audiences outside 
their fields.2 As Jean Allain and others have argued, servile marriage 
has been a neglected dimension of slavery studies, and forced marriage 
has only recently emerged as a scholarly topic in legal studies.3 here, we 
bring together legal scholars, anthropologists, historians, gender equity 
activists, and development practitioners to examine forced marriage, 
consent, and coercion across time and place in Africa.
 As with so many human rights issues, the spectacular hides the 
mundane, and the popular discourse misses the range of experiences 
and changes over time. In the case of “child, early, and forced marriage,” 
the focus of policy and academic discussion is often reduced to “child 
marriage.” And even “child marriage” is further reduced to “girl brides.” 
Thus, though a lack of capacity to consent to marriage due to age is a 
dimension of forced marriage, the concentration on girls obscures anal-
ysis of the limitations on consent more generally. We hear much less 
about forced marriage than we do about girl brides married to much 
older men in India, Afghanistan, and ethiopia, sometimes in group 
weddings.4 Photographer Stephanie Sinclair, who documented child 
marriages over a decade, produced the exhibit Too Young to Wed.5 In 
an interview, she compares the fight against child marriage to the anti- 
apartheid movement:
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Just like every other human rights issue, like apartheid or civil 
rights, it is real and important to the people who are going through 
it. And the only reason it’s happening to these girls is because they 
are girls. . . . Their lives are being held back because they are girls. 
This issue isn’t going to be resolved in a couple years. Maybe in our 
lifetime. Just like we fought for civil rights 50 years ago and racism 
is still a huge issue in our country, no single thing will solve this. 
People are just figuring out it’s an issue. We’ve started, but we have a 
long way to go.6
early and forced marriages have been on the human rights agenda since 
before the contemporary human rights movement and the Universal Dec-
laration of human rights (UDhr), but today, we are seeing an unprece-
dented level of international attention given to the issue. Like all human 
rights issues, change will come when the depth and complexity of the 
problem are realized and when policies and programs address changes at 
both the international level and in local communities.
FraMing Forced Marriage in Law and PoLit ics
Forced marriage has been framed in a variety of ways in law, politics, and 
popular advocacy over its long documented history. Forced marriages are 
often represented as matters of slavery, crimes against humanity, women 
and children’s rights, or human trafficking. The issue was an object of con-
cern in Africa for missionaries, colonial administrators, anthropologists, 
social reformers, and antislavery activists. These concerns were articulated 
first in the context of civilizing missions that sought to change African 
marriage practices. Both before and after World War I, as examined in 
this volume in the chapters by Brett Shadle and richard roberts, colonial 
administrators debated whether bridewealth and early marriage were akin 
to slave trading and slavery. The lack of consent to marriage was histori-
cally clustered in debates over “native marriage” in Africa—concerns that 
included age and capacity to consent, polygyny, seclusion, and violence in 
marriage. In addition to framing forced marriage as a matter of colonial 
social engineering, with the establishment of the League of nations forced 
marriage was seen as slavery or a practice similar to slavery. The debates 
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on the ground in Africa regarding bridewealth, consent in marriage, and 
age of consent resonated with debates in european capitals and emerging 
international organizations.7
 Though not explicitly included in the 1926 Slavery convention, 
child marriage in particular was referred to by antislavery activists as a 
form of slavery. The drafters of the convention, having considered native 
marriage practices, concluded that forced marriage or dowry ought not 
be included in the 1926 convention. In his analysis of the debates within 
the Temporary Slavery commission, Jean Allain writes that the com-
mission concluded both customary law and Muslim law do not regard 
marriage as involving the purchase of a wife or an act of enslavement 
even if the situation may approximate slave dealing.8 nonetheless, after 
discussion of practices similar to slavery including forced and child 
marriage, the League of nations adopted the 1926 Slavery convention, 
of which article 1(1) states, “Slavery is the status or condition of a person 
over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership 
are exercised.”9
 Significant debate remained as to whether servile forms of marriage 
ought to be included in the definition of slavery. Whether these mar-
riages could be considered slavery depended on the conditions at the 
time of the marriage and also on whether “the powers attaching to the 
right of ownership” were exercised over the spouse, as required by the 
1926 definition.10 It is important to note that marriage without consent 
of one of the spouses does not generally meet the convention thresh-
old for servile status. however, as we will discuss and as was discussed 
throughout the colonial period, bridewealth—as the transfer of goods 
and services for rights in persons—may meet this measure. clearly, the 
framers of the 1956 Supplementary convention on the Abolition of Slav-
ery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 
thought so. The post−World War II era experienced the development 
of a much more robust framework for international human rights and 
human rights conventions.
 The 1956 Supplementary convention includes child exploitation and 
marriage without the right to refuse where consideration (in legal terms 
this applies to anything of value promised to another when entering into 
a contract) is exchanged as forms of slavery as defined in the Slavery 
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convention of 1926.11 Article 1(c) of the 1956 Supplementary convention 
calls for the suppression of
any institution or practice whereby:
(i) A woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in 
marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to her 
parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or
(ii) The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan has the right to 
transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise; or
(iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be inherited 
by another person.12
here, the language is “given in marriage” for money or consideration, 
“transferred” or “inherited,” indicating that this prohibition was tar-
geted at families treating girls and women as chattel. In other words, the 
1956 Supplementary convention developed a critique of familial and 
community practices, some of which came to be referred to as “harmful 
traditional practices.” In current child marriage advocacy, for the most 
part only Anti-Slavery International, Walk Free Foundation, and Free 
the Slaves frame the issues of forced and child marriage as a matter of 
“modern slavery.”13 The nomenclature of slavery operates as a powerful 
rhetorical and symbolic tool in efforts to combat severe exploitation in 
marriage.
 In international human rights law and many national legal regimes, 
forced marriage refers broadly to cases where one or both spouses are 
married without their full and free consent. This is wider in scope than 
servile marriage and is a matter of state responsibility. The Universal Dec-
laration of human rights states that
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to 
race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found 
a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution.
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent 
of the intending spouses.14
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Shortly after the UDhr and the 1956 Supplementary convention, the 
United nations (Un) passed a treaty on age and consent to marriage. 
The 1962 convention on consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Mar-
riage and registration for Marriage mandates that national governments 
pass laws that prohibit child marriage and require full and free consent 
to marriage.15 The 1979 convention on elimination of All Forms of Dis-
crimination against Women (ceDAW) reiterates this prohibition on child 
marriage and marriage without consent in article 16.16
 Age and consent have figured prominently but paradoxically in the 
international law of marriage rights. Although consent and the capacity 
to consent are assumed to be requisite elements of legitimate marriage, 
international human rights law has deferred to States Parties to determine 
when young people have the requisite age of maturity. The UDhr notes 
in article 16 that men and women of full age have the right to marry, but it 
does not specify what “full age” means. even the 1962 convention on con-
sent to Marriage and ceDAW do not specify a minimum age at marriage 
or how to ascertain what constitutes meaningful consent. In its preamble, 
the 1962 convention calls on states to
take all appropriate measures with a view to abolishing such 
customs, ancient laws and practices by ensuring, inter alia, complete 
freedom in the choice of a spouse, eliminating completely child 
marriages and the betrothal of young girls before the age of puberty, 
establishing appropriate penalties where necessary and establishing 
a civil or other register in which all marriages will be recorded.17
Article 2 of the convention calls on States Parties to set national marriage-
able ages in law and to establish marriage registries.
 In 1965, the United nations passed a nonbinding recommendation on 
marriageable age that included in Principle II that “Member States shall 
take legislative action to specify a minimum age for marriage, which in 
any case shall not be less than fifteen years of age.”18 The 1989 conven-
tion on the rights of the child defines a child as anyone under the age 
of eighteen years. This standard is now read into the definitions of child 
marriage. The debates today take up children’s rights not to be married 
and women’s rights to fully and freely consent to marriage. Most recently, 
the African Union passed the Protocol to the African charter of human 
and Peoples’ rights on the rights of Women in Africa (2003).19 In article 6 
introduction: something old, something new? 7
of the protocol, States Parties are called on to enact legislation to guarantee 
a minimum marriage age of eighteen years and free and full consent to 
marriage. The article also instantiates monogamy as the “preferred form 
of marriage.”
 notwithstanding international efforts to concretize terminology, in 
the first decade of the new millennium forced marriages in conflict situa-
tions ushered in new challenges. notably, in 2008 the Appeals chamber of 
the Special court for Sierra Leone (ScSL) determined in the trial of rebel 
soldiers affiliated with the Armed Forces revolutionary council (AFrc) 
that the practices described as forced marriage constituted a separate 
crime against humanity, as another and distinct inhumane act.20 The Trial 
chamber found the practice of sexual slavery to constitute a crime against 
humanity.21 The International criminal court (Icc) issued indictments in 
Uganda for similar practices as “sexual enslavement.” In the Democratic 
republic of the congo, the Icc indictments include the war crimes of 
“sexual slavery and rape.” In the extraordinary chambers in the courts 
of cambodia, lawyers for civil parties requested in February 2009 that the 
prosecutor conduct a supplementary investigation with the aim of amend-
ing the indictments in a case to include forced marriage.22
M A P  I . 1 .  contemporary West Africa, by Phil Schwartzburg, 2015
M A P  I . 2 .  contemporary central and Southern Africa, by Phil Schwartzburg, 2015
M A P  I . 3 .  contemporary east Africa, by Phil Schwartzburg, 2015
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 The former Un special rapporteur on systematic rape, sexual slavery, and 
slavery-like practices during armed conflict, Gay J. McDougall, reported in 
1998 that sexual slavery “also encompasses situations where women and girls 
are forced into ‘marriage,’ domestic servitude or other forms of labor that ul-
timately involve forced sexual activity, including rape by their captors.”23 The 
ScSL established the new crime against humanity of “other inhumane act 
(forced marriage)” in the Appeals chamber decision regarding the AFrc 
to hold commanders responsible for the harms described as the “bush wife 
phenomenon.” In that case, the legal precedent was set, but convictions on 
this ground were not entered. But the ScSL’s prosecution of commanders of 
the revolutionary United Front (rUF), another rebel army in Sierra Leone, 
resulted in a conviction for committing crimes against humanity.
 In the rUF appeals decision, the court laid out the elements according 
to the ScSL statute as follows:
With respect to forced marriage, the Appeals chamber recalls that 
the offence “describes a situation in which the perpetrator[,] . . . 
compels a person by force, threat of force, or coercion to serve as a 
conjugal partner.” The conduct must constitute an “other inhumane 
act,” which entails that the perpetrator: (i) inflict great suffering, 
or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health; (ii) 
sufficiently similar in gravity to the acts referred to in Article 2.a 
through Article 2.h of the Statute; and that (iii) the perpetrator was 
aware of the factual circumstances that established the character of 
the gravity of the act. As a crime against humanity, the offence also 
requires that the acts of the accused formed part of a widespread 
or systematic attack against the civilian population, and that the 
accused knew that his crimes were so related.24
According to valerie Oosterveld, this new definition of the crime of 
forced conjugal association substantially adds to the recorded history of 
gender-based violence within the conflict in Sierra Leone and thereby 
contributes to transitional justice in that country.25 This definition may 
also have a substantial impact on future indictments from the Icc. With 
the conclusion of its work in Freetown, the ScSL moved on to the legacy 
stage of its mandate. The two most important precedents from the per-
spective of the offices of the prosecutor and registrar of the Special court 
for Sierra Leone are its decisions on recruiting children into soldiering 
and forced marriage.
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 however, there appears to be no universal agreement on whether 
forced marriage under wartime is a human rights crime. The 2012 ScSL 
case involving charles Taylor revisited the matter and found that the new 
crime against humanity of forced marriage was flawed and inaccurate.26 
The Taylor decision held that the term marriage should be avoided and 
that conjugal form of enslavement more accurately described the experi-
ence of women and girls who were abducted and held by rebels for long 
periods of time for sexual and other labor. The earlier Appeals cham-
ber decision for the AFrc did not enter fresh convictions because the 
court was “convinced that society’s disapproval of the forceful abduction 
and use of women and girls as forced conjugal partners,” being “part of 
a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population,” was 
“adequately reflected” insofar as “such conduct is criminal and that it con-
stitutes an ‘Other Inhumane Act’ capable of incurring individual criminal 
responsibility.” The 2012 Taylor decision upended this.27 It focused initially 
on the enslavement and then on the sexual aspect, and in so doing, it ad-
dressed the “linguistic camouflage” critique of the use of the term forced 
marriage.28 The Taylor verdict also recognized that enslavement through 
forced labor can be a gendered crime, leading Oosterveld to opine that 
“conjugal slavery” may have “clear expressive benefits” over the “forced 
marriage” formulation.29 The term conjugal slavery signals the organiza-
tion of labor in war and the severity of the crime, while also distinguishing 
it from peacetime marriage without consent.
 Despite the legal recognition that servile marriage is a form of slav-
ery, the prosecution strategies and judicial decisions of the Icc and the 
ScSL do not yet show a coherent approach or theory for holding perpe-
trators responsible for practices of forced marriage. Although the inter-
national legal standards make it clear that the constituent elements under 
the rubric of forced marriage—such as torture, rape, and forced impreg-
nation—are distinct crimes against humanity, it remains unclear whether 
the totality of crimes amounts to slavery, sexual slavery, or some “other 
inhumane act.” The academic commentary is also mixed in assessing the 
relative merits of charging forced marriage as slavery or as a new and 
separate crime. On the one hand, when forced marriage is framed as a 
form of slavery, it is recast as the most serious crime against humanity, one 
with the longest and richest history of global prohibition. On the other 
hand, to successfully prosecute forced marriage as a form of slavery, the 
court must find that the perpetrator had “powers attaching to ownership 
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over a person” (1926 Slavery convention) or “a similar deprivation of that 
person’s liberty” (rome Statute of 1998).
 The rome Statute of 1998, establishing the Icc and its elements of 
crimes, expands the 1926 definition of slavery—“any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership” over a person—with the additional 
phrase “or similar deprivation of liberty.” enslavement in the rome Statute 
explicitly signals analogous situations. Thus, there is good reason to argue 
that the practice described variously as the “bush wife phenomenon” or 
“forced marriage” in Uganda or Sierra Leone would meet this definition of 
enslavement (see the chapters by Mariane Ferme and Stacey hynd in this 
volume). nonetheless, any effort to designate contemporary practices as 
forms of slavery may provoke charges of analytical overreach and rhetorical 
excess. even if we accept that some practices can legitimately be described 
as a form of slavery or enslavement, it does not necessarily follow that the 
relevant actus reus (criminal act), such as exercising the powers of own-
ership, can be easily applied to specific cases of forced marriage in either 
wartime or peacetime.30 Some observers will be very concerned that pros-
ecuting practices referred to as forced marriage in conflict situations as 
forms of slavery will lead to higher standards of proof for forced marriage 
in nonconflict situations. The context and conditions of war are substan-
tively different from times of relative peace, and therefore, forced marriage 
in nonconflict zones would not necessarily meet the definition of slavery, 
nor would it be required to do so. The Supplementary convention of 1956 
defines servile marriage, and not all forms of marriage without consent 
meet this definition.31
 Survivors of forced marriage in Sierra Leone and elsewhere and their 
advocates may or may not agree with this characterization as slavery or the 
distinctions drawn between sexual slavery and forced marriage. Indeed, 
the language of sexual slavery is very provocative and powerful. Joel Quirk 
writes that the “key question here is not so much whether specific prac-
tices are identical to slavery, at least in part because slavery can be defined 
in a number of ways, but instead whether they share sufficient features in 
common with slavery to be rendered illegitimate as a result of prior anti-slavery 
commitments.”32 It is important to underline that international criminal 
law holds individuals responsible for crimes against humanity, genocide, 
and war crimes.
 In the cases before the Icc, the ScSL, and their predecessors—the 
International criminal Tribunal for rwanda (IcTr) and the International 
introduction: something old, something new? 13
criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (IcTY)—the highest-ranking 
officials were indicted for crimes against humanity. however, international 
customary law includes the prohibition on slavery and calls on states, not 
individuals, to be responsible for compliance and breaches.33 International 
human rights law is also a matter of state responsibility. When states enact 
penal laws against slavery, individuals may be prosecuted under such pro-
visions, as demonstrated in 2008 in Australia in the case of The Queen v. 
Tang. The legal field of action against forced marriages is only part of a 
wider campaign against these practices.
arranged Marriages and Forced Marriages
The 2008 decision of the Appeals chamber of the ScSL in its judgment 
of the AFRC case raised significant but vague distinctions between forced 
marriages and arranged marriages. Justice Julia Sebutinde’s separate con-
curring opinion in the case compared forced and arranged marriages in 
Sierra Leone. According to neha Jain, the opinion argued that forced 
marriages “mimicked peacetime situations of gender-stereotyped roles of 
women, where they were forced to perform all kinds of domestic labour 
and have sexual relations (and as a consequence, children) against their 
will. however, arranged marriages were characterized by the consent and 
participation of the families of the parties and accompanied by rituals and 
religious ceremonies.”
 Both of these situations were different from forced marriages during 
conflict situations, where “girls were forcefully abducted and held against 
their will in order to render sexual services to and perform conjugal duties 
for the rebels, had no protection and security of their families and were 
completely at the mercy of the rebels.” The crucial distinction between 
forced marriage during conflict and the customary practice of arranged 
marriage was the “lack of involvement of the spouses and the absence of 
rituals in the case of the former.”34 In this volume, Mariane Ferme explores 
the differences between arranged and forced marriages from her two de-
cades of fieldwork experience in Sierra Leone. If, as Ferme argues, forced 
marriages mimic customary arranged marriages, how do we account for 
the fundamental and irremediable social changes to the character of such 
customary practices as a consequence of war?
 Building on the legal issues raised in the 2008 AFRC judgment, Kim 
Thuy Seelinger has explored the ambiguities of differentiating between 
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arranged and forced marriages as they apply to asylum cases in the United 
States and the United Kingdom. reflecting on the ScSL’s definition of 
forced marriage under combat conditions as a crime against humanity, 
Seelinger asserts that “most forced marriages are . . . quieter, subtler affairs: 
fathers settle debts by selling their daughters; uncles promise their young 
nieces to their friends; or rapists avoid punishment by marrying their 
victims.”35 These quieter forms, Seelinger argues, remain distinct from ar-
ranged marriages: “The former is a violation of human rights, while the 
latter is generally not.”36 Seelinger supports her argument—at least insofar 
as it applies to claims of persecution in asylum cases—with reference to 
the UK Foreign and commonwealth Office document entitled “Forced 
Marriage: A Wrong, not a right.”37
 In arranged marriages, the families of both spouses take a leading role 
in choosing the marriage partner, but the choice of whether to accept the 
arrangement remains with the potential spouses. They must give their full 
and free consent. The UK document describes this as a “consensual model 
of arranged marriage.” crucial to the UK policy on arranged marriages is 
the assumption that the individuals to be married give their “full and free 
consent.”38 In a forced marriage, by contrast, one or both spouses do not 
consent to the marriage or consent is extracted under duress, as examples in 
Benjamin Lawrance and charlotte Walker-Said’s chapter demonstrate. Du-
ress includes both physical and emotional pressure. In some societies, the 
tradition of arranged marriage is a deeply entrenched practice, and it may 
be very difficult for potential spouses to resist pressure to accept the paren-
tal choice of marriage partner. Ferme argues persuasively that within the 
totality of forced and arranged marriages, we should be attentive to a spec-
trum ranging from forced subjection to something akin to consent, which 
suggests that the boundaries separating arranged and forced marriages are 
much more ambiguous. Francesca Declich, Bala Saho, and Judith-Ann 
Walker explore these ambiguous boundaries later in this volume.
 Those seeking to make a distinction between arranged marriages and 
forced marriages are implicitly invoking “custom” as age-old practice. 
In an important argument about the politics of custom in both colonial 
and contemporary Africa, Liz Thornberry, in chapter 5, examines debates 
about abduction as a form of marriage in South Africa. Thornberry is es-
pecially interested in determining in whose interests claims of “custom” 
are being made and how these claims invoke history. In his discussion of 
the challenges of reforming forced marriages in the Gambia, Saho also 
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asks in whose interests the claims of “endless tradition” are being made. 
These are vital issues to examine precisely because claims of custom and 
tradition are often invoked to shield practices from international human 
rights conventions and because students of custom in Africa have long 
understood that custom is unstable, flexible, and often subject to robust 
debate.
 Although Seelinger generally accepts the distinction between arranged 
and forced marriages, she notes that “as the amount of input parents ac-
cept from their child and the degree to which parents allow their child to 
make the decision decrease, and the pressure to marry a certain individual 
rises closer and closer to the level of duress, the marriage moves along the 
continuum from ‘arranged’ to ‘forced.’” In such a situation, Seelinger ad-
mits that “full and free consent” may be difficult to measure.39 This was es-
pecially true in marriages of young girls arranged by their kin, as Saho and 
roberts discuss in this volume. Many of the contributors to Aisha Gill and 
Sundari Anitha’s volume on forced marriages in the United Kingdom and 
the european Union point to the range of coercion that girls and young 
women experience in the arranged marriages that still take place within 
some immigrant communities.40 Gill and Anitha argue effectively that the 
coercion involved in arranged marriages is actually gendered violence 
and thus addressable under the legal sanctions of violence against women. 
Such coercion rises to the level of violence against women and sexual mi-
norities precisely because of both the psychological harm and the actual 
harm the individuals fear if they say no to an arranged marriage. This co-
ercion thus forms the basis of a “diminished capacity to consent.”41 As we 
will discuss next, the ability to consent to marriage or to think otherwise 
about marriage has been deeply constrained by ideologies and social prac-
tices linked to personhood and bridewealth in Africa.
Personhood, brideweaLth, and consent:  
constraints on choice
Marriage is a central institution in African societies, but its forms and 
meanings have changed over time. Marriage was and remains linked to 
personhood, although the instability of marriages in Africa raises key 
questions about gender, status, and social vulnerability. Bridewealth and 
early female marriage, long core components of marriage, have changed 
dramatically since the 1960s. The arrival of statutory same-sex marriage in 
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sub-Saharan Africa adds a new dimension to a constantly changing set of 
traditions and practices. This section explores the linked nature of person-
hood, marriage, bridewealth, and consent.
 Personhood in Africa is a process. Becoming a person depends in 
part on participating fully in social relations. John comaroff and Jean 
comaroff have described this process as “becoming rather than being.” 
They contend that the Tswana social construction of the person should 
be understood as “nobody existed or could be known except in relation 
and with reference to, even as part of, a wide array of significant others.” 
Moreover, “the identity of each and every one was forged, cumulatively, 
by an infinite, on-going series of practical activities.”42 Personhood should 
therefore be considered a process through which social relations gener-
ate social identity, but social identity itself changes with statuses achieved. 
Jane Guyer refers to this as “stages in social maturation.”43
 In a major assessment of personhood in Africa, J. S. Fontaine has com-
pared the concepts of personhood in four African societies. She concludes 
that “the completed person . . . is the product of a whole life. By confer-
ring personhood on the individual such societies also, though implicitly, 
distinguish between person and individual, conferring moral worth not 
on the individual but on the social form.”44 Fontaine’s distinction between 
person and individual illuminates the process through which individuals 
attain the rights and privileges of personhood. Personhood thus carries the 
quality of social authority and indicates that the individual has achieved 
such a status. Along the way to this status, the individual gradually accrues 
more qualities of personhood. Marriage and having children usually play 
significant roles in this process, thereby ensuring the reproduction of the 
social unit. But personhood does not adhere evenly to men and women. 
Gender was historically a central part of the social construction of person-
hood, and in many African societies during the precolonial and colonial 
periods, women were considered jural minors and could not attain politi-
cal office or titles, even if they could exert significant influence on kin and 
community.45
 The concept of rights-bearing individuals, so central to the interna-
tional human rights conventions, maps uneasily on the more fluid and 
complex African concepts of personhood, in which different sets of rights 
adhere to individuals during different stages of their lives. concepts of 
personhood are often framed in processual terms about changes through 
status, but they do not account for social and historical change. concepts 
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of personhood are shaped by specific cultures, but cultures are hardly 
static and are most often sources of considerable debate among mem-
bers of societies. historical change, including the multiple encounters 
with other cultures, religions, and colonialism, merely accelerated these 
debates. Moreover, the context of the social relations that generate social 
identity has never been static and is linked to broader changes in the wider 
political economy in which the social unit generating social relations is 
embedded. Social identities are shaped by deep inequalities in terms of 
gender, generation, and access to economic and political resources. Per-
sonhood thus emerges out of what Anitha and Gill call “a matrix of inter-
secting inequalities.”46 These intersecting inequalities shape an individual’s 
consciousness and agency, particularly in his or her abilities to consent or 
to think otherwise about socially sanctioned passages to personhood.47
 The forces that have shaped social relations and personhood in Africa 
include the slave trade, conversion to Islam and christianity, the redefini-
tion of ideas of “custom” and “tradition” under colonial rule, new colonial 
legal systems, the end of slavery, male labor migration and the resulting 
feminization of poverty in rural areas, increasing commoditization of things 
and social relationships, the emergence of new forms of property and new 
means of accumulation in the colonial and postcolonial economies, rapid 
urbanization, the hIv/AIDS pandemic, rising heteronormative discourse 
and homophobia, and international human rights conventions. each of 
these forces has influenced the constitution of personhood through its im-
pact on households and communities and their relations with their mem-
bers. each of these influences has spurred intense debates about culture, 
obedience, and belongingness.48 Many of the influences also have exerted 
deeply contradictory pressures on these debates. For example, colonial ef-
forts to end slavery enhanced the debates about rights adhering in persons 
at the same time that colonial indirect rule policy strengthened the author-
ity of male household heads over female and junior male members of their 
domestic units.49 Bridewealth and age of marriage practices were essential 
parts of the “matrix of intersecting inequalities” that influenced colonial 
and postcolonial debates about forced marriage in Africa (see the chapters 
by roberts and Shadle in this volume).
 In much of Africa, marriage was legitimated through bridewealth. 
Bridewealth was a strategic investment that built and maintained webs of 
kinship and organized and controlled labor. Bridewealth often involved 
the transfer over a number of years of goods (grain, livestock, and cash) 
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and services (weaving, herding, and occasional farmwork) from the hus-
band’s kin to those of the bride. In return, the husband and his kin group 
received the rights to the bride’s labor (at least for that portion of the day 
customarily devoted to household chores and other activities that contrib-
uted to the well-being of the household, such as farming, weeding, spin-
ning, and the like), as well as her reproductive power and her domestic 
services.50 The value of bridewealth changed over time as African regional 
economies were drawn ever more fully into colonial and global ones. 
Many regions of colonial Africa experienced a “marriage crisis” when the 
value of bridewealth increased as rural and urban incomes increased, only 
to collapse again in the face of economic reversals such as the Great De-
pression. As Olatunji Ojo argues in this volume, changes in the value of 
bridewealth often resulted in waves of litigation in African native courts, 
as promises of betrothal and value of bridewealth were broken.51
 colonial administrators consistently failed to understand the complex 
flow of goods and obligations involved in bridewealth transfers. The shift 
in terminology is indicative of this: in the early colonial period, the term 
bride-price was widely used by colonial officials, which implied a sale or 
transfer of the bride to the husband’s kinship group. As colonial anthro-
pologists began to study African social practices more fully in the interwar 
period, the term bridewealth gained currency by suggesting that marriage 
involved more than a commercial transaction.52 But the transfer of wealth 
from the groom’s kin to the bride’s guardian was often only one part of a 
much more complicated flow of goods and value between the groom’s and 
bride’s kin. In her discussion of Muslim hausa in niger, Barbara cooper 
prefers the term gift exchange to bridewealth, in part because the female 
kin of the bride and groom actively engaged in gift giving that enhanced 
both the value of the marriage and the social networks of the women. 
Among these gifts were portions of a dowry, which were gifts given to the 
bride to carry into marriage.53
 cooper’s analysis complicates the generalized binary between bride-
wealth and dowry marriage systems. Jack Goody and Stanley Tambiah 
have laid out the bold distinctions between these systems for sub-Saharan 
African and north Indian societies and the implications for women’s social 
positions. They stress the separate nature of these systems rather than a 
more complex interrogation into the multiplicity of cross-flowing trans-
fers of gifts, wealth, and labor. In general, dowry is a means to enhance the 
attractiveness of a bride in marriage and is provided by the bride’s kin. The 
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dowry, as Tambiah argues, consisted of several different portions that were 
used to support the “joint” family of the new couple within the groom’s 
kin, to enhance the bride’s well-being in her new home, and to provide a 
fund to support the bride if she became a widow. In bridewealth systems, 
Goody asserts, most of the value flowed from the groom’s kin to the bride’s 
kin in order to secure unambiguously the affiliation of her children.54 In 
African Muslim communities, bridewealth, dowry, and dower often co-
incided. As the bridewealth flowed from the groom’s kin to the bride’s, the 
bride’s father sometimes provided a dowry to ease her entry into her new 
home. The groom also gave presents directly to the bride, which formed 
the dower. Upon divorce, the wife retained the dower and often the dowry, 
especially if it was not commingled with the household’s general assets.55 
As the value of bridewealth increased in many places throughout the sub-
continent during the colonial period, some husbands also understood the 
higher value of bridewealth to confer on them both fuller control over 
their wives’ labor and sexuality and enhanced patriarchal authority. At the 
same time, economic pressures often limited the ability of husbands to pay 
bridewealth and contributed, particularly in the postcolonial period, to a 
rise in long-term domestic relationships that did not attain the status of 
marriage.56
 Starting in the colonial era, european administrators sought to engi-
neer changes to African societies, especially in areas where they consid-
ered African practices to be contrary to civilization. Age of marriage was 
one such area for significant colonial intervention. colonial administra-
tors faced considerable pressure from missionary societies, activist groups 
in the metropole, and the liberal press to prohibit child marriages. The 
signal imperial precedent for legislating against child marriages was the 
Indian Government Age of consent Act of 1891, which was part of a revi-
sion of the Indian Penal code and code of criminal Procedure. The Age 
of consent Act did not prohibit child marriages, but it made sexual in-
tercourse with girls and the consummation of marriage with child brides 
under the age of twelve illegal. This 1891 act revised an 1882 law that had 
permitted sexual intercourse with girls at age ten. The debates surround-
ing the 1891 act were precipitated by the death of a child bride of eleven 
due to massive hemorrhaging following sexual intercourse with her much 
older husband. The 1891 Age of consent Act had nothing to say about con-
sent, but it did intervene in Indian child marriage and religious practices 
by adding another element to the social construction of biological sexual 
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difference in assuming a uniform age at which Indian girls reached men-
arche. child marriages remained common, and girls were often betrothed 
as infants even if they did not move to their husbands’ homes until pu-
berty. But there was another side to the controversies in India surrounding 
the 1891 Age of consent Act, and that had to do with the bride’s obligation 
to fulfill her wifely duties even if she did not consent to the marriage.57 
Age, consent, and coercion were thus deeply entwined in debates about 
both Indian and African marriages precisely because the Indian Penal 
code was received into British colonial east Africa with the establishment 
of colonial rule. In this volume, Shadle explores the periodic expressions 
of debates about the age of majority, sexual development, and consent in 
marriage in colonial Kenya. As discussed by Declich in her chapter, forms 
of forced marriage in which the consent of the brides was deemed unnec-
essary existed in postemancipation colonial Somalia, where Italian settlers 
and administrators sought to mobilize labor by forcing women to marry 
male laborers.
 With mounting intensity since World War II, human rights activists 
have also targeted child marriages as human rights violations. Organiza-
tions such as the United nations children’s Fund (UnIceF) and the Inter-
national Women’s health coalition have argued that early marriage harms 
the child in several overlapping ways: it forces the girl to leave school, it 
imposes sexual activity that may be physically and psychologically harm-
ful, it may result in pregnancy that can cause obstetric fistulas associated 
with long and obstructed labor, it increases a girl’s dependence upon her 
husband, and it can raise rates of sexually transmitted infections (STIs) 
and hIv among young married girls.58 crucial to the argument about why 
child marriages constitute forced marriages is that children may not be 
capable of giving their full and free consent or at the very least what one 
US asylum judge called “meaningful consent.”59
 The age of consent in marriage was one of the fraught areas in this 
broad transformation of law and society.60 changing notions of child-
hood, contract, and age of reason in seventeenth-century england led 
to changes in marriage laws governing the minimum age of consent. In 
the sixteenth century, children as young as seven were considered able to 
enter into legally binding marriages, although they could seek a divorce if 
they had not consummated the marriage by the time they turned twelve. 
Marriages were directly linked to status, and marrying was a means of 
maintaining status endogamy. The major change occurred between the 
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seventeenth and nineteenth centuries when parental control over chil-
dren was strengthened. holly Brewer points to a link between an increas-
ing sense that valid contracts “should be based on intentional choice” 
that only comes with age and experience and that “binding marriages, 
once linked to puberty, shifted upwards, and parental consent for mar-
riages began to be enforced.”61 Brewer also argues that children’s ability to 
choose marriage partners was more constrained when they were seen as 
property. children as property, in which rights in their persons could be 
exchanged or transferred, was most pronounced in societies where patri-
archal ideology was most enshrined. The society Brewer has in mind was 
antebellum virginia, where masters’ control over slaves and servants and 
parents’ control over their children were most fully elaborated in law. But 
the same process prevailed in many African societies where bridewealth 
marriages were common. Within this context, what does it mean to talk 
about consent in marriage?
 consent in marriage has a distinctive history. It is linked to funda-
mental changes in marriage and the family and in conceptions of child-
hood, personhood, and individual agency that have occurred over the 
past three centuries and accelerated with late nineteenth-century impe-
rialism and with the trajectories of twentieth-century globalization and 
religious conversion. It is also linked to the development of international 
human rights and the international women’s movement that has its roots 
in the early and mid-twentieth-century north American, european, and 
Soviet worlds.62
 The concept of consent in our contemporary debates about forced 
marriages takes as its starting point a “robustly self-sufficient notion of 
responsibility” that associates freedom with the ability to separate oneself 
from others and assumes a significant distinction between free choice, ar-
ranged, and forced marriages. The concept of consent is linked to freedom 
more generally, which has a long and tortured intellectual history. Few 
scholars would agree that freedom is simply equated with “not being 
physically constrained.” Many would want to introduce a more complex 
notion of constraints on freedom to consent because of the varied pres-
sures to conform and the lack of viable alternatives. Thus, consent is always 
in conversation with the capacity to imagine and to implement alternative 
visions of society and social relations.63
 herein lie the important contributions of carole Pateman to liberal 
theories of democracy and contract. These theories assume that political 
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obligations derive from voluntary acts made by free and equal individ-
uals. These voluntary acts are linked to free consent. Pateman contends 
that such liberal theories fail to recognize how liberal theorists have con-
structed women as men’s natural subordinates and thus incapable of ex-
ercising consent that would give them the status of full citizens. Pateman 
draws attention to the cultural and structural constraints on real autonomy 
and meaningful consent under conditions of social, economic, and gender 
inequality. To consent freely also means to be able to say no. As such, con-
sent needs to be distinguished from “habitual acquiescence, assent, silent 
dissent, submission, or even enforced submission. Unless refusal of con-
sent or withdrawal of consent are real possibilities, we can no longer speak 
of ‘consent’ in any genuine sense.” 64 Much of Pateman’s original concern 
related to the legal issues of rape, wherein submission was often construed 
as consent unless resistance could be proved. Pateman’s argument raised 
the broader issue of what she identified as “the special problem of women 
and consent” in a world shaped by deep inequalities of all kinds.
 The status of full and free consent is central to issues raised by child 
marriages, which have been included within the growing corpus of forced 
marriages. Pateman has recently elaborated her theories of consent, con-
tract, and subordination with a more precise linking of subordination to 
rights in persons. She argues that the “specific form of contracts about 
property in the person constitute relations of subordination, even when 
entry into the contract is voluntary.”65 Pateman is not necessarily thinking 
about bridewealth, but certainly bridewealth as the transfer of rights in 
persons is linked to marriage, subordination, and lack of consent.
 International human rights instruments dating from the time of the 
UDhr have reiterated again and again certain basic assumptions about 
rights to marry, and over time, they have established a universal standard 
for the age of consent at eighteen.66 In a major challenge to the propo-
nents of a mandated minimum age of marriage, Annie Bunting argues 
that a human rights strategy to protect girls based on a uniform age of 
marriage of eighteen “obfuscates the diversity of childhoods” throughout 
the world. Bunting calls instead for analysis of “the complexity of both 
marriage and age” in different societies in which “cultural constructions 
of childhood need to be considered.”67 Bunting is not arguing for cultural 
relativism in demanding that scholars and practitioners pay attention to 
culture and especially the cultural construction of childhood. nor does 
she deny the very real physical and psychological harm that can result 
introduction: something old, something new? 23
from early marriage. Instead, she asserts that early marriage is more often 
than not directly related to social and economic conditions and to strong 
cultural biases against premarital sex.
 countries that have the lowest average age of marriage for girls and 
adolescents also have the lowest social indicators such as socioeconomic 
development, maternal and infant mortality, literacy, and life expectancy. 
early marriage, Bunting argues, is directly correlated with a lack of schools, 
gender inequality, and deteriorating economic conditions, and as a result, 
many families seek to marry off adolescent girls in order to have one less 
mouth to feed or fewer school fees to pay. cultural factors, such as social 
shame associated with out-of-wedlock pregnancy, contribute to the pressure 
to marry off young daughters. Islam, Bunting admits, also influences early 
marriage. Gender inequality, often leading to significant age disparities be-
tween spouses, is both a cause and a consequence of early marriage.
 In calling for the analysis of socioeconomic conditions as well as 
cultural constructions of childhood in the practices of early marriage, 
Bunting wants international human rights advocates to be attentive to 
problems that adhere to what she terms “facile universalism” and an 
“inflexible legal standard.” In challenging “simplistic portrayals of ‘child 
brides’ and ‘child marriage,’” Bunting calls for enlarging the intellectual 
and political space between facile universalism and facile relativism in 
order to promote productive conversations about change.68 Bunting’s ar-
gument, however, does not address the place of consent in marriages and 
thus the agency and relative autonomy (“the ability to say no”) of the 
girls or adolescents who enter into early marriages. In many African con-
texts, the boundary between consent and coercion is a gray area marked 
by social, economic, gendered, and cultural constraints on a girl’s, boy’s, 
man’s, or woman’s consent to marry. In this volume, roberts explores the 
interplay of consent and coercion, especially in first marriages in colo-
nial French West Africa, and Muadi Mukenge discusses how programs 
funded by the Global Fund for Women (GFW) are empowering mothers 
and girls to resist significant pressures for early marriages and to develop 
their human capital through schooling.
Locating Forced Marriages
A central contention in this volume is that although forced marriages lie at 
the fraught intersection of intimacy and labor, they are difficult to theorize 
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because they constitute “continuing crimes” in the sense first interdicted in 
the 2012 Taylor decision pertaining to sexual slavery.69 As Jeffrey r. Boles 
explains, within the criminal law crimes may be classified according to 
their nature as instantaneous or continuing; as its name implies, an instan-
taneous offense is a discrete action at a single, immediate period of time. 
The harm caused occurs in the moment (as, for example, with battery) and 
does not continue beyond the moment. A continuing offense, by contrast, 
“embodies a special legal meaning” and covers conduct over an extended 
period of time, and the harm it generates continues uninterrupted until 
the course of conduct ceases.70 Previous scholarship on forced marriages 
has often framed such unions as intimate, domestic, or familial sites of 
struggle, but our collection blurs the lines between domestic, familial, 
public, and state by shifting attention to what is actually at stake when a 
union is forcibly established. The contributors to this volume argue that 
control over labor is a central dimension in contestation, as much as con-
trol over sexuality and the physical body.
 At its core, forced marriage reflects ongoing struggles in Africa over 
patriarchy, patrimonialism, power, and control over labor and bodies. The 
difficulties encountered when investigating and narrating forced marriage 
speak to its role as part of a continuous and much broader drama. The 
public website of the Greater Manchester Police describes forced mar-
riage as “a form of domestic abuse [that] is primarily, but not exclusively, 
an issue of violence against women.”71 Mirroring British legal formulas 
wherein forced marriage is not a crime per se but the associated offenses 
are criminal acts, officials in Sierra Leone or Ghana, for example, routinely 
advise women fleeing forced marriages to first seek assistance from do-
mestic violence teams in urban police departments.72 And as Lawrance 
and Walker-Said’s chapter demonstrates, lawyers representing asylum 
claimants alleging forced marriage often compensate for social prejudices 
by reframing claims within more recognizable and documented forms of 
persecution, such as gender violence or state-sponsored homophobia.
 A central element in the definition of domestic violence is controlling 
behavior on the part of the abuser. Forced marriages are always the result 
of controlling behavior, but the abuser may well be the household head 
who is eager to marry off his child. clearly, the receiving groom or groom’s 
kin also have a significant interest in controlling the new spouse’s labor and 
sexuality. Physical and psychological violence and threats thereof serve 
to maintain control over the new bride and occasionally the new groom. 
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Yet domestic violence is only a part of the wider phenomenon of forced 
marriage. As a “continuing crime,” the violence of forced marriage often 
begins long before the establishment of the conjugal union that becomes 
the site of domestic violence. In terms of refugee law, an individual flee-
ing a planned or imminent forced marriage may fear violence even before 
aspects of the threatened violence take place. But as the chapters by Saho, 
Ojo, Declich, and others demonstrate, the violence of forced marriages 
may originate with a father, an uncle, an imam, or a colonial state official. 
Indeed, as the essays in this volume attest, control over labor resides at the 
heart of many forms of forced marriage.
 Building on such debates, the essays presented in this volume offer 
new perspectives on the nexus of coerced productive and reproductive 
labor and patriarchy. The authors examine a variety of contexts, historical 
and contemporary, that collectively reveal how attempts to coerce indi-
viduals into marriage are linked to struggles over labor and how labor 
demands have manifested themselves in the form of new ways of coercing 
individuals into marriage. During the colonial era, coercing women into 
marriage operated as a powerful mechanism for the expansion of politi-
cal, social, and economic power in complex and contradictory ways. Ojo 
explores how, in the wake of the official abolition of slavery by the British, 
men in western Igboland revisited and resurrected various form of labor 
coercion through marriage as means to enhance household labor. And 
though slavery had already been abolished, the British colonial officers 
had an ambivalent attitude toward many practices they viewed as tradi-
tional, whether benign or not. Pawnship, for example, reemerged during 
the colonial period through child betrothal and bridewealth exchanges 
because wealthier men sought wives to contribute to their social aggran-
dizement. Bridewealth exchanges conveyed to prospective grooms certain 
rights to women (even as it deprived the women of consent), including 
sexual access, power to commandeer a woman’s labor, and custody of chil-
dren and the children’s labor, even if the woman had had children by an-
other man. Shadle’s discussion of colonial Kenyan policies demonstrates 
that colonial ambivalence toward tradition, the age of consent, and the 
appropriate labor expectations for children extended across the colonies.
 Similar patterns are discerned by roberts in the French Soudan in 
the wake of the abolition of slavery during the first decade of the twenti-
eth century. African societies were dynamic and rapidly changing, in spite 
of the imaginings of French colonial officers who documented customs 
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and practices as if they were static. But unlike the British, the French co-
lonial authorities were constrained by metropolitan pressures to civilize. 
Bridewealth contracts were viewed by many europeans as little more than 
disguised purchases of women and girls, yet facilitating female emanci-
pation by refusing to enforce such contracts threatened to destabilize the 
continuity and supply of labor that were essential to the colonial economy. 
Bridewealth operated as a bond, and the women subjects of bridewealth 
were bondswomen. Though the French wanted to enforce minimum ages 
of consent to marriage, they also realized that their colonial economic and 
political interests were best served when patriarchy—and female labor as 
a form of “patrimony”—remained undisturbed.
 African men sought to “capture” women and the labor of women via 
marriage, in some cases with the tacit acquiescence of europeans. Thorn-
berry’s discussion of the xhosa practice of ukuthwala (bride abduction) 
reveals a complicated and contested site of labor coercion. Some South 
Africans insist that the practice of seizing a woman, which often included 
the sexual assault and rape of a girl, has become corrupted in the pres-
ent era. The contemporary practice has spread beyond the xhosa of the 
eastern cape, and the term has entered South Africa’s legal lexicon and 
lingua franca.73 The historical practice, however, was a mock experience of 
abduction, whereby a young man indicated the woman he wanted as his 
wife. But the historical record does not support the idea that the south-
ern African practices once existed in a benign form. Instead, Thornberry 
demonstrates that the ukuthwala concept emerged to describe “irregular” 
marriages without consent, which men used to exert pressure over a wom-
an’s parents in order to release her and her labor into a marriage that was 
not necessarily of her own choosing.74 Whereas the British South African 
authorities were confounded in their attempts to explain the practice or 
legislate the matter, Declich finds that the Italian government in Somalia 
deliberately restructured marriage to attend to labor considerations. In 
Somaliland, a variety of arranged marriage practices safeguarded the in-
terests of women and children, as well as particularly vulnerable depen-
dents. As the Italians sought to expand industrial agricultural production, 
they used marriage as a means to mobilize male and female labor. To this 
end, they enacted a policy of forcible monogamous marriage to supply 
plantation labor to Italian settlers.
 The use of marriage as a vehicle to control labor is not confined to the 
colonial period. examples from western, central, eastern, and southern 
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Africa show that in the postcolonial era and the contemporary period, 
a coerced conjugal union is often the most reliable and accessible form 
of labor control. Ann McDougall’s analysis of hartaniyya (freed slaves) in 
Mauritania demonstrates that as slavery was abolished, elite Muslim men 
resorted to concubinage and “secret marriages” to safeguard their inter-
ests in women and their labor. Just as research on human trafficking has 
revealed how slippery terminology contributes to the persistence of coer-
cive labor practices, McDougall focuses on the emergence of amorphous 
parallel marital norms. But concubinage also creates complex kinship re-
lations that foster increased interdependence and provide access to labor 
for patriarchal family heads. In contemporary Gambia, Saho describes 
how labor considerations are at the heart of many nonconsensual mar-
riages and why forced marriages persist to this day. Betrothals of girls per-
mit parents to access the labor of potential grooms through preconjugal 
bridewealth payments in the form of labor. Girls or boys who resist these 
“customary” obligations risk violence at the hands of family elders.
 violently coerced labor is at the core of some of the most infamous 
forms of forced marriage in contemporary African sites of conflict. Stacey 
hynd examines evidence of forced marriage from Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
Uganda, the Democratic republic of the congo, Somalia, and other coun-
tries, and she highlights how labor considerations paralleled the increasing 
militarization of girls’ and women’s lives in conflict zones. Marital frame-
works and marital simulacra are routinely used by men to ensure domestic 
and sexual labor in conflict situations. In civil and ethnic conflicts, forced 
marriage combines sexual abuse with domestic labor and inverts the so-
cially desirable status of marriage and motherhood. Ferme, however, ar-
gues that with international attention to forced marriage—and the drive 
to criminalize the practices attendant to so-called bush wives in Sierra 
Leone—traditional and customary marital practices are misinterpreted. 
Although forced marriages operated as a mechanism to secure the nec-
essary labor and logistic support to maintain the war effort, particularly 
among nonregularized, mobile forces such as the rUF, Ferme contends 
that the new crime of forced marriage undermines one explicit goal of 
international transitional justice institutions—namely, to use war crimes 
courts as models for the return to the rule of law in postconflict settings—
by criminalizing and thus undercutting traditional marital practices.
 early marriage has significant economic, social, and health conse-
quences. Mukenge investigates efforts to combat girl marriage in Burkina 
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Faso, Benin, Uganda, and the Democratic republic of the congo. evidence 
supports the view that deeply vested patriarchal interests in sub-Saharan 
Africa resist efforts to combat sexual violence and safeguard the rights of 
girls and protect them from illegal demands on their labor. But her research 
ties the struggle against forced marriage to the expansion of educational 
opportunities for girls and demonstrates an equally, if not more, powerful 
emerging resistance against patriarchy led partly by mothers who want for 
their daughters the equality they themselves never experienced.
 The authors herein explore a variety of innovative legal strategies that 
emerge from the contestation over marriage. Lawrance and Walker-Said’s 
experiences as expert witnesses in asylum claims provide the insight for 
an examination of how lawyers representing both heterosexual and homo-
sexual clients seeking protection often choose to dismantle and reassem-
ble their clients’ narratives to privilege particular forms of persecution. 
In cases where women flee forced marriages and traditional gendered ex-
pectations, asylum claims are framed as defensively resisting patriarchy 
and “tradition.” When lesbians, gay men, and bisexual individuals escape 
heteronormative marital regimes, their claims are often reframed as affir-
matively contesting homophobia. Judith-Ann Walker’s chapter discusses 
an innovative but problematic Islamic solution to widowed, abandoned, 
destitute, and vulnerable young women. In Kano State, government- 
sponsored mass marriages have ushered in thousands of unions of young 
women to men of all ages. Deciphering the degree of consent and coer-
cion is difficult because of the complex process involved in the required 
written application and because of the powerful role of the quasi-judicial 
hisbah Board in overseeing the program; further, the labor dimensions 
are concealed in the discourse of “welfare” efforts to ease the social bur-
den of visibly destitute women. Young women, some of them divorcées or 
unwed mothers, find themselves in domestic labor situations as a result of 
these marriages, and many male spouses find second, third, or even fourth 
wives through the program.
the ( in)v is ib iL ity oF Forced Marriage
We began this book with the observation that forced marriage has emerged 
as one of the more critical human rights challenges in twenty-first-century 
sub-Saharan Africa. Domestic mobilizations and transnational human 
rights activism have spawned organizations, charities, newsgroups, and 
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other entities devoted to elevating public awareness of forced marriage far 
beyond Africa.75 Sensational stories about forced marriage circulating in 
the media, in the annual reports of gender equity advocacy organizations, 
or at film festivals capture the violence, horror, and injustice of this prac-
tice throughout the continent. Such narratives have added to the public 
debates about the persistence of forced marriages.76
 Beyond continental Africa, international awareness of the global di-
mensions of forced marriage has never been greater. Mukenge documents 
US-led and Un-led advocacy and shows how international norms are re-
shaping domestic African statutes and curbing customary norms. vigilance 
for indicators of compulsion and coercion has never been higher, and forced 
marriages are uncovered with increasing frequency in a broad swath of 
contexts, including as a vehicle for immigration fraud.77 Growing interna-
tional migration from the Global South to the north is one of several factors 
thrusting debates about forced marriage into public consciousness.78 Many 
jurisdictions have promulgated new statutes prohibiting a plethora of prac-
tices, many of which are perceived to be “new,” “deviant,” or curiously “per-
sistent.”79 And new rulings across the globe abound, expanding protections 
and giving rise to important legal novelty and neologism. One has only to 
consider UK Justice J. Parker’s 2013 description of the Islamic and civil mar-
riage of a woman of diminished mental capacity as “incapacitous marriage” 
and therefore a “forced marriage” under the United Kingdom’s 2007 Forced 
Marriage Act.80 Forced marriage has never before garnered such intense po-
litical, juridical, or public interest throughout the world.
 notwithstanding the value of greater visibility and accessibility, such 
scandalous representations of forced marriages are often monocausal, 
simplistic, heteronormative, and reflective of vested interests. What may 
be gained in terms of public visibility may actually be to the detriment of 
a richer and more nuanced understanding of the sociocultural habitus of 
forced marriage in Africa. very few of the developments discussed pre-
viously are demonstrably tied to empirical fieldwork or synthetic schol-
arly analysis of forced marriage practices or patterns. The chapters in this 
volume by contrast offer a variety of perspectives that move beyond the 
representation of forced marriage as “scandal” and increase the visibility 
of forced marriage in Africa’s historical past and its persistence, often in 
different guises, into the contemporary present.
 The historical dimensions of contemporary forced marriage confu-
sion are embedded in colonial archival records, where they became visible 
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in social and official contestations and court struggles. Shadle demon-
strates that in the first half of the twentieth century, Kenya colonial of-
ficials, missionaries, and elite African men wrestled with the question of 
early marriage, specifically regarding the appropriate minimum age for 
marrying Kenyan girls. Although marrying prepubescent girls appeared 
to have been universally rejected, establishing a “marriageable” age was 
next to impossible. Because of a reluctance to define the terms puberty 
and sexual maturity, no legislation was enacted. Instead, customary prac-
tices prevailed, giving rise to the context for the contemporary struggles 
we see today. By contrast, Declich observes, the Italian colonial rulers of 
Somali identified “monogamous” marriage as a mechanism for managing 
male and female labor. As Italian officials in the early twentieth century 
sought to establish plantations in the riverine regions of Gosha and the 
Juba valley, they co-opted marriage practices, which they viewed as mere 
economic arrangements, and forced young women into unions with men 
who had no connection with their familial lineages or clans—affiliations 
that often protected women from domestic abuse. These women were 
deeply traumatized by the experience of forced marriage, which conveyed 
to the new husbands complete control over their bodies and sexuality in a 
manner entirely unrecognizable to prevailing cultural practices.
 In a variety of contexts in sub-Saharan Africa, what precisely consti-
tutes “custom” and “forced marriage” is a rich site of historical and contem-
porary struggle. Forced marriages often conceal conflicts over resources. 
In his exploration of forced marriage in the Gambia, Saho argues that 
when individuals, families, communities, or nations act in a “traditional 
way,” we ought to ask precisely whose interests are reflected in the invo-
cation of “tradition.” In his study of historical and contemporary forced 
marriage incidents, Saho finds that the sociocultural, economic, and tra-
ditional norms and values as well as rural livelihood practices continue to 
be controlled by elderly men.
 Ideas of custom, tradition, and religion inform contemporary north-
ern nigerian policies of organized mass marriages, as discussed by Walker. 
She describes how the paternal power to give consent or select a husband 
for a hausa daughter is mostly legitimated using the doctrine of Ijbar 
under the Maliki school of Islamic law. But in Kano State, the hisbah 
Board, a quasi-legal government entity, has taken over this responsibility 
for women considered “vulnerable,” including young widows, divorcées, 
single mothers, and destitute individuals, and created a program of mass 
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marriage. Although advocates claim to be finessing a traditional legal 
practice, many of the components, such as mandatory testing for sexually 
transmitted diseases and application forms, have been rejected by more 
conservative Islamic clerics as un-Islamic corruptions of tradition. And 
flight from custom or tradition is often the foundation of an asylum claim 
alleging forced marriage.
 Such struggles over what constitutes custom are mirrored in south-
ern nigeria and South Africa. Ojo examines an epidemic of isinmo, or 
“hair cutting,” in Igbo communities in the 1930s. Isinmo involved a man 
cutting a lock of a girl’s hair, putting an eagle feather on her head, or 
throwing an egg at her in order to coerce her into marriage. histori-
cally, isinmo was associated with the creation of a regal mate for the 
most senior Western Igbo chief (eze), but by the 1920s, it had become a 
tactic for forcing woman into marriage and maintaining sexual fidelity 
even if the husband was not a chief. Isinmo increased sharply during 
the Depression because young men had fewer resources for bridewealth. 
Thornberry observes similar changes over time in her discussion of the 
South African practice of bride abduction, or ukuthwala, prevalent in the 
eastern cape and KwaZulu-natal Provinces. Thornberry interrogates the 
changing meaning of the practice of ukuthwala and how traditions sur-
rounding this practice are invoked in the present. In today’s postapart-
heid South Africa, men participating in ukuthwala marriages may be 
criminally charged with abduction, kidnapping, assault, or rape, but the 
first public discussions of marriage by abduction date to the 1880s in both 
civil and criminal court cases. In the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, people used the word to refer to a variety of irregular forms of 
marriage that took place without the prior consent of a woman or her 
father or both; ukuthwala included both consensual mock abductions, 
which South African commentators today assert are the “proper” form of 
the custom, and truly violent abductions.
 Ojo and Thornberry find a proliferation of marriage disputes in nigeria 
and South Africa, respectively, to be a rich source for studying contesta-
tion over marriage, divorce, and consent to a union, reflecting how local 
patterns are challenged by international and global transformations and 
the emergence of new standards. Formal court disputes also speak to the 
widespread social mobility and household instability that erupted during 
the colonial period. roberts, examining French colonial polices in French 
Soudan, finds considerable ambivalence about marriage, divorce, and 
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consent in the early twentieth century. The French harbored conflicting 
opinions regarding women’s consent to marriage, likening bridewealth 
payments either to “disguised purchases” of people and thus contrary to 
French antislavery policies or to the foundation of family stability and 
patriarchal households. Women and men went to court with increasing 
frequency because at the core of the “murky separation” between arranged 
and forced marriage was the problem of bridewealth. Particularly in first 
marriages, bridewealth constrained females’ capacity both to consent to 
marriage and to envision alternatives to those unions arranged by kins-
men or lineage heads.
 contemporary forced marriage struggles continue to play out in courts 
and tribunals. court testimonies often provide open-ended discussions 
of how gender violence, rape, and women’s victimhood all contribute to 
forced marriages. In the privileged spaces of courtrooms and tribunals, 
such discussions can lead to a better understanding of the longer-term 
structural violence that gives rise to the wartime concepts of forced mar-
riage, such as the so-called bush wife. Testimonies recorded by truth and 
reconciliation commissions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, rwanda, 
and elsewhere, as investigated by hynd, demonstrate how tribunals situate 
forced marriage narratives within emerging international humanitarian 
discourses and in so doing validate such discourses in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, she documents how the contemporary conceptualization of 
forced marriage owes much to the confluence of emerging concerns about 
child rights, child soldiering, and human trafficking. The hisbah Board of 
Kano State operates as an autonomous quasi court, and Walker explains 
how it vigorously defended itself against charges that the girls comprising 
mass marriage cohorts are compelled by documenting the support of par-
ents, even in cases where girls are below eighteen, the age of consent. Both 
McDougall and Declich cite examples of how forced marriage features as 
an aspect of contemporary refugee claims, specifically in canada and the 
netherlands.
 The chapters in this volume also demonstrate how African forced 
marriages continue to spill out of courts and refugee tribunals into new 
international legal contexts, contributing to the reshaping of debates and 
the emergence of new norms and even customs. Mukenge documents how 
grassroots women’s organizations in Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and the 
Democratic republic of congo address the complex factors that perpet-
uate child and early marriage. They adopt emerging international norms, 
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many of which originated from court-based struggles, and turn them into 
community-based initiatives that are subsequently integrated into higher- 
profile, broader regional and global campaigns seeking to bring about 
transformations in the everyday lives of girls. Ferme studies the impact 
of the ScSL and focuses on notions of individual and collective consent, 
which in some instances mimic the gender biases of local customary law. 
She argues that the criminalization of forced marriage at the ScSL has 
a paradoxical consequence for women’s rights because it appears predi-
cated on establishing certain forced relations as crimes against humanity, 
whereas others practices are accepted as “customary.” She highlights how a 
transformative impact is being wrought by what she describes as the “legal 
empowerment” movement, which arrived in postconflict Sierra Leone 
simultaneously with the ScSL but remained beyond its control. In one 
sense, this nongovernmental organization (nGO) community is an aspect 
of the transitional and international justice apparatus, but it often operates 
in tension with the criminalization paradigm.
Even if the 2008 ScSL Appeals chamber finding that forced marriage in 
wartime is a human rights crime has not yielded widespread legal agree-
ment, it has generated public awareness and significant new scholarship on 
the issues of forced and arranged marriages. The chapters in this volume 
bring historical and contemporary perspectives to these issues and pro-
vide much-needed context to the discussions. Taken together, the chapters 
demonstrate how important it is for legal practitioners and community 
development experts to be aware of the historical precedents and wide 
variations in forced and arranged marriages practices we see today. Simi-
larly, historians need to be mindful of how pressing legal and development 
issues influence the ways in which both historical actors and historians 
define problems.
 As the contributors to this volume argue, coercion and consent play 
major but complex roles in marriages. The interplay between coercion 
and consent is mutable and changes dramatically in the face of contem-
porary pressures, including violent conflict, economic conditions, panics 
regarding status and culture, gender and sexuality, and international legal 
norms. coercion and consent are also linked to the changing character of 
patriarchy, patrimonialism, heteronormativity, and the demand for labor. 
As discussed in the chapters ahead, any analysis of forced and arranged 
marriages must examine the wider social, cultural, economic, and legal 
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contexts in which the debates occur. The chapters presented here under-
score the three central themes of this volume: analysis of continuities and 
ruptures in forced marriage practices in the colonial and postcolonial era, 
the place of forced marriage as coerced labor, and the value and limitation 
of the new legal decisions on forced marriage in relationship to the longer 
history and ongoing efforts to prohibit it.
 This book is organized into three parts. The first section explores colo-
nial debates about forced marriage. The case studies in this section address 
colonial anxieties about African customary practices and the conflicts that 
erupted as european colonial officials attempted to control, alter, and re-
shape African lives and families. The second section focuses on what we 
call postindependence transformations. These chapters investigate com-
plex indigenous idioms, practices, and traditions contested in the colonial 
past and reshaped and revalidated in the postcolonial present. The third 
section examines contemporary perspectives on prevailing practices in 
the present day, concentrating on the legacy of recent conflicts, attempts 
to rebuild and reconcile, refugee mobilities, and the lived experiences of 
day-to-day struggles between local attitudes and the imposition of inter-
national legal norms and standards.
 The new research presented here suggests directions for future work 
on marriage, consent, and coercion. Studies of contemporary forced mar-
riage in Africa are not often linked to marriage practices and debates in 
the diaspora, whether within corresponding immigrant communities or 
elsewhere. Thus, we see a tendency to study early and forced marriage in 
Africa in isolation from the debates in europe and north America on the 
same topic. refugee claims on the basis of fleeing forced marriage is one 
site of intersecting debates on violence and resistance in marriage. There 
is also rich potential for comparative work on forced marriage in Asia and 
Africa, while remaining ever attentive to the local sociohistorical context. 
Further, there is an urgent need for qualitative research on the ways in 
which people living with disabilities as well as gay, lesbian, and nontradi-
tionally gendered young people are vulnerable to forced marriage. Finally, 
although there is a recognition among development workers and legal 
practitioners that men need to be engaged in programs to prevent and re-
dress early and forced marriage, little research exists on the perspectives of 
traditional and religious leaders, heads of families, and others implicated 
in the institution of marriage.
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Constrained Consent
Women, Marriage, and household Instability in colonial French West Africa, 1905–60
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The 2008 decision of the Appeals chamber of the Special court for Sierra 
Leone in its judgment of the AFRC case catapulted issues of forced mar-
riage to the forefront of recent human rights debates. The court ruled that 
forced marriage involved specific elements of psychological and moral 
suffering and not merely rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, and forced 
domestic labor. The combined nature of these acts under wartime condi-
tions thus separated them from the crimes of sexual violence and sexual 
slavery.1 But debates about forced marriage, arranged marriage, and con-
sent in marriage have a longer history and are related to the complex 
interactions between African societies and colonial societies in Africa. 
This chapter explores how the complex and intertwined issues of consent 
in marriage, patriarchal regimes, property rights in people, and mobili-
zation of domestic labor converged in the socially complex and changing 
worlds of colonial French West Africa.
 African societies and their customary practices were never static. They 
were dynamic entities that shifted in relationship to broad changes in cul-
ture, economy, and polity. nor was French colonial native policy coherent 
or stable; it changed over time in response to shifting metropolitan sen-
sibilities about African social practices, periodic colonial crises that shot 
bolts of reform up and down the administrative hierarchy, and changes that 
Africans initiated on the ground. Above all, French colonial native policy 
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was shaped by two deep policies: the first involved the legal category of 
the protectorate, in which the French colonial power agreed to let African 
societies retain internal sovereignty over their customs; the second was 
the French commitment to intervene in African practices whenever they 
contravened or seemed to contravene the French sense of “civilization.”2 
These two policies were often in conflict, as French intervention to end 
practices contrary to civilization often resulted in deep transformations 
in African societies. The classic example of this is French efforts to abolish 
African forms of slavery, which entailed many halfhearted attempts be-
fore the slaves themselves began to leave their masters and thus forced the 
French to institute the policy.3
 African marriage practices also posed considerable challenges to these 
two sides of French colonial policy. colonial administrators harbored deeply 
conflicting opinions regarding African women’s consent in marriage. 
Some likened bridewealth payments to “disguised purchases” of people and 
thus believed they were contrary to French antislavery policies, whereas 
others saw bridewealth as the foundation of African family stability and 
the unquestioned authority of the male household head. This dispute 
flared brightly for a brief moment in the period immediately following 
the establishment of newly created native courts in French West Africa 
in 1905, when waves of disputes regarding marriage, divorce, bridewealth, 
and child custody filled the courts.4 These controversies flared again in the 
mid-1930s following the scandal involving the disguised marriages of girls 
and women pawned by their impoverished guardians during the Depres-
sion.5 This colonial scandal gained traction precisely because it coincided 
with the rise of the Popular Front and the Popular Front’s willingness 
to challenge established practices in the colonies. The pawning scandal 
prompted bursts of activity through the colonial administration and re-
sulted in a surge of new research on African marital customs, especially 
the place of women’s consent in marriage. It also resulted in the Mandel 
Decree of 1939, which mandated the minimum age of marriage for girls 
at fourteen and boys at sixteen and required the consent of the parties to 
be married.6 The war in europe stopped further intervention into Afri-
can marriages and toppled the Popular Front. It was not until the postwar 
effort at promoting colonial welfare and development that the Jacquinot 
Decree of 1951 gave women over twenty-one the freedom to marry with-
out parental consent.7 Of course, by that age most African women were 
already married.
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 At the intersection of consent in marriage and the often murky sepa-
ration between arranged and forced marriages lies the problem of bride-
wealth. Bridewealth, especially in first marriages, significantly constrained 
girls’ and women’s capacity to consent to marriage or to imagine alterna-
tives to marriages arranged by their kin.8 The sections that follow explore 
colonial perspectives on marriage; child custody disputes brought before 
the native courts of the French Soudan in the early twentieth century that 
illuminate the linkage between rights in persons, bridewealth, and mar-
riage; and the linked issues of household instability and women’s consent 
in second and subsequent marriages.
aFrican Marriages, brideweaLth, and consent
In much of French West Africa (and throughout the patrilineal world of 
sub-Saharan Africa), marriage involved strategic investments between kin-
ship groups. These investments revolved around building and maintaining 
webs of kinship and controlling labor and descendants. camilla Toulmin, 
an anthropologist who worked among the Bambara, describes marriage 
primarily in material terms as “a particularly long-term investment.” Al-
though the wife provides immediate labor and services to help compensate 
for the “heavy marriage costs, many of the benefits will accrue over the 
following 30 years or more.” Toulmin further notes that because the con-
sequences of marriage are likely to be with the family for decades, care in 
making marriage choices is not left to the potential spouses. The preferred 
spouses come from groups already linked by existing marriage ties. In this 
way, “the household head hopes to ensure that marriages endure and are 
free of conflict.” “Men and women,” Toulmin notes, “may not choose their 
partners, but love and respect frequently grow between them.”9
 Toulmin’s description of Bambara marriage reflects the classical 
structural-functionalist perspective on African marriages offered by A. r. 
radcliffe-Brown in 1950. “The African does not think of marriage as a 
union based on romantic love although beauty as well as character and 
health are sought in the choice of a wife,” he observed. “The strong af-
fection that normally exists after some years of successful marriage is the 
product of the marriage itself conceived of as a process, resulting from 
living together and co-operating in many activities and particularly in the 
rearing of children.” congruent with the evolutionary thinking then preva-
lent in anthropology, radcliffe-Brown likened African marriage to early 
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english marriage, where the “marriage is an alliance between two bodies 
of kin based on their common interest in the marriage itself and its con-
tinuance, and in the offspring of the union, who will be, of course, kin of 
both the two kin-groups.” crucial to this alliance “in early england and in 
a great number of societies in ancient and modern times in all parts of the 
world” were the marriage payments given by the bridegroom or his kin to 
the father or guardian of the bride.10 These payments constituted the mak-
ing of a “legal” marriage, especially when the state was not (or not yet) an 
interested party in the marriage and in registering it.
 radcliffe-Brown wanted his reader to understand the difference be-
tween bridewealth and purchase. “Some people,” he said, “regard pay-
ments of this kind as being a ‘purchase’ of a wife in the sense in which in 
england to-day a man may purchase a house or a motor-car. . . . The idea 
that an African buys a wife in the way that an english farmer buys cattle is 
the result of ignorance, which may once have been excusable, but is so no 
longer, or of blind prejudice, which is never excusable in those responsible 
for governing an African people.” Instead, radcliffe-Brown argued, Afri-
can marriages involved a whole series of “prestations” (payments, gifts, or 
services). Though most wealth flowed from the husband and his kin to the 
wife’s kin, some flowed in the opposite direction, especially when guard-
ians (and sometimes mothers) provided wedding presents (as a form of 
token dowry) to their daughters.11
 According to radcliffe-Brown, African patrilineal and virilocal mar-
riages consisted of three core characteristics. First was the modification 
or partial rupture of the relations between the bride and her immediate 
kin, particularly when she left her family to live with her husband and his 
family. Second was “legal marriage,” by which radcliffe-Brown meant the 
transfer of marriage payments that gave the husband and his kin certain 
rights in relationship to his wife and the children she would bear. This was 
the crucial part of the marriage transaction: “It is the objective instru-
ment of the ‘legal’ transaction of the transfer of rights.” What was being 
transacted varied from society to society, but it almost always consisted of 
rights to the labor of the wife for the well-being of the household, includ-
ing domestic labor, sexual services, and labor in the household’s fields; it 
also consisted of rights to the children born during the marriage. “Once 
the payment, or some specific portion of it, has been made the bride’s fam-
ily have no right to fetch their daughter back, and in most tribes, if the 
union is broken by divorce at the instance of the husband, the payment 
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has to be returned and the woman’s family recover the rights they have 
surrendered.” The third characteristic was that the marriage was not sim-
ply a union between a man and a woman but also an alliance between two 
bodies of kin.12
 To think of marriage as a contract between two bodies of kin and as 
a transaction involving some rights in the person of the bride helps us 
understand how little space there was for brides to consent. “In Africa,” 
radcliffe-Brown wrote, “an unmarried woman is in a position of depen-
dence. She lives under the control and authority of her kin and it is they 
who afford her protection. . . . At marriage, she passes to a greater or less 
extent . . . under the control of her husband (and his kin), and it is he (and 
they) who undertake to afford her protection.”13 Thus, marriage shifted a 
woman’s dependence, but it did not fundamentally alter it.14
 Bridewealth should also be understood as a bond holding the marriage 
together. The difficulty of returning the bridewealth should the marriage 
fail forged the bond. The difficulty stemmed from the uses to which the 
guardian of the bride put the bridewealth. Only rarely was the bridewealth 
accumulated and retained by the guardian. Instead, it was more or less 
immediately redirected and used as bridewealth for the family’s sons. As 
part of his strategy for maintaining the household, the household head 
was obliged to provide wives for his sons.15 Thus, the difficulty of returning 
bridewealth acted as a significant barrier to divorce, although, as we shall 
examine in the final section, unhappy wives could seek out lovers to help 
return bridewealth.
woMen’s condit ions and crises in Marriage
concern about African women’s conditions and marriage more gener-
ally within French West Africa was rooted in the implementation of the 
colonial native courts in 1905. rendering judgments in disputes among 
Africans at the native courts and in appeals of those judgments revealed 
wide debates about customs and the value of codification. Those opposed 
to codification argued persuasively that it would freeze in place previ-
ously flexible African customs and rob customs of their ability to adapt 
to changing conditions. Those in favor of codification wanted an easily 
accessible guide to facilitate legal judgments rendered in the new native 
courts and at the level of appeals. The anticodification faction won with 
the support of Governor-General ernest roume.16
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 As the volume of marital disputes increased in the native courts after 
1905, pressures to render judgments efficiently persisted and so did calls 
for codification. In 1912, Maurice Delafosse published his magisterial, 
three-volume Haut-Sénégal-Niger, of which the third volume was his syn-
thesis of the common core of customs for what he considered to be the 
“Soudanese civilization.” In a chapter dedicated to marriage, Delafosse 
stated that regardless of age differences between the bride and the groom, 
“there is no question of consent [being needed] by the future bride.”17 Only 
the consent of the bride’s guardian was required.18
 World War I and postwar reconstruction interrupted further debates 
on the codification of African customs until 1931 when Governor-General 
Jules Brevié, a scholar-administrator in his own right, reasserted the use-
fulness of having a guidebook on customs (recueils de coutumes) for use by 
european administrators overseeing native courts. To that end, Brevié sent 
out a questionnaire to guide administrators in assembling these reports, 
which included a question regarding consent in marriage.19 The re-
sponses from the districts varied considerably in quality. The best reports 
traced changes over time; most were formulaic and consisted of short, de-
scriptive responses to the questionnaire. Bernard Maupoil selected thirty 
studies from districts in the West African federation organized by colonies 
for inclusion in the volumes.
 The colonial administrators who wrote the reports only rarely probed 
beneath the surface to explore changes and ambiguities. Many saw bride-
wealth as a reflection of the transactions in rights in the person of the 
bride. captain courturier of Bilma District in niger went even further 
to argue that “the woman is a good that belongs to her relatives and then 
to her husband. She constitutes a part of the patrimony of her husband 
and whose relatives include her upon his death into the inheritance and 
remarry her.”20 Levirate was widely practiced in French West Africa. By its 
very nature, levirate denied women choice, and it became an element of 
the French colonial representation of African women as being like live-
stock.21 consent in marriage was the prerogative of the guardians of both 
the bride and the groom. Gilbert vieillard captured the constraints on 
choice when he stated that even the groom “voluntarily accepts the fian-
cée imposed on him because one does not question the will of the elders.”22 
The elders controlled the bridewealth, after all.
 Alfred Aubert provided one of the best studies in Maupoil’s collec-
tion. Aubert’s investigation of Bambara custom in the district of Bouguni 
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was attentive to history and to cultural relativism. In his opening sections 
on marriage, he noted that though the issues of engagement, bridewealth, 
consent, divorce, and the like “may seem strange to us, the reverse is also 
true. Our tirailleurs, upon returning from France recount to their com-
rades who remained at home the amazing stories of the purchase of men 
by women, about the ceremonies in our churches, the clothes of the bride 
and groom, all of which have no place here [in Bouguni].”23 In terms of 
consent in Bouguni, Aubert agreed that the girl “has no consent to give 
and she does not know to whom she will be married.” But he understood 
that even under these conditions, girls exerted some agency (even if they 
did not have power). even if the betrothal took place while the bride and 
groom were still young children (perhaps even in utero), the marriage 
was delayed under the onset of the girl’s puberty. Aubert noted that “very 
often, the girl, who dreads this moment [the onset of menstruation, with 
impending marriage], hides her condition from her guardian in order to 
conserve as long as possible her freedom.”24
 converging with Brevié’s practical and scientific interest in African 
customs was the emerging colonial scandal involving pawning and forced 
marriages. A series of poor harvests, the long-term deceleration of de-
mand for African commodities in europe due to the Depression, and the 
persistent pressure to pay taxes resulted in a resurgence of pawning in 
French West Africa. In 1931, the League of nations sent out a questionnaire 
requesting information about the distribution and practices of pawning, 
a document that made its way into Brevié’s questionnaire on customs. 
By 1933, however, Monsigneur Joanny Thevenoud, the vicar apostolic of 
the White Fathers in Ouagadougou, wrote to the governor-general about 
widespread “sales” of girls in the colony. One year later, drawing on data 
provided by Thevenoud, Gustave Gautherot, a catholic senator in Paris, 
wrote to the minister of colonies about this practice of selling girls in 
order to pay taxes. The minister put pressure on Governor-General Brevié 
to explain the sales of girls and women, which seemed to contravene the 
1905 decree prohibiting the alienation of another person’s liberty. Brevié 
in turn put pressure on local administrators to inquire about the facts on 
the ground. The result was a flurry of reports on pawning. Many of the re-
ports explained that pawning had indeed increased but noted that pawn-
ing was not a sale and was therefore unlike slavery. Instead, they pointed 
out, pawning was a long-established credit mechanism that was suited 
to the rural population due to the lack of private property that could be 
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used as collateral for loans.25 The most ubiquitous collateral available to 
a rural household was an individual—usually a girl or a woman—who 
would work for the creditor until the loan was repaid. The labor of the 
pawn while in the custody of the creditor served as the interest because 
it was not compensated. If the loan was not repaid, however, the creditor 
had the right to dispose of the pawn, most often through marriage either 
to the creditor himself or to a third party; thus, he recouped through the 
bridewealth the value of the original loan. The pawn was not consulted on 
the marriage. Given the depth of poverty during the Depression, repay-
ing a loan was often difficult, and consequently, many creditors married 
their pawns.
 In 1936, the pawning scandal flared anew. In Guinea, poor harvests 
forced farmers to take their daughters to the central market of Sangalan, 
where they would be auctioned in order to pay taxes. The Sangalan af-
fair coincided with the rise of the Popular Front in France, which had 
campaigned for a host of domestic and colonial reforms, including some 
affecting the condition of African women, and once in power, the front 
leaders put significant pressure on the colonial administration to address 
the pawning crisis. Acting aggressively, Brevié and his successor, Marcel 
Jules de coppet, annulled the pawning contracts and ordered the girls 
returned to their homes. recognizing that these actions would probably 
not dampen the use of pawns as collateral for loans, Brevié ordered that 
the pawns receive minimum wages during their tenure as pawns. These 
decrees did not, however, address the problem of consent, especially as 
marriage remained a likely outcome for pawns.26
 Within this context of increasing attention to the status of African 
women in French West Africa, Soeur Marie-André du Sacré-coeur pub-
lished La femme noire en Afrique Occidentale in 1939. A member of the 
White Sisters, she had a law degree, and by 1939, she had served ten years 
in French West Africa. The White Fathers’ efforts to raise attention to the 
crisis of pawning certainly influenced her thinking. Soeur Marie-André’s 
book was framed as a study of African women’s status, and it had all the 
obvious flaws of generalization. In the book, African women as a group 
were juxtaposed to christian converts, for whom consent was an essen-
tial part of the sacrament of marriage. 27 Soeur Marie-André’s arguments 
gained attention and contributed to new colonial legislation dealing with 
marriage.28 her starting point was the place of women and marriage within 
the household order:
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The head of family has the task of maintaining the prosperity of 
the family group, which generally involves procuring wives for 
members of the group. The parties concerned are not necessarily 
the future spouses; in a number of tribes, the father of the young 
man or the head of the family begins the necessary steps to procure 
a first wife for his son. The young girl is never part of the contract; 
her guardian has the right to decide her future, most often without 
consulting her. nevertheless, the question never occurs to her to 
choose between marriage and celibacy: all African women marry 
and she will do as her mother and the other women in the family 
have done, habituated for centuries to servitude and passive 
submission towards their masters. . . . The young girl can not but 
ratify the decision taken on her behalf and she must submit. . . . 
consent of the future spouses, regardless of their age, is not needed 
to conclude a marriage.29
The last two sentences of this passage are worth examining more fully. 
If a woman’s consent was not needed to conclude a marriage, did she 
even have the capacity to dissent or “to think otherwise”? If a woman’s 
dependence on a male was the norm, if marriage was an inevitable part 
of women’s position in society, and if a bride’s male guardians understood 
the value in the transactions regarding rights in her person, was consent 
even a possibility?
 In his report on Bambara customs in Bouguni, Aubert underscored the 
conceptual constraints that limited girls’ and women’s consent to marriage: 
“It is necessary to say that there is no immorality in native marriages, and 
that women are neither unhappy nor mistreated. In any case, the women 
do not conceive of any other manner of contracting a marriage.”30
 In a subsequent book on African family life, published more than 
two decades after her 1939 study, Soeur Marie-André elaborated the con-
strained nature of consent. “The payment of the bride price and its accep-
tance,” she wrote, “confirm the accord between two family heads; they do 
not signify the consent of the spouses. Where this consent is required, it is 
given in a symbolic fashion when the bride is led to her husband’s home 
or in a ceremony shortly before the wedding. . . . In the course of the cer-
emony the bride signifies her consent by tacit acceptance and by going 
through the prescribed ritual.”31 This notion of tacit consent (or fatalism) 
stems from both the lack of capacity to dissent and the lack of alternatives 
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to imagine. For further discussions on age and consent in marriage in this 
volume, see the chapters by Brett Shadle, Bala Saho, Francesca Declich, 
and Mariane Ferme in particular.
 West African bridewealth marriage systems had a number of important 
consequences. First, there was the constrained consent of the spouses 
entering into the marriage. Despite Toulmin’s assertion that the elders 
took care to ensure the marriages would persist, they very often did not. 
Divorce was frequent in almost all groups in French West Africa, and it 
often entailed disputes over child custody, as we shall see in the next sec-
tion. Second, precisely because of the practices of bridewealth, girls were 
valuable and female infanticide was exceedingly rare; this is also linked 
to child custody. And third, subsequent marriages often involved signifi-
cantly reduced bridewealth and thus provided far more space for consent 
in marriage, which we will examine in the final section.
rights in Persons, brideweaLth,  
and chiLd custody disPutes
In his magisterial Haut-Sénégal-Niger, Delafosse attributed the ubiquity of 
polygyny in the Soudan to the African’s primary occupation as an agricul-
turalist. The African, therefore, “needs many arms, and so it follows that 
children are for him a source of wealth.”32 Precisely because children were 
a source of wealth, marital instability translated directly into conflicts 
over child custody. The Bamako administrator noted in 1909 that “par-
ents, particularly those belonging to the Bambara race, fiercely dispute 
after divorce or the death of one of the spouses the questions of guardian-
ship and custody.”33 One of the central functions of bridewealth was the 
transfer of rights in children from the mother’s kin to that of the father. 
relationships between men and women that resulted in children but were 
not regularized by bridewealth as well as those where bridewealth was in-
completely transferred produced the fierce disputes the Bamako admin-
istrator identified.34
 Delafosse’s quote about children being a source of wealth had at least 
two dimensions, although he only seemed to recognize one. he saw chil-
dren as sources of extra labor in the fields and in the homes. children 
were clearly a source of joy, a means of reproducing the community, and 
a source of labor to assist both the male household head and the women 
of the household in their domestic duties. What he did not recognize was 
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that girls were a source of wealth precisely because of their potential to 
secure goods, cash, and services in the form of bridewealth payments.
 In reflecting on the relatively high incidence of civil cases regarding 
custody of children, the administrator of Sikasso in 1911 argued that the
disputes surrounding the reclaiming of children have as their source 
the custom that permits the wife to freely abandon the conjugal 
dwelling and to take her young children with her. The husband, 
most of the time, leaves the girls with their mothers until they have 
reached a certain advanced age and only then does he reclaim them. 
The mother opposes their departure and in many cases the girls, 
used as they are to living in the household of their mother, also 
refuse to leave. This situation gives rise to problems without end.35
nonetheless, because of the nature of the transactions in rights in persons, 
only rarely did the wishes of the mothers and children influence the deci-
sions taken by the African magistrates of the provincial courts.
 In this section, I draw on a body of civil disputes heard in the native 
courts of the French Soudan from 1905 to 1912. Of the two thousand cases 
coded in this database, those that are primarily child custody disputes 
constitute 12 percent.36 Of these cases, I am particularly interested in those 
dealing with the claims of husbands/fathers or their kin on their children 
who had been living with their mothers following divorce.
 On July 12, 1907, Faraba Bamakana of Bamako District sued for the 
recovery of his children. Bamakana’s wife had apparently left him, taken 
her children, and moved back to her father’s home. There is a hint in the 
record that she had left because her husband had been away from the 
household (“en raison de ses absences”) and thus left her without mainte-
nance. The wife subsequently died, although it is not clear how long she 
had been dead before Bamakana introduced his case. her children were 
being raised by their maternal grandfather, the deceased mother’s father. 
But now, Bamakana wanted his children back. The court agreed with his 
argument and ordered that the children be returned to him.37 Despite the 
fact that he had not taken any responsibility in providing for his wife and 
children, the court ruled in his favor because he had obviously paid bride-
wealth and the children thus belonged to him.
 The disposition of the courts in child custody cases hinged upon evi-
dence of the regularization of marriage through the completion of bride-
wealth. If bridewealth was transferred, even if only partially, then the courts 
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generally ruled in favor of the male claimant or his kin. If bridewealth 
was not paid, as in the cases of slave marriages, the courts usually let the 
mother retain custody. Breast-feeding infants remained with their moth-
ers until they were at least four or five.38
 Dougou Traore had a daughter with his wife; the couple subsequently 
divorced, and the wife died. Traore went to court on January 4, 1907, to 
demand that his former mother-in-law, cira Koulibali, send his daughter 
back to him. It is not clear from the record how old Traore’s daughter was, 
but the court did not hesitate to issue its judgment that the custody of 
the child belonged to the father. Given that the court did not reflect on the 
issue of bridewealth, it would seem that Traore had fully transferred the 
bridewealth, rendering the marriage thoroughly legitimate and his claim 
on custody absolute.39
 Upon the death of his brother neguiba Jara, Kanegue Jara, who was 
also head of the household, was in court seeking custody of his brother’s 
children. his sister-in-law, Koura Traore, had abandoned her husband’s 
home, although the court record did not make clear the circumstances of 
her departure. The court ruled in favor of Jara’s petition and confirmed his 
custody over his brother’s children.40 As this case underscores, bridewealth 
transferred rights to the bride’s children to her husband’s kin regardless of 
the status of the marriage. The husband’s kin, therefore, had the right to 
claim the children upon the death of their kinsman.
 Often, divorced husbands or their kinsmen were not in a rush to 
regain custody of their children taken by their mothers upon divorce. In 
one case, the father, Brahima Ture, waited ten years before seeking cus-
tody of his child from the mother. The child’s mother did not challenge 
her former husband’s claim but asked the court to oblige him to com-
pensate her for the costs of bringing up the child over the past decade. 
The court ruled in favor of both parties, granting the father custody 
and the mother an indemnity of one hundred francs in compensation.41 
In an analogous case, either divorce or the death of her husband led 
Douko Kane to leave the conjugal home. Sometime later (probably a 
considerable time later), Moussa Bagayogo, brother of the deceased hus-
band, claimed custody of his brother’s children. Kane did not dispute the 
claim, indicating that bridewealth had been transferred, but she asked 
the court for the costs of maintaining the children. The court gave cus-
tody to Bagayogo but required that he compensate Kane for the costs of 
raising the children.42
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 Another case stemmed from Moussa Doumbia’s divorce from Sogone 
Kamara. The court record did not explain when the divorce occurred, but 
the notes indicated that some significant time had elapsed before Doumbia 
went to court on August 3, 1909, seeking custody of his daughter. “Since 
then [the divorce], the girl is now eight and no longer needs her mother’s 
care,” the court stated as it granted Doumbia custody.43
 The timing of many child custody cases may have been innocent, 
but there seems to have been a strategic quality as to when the claim was 
brought to court in the case involving Teneba Kouyate. According to the 
records, “Teneba Kouyate’s husband died leaving her with two daughters. 
She raised her daughters without any assistance from her brother-in-law. 
The latter now wants custody of the girls and bases his claim on custom. 
Teneba argues that the only reason her brother-in-law wants custody is to 
gain the bridewealth.” In a rare reversal of custom, the court sided with 
Kouyate and granted her sole custody of her children.44
 Sometimes, child custody disputes revealed deep cleavages within ex-
tended families, especially when fathers died. The following case appeared 
to pit the mother of the father against the brother of the father in a dis-
pute over custody of two young girls. Souse Sidibe, the uncle of the girls 
in question, was in court seeking their custody from nene Diallo. nene 
Diallo was the grandmother of girls, and she had taken custody of them 
when her son died. At some point, the mother of the girls had “disap-
peared.” Sidibe argued that custom allocated the children to the paternal 
line and that, as their uncle (the brother of their father), he deserved cus-
tody. The court ruled in Sidibe’s favor but left custody of the girls with their 
grandmother until they were thirteen.45 At that time, the girls would be 
exactly the age when the guardian would benefit from their bridewealth.
 Where bridewealth was not transferred, the children belonged to 
the mother or the mother’s kin. Some cases in this regard dated from 
the slave era and reflected slave marriages. Few of these marriages were 
regularized through bridewealth, especially if the master established re-
lations with his female slaves. Such was the situation in May 1908 when 
Demba Diakite, son of the slave master, went to court to recover custody 
of the children born to two of his father’s former slaves, Mentene Traore 
and Kaniba Dumbia.46 Traore and Dumbia argued in court that they 
were not married to Diakite’s father but were merely “his concubines.” 
The court dismissed Diakite’s case and left the custody of the children 
with their mothers. even though the 1903 legal code establishing these 
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native courts prohibited the mention of the litigants’ status, evidence 
of former enslavement can still be recovered from these records in dis-
guised terms such as concubines and servants.
 Occasionally, mothers went to court seeking to recover their children. 
Fatima Diabate was in court trying to gain custody of her four children. 
Apparently, she had fled her conjugal home when her husband, Sory 
Kouyate, died. Kouyate’s sister, nara Kouyate, had taken custody of her 
brother’s children. now, eight years later, Diabate was in court asking for 
custody of her children. nara Kouyate responded that according to cus-
tom the children should remain with their paternal kin and that she had 
done an excellent job raising these children after their mother departed. 
The court agreed with nara Kouyate and dismissed the case.47
 As these child custody cases suggest, marriages were far from stable, 
and divorce or marital rupture was quite frequent. More than anything 
else, the transfer of bridewealth solemnized a marriage. Transfer of bride-
wealth meant that a mother had little claim on her own children should 
the marriage fail. One of the great paradoxes of the bridewealth system 
was that after having been married and divorced, a woman had more 
choice in her subsequent marriage(s).
MaritaL instabiL ity and consent: reMarriages
In a classic life history of a hausa woman, Baba of Kano described her first 
marriage in 1904. “When I was about fourteen years old,” she related, “it 
was time for me to be married”:
Dabo, the son of Sarkin Zarewa our town chief, loved me and I 
wanted him, but my family would not agree to our marrying, they 
did not like titles and title-holders; they were farmers, they liked 
their daughters to marry farmers. . . . That was why I could not 
marry Sarkin Zarew’s son. There was also Malam Maigari, who 
wished to marry me. I promised him I would come to him later.48
Instead, Baba married her cousin Duma in a classic cross-cousin marriage 
between the son of a brother and the daughter of a sister. In the introduc-
tion to Baba’s life history, anthropologist M. G. Smith wrote that “girls 
are married between the ages of thirteen and fourteen, and probably re-
marry two or three times, on average, afterwards. The first marriage is 
always arranged by the bride’s parents, her consent being purely formal. 
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. . . Similarly, divorce, which is frequent among hausa, is often instigated 
by one or other of the wife’s kinswomen, with a view to arranging a future 
marriage to somebody preferred by the instigator—often in discharge of 
some obligation.”49 After three years of marriage to Duma, Baba sued for 
divorce, which was granted by the local qadi (Muslim judge), and sub-
sequently married Malam Maigari, as she had promised to do. Baba’s 
marriage to Malam Maigari lasted fifteen years, but she divorced and re-
married twice more during her lifetime.
 Marital instability and serial remarriages were quite common in 
sub-Saharan Africa. Lloyd Fallers argued that, among the Basoga, despite 
“a belief in the desirability of stable marriages . . . marriage in Busoga is 
quite unstable.” Based on his work with court records, he contended that 
between one-quarter and one-half of all marriages ended in separation, 
and 90 percent of those resulted in formal divorce. Without having good 
data from the precolonial period, Fallers hypothesized that a high divorce 
rate might have been related to social change and a breakdown in lineage 
solidarity.50 What, then, contributed to marital instability in sub-Saharan 
Africa during the colonial period?
 In the early years of the twentieth century, French colonial officials 
worried that the incidence of divorce both reflected and contributed to 
“familial anarchy.”51 Already in 1906, the Bamako administrator explained 
to Lieutenant-Governor William Ponty why so many of the civil disputes 
brought before the native courts dealt with marriage and divorce. “It is to 
be remarked,” he wrote, “that because the bonds of family are relatively 
fragile, marriage is easily dissolved.”52 The Gumbu administrator qualified 
this general assessment when he attributed the incidence of divorce to the 
“weak bonds attaching the native woman to her new family.”53 Linking 
women seeking divorce to the organization of the African family and to 
marriage practices, French district administrators developed components 
of a discourse about African women and the African family. One of the 
earliest reports emerging out of the need to explain the high incidence 
of women seeking divorce was penned by the Bamako administrator fol-
lowing his observations of the new courts’ operation: “The young girl is 
married, or more precisely exchanged for a bridewealth payment, by those 
who exercise paternal power over her: her father, grandfather, uncle or 
brother.” The Bamako administrator underscored the commodity nature 
of daughters when he noted that if a household head died leaving a son 
and a daughter, the son “literally” inherited his sister and the rights to 
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acquire the bridewealth. The administrator’s interpretation of inheritance 
was not quite right in this case, but it led logically to his conclusion: “The 
social condition of the married woman is very close to that of slavery. She 
is given the most difficult work and frequently beaten.” The administrator 
contrasted the social condition of the woman married by her male guard-
ians to that of the widow not inherited by her husband’s kin. “The widow is 
then declared free,” he observed, “and she can remarry following her own 
wishes. More independent than the female married as a young girl, she is 
able to earn her own goods, she is much better treated, and generally does 
not abandon the home of her [new] husband.”54
 Other administrators began to articulate a causal link between trans-
actions in rights through bridewealth, the bride’s lack of choice in partners, 
and requests for divorce. The Gumbu administrator argued in 1907 that
the cases heard before the tribunal de province concern above all 
with divorces, which reflect the social development of the native. In 
effect, the authority of the head of the family permits him to marry 
his daughters as he wishes. This results in his efforts to squeeze as 
much as possible from the transactions. The girl is never consulted 
on the choice of her future husband and she is almost always given 
to the suitor who furnishes the largest bridewealth.
Faced with the significant outlay of capital to secure his new wife, the hus-
band usually gave this wife the hardest work and mistreated her. Soon, the 
Gumbu administrator concluded, the husband “tires of his wife’s complaints 
(doléances) and in pursuit of peace in the household, divorce is requested.”55 
The high incidence of divorce, wrote the Koutiala administrator in 1909, was 
due to the “conception that the woman is a captive, an instrument of work 
and of exchange, who can be sold, given away, and repossessed according to 
the [husband’s] whims and means without ever consulting her.”56
 The dissolution of the first marriage always involved the return of the 
bridewealth. I have already remarked that this was often difficult because 
the household head did not normally hold on to the wealth thus obtained 
but used it to secure wives for his sons. Thus, the woman seeking divorce 
needed to find a lover capable of returning the bridewealth to the hus-
band’s kin or else she had to draw from her own wealth.57 Just as Baba 
described earlier, the dissolution of the first marriage, in which the bride 
had little choice, liberated a woman to marry whomever she wanted or 
whoever had significant resources to return the bridewealth to the first 
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husband. clearly, then, the need to return the bridewealth imposed its 
own constraints on the choices of divorced women.
 Maupoil’s 1939 compilation of coutumiers (customary law guides) under-
scored this fundamental change in women’s ability to consent to marriage. 
F. De coutouly, in his report on Soninke customs in nioro, noted sim-
ply that a divorced woman could choose “at her discretion a new hus-
band.”58 Administrator Bourouillou of the Bandiagara District juxtaposed 
the bride’s lack of consent in the first marriage to enhanced capacity for 
agency as soon as that first marriage was consummated. “The lack of con-
sent on the part of the young girl,” he noted, “does not break the engage-
ment as long as the kinsmen consent to it. Once the marriage has become 
definitive, then [the] woman can, if she wants, abandon the conjugal home 
for another domicile of her choosing.”59 Aubert, of the Bouguni District, 
emphasized the transformation that followed divorce: “no woman whose 
marriage has been formally dissolved can be given to a new husband 
without her consent. This rule is uniformly observed and it explains that 
the fact of the first marriage produces in the woman the semblance of 
emancipation.”60
 So how do we explain this transformation in women’s consent to 
marry? It may, as Fallers argued, be related to social change, and indeed 
the early colonial period witnessed significant change. But it could also be 
related to the changed nature of rights in persons that lay at the heart of 
bridewealth, in the changed set of players involved, and in changes to the 
ideas of personhood discussed in the introduction to this book. The value 
of girls lay in their linked productive and reproductive capacities. In soci-
eties that valued numerous children, a pubescent girl would presumably 
be fertile for a longer period than a more mature woman. Thus, the length 
of fertility probably contributed to the value of the rights in persons trans-
acted through bridewealth. A divorced woman had some loss to her fer-
tility simply by having spent a number of years with her former husband. 
In turn, this diminished fertility meant diminished value. Moreover, for 
societies that valued female virginity at marriage, a divorced woman was 
somewhat less valuable.
 Although the first divorce involved the reimbursement of the origi-
nal bridewealth, the second and subsequent divorces may have involved 
even lower bridewealth. And it is possible that serially divorced women 
received the bridewealth on their own account, much like the dower in 
Muslim family law.
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caPacity to consent
As the judge in a recent asylum case argued, the distinction between 
arranged and forced marriage depends upon “meaningful consent.”61 
Meaningful consent assumes a set of conditions that allows girls and 
women to assess alternatives and gives them the capacity to dissent. The 
ability to assess alternatives and consequences and the capacity to dissent 
may be linked to some definition of the “age of reason,” but it is also pro-
foundly shaped by cultural constructions of patriarchy, girls’ and women’s 
relative autonomy within households, and the degree of their dependence 
on men. how can we assess meaningful consent if, as Soeur Marie-André 
remarked in 1939,
the question never occurs to [a girl or woman] to choose between 
marriage and celibacy: all African women marry and she will 
do as her mother and the other women in the family have done, 
habituated for centuries to servitude and passive submission 
towards their masters. . . . The young girl can not but ratify the 
decision taken on her behalf and she must submit.
 The capacity to dissent requires the ability to imagine alternatives and 
the capacity to implement these alternatives. Girls’ and women’s accep-
tance of their futures as wives is deeply ingrained in the culture of patri-
archy and the ideology of personhood where women are valued primarily 
for their labor and reproductive powers. Bridewealth systems of marriage 
value these rights in women and provide the means to exchange these 
rights. This helps explain why girls are valuable and why divorced fathers 
or their kin seek to recover these girls before they reach puberty, when the 
value of their fertility is at its peak.. As carole Pateman has argued, when 
property in persons is at stake, subordination is tightly structured.62
 The great paradox—and one that needs further conceptualization—is 
why divorce “emancipates” women from their kin’s control over their labor 
and reproductive capacity. Such emancipation is never complete if wom-
en’s dependence on men remains unchallenged. A central part of this issue 
of enhanced consent is whether the capacity to give consent in second and 
subsequent marriages actually increases the instability of first marriages, 
when the value of bridewealth is the highest.
 In many areas of colonial Africa, girls and women had options other 
than arranged and forced marriages. Some could seek refuge in christian 
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missions, in radical Muslim communities that did not recognize bride-
wealth in marriage, and in the expanding urban and mining centers. 
choosing these options most often ruptured kinship ties, thus exacerbat-
ing female vulnerabilities and often replacing the duress of kin with pres-
sures to conform to new communities’ rules.63 These options, however, 
were not often available to girls and women in many other parts of Africa.
 clearly, the history of girls’ and women’s constrained abilities to con-
sent is central to the story of the links between patriarchy, the transactions 
in rights in persons exercised in marriage, and wider regimes of produc-
tion and property that value unpaid household labor.
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Forced Marriage, Gender, and Consent  
in Igboland, 1900–1936
OL ATUnJI  OJO
In 1927, nearly three decades after the British colonial administration of-
ficially abolished the slave trade and a decade after the legal cessation of 
slavery and related practices such as pawnship and panyarring in nigeria, 
a woman named Mgbocha, from Kwale in western Igboland, was seized 
and sold into slavery for the purpose of marriage.1 In her court testimony, 
she said that on her way to Port harcourt around January 1927, she met 
a man, Oshodimi, who offered to take her by a shorter route. The duo, 
however, did not travel to Port harcourt but rather to Azuwama village, 
where Oshodimi left Mgbocha with a man, ngashi, who told her he had 
bought her as a wife. After a number of days, Mgbocha saw some people 
searching for her, and she reported her story—a story about both slavery 
and forced marriage. With her sale, she became a slave wife, lacking choice 
in the selection of a spouse.2 Forced marriage, age of consent, and wom-
en’s agitation against forced marriages were recurrent topics of discussion 
in colonial nigeria and in other parts of Africa.3 I draw attention to this 
discourse because it highlights a central issue whereby, for many women, 
marriage involved coercion. In western Igboland, forced marriage was not 
confined to slave wives but extended to other women as well. It victimized 
many young girls (including infants) whose parents arranged their mar-
riages, often without consulting with them, on the basis that the “parents 
knew better” and the girls were too young to have an opinion. This chapter 
66 olAtunji ojo
explores the sociological and historical context in which forced marriage 
was common, reflecting the unequal gender relations in early colonial 
western Igboland. I seek to understand the meaning of forced marriage 
and marital consent; avenues for forcing women into marriage; and why 
women, more than men, suffered from forced marriages. Under colonial-
ism, however, the government banned some of the institutional bases of 
forced marriage—slavery and pawnship—and created opportunities for 
ending existing coerced marriages.
Forced Marriage, arranged Marriage,  
and consent in igbo society
Marriage was and remains a highly valued institution in Igbo society. 
no man or woman is considered complete unless he or she is married. 
To the degree that marriage was central to societal reproduction as new 
babies replaced old and dead ancestors, marriage turned children into 
social adults. Igbo traditions attest to the interest attached to marriage, 
with girls being given names such as Di wu ugwu (husband is presti-
gious). Wives, as mothers, produced the next generation of workers and 
contributed to men’s social aggrandizement. The more wives a man had, 
the higher his social status and potential capacity to acquire economic 
and noneconomic resources. Across Africa, marriage was not a union 
of two individuals but the coming together of two communities and a 
tool for building communal networks and alliances (also see the chap-
ters by richard roberts, Francesca Declich, and Bala Saho in this vol-
ume). Since marriage was considered mandatory—a rite of passage—it 
was open to abuse and often used as a means to exploit certain people, 
especially women when forced to marry or marry particular men against 
their will. George Basden, an Anglican pastor in eastern nigeria during 
the interwar years, wrote that from about age seven, Igbo girls were con-
scious of their public appearance. So they decked themselves out in or-
naments, lotion, and clothes and watched their weight because girls with 
long, thin legs were considered more attractive to men. The ideal was for 
a girl to attract a suitor. Yet betrothal often involved coercion, for not 
every girl had the choice of dressing up to attract men. Often, parents 
made the decisions, and girls had to comply. Forced marriage foreclosed 
a girl’s right to reject a marriage proposal. Precisely because of the per-
ceived benefit to the communities joined by marriage, many people paid 
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little or no attention to the process that often denied women freedom in 
the choice of husbands.
 To the degree that marriage brought together two or more families 
or communities, it was also a legal transaction in which all the parties 
involved had a set of expectations and obligations. Thus, the community 
at large generally viewed marriage as a “traditional” or “customary” rite 
or what the early agents of the church Missionary Society (cMS) in West 
Africa referred to as “country fashion.” This was not necessarily because 
things remained static but because the origin of these rites lay in the distant 
past and the pace of change was so slow as to be indiscernible to many. The 
levers of power were within the socioeconomic and political spheres con-
trolled by senior men and women who were averse to changes that could 
threaten their upper-class social status. As we will see, young women and 
young men as well as strangers and those on the periphery of power were 
the first to embrace changes that would attack “customary” marriage laws 
and practices. 
 There were four means of marriage in Igboland during the period 
under study: child betrothal, pawnship (igba ibe), slavery (ohu), and 
isinmo (cutting of women’s hair). Perhaps the most popular means was 
child betrothal, whereby shortly after a girl’s birth or some years later, a 
suitor took firewood and palm wine to her mother in order to stake a 
claim (igudo-nwanyi) to the girl.4 Igbo marriage entailed the exchange of 
gifts. Bridewealth was for some a token of appreciation paid to parents 
for caring for a girl; for others, it was compensation given to a family for 
losing their daughter to the husband. Bridewealth payment (also called 
bride-price or dowry) and parental consent underpinned marriage. Bride-
price can be defined as a gift of money, labor, natural produce, real or 
personal property, or a combination of any of these, including any waiver 
in the content or quantum of such a gift, given to the appropriate person 
in connection with marriage to a woman. The peculiar nature of the bridal 
payment is that it may be given before or at a marriage under customary 
law, and no matter how long a couple cohabits or even if they procreate, no 
valid marriage exists until the payment is made.5 Among the Igbo, regard-
less of whether a suitor acted for himself or was represented by others, par-
ents of a young daughter consented to the marriage request by accepting 
the gift, and the suitor began paying bridal wealth, including periodically 
working for the girl’s father and making gifts of yams, palm oil, and cash 
to the mother. Ultimately, the bridewealth would give the groom certain 
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rights to the woman: sexual access, power to commandeer her labor, and 
custody of children even if she had had children by another man. These 
rights remained in force as long as the bridewealth was not refunded. As I 
will discuss, women in some areas had no access to divorce.
 Bridewealth payments continued for years until the girl reached pu-
berty, marked by the early signs of menstruation; after that point, the 
suitor made a lump payment, the amount of which varied depending on 
the age of the girl, her beauty, and the rank of the families involved. A 
related system involved payment of a fixed amount to the parents of a ma-
tured girl by the prospective husband. The final marriage ceremony fea-
tured a huge feast, dancing, and more exchanging of gifts, after which the 
woman went to her husband’s compound. The central element of child 
betrothal was that the girl’s parents were the ones who made marital de-
cisions, as they had marital experience and were trusted to make wise 
choices. This view is captured in an Igbo proverb: Okenye ada ano nauno, 
ewu amuo na ogbuli (no old person leaves a goat in chains when it is 
under pain of giving birth). It is important to separate arranged marriage 
from forced marriage.
 If child betrothal was coercive, it scarcely matched the violence asso-
ciated with slave marriages. Suzanne Miers and Igor Kopytoff argue that 
the demand for wives partly underpinned the development of slavery in 
Africa.6 The preference for female slaves may be located in the differential 
status between free and bonded wives. As seen earlier, a freeborn girl was 
generally betrothed at an early age, and future spouses confirmed their 
interest with periodic payments and services to her parents. But a slave 
wife was cheaper and more controllable than a free woman because mar-
rying a slave had none of the expenses and labor involved in marrying a 
free woman. Most slave wives were acquired through warfare, as gifts from 
allies or via purchase.
 Igbo men desired slave wives in order to avoid the huge bridal fees 
required for freeborn girls. The high cost of marriage prolonged slavery, 
as those who could not afford to marry freeborn girls took to kidnapping 
or buying female slaves. In 1932, Diribeofor Mgbeke, Jack ngwu, Okronk-
wor, and Wokocha appeared before the Okigwi court, accused of steal-
ing and selling a girl, Udorie. Diribeofor had lured the girl away from the 
police quarters on the excuse that he was sending her to a police officer. 
Innocently, the girl followed him, and within a few days, she had been 
sold a couple of times until finally a man named Okpani informed her she 
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was his promised wife.7 Many female slaves spent time and possibly de-
veloped relationships with their captors before becoming slave wives, but 
girls like Udorie had no such luxury. Many times, their experience of mar-
riage began with rape by the buyer-husband, making marriage a source 
of victimization because the girls had no voice in their unions and were 
not in a position to end the alliances. The absence of bridal obligations be-
tween consenting families subjugated a slave wife to her master-husband 
and rendered her malleable. Slave wives had no kin and hence were more 
dependent on their husbands. And whereas a freeborn woman could call 
on her blood relations for help if a man mistreated her, a slave wife had no 
such kinship protection.8
 Similarly, enslavement tactics such as kidnapping, raids, court judg-
ments, and debt punished more women than men. And girls were at a 
greater risk of enslavement than female adults. Since Igbo culture permit-
ted early marriage, after 1900 child enslavement was disguised as mar-
riage. Indeed, rather than disappearing under colonialism, the slave trade 
merely went underground as slavers turned to kidnapping children. The 
result was a booming trade in child slaves in southern nigeria until about 
1940. These children, some as young as three months, were all stolen and 
sold as slave wives.9
 Pawnship—a related institution of credit whereby individuals served 
as debt collateral and interest on loans—also enabled forced marriages. 
Although pawnship existed alongside slavery and fed its victims into that 
system, it lasted longer because it was widely considered benign, since 
most pawns remained in their own community. The pawn served the 
creditor until the debt was liquidated. But loans often had no payment 
deadlines, allowing debtors to spread out repayment; the pawn system 
also empowered creditors to enforce payment at any time, by seizing 
debtors, treating pawns like slaves, and using other similar tactics. By 
the 1920s, girls predominated among pawns and marriage had become 
a principal means of liquidating debts. The pawning of young girls in 
Igboland was often disguised as infant marriage. For instance, a man 
could pawn his young daughter to a creditor with the assumption that 
she would marry him and that the loans would be converted to prepaid 
bridal fees. The difference between bridewealth and debt had to be paid 
to whoever had the balance. Although a creditor could not force a girl to 
marry him, long-outstanding debts enabled him to take a female pawn 
as a wife.10 What qualified such an arrangement as forced marriage was 
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that the female pawn was subjected to the creditor, due to pressure from 
her family. If she disobeyed, a creditor could enforce credit payment 
by seizing properties and people owned by the debtor. To avoid untold 
hardships, debtors pawned their daughters as a sign of their creditwor-
thiness and as a means for liquidating debts, and the girls complied to 
protect their families from vindictive creditors.11 The pawning of girls 
and their ultimate marriage to male creditors or their associates was cul-
turally legitimated much as any form of arranged marriage that involved 
potential spouses meeting through third-party mediators and parents 
giving consent and receiving respect.12
 As early as 1895, claude MacDonald of the niger coast Protectorate 
said enslavement for debt had historically been the “recognized form of 
collecting debt and giving trade security.”13 The interface between female 
pawning and marriage highlights a major source of victimization for girls. 
Though a female pawn could not be taken as a wife or married to a third 
party without prior discussion and approval of the debtor, long-overdue 
debts meant lengthy service in pawnship and made the enslavement of 
pawns likely.14 In a 1936 report on forced labor in southern nigeria, a se-
nior police officer submitted that child marriage was used as a means of 
paying off debts. Indeed, the first reaction of a man pressed for money was 
to give his daughter or sister in marriage, no matter her age, and receive 
bridewealth. Parents had an obligation to protect and support their chil-
dren, who in turn were culturally bound to serve and assist the former in 
any way required.
 The final system of coerced marriage was isinmo, whereby a man cut 
a lock of a girl’s hair, put an eagle feather on her head, or threw an egg at 
her and in so doing made her his wife. historically associated with the 
creation of a regal mate for the most senior Western Igbo chief (eze), by 
the 1920s isinmo had become a tactic for forcing woman into marriage 
and maintaining sexual fidelity even if the husband was not a chief. Men 
also used the rite to take a woman they could not marry through normal 
circumstances, for example, when a common or poor man married an up-
per-class or rich girl or when an old man forced a young and attractive girl 
to marry him.15 As with slavery or pawnship, women subjected to isinmo 
were presented with a fait accompli. A parent could not deny consent, for 
no other man would marry the girl. Isinmo obviated divorce and adultery, 
since the woman risked death, exile, enslavement, fine, and/or public rid-
icule if she took recourse in either of those two acts.16 By the symbolic or 
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ritual possession of a woman’s head, isinmo gave a man full control of his 
wife. Although isinmo is considered customary, it also carried with it ele-
ments of kidnapping and ukuthwala, or abduction for the purpose of mar-
riage, as described in elizabeth Thornberry’s chapter on South Africa.17 But 
rather than kidnapping a girl and taking her to the husband’s house, isinmo 
involved a temporary confinement of a girl so the abductor(s) could cut 
her hair.
 At the core of forced marriage was the role of the “family” in matters 
of spousal choice, coercion, consent, bridewealth, and gender. coercion 
ignored a girl’s interest in marriage. In Igbo society, the community comes 
before the individual, so a member had to protect societal interests even 
when this involved coercion. In neighboring Benin, Philip Igbafe notes, 
the community was deemed greater than the individual, so “a girl could 
hardly afford the isolation into which a refusal to marry a family-chosen 
husband would [have] plunged her.”18 The paradox was that in a mostly 
patriarchal society, adult men dictated the communal interest and the cost 
of securing it. communal solidarity gave a girl little freedom in the choice 
of a husband. She had to accept the man picked by her family, with little or 
no possibility of divorce. Further, her parents had no desire to terminate a 
contract they had arranged and had worked on for many years, and they 
had little incentive to refund bridewealth even if the amount appeared 
insubstantial. Until the 1960s, researchers focused on supposedly normal 
marriages, in which parents generally arranged spouses for their children 
and elders for their juniors in ways that made the marriages alliances 
between communities rather than unions of consenting adults. In Igbo 
society, one scholar observes, “when you marry, you marry not only a hus-
band or wife but an entire network of relationships and responsibilities.”19 
Well into the colonial period, infant marriage reigned supreme; hence, the 
consent of a future wife was hardly a crucial factor in marriage relations. 
Parents claimed to know what was best for their wards, which helps ex-
plain Basden’s view that “love” did not exist in Igbo marriage and played 
no part in courtship.20 As long as parents agreed to a marriage contract, 
a girl could be forcibly taken to her husband’s house and raped for the 
purpose of impregnating her. According to Flora Kaplan, “Women were 
given in marriage without consent, and forced to submit if they objected 
later. If they were ill-treated and unhappy after marriage, they were forc-
ibly restrained from leaving the husband’s house, and forcibly returned if 
they managed to leave.”21 Buchi emecheta’s novel The Bride Price makes a 
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literary reference to the linkage between rape and forced marriage in Igbo 
society. The protagonist, a girl named Aku-nna, was promised to Oko-
boshi, an arrogant son of a chief, though she loved chike, a young school-
teacher. She lived in constant fear of Okoboshi marrying her forcefully. 
Knowing that Aku-nna was not keen on marrying him, Okoboshi and his 
friends, like their South African counterparts, kidnapped Aku-nna and 
carried her to his house; the intent was to rape her and make her his wife 
because no man would marry a defiled woman.22 In some towns, recalci-
trant girls were forced to marry the obi (king). If the girl was previously 
betrothed to another man or if she had another man in mind, that man 
dared not complain.23
 A punitive yet common means of enforcing marriage was through 
seizure—that is, a husband could seize (fie igwo in Igbo) his errant wife or 
her associates. As a form of collective punishment, seizure allowed an ag-
grieved man, when he found no other way of recovering his wife, to hold 
an entire community liable for actions such as being rejected by his spouse 
after he had paid bridal wealth (even when the wife did not want the man 
and was not party to the original marriage negotiation). At Idumuje, if 
a girl refused a man and had babies with another man, her father could 
seize the children and hold them hostage until she agreed to be with the 
assigned spouse. Under colonialism, bridewealth became an avenue for 
funding numerous expenses, including tax payments. Therefore, the ten-
dency to force daughters into marriage and compel them to stay married 
increased. At the same time, however, colonialism led to changes in the 
institution of marriage.
brit ish conquest, sociaL change, and MaritaL consent
From the late nineteenth century onward, a wind of change began to 
blow across Africa. In Igbo society, this started with conquest and rule 
by Britain, followed quickly by the expansion of christian missionar-
ies and changes in economic activities. Britain justified its imperialism 
in nigeria on the need to induce socioeconomic reform. In the sphere 
of marital relations, British colonialism emphasized the personal sta-
tus of women. In particular, Britain rejected the purchase or pawning 
of females for the purpose of marriage, child betrothal, widow inheri-
tance,24 and marriage without spousal consent—practices that directly 
infringed on the freedom of women. Antislavery laws also addressed 
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forced marriage. The Slave Dealing Ordinance of 1909 and the Slavery 
Ordinance of 1916 equated child pawning, child betrothal, and panyar-
ring with slavery. In the debate on pawnship, a source of forced mar-
riage, the issue of the age of consent arose. Though the government 
tacitly conceded child betrothal was customary, it insisted on sepa-
rating adult and child pawning, with the purpose of ending coerced 
marriages.25 Due to British abolitionism, the slave population became 
composed mostly of females and children, and slavers began to focus 
more attention on those who could reproduce the next generation of 
unfree labor, those with more years of exploitable labor, and those who 
posed minimal opposition to the slave regime. The continued demand 
for slaves and their short supply led to rising prices. Igbo oral traditions 
indicate that the average price of a slave in the late precolonial period 
was only one to two bags of cowries or one to two British pounds in the 
late nineteenth century. By 1900, however, the price of a female slave 
had risen to two and a half pounds, jumping to four pounds at Isele 
Uku and up to eight pounds in nearby Igbuzo on the eve of World War 
I. The sharp rise in price was due to the scarcity of slaves and the atten-
dant high cost of marriage.26 Thus, the demand for coercible women 
and children during the colonial period actually led to the persistence 
of slavery and the increased victimization of girls.
 As early as 1913, investigations highlighted direct relationships be-
tween child marriage and the enslavement of young girls. consequently, 
the government proposed the registration of new marriages, especially 
those involving girls.27 Three years lapsed between the report’s submis-
sion and its consideration by officials, with Governor Frederick Lugard 
concluding registration no longer met the practical needs of all segments 
of the country.28 Perhaps drawing on his experiences in northern nigeria, 
where local cultures permitted early marriage, slavery, and polygyny, Lu-
gard opined that marriage registration could in fact be abused to promote 
slavery if some people began to perceive marriage certificates as equiva-
lent to property licenses. Through its inaction, the government certainly 
helped those still involved in the slave trade, since it did not disrupt their 
operations and might actually have helped them. From the 1920s, reports 
from Umuahia in Bende Division pointed to the continued sale of young 
female slaves via child marriages: parents disposed of their children in 
this way in order to obtain cash and pay for titles.29 In 1933, T. W. Gar-
den, the police commissioner for Owerri, reported that parents in Bende 
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sometimes failed to consider the fate of their daughters who were purport-
edly married to third parties.30
 colonialism also transformed the economy by introducing new mar-
kets and better transportation systems, which meant that women had more 
trade opportunities. A good road system boosted female mobility and en-
hanced women’s opportunities for making contacts outside of Igboland. 
Asaba women traded as far as Lagos, calabar, Aba, Benin city, and be-
yond, dealing in textiles, palm oil, and foodstuffs. Women’s greater access 
to and control of independent sources of income helped them resist un-
wanted suitors.
 christian missionaries were closely associated with colonialism on 
the ground. Although christianity was introduced into eastern nige-
ria in the mid-nineteenth century, it took nearly another three decades 
before the missions gained a strong footing. In addition to building 
churches and preaching the Gospels, the missionaries also established 
schools at Asaba, Igbuzo, and nearby towns. At Asaba, the catholic Fe-
male Institution, founded in the 1890s, trained female teachers, nuns, 
and nurses. The curricula included topics on domestic science and the 
virtues of womanhood. As we will see, educated and christian girls led 
the protest against forced marriage.
 central to the colonial project, the colonial government established 
courts headed by British officers. After 1900, the it established native 
courts that were allowed to administer justice based on indigenous laws or 
local sensibilities, as long as these conformed to certain British standards. 
When African laws were incompatible with european concepts of natu-
ral justice, equity, and good conscience, the latter were to prevail and the 
former were to be abolished. The courts thus ruled against child betrothal 
and forced marriage, which eventually modified Igbo marriage practices.31
 One method of simplifying marriage procedures and providing ave-
nues for ending unhappy unions was the creation of courts to adjudicate 
matrimonial disputes and grant divorces under certain criteria, such as 
the refund of bridal fees, calculated as cash payments to a girl’s parents. 
Bridal payment refund was meant to disentangle young girls from non-
consensual marriages. The courts gave women a way to defy tradition by 
rejecting marriages imposed by parents.32 Philip Igbafe and Flora Kaplan 
note that in Benin Division, north of Igbuzo, with the establishment of 
marriage courts young girls learned quickly that the colonial government 
was appalled by the practice of child betrothal, and they began to refuse 
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husbands under such conditions.33 By attacking certain marriage rites and 
instituting divorce, colonialism curtailed the power of men who gained 
most from existing practices and weakened parental control. christian 
missionaries, including the priests in charge of the roman catholic Mis-
sion at Asaba and Igbuzo and Miss ross of the Anglican Institute at 
Ogwashi-Uku, also promoted girls’ consent in marriage.34
 Social and economic changes under colonial rule radically altered 
gender and generational relations. Innovations such as wage labor, West-
ern education, and new laws benefited young men and women more than 
their parents. colonialism ended recourse to warfare and slavery as tools 
of economic activity and as means of conflict resolution. With a dimin-
ished capacity to use violence against their subordinates, senior African 
chiefs lost part of their income and some of the aura surrounding their 
power. A new elite emerged from among people supportive of British 
policies. Women reaching maturity under colonialism enjoyed benefits 
that had been denied to older generations of females.35
contesting Forced Marriage
One of the ways women attacked forced marriage was to challenge mari-
tal rites and not marriage per se. colonial rule also changed bridewealth 
practices and ultimately the meaning and process of marriage. Brett Shadle 
discusses the role of bridewealth in Gusii (Kenya) marriage under colonial-
ism, noting how a spike in the value of bridal wealth after 1940 transformed 
Gusii marriages. With bridal payments priced beyond many young men’s 
reach, more people married late because potential grooms had to work lon-
ger to raise the payments; meanwhile young girls waited endlessly for male 
suitors. Ultimately, exorbitant bridal rites created tension along genera-
tional lines, as Gusii youths began to defy old marital forms and wanted to 
seize from their parents the power to decide who, when, and how to marry. 
Sometimes, girls promised to men by their parents fled or eloped with other 
men, prompting contestations on the concepts of consent, bridewealth, and 
parental control.36 With girls fleeing from unwanted marriages, the British 
administration in its various African colonies passed new laws that modified 
existing marriage practices, especially the value of bridal wealth but also 
the age of marriage and consent. There are close similarities in the changes 
introduced in Kenya, as discussed in this volume by Shadle, and in nige-
ria.37 Among the Igbo of southeastern nigeria, where complaints against 
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exorbitant bridal payments were loudest, colonial policies forced a change 
in marital processes. In precolonial Igbo society, bridal payments included 
the transfer of female slaves from the groom to the bride’s family. however, 
the cessation of the slave trade meant bridal fees could no longer be paid in 
slaves but required cash. The shift increased monetization of the economy 
in the late nineteenth century and led to a rise in the value of the bride-
wealth paid in cash. In the 1890s, cash payments averaged about £2 before 
rising, on the eve of World War I, to £10–22 at Asaba and £5–10 at Onitsha 
Olona and nearly £40 pounds in the 1920s.38 The monetary value of non-
cash payments and services increased the total cost of marriage by another 
100 to 300 percent. These were huge payments when the average man made 
no more than £13–40 annually.39 In fact, marital expenses were so high that 
europeans conceived of bridewealth as cash exchanged for girls analogous 
to the purchase of slaves. There was some rational basis for this opinion. 
For instance, occasional reports indicated that Igbo parents promised their 
daughters to multiple suitors, wanted huge bridewealth, and prolonged 
courtship so they could gain more from marrying off their daughters. In 
a report compiled around 1910, northcote Thomas, a colonial anthropol-
ogist, claimed an Igbo wife was practically a commodity sold to the hus-
band. her children belonged to him, and “under no circumstances does 
she pass out of [his] family.”40 In the interwar years, complaints about exor-
bitant marriage costs and the high rate of divorce pushed the government 
to streamline marriage rules by reducing bridal payments to £10, £5, and 
£2.5, respectively, for pubertal girls, middle-aged women, and women who 
had been married for some years.41 The debate over bridewealth changed 
the meaning and process of marriage in nigeria.
 In attaching a woman’s age to the value of bridewealth payable by her 
spouse, with pubertal girls commanding higher payments than other cate-
gories of women, two issues emerged. First, it meant age was a significant 
factor in marriage considerations. Second, it encouraged the coercion of 
the most valuable potential brides, young girls, into marriage and denied 
them the right of consent or marital choice. Because parents frequently 
anchored their objections to a daughter’s choice of spouse on the nonpay-
ment of full bridal fees, some girls claimed their spouses had paid in full; 
technically, this suggested the marriage was proper and had to be allowed. 
A woman named Mgbolie argued that the £12 her lover paid to her par-
ents through the native court was sufficient, but because her parents had 
promised her to another man, they refused her choice on the basis that the 
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amount the man paid was not enough.42 Other girls claimed their consent 
was sufficient for marriage—not their parents’ consent, the bridal wealth, 
sex with their lover, or pregnancy. By rejecting expensive bridal rites or 
delaying payment, Igbo women sought to avoid complex and inescapable 
marriage contracts that could subject them to men for whom marriage 
was a tool of female disempowerment.
 new marriage laws enabled Igbo youths who were unafraid of indige-
nous sanctions to seduce or forge sexual liaisons with the wives of older 
men. As discussed earlier, in emecheta’s The Bride Price Okoboshi, a chief ’s 
son, kidnapped Aku-nna, who was promised to him as his wife, only be-
cause the girl did not want him. The reason he failed to make the girl 
his wife was because these events took place during the colonial period. 
rather than submit to the rapist, Aku-nna feigned madness; she screamed 
and lied, claiming that she was not a virgin because she had slept with 
another man, chike, whom she wanted to marry. A day after her forc-
ible confinement, Aku-nna and chike fled to Ugheli, where chike lived. 
The two started a happy life together, though Aku-nna felt guilt over her 
unpaid bridewealth.43 This story is a literary reference to changing marriage 
patterns, especially the way in which, under colonialism, young girls used the 
symbolism of premarital sex to challenge unwanted marriages. Aku-nna’s 
rejection of tradition rested on changes brought about by the imposition 
of european rule and values such as Western education, wagework, and 
mobility for educated young men and women.
 Since access to colonial courts enabled women to challenge marriage 
rites, during the interwar years matrimonial cases accounted for about 75 
percent of all civil cases in southern nigeria, and quite often, these cases 
ended in divorce. The government did not seem to anticipate the dissat-
isfaction with old marriage rules and the eagerness with which people 
wanted to end existing contracts. In 1922, the government ordered inqui-
ries into the rise in conjugal disputes following the establishment of native 
courts in 1900, specifically looking at divorce, return of bridewealth, fugi-
tive wives, seduction, elopement, adultery, and child custody. In his report, 
the resident for Benin Province, e. B. Dawson, claimed that most civil cases 
consisted of requests by women seeking “eagerly to end objectionable mar-
riages.” The report blamed the marital crisis partly on the court’s willing-
ness to grant divorces and on the custom of child betrothal whereby a girl 
probably did not know the groom until the eve of her wedding. The officer 
submitted that under existing practices, as long as bridewealth had been 
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paid a woman could not escape from marriage (inu nwunye, in Igbo).44 
his counterpart in Warri Province attributed divorce to the victimization 
of women, insofar as a “high divorce rate was expected as a woman is re-
garded as a chattel and married against her will to the highest bidder.”45 
The investigation emblematized changes in marital practices, specifically 
regarding spousal consent, in nigeria from the 1890s to the 1930s.
 The popularity of divorce under colonialism prompted a range of re-
actions from colonial officers, attributing the high divorce rate to moral 
lapse and not a failure of the existing marriage system. Occasionally, offi-
cials accused young women seeking to end their marriages of preferring 
prostitution to having stable families. In 1922, the resident officer for Ow-
erri Province noted that “native marriage customs are being undermined 
rapidly and chastity in marriage treated with little regard.” he added, 
“Women were being attracted away by younger men and to an increasing 
degree by the fine clothes and idle life which they can have in large [urban] 
centres.”46 Members of the local elite, including some leading scholars, also 
concluded that colonial marriage practices were detrimental to the mo-
rality of marriage and the society. Their argument presumed there had 
been tranquility under precolonial marriages practices. Igbafe and others 
blamed colonialism for unstable marriages, as the return of bridewealth 
associated with divorce became a form of “deposit” that was “refundable 
whenever the wife decided to leave the husband.”47 Other writers have sug-
gested that the greater amount of divorces during the colonial period in-
dicated troubles with old marriage patterns. They also have debunked the 
claim that divorce was easy under colonialism, pointing out the obstacles 
women faced in the courts—courts that were stacked with male judges, 
some of whom were sitting in cases in which they had interests them-
selves. Some women could also not afford the high cost of divorce, and 
many of those who secured divorce lost access to their children and joint 
properties.48 In the Gold coast, Jean Allman writes, Asante chiefs passed 
a law mandating young women to marry or risk imprisonment.49 Similar 
attitudes prevailed in nigeria. At a meeting of chiefs in northern nige-
ria in 1941, certain chiefs conflated unmarried women with prostitutes; 
hence, they suggested that girls should be forced to marry and that those 
who failed to comply should be deported.50 A survey of divorce applica-
tions filed by women shows that the courts rarely dissolved a marriage 
based on a “no default submission” when a woman claimed she no longer 
loved her husband or when she simply returned the bridewealth. Instead, 
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women generally gave nearly the same excuses, which the court could not 
overlook: their husbands were persistently cruel and the age difference be-
tween the husband and wife was too wide—in other words theirs was a 
forced marriage.51
 Women’s mounting resolve to contest their marriages in the court-
room corresponded with rising reports of adultery, divorce, and elope-
ment. As noted previously, in adultery allegations Igbo customary laws 
demanded confession as well as compensation for the legal husband. At 
Ubuluku, the adultery fine was pegged at £5 for a commoner’s wife and 
death or enslavement for the wife of the obi. Under colonialism, the obi 
lost the power to impose capital punishment, so he settled for adultery 
fees. comparative rates operated in neighboring towns.52 In 1922, the dis-
trict officer for Asaba, W. B. rumann, produced a new marriage rule to 
guide the native courts. The guideline divided adultery into two catego-
ries based on the rank of the injured husband. Adultery among wives 
of commoners resulted in fines; adultery among wives of chiefs was a 
criminal offense, subject to both fines and imprisonment.53 Most litigants 
settled for civil charges in order to collect compensation. Yet not every 
court official supported compensation for adultery. In a society where 
polygyny was widespread, many secondary wives complained of neglect 
by their husbands. In Ishan Division, a colonial officer, M. h. F. Marshall, 
was reluctant to award adultery fees. Though he admitted that adultery 
violated indigenous traditions, he maintained that not only was adultery 
a most difficult thing to prove but also that, as often as not, the husband 
drove the wife into committing adultery in order to reclaim the bride-
wealth. In his opinion, a woman abandoned by the husband would most 
likely not remain celibate for long. The man would wait for her to commit 
adultery so that he could demand refund of his bridal expenses as well as 
adultery fees.54
 To reduce the rate of divorce, the government passed a law in 1924 
stipulating conditions for granting divorce, setting a marker for other 
courts in the province in matters of marriage disputes. The law stated that 
after the consummation of marriage, divorce would only be granted in 
cases of impotence, cruelty, serious disease, and spousal neglect for at least 
three years. The law prohibited divorce for pregnant women in order to 
avoid custody battles over infants borne when the wife was leaving the 
husband for another man;55 divorce proceedings could start after the 
birth of the child. Moreover, the wife was required to refund £10 in bridal 
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payment to the husband. By 1930, due to the economic depression and 
the fact that people had less disposable income, together with the govern-
ment’s opposition to marriage commercialization, fees refundable upon 
divorce had fallen to between 15s. and £2.5.56
 consent was an ever-present issue in divorce litigations and the cen-
tral factor in forced marriages. Before 1910, men frequented the courts to 
demand the return of fugitive wives, adultery fees, and child custody. Later 
on, women, supported by their lovers, became primary litigants, seeking 
the dissolution of their marriages to older men. They wanted the court to 
compel their husbands to refund the bridal wealth. A woman’s usual rea-
son, according to commissioner F. Marshall, was: “I do not want to marry 
him anymore.”57 Some informants accused girls of faking consent at the 
time of marriage.58 Afraid of the backlash from their society, these girls 
halfheartedly gave consent and then sought a quick end to their marriages. 
Their strategy was to go along with arranged marriages while hiding their 
true plans, such as eloping with new lovers and younger men several 
months or years into their marriages to unwanted suitors. By 1930, fees 
refundable to jilted husbands had fallen to between 15s. and 50s., based on 
location, age of the wife, rank of the husband, and whether the wife had 
children with the husband. Because men got custody of children, women 
who bore them repaid less bridewealth than young brides who were not 
yet pregnant.59 The government agreed that a woman should be able to 
end an unhappy or unwanted relationship. Marshall distinguished be-
tween divorce in forced and consensual marriages, concluding that under 
no circumstances should a woman marry a husband other than the one 
she chose herself.60
 Disputes over consent to marriage flared up in the Asaba area in the 
1930s when reports circulated about razor-wielding men cutting off locks 
of young girls’ hair for marriage purposes, regardless of the girls’ conjugal 
tastes.61 As noted earlier, isinmo, or the cutting of women’s hair for the 
purpose of binding them into marriages, was popular in Asaba District, 
even when the women were married to abusive men. With the economic 
depression of 1929 and its aftermath, poor men resorted to isinmo to 
marry women they could not secure through normal processes. To dis-
courage such unwanted men, as table 2.1 shows, several young girls and 
women seeking divorce in the Asaba area arranged with their boyfriends 
and lovers to cut off locks of their hair. The act made the girls unsuitable 
for other men and gave those seeking divorce the ritual license to achieve 
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their goal because an original husband was ritually prohibited from mar-
rying or keeping as his wife a woman on whom another man had per-
formed isinmo. Although these acts were illegal and officially termed 
assaults on women, incidents generally did not constitute assault in a legal 
sense. Most often, women approved of these attacks to express choice and 
forestall forced marriage.
 By the 1930s when this wave of isinmo took place, some young men 
and women had attended mission schools and been taught to defy old 
marriage practices. Others had been exposed to new economic oppor-
tunities, such as working for wages or being employed in long-distance 
trade, thereby learning more about Western values in the big cities. More-
over, native courts contributed to the new sense that consent in marriage 
was normative by granting divorces to women who absolutely refused to 
remain with their husbands. For example, Mgboani chose as her new lover 
a man who had not paid bridal wealth. When confronted with the fact that 
she had an existing marriage, she told the court her marriage lacked merit 
because she had been forced to marry a man she did not want. Mgboani 
submitted to isinmo in order to end her unwanted marriage.62 One could 
attribute the protests here to the system described earlier whereby family 
elders negotiated marriage contracts on behalf of their subordinates, cre-
ating instances where a girl might not know her real spouse until close to 
the time of their wedding.
 elopement with a lover, adultery, demand for smaller bridewealth, 
divorce, and impregnation by a man other than the legal husband were 
among the various tactics that became widespread under colonialism; 
all represented women’s expression of marital discontent and their with-
drawal of consent from marriages that had been arranged by parents. This 
was evident at the trial of thirty-four men by the Igbuzo court in 1934 
on allegations they had either married improperly (having performed 
isinmo, a rite reserved exclusively for chiefs) or failed to make full bridal 
payments. But court evidence shows that in most of the cases, the alleged 
female victims described themselves as the lovers or wives of the young 
men and testified for the accused against their parents. Twenty-six women 
consented to the isinmo ritual, and one gave her consent after the rite 
had been performed on her. Only in six instances did the women deny 
consent and accuse the men of forced marriage. Women’s appropriation 
of the power to consent was a major step in the reconfiguration of Igbo 
marriage rites.
Table 2.1   IsInmo and Marriage consent
  relationship with or without
Victim (A) Accused (B) of A to B Consent
Susie Okolie Joseph nwani Okeze Wife With consent
nwadiafu Aniemeke Wife With consent
Alice Daniel Okoma Wife Late consent
Ukadiga Okolie Wife With consent
Alice Obunuwa John Uda Lover With consent
Otubo nwote Idoko Wife With consent
Agnes Okonkwo Okobia Wife With consent
ebonewebka Okonne Lover With consent
Mgbolie Abubuike Wife With consent
Idumaza Okobi Wife With consent
Maggie Osekwe Mgbodo Lover With consent
Maggie nwabuiwe nwalama Wife With consent
Mgboani Mbuzo Wife With consent
Matilda Utomi D. Okonkwo Wife With consent
Amulu Odiogoli nzekwu Wife With consent
Agnes Mgboude nwaokolo Wife With consent
— c. Maduagwu Wife With consent
nwakele ezolu Wife With consent
nwezebuona Ofunyeadi Sister-in-law With consent
nwaogwugwu Mogeme Wife With consent
chionye James Okobi Lover With consent
Jane Moweter chibuogwu Wife With consent
nwakele Utulu Lover With consent
Lucy eke Francis Ajuku Wife Without consent
nkemuamuna Onwuezim Acquaintance Without consent
ngbonwale Okolie II Acquaintance Without consent
Mboafo Amolo Wife With consent
Lydia charles James Mama no relation Without consent
— Unknown — —
Mbuike Owezim Wife With consent
nwaboshi Akaluzia Lover With consent
Adeze Mgbolu Sister-in-law With consent
Malechi Akahaiwe Acquaintance Without consent
Mgobogo Okolie Uzu Acquaintance Without consent
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 As Flora Kaplan and Marjorie Mbilinyi reveal for Benin (nigeria) and 
Tanzania, respectively, when women could not predict the outcome of a 
court decision or feared losing their case, they fled.63 Women also sought 
to fool the courts. Jean Almann reports that in response to an Asante law 
forcing young women to marry or risk imprisonment, many women tes-
tified in court to nonexistent husbands or arranged with male friends to 
show up in court as their husbands should they be arrested.64 In his 1914 
report, Thomas noted that Igbo women seeking to end unwanted mar-
riages were escaping to neighboring towns despite the fact that it was risky 
to do so because powerful chiefs could declare war on the hosts of their 
runaway wives.65 If what Thomas saw was a trickle of women fleeing from 
marriage, it had become a flood by the 1920s. The rate of women becom-
ing fugitive wives was so high that the commissioner for southern ni-
geria, William hunt, was asked to make it illegal for commercial drivers 
to transport fugitive wives.66 hunt did not agree, but his counterpart in 
Yorubaland supported the expulsion of any man who seduced the wife of 
a senior chief.
Persistence oF Forced Marriage
The world was horrified by reports of the Boko haram terror organization 
in nigeria kidnapping about three hundred teenage girls from a chibok 
secondary school in the northeastern part of the country in April 2014. But 
the greater shock came when the leader of the organization announced 
he would sell the girls into slavery for the purpose of marriage. Although 
many of the girls remained in captivity as of late 2015, some have escaped 
and returned to their parents or relocated in safer communities. Mean-
while, debate continues in nigeria about the appropriate age of consent. 
Although the official marriage code has pegged the age of marriage con-
sent for boys and girls at eighteen, some still refer to the old english com-
mon law that put the ages at twelve for girls and fourteen for boys. For 
others, the reference was the eastern nigeria Marriage Law of 1956, which 
stipulated that “marriage . . . between or in respect of persons either of 
whom is under the age of sixteen years shall be void.”67 The law also crimi-
nalized forced marriage, described as aiding, abetting, and promotion of 
child marriage. Unfortunately, the law is frequently breached, with no fear 
of retribution. Issues about forced marriage, especially of pubertal girls in 
nigeria, and the resistance against it have a longer history and are part of 
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the persistent contestations between adult males seeking “free wives” and 
their female victims demanding the right to agree to or reject a man. In 
forced marriage, a girl lacked choice and had no capacity to give consent. 
In Igbo society, native law did not limit the age at which a girl could be 
given in marriage, and parents arranged most marriages when a girl was 
too young to give consent. children were never part of the negotiation, and 
in most cases, this meant girls, who generally married early. Their respon-
sibility was to obey their parents and future spouses. Failure to obey their 
parents could result in flogging or the denial of food and familial support. 
In the case of pawning, the creditor took the girl home, put her to work, 
watched her grow, and acquired the bridal fees when the girl reached pu-
berty. With a free girl, a man offered some gifts when the girl was an in-
fant and completed other marital payments and rites several years later.68 
Under colonialism, many repugnant practices facilitating the compulsion 
of women into marriage were reformed and sometimes abolished. Women 
did not fail to exploit the opportunities that were provided, and divorce 
disputes in which women claimed that they did not give consent became 
rampant. eventually, Igbo society accepted women’s consent in marriage. 
There is no doubt that the modification occasioned by British rule trans-
formed marriage laws and custom.
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Debating “Early Marriage” in  
Colonial Kenya, 1920–50
BreT T L .  ShADLe
The Kenya Marriage Act of 2014 set eighteen years as the minimum age 
of marriage for brides and grooms.1 This law for the first time established 
a uniform minimum age, regardless of the type of marriage contracted—
christian, hindu, Islamic, customary, or civil. It also harmonized the law 
books, as the children’s Act had already prohibited marriage under eigh-
teen. now, to enter into a marriage with someone under eighteen or to 
witness or perform such a marriage constitutes a criminal offense, and the 
marriage itself would be void. Although the 2014 act will not eliminate the 
marriage of those legally defined as children, it does create legal clarity 
over who is marriageable and who is not.
 The Marriage Act should be understood as the most recent episode in 
a long series of debates over the definition of early marriage. The men dis-
cussed in this chapter—government officials, missionaries, and elite Africans 
in colonial Kenya—all concurred that the early marriage of girls was a bad 
thing. That was simple enough. Beyond this, alas, things became more com-
plex. For there was no clarity on a fundamental point: what, exactly, was early 
marriage? Despite their shared condemnation of early marriage, these men 
found it exceedingly difficult to determine what transformed an unmarriage-
able girl into a woman eligible to be wed. This confusion, combined with 
administrators’ reluctance to meddle in African marital customs, meant that 
the colonial state remained paralyzed in dealing with early marriage.
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 In this chapter, I examine three points in time—1926–27, the 1930s, 
and 1949–50—when colonial officials, missionaries, and elite African men 
wrestled with the question of early marriage of African females. virtually 
all found early marriage deplorable, but it is striking how difficult they 
found it to decide what made an (unmarriageable) “girl” into a (marriage-
able) “woman.” Most believed the transition was either physical (puberty) 
or emotional (with girlhood being a period that might extend well into 
the teen years). nevertheless, no one ever precisely defined puberty, sex-
ual maturity, “girl,” or girlhood. neither were their reasons for opposing 
early marriage always consistent. It would seem that if a girl should be 
considered unmarriageable because she is prepubescent, then her mar-
riage should be equally objectionable regardless of who she marries. Yet 
many of the men discussed here were more revolted by the marriage of 
girls to elderly polygamists than by marriages of girls to younger (though 
still adult) bachelors. Similarly, those who thought emotional develop-
ment marked the transition from girl to woman expressed special disgust 
at the marriage of prepubescent girls—meaning that both physical and 
emotional development retained importance for the making of a woman.
 In what follows, I examine how a select group of men tried to decipher 
the process by which an African girl became marriageable, why marriage 
before that point was improper, and how early marriage could be stopped. 
Their discussions produced no legislation; they led to no firm adminis-
trative directives.2 nor were these the only moments when the question 
of early marriage provoked protest, confusion, memoranda writing, inac-
tion, and denouement. They are illustrative, however, of elite discussions 
over early marriage, and they offer a window into the history of contem-
porary concerns.
the iMPeriaL context
The exchanges over early marriage in Kenya took place within an impe-
rial world caught up in questions over the status of colonized women.3 
From at least the 1890s, the colonized (and later the so-called Third World) 
woman emerged as an object of european concern. The confluence of 
several trends after World War I concentrated attention on females in the 
colonies. British women (over age thirty) gained the vote in 1918, leaving 
many activists energized and idle.4 Organizations such as St. Joan’s So-
cial and Political Alliance and the British commonwealth League looked 
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beyond the plight of white women. eleanor rathbone, among the first fe-
male members of the British Parliament, regularly assailed the colonial 
Office with queries and complaints about women’s oppression. her ques-
tions in Parliament, mass meetings, and publications galvanized sections 
of the public; the specter of slavelike Indian and African women refused 
to be exorcised. The League of nations similarly offered a public arena in 
which to raise international issues. Discussions in Geneva and London 
often turned on the question of the individual liberties to be afforded to 
colonized women. Too many practices, activists insisted, forced women to 
do things against their will: to marry, to have sex, to have their bodies mu-
tilated. A nation that prided itself on personal freedom and autonomy; a 
continent remade out of deference to peoples’ rights of self-determination; 
but colonies in which women were treated as if they were slaves? (Activists 
expended less energy protesting the fact that colonized peoples as a whole 
lacked self-determination.)
 Within these larger discussions about the colonized female were ques-
tions about the nature of girlhood. By the 1880s in Britain, as Sally Mitchell 
notes, “the concept of girlhood as a separate stage of existence with its own 
values and interests was only beginning to take shape.” With changes in 
public schooling and labor laws came the emergence of a girl who was “no 
longer a child, not yet a (sexual) adult.”5 There would be no consensus as to 
when this girl became a woman. For example, the new Girl Guides move-
ment included females from eleven to sixteen. A magazine entitled Girls’ 
Own Paper featured protagonists who ranged from eleven to eighteen, and 
its readers included females up to twenty-four—which, the magazine sug-
gested, was an opportune age for females to marry.6
 This new girl—whoever she might be—required protection. Thus, Par-
liament in 1885 raised the female age of consent for sex from thirteen to 
sixteen. Yet this law did not treat all “girls” alike. A man who had sex with 
a female less than twelve years of age was guilty of a felony, but if she was 
between twelve and sixteen, he had committed only a misdemeanor. Why 
this distinction? A female under twelve was assumed to be a prepubescent 
child. her body was developmentally incapable of safely engaging in inter-
course, and she was not yet mentally capable of consenting to such an act. 
A female over sixteen was presumed to be both physically and emotionally 
prepared to engage in and freely consent to sex. The years between twelve 
and sixteen constituted a kind of liminal period. A female might or might 
not be pubescent; she might or might not have the mental faculties to 
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understand the perils and pleasures of sex.7 Therefore, those from twelve 
to sixteen required at least a measure of sexual “protection,” in part out of 
concern for their bodies and in part because they occupied a psychologi-
cal middle ground between childhood and adulthood, namely, girlhood.
 In the colonies, Britons searched in vain for girlhood. colonial officials 
seemed blind to any African categories that might approximate British 
ideas of girlhood. They generally understood females as moving rapidly 
from children to women, daughters to wives, with no stage in between.8 
In addition, most europeans believed that females in the tropics reached 
puberty several years before those in more temperate climes.9 British girls 
of twelve to sixteen years might not be physically ready to safely engage 
in intercourse; they might not be psychologically prepared to consent 
to intercourse. In contrast, with the early onset of puberty and absent 
the transitional psychological period of “girlhood,” colonized females of 
twelve years might well be perfectly ready for sex.
 The thoughts of Tanganyika’s attorney general on the age of consent in 
regard to sex are instructive. commenting on a 1926 draft penal code for 
east Africa, he thought it “unsuitable” to “define the age of consent [to sex] 
in years.”10 Africans neither measured nor understood time in such a way. 
Instead, he wrote, a “large body of native opinion” understood puberty “as 
making a division between permissible and impermissible intercourse.” 
childhood stopped upon puberty. Using puberty to mark the age of con-
sent appealed to the attorney general because it  “expresses the essence of 
the offense more accurately than an age limit can” and because the “attain-
ment of puberty is a physiological fact.” That is, the physical ability to have 
sex was presumed to be accompanied by the psychological or emotional 
maturity to consent to sex. There was no cultural or social category of girl-
hood as there was in Britain. The line between child and adult was strictly 
a physiological one. Like many officials elsewhere in the empire, however, 
the attorney general failed to explain exactly what he meant by puberty. It 
was a “fact” that could be determined biomedically, although he deferred to 
Africans as to what that fact was: he suggested vaguely that puberty should 
be used in “its full meaning, as the natives themselves understand it.”
 The focus on physiology as opposed to psychology carried over into 
debates on the minimum age of marriage. In fact, the age of consent in 
regard to sex and the minimum age of marriage were often intertwined.11 
It was presumed that sex followed immediately upon marriage, and thus, a 
female could not be ready for marriage unless she was also ready for sex.12 
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For many officials, the reverse was also true: once a female was ready for 
sexual intercourse, she was ready for marriage.
 India saw some of the most intense debates over ages of consent to sex 
and to marriage. In a ghastly incident in 1890, a thirty-five-year-old man had 
sex with his eleven-year-old bride, who later died of the resulting injuries. he 
could not be held criminally responsible for her death because he had engaged 
in lawful sex with her. She was a year older than the age of consent to sex, and 
she was his wife—and British law could not conceive of sexual violence within 
marriage. To remedy the outrage, the imperial government pushed through 
a law setting the age of marriage at twelve—the presumed age of puberty for 
Indian girls. That is, marriage at eleven years was wrong because the female 
was not physically ready for sex, while marriage at twelve years was acceptable 
because the female was pubescent and thus physically ready for sex. At what 
age a female became mentally and emotionally prepared for sex and marriage 
was a question left unasked. hindu nationalists condemned this interference 
into the domestic sphere, and for decades, the government shied away from 
any further legislation on family or gender issues.13
 consequently, when missionaries, activists in Britain, colonial of-
ficials, and elite African men in Kenya considered early marriage, they 
took part in empirewide debates over girlhood, maturity, and consent.14 
In nyanza Province, in nairobi, and along the coast, they talked about 
puberty, about emotional maturity, about custom. Officials worried over 
the true extent of their power to alter African life, missionaries stretched 
the boundaries of girlhood, and African elites pressed for change. And it 
seems that no one thought to inquire into the opinions of African females.
nyanza Province, 1926–28
In a meeting on September 30, 1926, the native catholic Union (ncU) 
considered the issue of child marriage and the marriage of young girls 
to elderly men. The history of the ncU has yet to be written, although 
its origins lay in the nyanza Province−based Kavirondo Taxpayers’ Wel-
fare Association (KTWA), a relatively mild political group. earlier in 1926, 
when the KTWA had come too much under the influence of the Protestant 
missionary W. e. Owen, some members left to create the ncU under the 
leadership of Father J. A. Wall.15 The notes of the September meeting of the 
ncU have not been found, and it is difficult to know if African members 
or their missionary mentors broached the topic of early marriage. That it 
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came at the height of discussions in India and in the League of nations 
is perhaps not coincidental. The ncU members, like Indian reformers, 
may have been using child marriage as a means of measuring themselves 
against the tape of international standards.16
 c. M. Dobbs, the senior commissioner of the province, was recep-
tive to the ncU’s concerns. “It is undoubtedly very undesirable,” he wrote 
to the nyanza district commissioners, “that girls who are still immature 
should be married, and especially to old men, who may have many wives 
already.” he asked his district commissioners to raise the issue with their 
local native councils (Lncs)—bodies with a mixture of elected and ap-
pointed members, intended to channel political strivings into a controlled 
arena.17 Dobbs offered that the Lncs could enact bylaws making it an of-
fense to marry off a girl under the age of fourteen or fifteen years.18 The 
Kericho Lnc admitted that although “some few girls may be married 
young,” they did not cohabit with their husbands unless they and their 
mothers gave consent.19 The central Kavirondo Lnc, however, proposed 
that to marry a female under fifteen or to allow one’s daughter to be mar-
ried before that age should be an offense punishable by a 150-shilling fine 
or, in default of payment, a three-month prison sentence.20 The north Ka-
virondo Lnc passed a similar resolution early in 1927.
 Lnc resolutions gained the force of law only with the government’s 
assent, which in this case would be denied. The director of medical and 
sanitation services weighed in, explaining that by age fifteen some African 
females could not be counted as “immature.” If African females were physi-
cally “mature,” then they were, he implied, fully ready for marriage.21 J. A. 
ross, medical officer for north Kavirondo and nandi, also dismissed any 
attempt to establish a minimum age of marriage. Some African females 
were mature at twelve years or even younger, he asserted. Puberty—and 
the marriageability of females—could not be predetermined by a calendar. 
The only means of establishing the “suitability of girls for marriage” was 
through a visual examination.22 (What he expected to be revealed by such 
an exam ross did not say.) Dobbs countered with a resolution that would 
omit a minimum age and criminalize only the marriage of “immature” 
girls.23 The question was rendered moot by the attorney general, who ruled 
that Lncs lacked the authority to make resolutions on items “of such grav-
ity as the subject matter in this case.”24
 nonetheless, the topic of immature marriage lingered along for several 
more months. In August, the central Kavirondo Lnc resolved that the 
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government should alter section 375 of the penal code, which established 
twelve as the age of consent for sex in marriage.25 The Lnc recommended 
the age be increased to fifteen.26 Thus, a twelve-year-old female could 
still be betrothed, but the marriage could not be consummated until she 
reached fifteen. The crown counsel, P. A. Mcelwane, proved unreceptive. 
Increasing the age was unnecessary, for (he claimed) even at twelve Afri-
can females had reached puberty and were ready for sex. Such a change 
in the law also carried disturbing racial implications. The age of marriage 
in Britain was still twelve under common law. “If an english girl of twelve 
can marry in the fullest sense of the word,” Mcelwane wrote, “I see no 
reason why a girl here should not marry at that age.” “If a girl married in 
england at say the age of fourteen [should] come out here,” he asked, “is 
she not to be allowed to cohabit with her husband in Kenya though she 
might lawfully do so in england?” could African definitions of girlhood 
be more expansive than those of Britons? If anything, he argued, the age 
of marriage for African females should be lower than that for whites, since 
the former reached puberty at an earlier age than the latter.27
 There remained a glimmer of hope for some kind of action. The chief 
native commissioner wrote the attorney general in October that early 
marriage was, in fact, a dangerous and growing practice. he claimed it 
was “against the interests of the tribe from a eugenic point of view, and 
it appears to be very desirable, in the public interest, to put a stop to the 
practice.”28 Altering the penal code was a large undertaking and would 
implicate all residents of the colony. Would other “tribes” be amenable to 
such a change? the attorney general wondered.29 Over a year into the dis-
cussion, Dobbs turned to white authorities in the province—administrators 
and missionaries—for feedback.30 The north Kavirondo acting district 
commissioner thought that the chronological age of females at marriage 
was irrelevant, for no “harm is done . . . provided she has attained matu-
rity.”31 Of greater concern to him and his colleague in nandi was African 
youths’ illicit sexual intercourse with girls as young as ten.32
 Missionary opinion was mixed. O. c. Keller of the nyangori Mission 
thought underage and forced marriages were absent among the Luhyia, al-
though, like the district commissioner, he believed sex between adult men 
and immature girls was quite common.33 eric Beavon of the Seventh-day 
Adventist (SDA) mission believed that the “evil of immature marriage 
with consummation is sufficiently widespread” among the Gusii so as to 
require “special legislation.” his colleague, W. W. Armstrong, thought it 
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much less common among the Luo, but h. W. Innis of the Ogada Mission 
disagreed.34 Like administrators, Innis opposed setting a minimum age to 
marry, believing that it was too difficult to reckon an African’s age and that 
girls reached puberty at anywhere from twelve to sixteen years. he instead 
recommended that marrying off a prepubescent girl should be a serious 
offense under the penal code and should “be considered such an offence 
as rape” for all residents of the colony—regardless of race.35
 At this point, the archival record runs dry. It is unlikely that any revised 
resolution was ever passed and approved, for nothing was mentioned of it 
in later correspondence. The discussion reveals, however, competing and 
contradictory ideas about girlhood and marriage. The primary question 
quickly shifted from chronological age to physical development as mark-
ers of marriageability. All of the men involved seemed to agree with one 
line of reasoning: marriage meant sex, prepubescent girls should not have 
sex, and thus prepubescent girls should not be considered marriageable.
 Puberty, to ross, Dobbs, and many others, seemed to be the clearest 
way to distinguish between a female who could be married and one who 
could not. Yet many questions were left unanswered or, in fact, were never 
asked at all. As much as the men in nyanza wrote about it, they never quite 
got around to explaining what they meant by “reaching puberty.” Was it 
the onset of outward physical signs of puberty? If so, should the first faint 
signs of the development of breasts be sufficient? Did first menses mark 
the onset of puberty—or the culmination of it? That is, did menarche sud-
denly transform a girl into a woman? And if puberty was intended to mark 
a female as sexually mature and thus ready for marriage, did menarche 
actually make a girl physically prepared to engage—safely—in intercourse?
 The focus on puberty and physical development overshadowed any 
consideration of a female’s emotional and mental standing. This latter 
issue had been part of the native catholic Union’s original complaint—the 
marriage of young girls to elderly men. This concern was separate from 
the physical question: physiologically, it made no difference if a prepu-
bescent girl engaged in intercourse with a man three years her senior, or 
twice her age, or four times her age.36 The presumption, however, was that 
emotionally, the girl would be more repulsed by an older man than one 
closer to her own age. To put it more bluntly: being raped by a young man 
was not nearly as bad as being raped by an old man. The question of age 
disparity was soon pushed aside, and thus so too was any consideration 
of a girl’s emotional or mental state in relation to marriageability. Focusing 
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on puberty privileged outward physical signs of adulthood, such that a ten-
year-old pubescent girl could be marriageable but not a late-developing 
seventeen-year-old.
 What is perhaps most surprising about these discussions in nyanza—
and indeed all the archival material considered here—is the absolute si-
lence on the matter of female initiation. In many parts of Kenya, including 
Gusii and some Luhyia areas of nyanza, females underwent initiation 
ceremonies that marked their emergence out of childhood. Yet in none 
of their correspondence or resolutions did these men broach the idea that 
initiation could be used as a sign of womanhood and maturity. This is 
in contrast to official discussions surrounding African males. Throughout 
the colonial period, government officials and members of the judiciary 
cast about for means of separating men from boys.37 They resorted to a 
variety of methods of reckoning a male’s age—dental x-rays, the appear-
ance of underarm hair—but evidence of initiation and circumcision were 
among the commonest.38 Female excision was, of course, much more con-
troversial than male circumcision, and administrators most often tried 
to take no official note of it. european men may have thought it more 
politic to simply ignore female initiation in their consideration of fe-
male adulthood.
archdeacon owen, Forced Marriage,  
and girLhood FroM 1930
Archdeacon Walter Owen of the church Missionary Society began his ca-
reer in Uganda in 1904, and in 1918, he  became archdeacon of Kavirondo 
(covering much the same area as nyanza province in western Kenya). he 
considered himself a defender of African interests against the exploitative 
practices of state and settler, although he exercised his own forms of pater-
nalistic authority over “his” Africans. By the 1930s, Owen had turned his 
attention to African women, particularly to (what he believed to be) the 
large number of forced marriages in his domain and in Africa generally.39 
In August 1935, he published a letter in the Manchester Guardian telling of 
a young woman forced into marriage—and African marriage, he insisted, 
was little more than “enslavement.” various women’s groups quickly called 
meetings and demanded answers from the colonial Office, to little effect.
 not to be dissuaded, in June 1936 Owen published a second and more 
devastating letter. In the pages of the Guardian, he related the story of 
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Kekwe, an eighteen-year-old female living in Tanganyika. Kekwe’s parents, 
as Owen told it, had married her to a man not of her choosing. She left him 
for another man, and when her (legal) husband came to retrieve her, Kekwe 
drew a knife. The knife hit its mark, he fell dead, and Kekwe stood trial for 
manslaughter. A British judge sentenced her to eighteen months  impris-
onment.40 A firestorm in Britain ensued. Faced with a small but vocal and 
politically connected set of critics, the colonial Office finally succumbed 
to pressure and ordered an inquiry. Administrators from across Britain’s 
African empire were requested to provide information on the existence 
(or, as the instructions strongly hinted, nonexistence) of forced marriage.
 Owen’s letter about Kekwe suggested a different understanding of 
early marriage. Through much of his crusade against forced marriage, 
Owen used the terms girl and girlhood. he described Kekwe as a girl, and 
he told his readers that “the degradation felt by African girls when dragged 
off is unspeakable.” “We must,” Owen continued, “for the sake of African 
girlhood, teach the tribes that without consent there is no true marriage.” 
he had for many years resisted critiquing African customs, but the “an-
guish of decent girls” forced him to take action.41 African societies could 
never be considered civilized while “such outrages on the personality of 
girlhood” continued.42 Although Owen also used the language of girlhood 
in his personal archive, he certainly understood the rhetorical importance 
of employing it in his public writings.43 he was alive to the emotional jolt 
he made when describing victims of forced marriage as girls. “Although 
they are ‘only Africans,’” he wrote in a letter about Kekwe, “their anguish is 
no less deep than the anguish of english girlhood.”
 Owen’s definition of girlhood differed significantly from those used in 
1926 and 1927, when an emphasis on puberty and age precluded discussion 
of a female’s mental or emotional state.44 The “girl” Kekwe was somewhere 
between seventeen and twenty years old. commenting on another case of 
forced marriage, Owen reported that “many African girls are forced into 
marriage in their middle ‘teens.’”45 Apparently, it was not a particular age 
nor physical development that made a girl into a woman. In fact, Owen 
seems never to have speculated on when a female could be considered 
marriageable. More important to him was eliminating forced marriage. 
he did not blanch at a female in her middle teens being married, so long 
as it was not a forced marriage. (And, after all, Kekwe had killed her legal 
husband when he came to fetch her from her preferred mate.) Yet Owen 
also believed it unlikely that a female of thirteen had the psychological 
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fortitude to reject a man to whom she had been betrothed at age nine or 
ten. The question thus seemed to involve, for Owen, finding a place at 
which a girl became a woman emotionally—when a child (incapable of 
refusing or consenting to marriage) became an adult (who could consent 
and whose ability to refuse marriage had to be protected).
 Moreover, Owen and like-minded thinkers in Britain believed that a 
marriage between a young bride and an elderly, polygynist groom was 
necessarily a case of forced marriage and an especially vile type at that. For 
a culture fully immersed in the idea of a companionate marriage, it was 
highly doubtful to Britons that a young woman would willingly marry a 
man decades her senior—what interests could they possibly share? What 
kind of romantic life could they find? A marriage of a young woman to an 
old man almost certainly had to be forced. Worse still was marriage to an 
old polygamist. The connection between polygamy and forced marriage 
seemed patent. It was inconceivable that a young woman would agree 
to marry an old man with multiple wives—there could be no tenderness 
there, no bond between two individuals. christine Spender, commenting 
on equatorial Africa, equated polygamy with nonconsensual marriage; 
Archbishop Alexandre Leroy, formerly of Gabon, believed it nothing 
more than slavery.46 More commonly, the evils of marrying an elderly man 
or a polygamist appeared so evident as to require no comment.
 Owen thus made a special point of noting age disparities when publi-
cizing cases of forced marriage. In his letters to the Guardian, he amplified 
his stories by observing that the groom was “very much older . . . and a po-
lygamist” or by describing “a girl just emerging from childhood” being be-
trothed to an “old man.”47 On another occasion, he pulled these arguments 
together as he tried to extract empathy from a district commissioner for 
African females. he recounted the story of A. (“a girl of 16–17 years”) who 
was caught in a dispute between “an old man” named O. (who had given 
bridewealth for her) and “an old friend of her father” (who had appar-
ently been promised A. in marriage many years before). “Such unions of 
old men to young girls,” Owen insisted, “must be as repugnant to normal 
girls as they appear to many of us”—including the district commissioner, 
presumably. “I would beg yet once again,” he continued, “that something 
be done to save African girls from experiences such as that of 16–17 yrl 
[sic] old A.”48 Later, he told of a “girl” who tried to reject a leviratic union 
because “she did not want to be married to an elderly man, but wanted a 
man of her own age.”49
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 By the time of Owen’s death in 1944, his campaign seems to have 
borne little fruit. he did gain the release of some females who had man-
aged to reach out to him, and perhaps colonial officials in nyanza were 
more sensitive to the plight of pubescent females because of Owen. But 
there is little evidence that officials took any steps other than dealing with 
the specific cases he brought to them. Officials believed forced marriage 
deplorable, as was the marriage of prepubescent girls. The notion that 
pubescent, teenaged “girls” might not be mature enough to consent to 
marriage was of less concern.50
chiLd Marriage on the coast, 1949–50
The Kenyan colonial administration had its attention drawn to child mar-
riage again in 1949. Seventh-day Adventist missionary W. S. raitt, stationed 
in nairobi, wrote to the district commissioner of Malindi about a “little 
girl” named Dama. Several months of correspondence fleshed out her tale. 
Dama’s father, Simeon, had once been an SDA adherent but had left the 
church. Simeon subsequently betrothed Dama and another daughter, and 
he expended their bridewealth on a wife for his brother and for daily living 
expenses. now, according to raitt, the time had come for Dama to go to 
her husband, chief Kalu, but she refused. raitt feared that the local Afri-
can court would uphold the marriage contract and force Dama to go to the 
chief. raitt relied on language Owen and others had used a decade before. 
he charged that the buying and selling “of little girls, this forcing them to 
become the junior wives of old men” was “nothing less than slavery.” Quite 
a scandal would arise, he warned darkly, should the story become public.51
 The district commissioner, F. r. Wilson, assured raitt that his facts 
were incorrect—there was neither scandal nor slavery in the case. After 
he left the church, Simeon had become a drunkard, and Dama had been 
more than glad to accept a marriage to chief Kalu to escape her unhappy 
home. (Whether he meant that was the case when the marriage was con-
tracted or now that it was time to cohabitate was unclear.) Moreover, basic 
fairness was in play. “I would not wish you to imagine that I am anything 
but sympathetic with your view of child marriage,” Wilson informed raitt, 
but it would be “grossly inequitable” to deny the chief his wife. Kalu had 
given bridewealth, which an indebted Simeon could not return. neither 
was it an issue for intervention: child betrothal was, after all, customary in 
the region.52
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 Unsatisfied, raitt took his concerns to nairobi officials. The native 
courts officer and the chief native commissioner conferred. As with most 
social issues, they had little desire to become directly involved. In part, 
officials shied away from interfering with customs that were critical to 
African social structures but largely irrelevant to the functioning of the 
colonial economic order. Female genital cutting was the classic example. 
When missionaries forced their Gikuyu converts in 1929 to choose either 
the church or genital operations on their daughters, the pews were left 
nearly empty. colonial officials tried as best they could to remain on the 
sidelines of the resulting furor—no sense in Government getting involved 
in a matter so central to African culture, as long as taxes were paid and 
bodies went out to work.
 rather than directly attacking practices they found distasteful, of-
ficials preferred to wait for education, social change, and propaganda 
to slowly alter custom and public opinion. As Africans became more 
“modern” and christian, the thinking went, they would naturally come 
to the conclusion that things such as child marriage and polygamy were 
backward, harmful, and pagan. The government could push Africans 
in this direction using propaganda through chiefs and public meetings 
(barazas). Until “public opinion” (a much-used phrase) came round, the 
government should not otherwise interfere. A law against something 
such as circumcision would be, in the meantime, widely unpopular—and 
widely ignored.53 When its laws were ignored, Government was shown to 
be impotent, and this would not do. If officials felt that something should 
be done, they turned to their local native councils. If an Lnc bylaw was 
unpopular, Government could deny responsibility: Lncs represented Af-
ricans, African councillors passed their own resolutions, and African-run 
courts enforced their bylaws. Of course, district commissioners chaired 
Lnc meetings, many bylaws were standardized and written by officials, 
and the attorney general could veto resolutions. Still, if Africans were 
going to be upset, better to direct their anger toward their fellow Africans 
on the Lncs.
 Faced with a potential scandal over early marriage, the courts officer, 
M. n. evans, thought to turn it over to the local native council. Would it be 
amenable, he wondered, to passing a resolution “making the contraction 
of marriages by girls under 16 illegal”?54 If so, offenders could be prose-
cuted in African courts. The provincial commissioner hesitated. As they 
all knew, the Lncs were not always representative, and did not necessarily 
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have that much influence. Thus, a resolution of that kind would be “use-
less” unless the people were supportive of such a law.55 Word then reached 
nairobi indicating the Lnc had, eight years previously, resolved “that it is 
contrary to nyika law and custom to give or take in marriage young girls 
who have not reached maturity and that offenders shall be punished.” At 
that time, government officials (likely through the chief native commis-
sioner or attorney general) expressed their appreciation of the sentiment 
but rejected the resolution.56 evans believed that it had been rejected at 
that time because it was unenforceable: the people were not behind it. Per-
haps now things had changed: perhaps now the majority of Giriama op-
posed child marriage, in which case a resolution should have government 
support. The chief native commissioner remained unconvinced that such 
a resolution would reflect “public opinion” or even a well thought-out de-
bate among Lnc members.57
 regardless, in April the Lnc pushed ahead with resolution 32/50. 
child marriage was a valid custom, it said, but undesirable, since girls 
were often married off to “much older men.” Propaganda and education 
should be the paths toward eliminating it. In the meantime, fathers and 
husbands should be prosecuted in African courts if girls were sent to live 
with their husbands before they reached “fully marriageable age.”58 This 
resolution apparently passed muster with nairobi officials, and by novem-
ber, eight cases had appeared in the native courts involving men marrying 
or giving in marriage “a girl who has not attained sexual maturity” as an 
offense against “native Law and custom.”59
 As in earlier debates, clarity in definitions of early marriage remained 
elusive. raitt wrote of a “little girl,” without explaining what he meant: was 
Dama five? Was she twelve but prepubescent? Was she classed as a teenager 
still in “girlhood”? evans first demanded greater precision, proposing six-
teen as an age by which all females could be assumed to be marriageable. 
The word maturity, he thought, lacked specificity.60 The Lnc in 1950 spoke 
of “sexual maturity” but without spelling out what this meant. evans now 
began to wonder about emotional or psychological maturity. Thinking of 
a bride betrothed as a child, he stated, “I should imagine that when the 
time comes for her to go to her husband, she has little or no hope of being 
able to resist the pressure from her father and husband, if the transaction 
is against her will.”61 A child betrothal might therefore still be wrong, even 
if the female was sixteen and “sexually mature” at the time of cohabitation. 
regardless, deferring to the Lnc and African court elders satisfied the 
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administrators. The typewriters soon fell silent, the inexactness over “early 
marriage” unresolved for officials.62 What became of Dama is unknown.
The three episodes recounted here certainly do not exhaust the archi-
val record, but they were chosen as instructive and provocative points 
through which to examine the history of early marriage. Many other 
individuals, across the colonial period and across Kenya, engaged in 
similar—and equally frustrating—attempts to identify a marriageable 
female. early colonial official charles Dundas in 1915 worried over “the 
early age at which native girls are married,” an “evil which seems to in-
crease year by year.”63 Lncs in central Province debated the implications 
of child betrothals for a least two decades from 1929.64 Other conversa-
tions remain to be recovered in the papers of “tribal associations” such as 
the ncU and Luo Union, in the transcripts of local African courts, and in 
the reminiscences of the elders. And today, even as the national Assem-
bly takes steps to define child and adult, marriageable and unmarriage-
able, Kenyans of all stripes—parents, educators, children, government 
officials—along with nongovernmental organizations (nGOs) continue 
to negotiate the definitions and meanings of childhood, girlhood (the “girl 
child”), and adulthood.65
 These discussions were not limited to colonial Kenya but ranged 
across the British empire and beyond. As the other chapters in this vol-
ume demonstrate, there were ongoing discussions among Africans and 
europeans over all manner of issues involving women and marriage. 
Was bridewealth a means to bind two families—or the enslavement of a 
woman? Was child betrothal an innocuous custom—or child slavery? To 
what extent should missionaries and government officials intervene in 
marital practices? At what point did parental rights shade into exploita-
tion? Did the protection of women’s liberty come at the cost of women’s 
licentiousness? And again, as authors in this volume show, many of these 
debates continue today. even as numerous groups and individuals fight to 
end forced marriage, we continue to find ourselves faced with the ques-
tions posed long ago by African councillors, Owen the missionary, and 
evans the official. how does one define force? how does one measure con-
sent? Who is a girl and who is a woman? What social, legal, biological, 
and/or emotional factors are critical to making a female marriageable? 
Legislation such as the Kenya Marriage Act of 2014 may help clarify the 
legal aspects of these issues, but they will not put all the questions to rest.
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c h a P t e r  F o u r
Italian Weddings and Memory of Trauma
colonial Domestic Policy in Southern Somalia, 1910–41
Fr AnceScA DecLIch
Marriage arrangements in African societies have been widely de-
bated by anthropologists and government officers since the colonial pe-
riod. In the horn of Africa, as well as elsewhere, colonial officers and 
anthropologists saw marriage transactions as forms of buying and selling 
insofar as women were exchanged among families and/or men.1 The Ital-
ian colonial officer Alberto Pollera described the ways consent was solic-
ited from all actors, including the bride, and demonstrated how complex 
marriage negotiations focused on goods and chattels. Despite his own 
insights, he concluded that marriage was often little more than an eco-
nomic transaction.2
 In the contemporary era, “arranged marriages” are often consid-
ered abusive and equated with “forced marriages.” In isolated cases, asy-
lum seekers have invoked fleeing an unwanted arranged marriage as the 
ground for a “well founded fear of persecution” and have thus been 
granted refugee protection status in europe and elsewhere.3 In order to 
understand contemporary arranged marriages, it is crucial to situate them 
in an ethnographic, socioeconomic, historical context and to recognize 
the importance of the social networks into which the new spouses enter 
by wedding. Similarly, the notion of forced marriage is also historically 
constructed and, as such, needs to be contextualized in the historically 
determined sociocultural environments from which it stems.
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 In this chapter, I demonstrate that forcing people into monogamous 
marriages was an integral part of Italian colonial policy, as implemented 
in Gosha, in the Middle and Lower Juba of Somalia, during the last fif-
teen years of the Fascist period before the British Military Administration 
(BMA) took over the area in 1941. As an explicit colonial policy, however, 
forced marriage was completely different from the indigenous institution 
of arranged marriage. The prevailing indigenous practice of arranged 
marriages ensured that young men, women, and children in vulnerable 
stages of their lives were embedded in a web of controlled social relations. 
The Italian forced marriage policy was implemented as a mechanism of 
labor control over men and women, and it operated uncomfortably along-
side a traditional practice of arranged marriage. Forced marriages gen-
erally took the form of wedding contracts imposed by colonial officers 
on couples, who were then forced to work on the colonizers’ farms. But 
in Gosha, a Maay Maay− and Bantu-speaking area of the Italian Somali 
colony, forced marriages were imposed on girls only. The Italian practice 
in Gosha demonstrates that regardless of the purported values asserted 
by the colonial state, real practices subjugated women and tied them to 
a european patriarchal norm of family structure. colonial forced mar-
riages effectively conveyed power to each man and enabled unrestricted 
access to a girl’s body, thereby permitting physical and emotional abuse of 
married women. By contrast, the historical practice of arranged marriages 
frequently ensured a web of social relations that supported the new couple 
emotionally and materially.
 Paola Tabet has demonstrated how much of the colonial moralizing dis-
courses about the sexuality of women, “on the legitimate or illegitimate use 
of the women’s body,” are discourses about “form of property in women.”4 
Tabet’s comparative analysis of marriages highlights the very diversified 
practices of offering sexual services in Africa and elsewhere.5 My research 
builds on these observations and demonstrates how moralizing attitudes 
toward “polyandric” forms of marriage in southern Somalia were nothing 
if not a reflection of the desire to channel and control African labor.
arranged Marriage and sociaL networks
In a subsistence farming economy, such as that in colonial southern So-
malia, webs of social relations among women are essential to ensure the 
provision of food and availability of child care. Kinship and neighborhood 
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networks support women who work on farms while simultaneously rais-
ing children. Individual women, moreover, need people they can trust to 
offer protection or assistance in times of need. In the absence of state-
based and religious welfare, people invest in other forms of social protec-
tion throughout their life cycle. Such protection limits choices individuals 
may exercise during the course of their lives in contexts where capabilities 
and aspirations are constrained both by the environment and by poverty.
 In this light, it is useful to reflect on the distinction some feminist 
scholars draw between negative and positive freedoms.6 Saba Mahmood 
notes that the former refers to “the absence of external obstacles to self-
guided choice and action, whether imposed by the state, corporations, 
or private individuals,” and the latter concerns the “capacity to realize an 
autonomous will, one generally fashioned in accord with the dictates of 
‘universal reason’ or ‘self-interest,’ hence unencumbered by the weight of 
custom, transcendental will, and tradition.”7 Both concepts of freedom 
embed the idea of individual autonomy, whereby choices and actions are 
a consequence of one’s “‘own will’ rather than custom, tradition, or direct 
coercion.”8 In material contexts wherein everyone experiences resource 
scarcity, webs of kinship relations and neighborhood ties provide the ideal 
of freedom from relations of domination. Freedom does not exist in a 
vacuum but ought to be analyzed against the context of various degrees of 
dependence. It may thus be more appropriate to describe arranged mar-
riage agreements in terms of contracts among families in which individ-
ual spouses may play more or less autonomous roles, depending on their 
character and personal options. Spouses, however, ensured a web of rela-
tionships that, particularly in poverty, were crucially important.
soMaLi  L ineages and soMaLia
At the turn of the nineteenth century, the country that is now split into 
Somaliland, Somalia, and Puntland was inhabited by a minority of Oromo 
and Bantu speakers and a majority of people who spoke Somali language; 
the latter were organized in groups of patrilineages also aggregated in 
larger patrilineal clans. Some practiced pastoral nomadism; some were 
farm owners and farmed mainly through slave labor in riverine and inter-
riverine areas; others were urban dwellers and traders.
 Somali lineages living in urban dwellings were genealogically inter-
related with the pastoral nomads and/or the farm owners, and weddings 
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as well as trade reinforced such ties. Several coastal groups were descen-
dents of migrants from countries of the Indian Ocean (hadramaut and 
Gujarat, for instance) and had connections with their previous countries. 
The population—especially in the central and southern territories of So-
malia, in the urban settlements along the Shebelle and Jubba rivers—was 
socially stratified: it was divided into those who had control over the terri-
tory and were considered “noble” and those considered commoners who 
“belonged” to lineages. commoners might or might not have different sta-
tuses in the elders councils, subordinated to the nobles of the prominent 
lineages from whom they had sought protection.9 It was not uncommon 
for a group initially in the position of being protected to increase in num-
ber with the arrival of members of the same clan from other areas and 
then override the previous “owners” of the land.10 In addition, there was 
a category of people considered outcasts, composed of hunter and gath-
erers, ironsmiths, and other kinds of artisans; the latter lived within the 
other groups but were bound by rules of endogamy. Moreover, there were 
slaves who were bought or acquired through raids, as well as escaped or 
freed slaves. Finally, groups of free ex-Bantu language speakers were likely 
to live in the northern areas of the Shebelle river. Aggregates of lineages 
exerting control over a certain territory are addressed in the south as reer.11 
To complicate our understanding of the social organization, smaller lin-
eages could be adopted by larger ones following different patterns, thus 
yielding even finer gradations among these broad categories, especially 
among so-called nobles. These were fluid categories, making it very diffi-
cult to map lineages and their locations in space.12
ForMs oF Marriages and Marriage transactions
Within this fluid social landscape, family and lineage interactions were 
continuously reinforced through intermarriages. Among pastoral no-
mads, exogamic marriages were usually arranged to maintain alliances 
between patrilineages as well.13 Unlike the situation among the north-
ern Somali clans, marriage among the rahanweyn interriverine groups 
could serve as a first step to actually changing one’s clan.14 During the 
first decades of the twentieth century, weddings and marriages in Soma-
lia were held according to several modalities.15 The marriage practices 
of slaves, nobles, and commoners had some variations in terms of the 
transactions of wealth and in the actors involved. The latter reflected 
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the set of social relations that were activated or reinforced as a result of 
the wedding.
 The most common was the arranged marriage, in which the families 
of spouses undertook most of the agreements prior to the wedding. The 
future spouses had some degree of consent about the choice of partner, de-
pending primarily on the relations they had with their parents. variations 
of custom, however, were recorded in different groups of patrilineages. 
Two ways of marrying, for instance, were reported in the 1920s among the 
Somali hawyie Abgal: in the first, a boy and girl would meet and agree 
to elope together; in the second, the potential groom negotiated with the 
brother or father of the bride.16 Among the Somali habar hintiro, future 
spouses might make an informal agreement with their respective family 
members before eloping: the groom might leave a cloth and some money 
for the mother of the bride, and she might, in turn, later hand that money 
to the daughter (now wed) to buy domestic tools.17
 Within the context of arranged marriages, a bride or groom could 
often suggest the choice of a specific partner. But such subtle suggestions 
were not always involved, and adolescents often submitted to the will of 
their parents. Some marriages were prearranged before puberty, mostly 
for daughters of very old fathers or for orphans. The principle expressed in 
this practice was that of securing the future of the female child through an 
early agreement with a trustworthy man.
 Because weddings were celebrated at or within one year of puberty, 
close relatives usually made the decision about a child’s marriage. In the 
event that the two potential spouses were not in agreement with their 
families’ decision, if they felt their voices went unheard, and/or if the 
groom was ill prepared to pay the bridewealth requested, the couple could 
opt for marriage by elopement.18 This option—wherein the couple decided 
to escape somewhere else and thereby refuse to engage with the families’ 
and lineages’ requests in wealth—was also apparently quite common in 
Somaliland in the 1950s, and it still exists today.19 After several months, 
the eloped couple returned to their respective families. At that point, the 
husband agreed to make some kind of payment reflecting the marriage 
transactions in order to formally establish relations between the families; 
otherwise, the families would not recognize the couple and would not 
want to meet them and their children. By seeking such reconciliation, the 
eloped couple hoped to reestablish webs of relations and thus guarantee 
future protection and support in a variety of ways.
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 Marriage by abduction was also possible. This kind of union was 
common in areas of Somalia where raids by nomads were daily occur-
rences, such as in frontier areas between the Oromo and Somali speakers 
in southern Somalia.20 In such cases, customary law differentiated the chil-
dren of the couple according to the lineage membership of the spouses. 
Such norms were fragmented and varied according to area. For instance, 
when a Somali Marrehan man abducted an Oromo Borana woman, she 
became a slave, but both she and her children would be considered free 
individuals as soon as she bore a child.21 Alternatively, in Migiurtinia it was 
considered dishonorable for men to have sexual relations with slaves, ap-
parently because most slave women were of Swahili origin.22 A number of 
variations pertaining to the treatment of kidnapped women and children 
existed throughout Somali territory.23
 Massimo colucci, who compiled a consuetudinary of rights and prac-
tices in southern Somalia, demonstrated that the forms of marriages var-
ied widely among the different lineages and groups in large territories.24 In 
light of such diversity, he suggested that some forms, such as a Gherra reer 
case he described, were survivals of primitive stages of social organization. 
Among the Gherra, three forms of marriage existed: the first was by elope-
ment (bòb) and involved a consenting woman acting without the approval 
of or against the will of those who had parental authority over her; the 
second was an irregular union, or dur-kuburs, that was engaged when a 
man did not have the means to respond to the requests of the family of a 
particular woman; and the third was the nicàh, which colucci defined as 
“derived from an original buying and selling of a woman with elements of 
some Islamic precepts.” Most interestingly, among the Gherra was a prac-
tice that he considered a remnant of “a form of collective marriage” within 
the reer.25 he described this in detail:
When all the practices that compose the nicàh . . . are completed, at 
the very moment in which the bride should enter the conjugal house, 
she rather escapes. She goes to a Gherra rer [sic] which is not her rer 
nor the one of her husband; there she lives bestowing herself to all 
those men of the rer who desire it. After a while, sometimes several 
months later, when the woman’s pregnancy is already visible, the bride 
is dressed of a futa [rectangular cloth] given to her as a present, and 
the entire rer who hosted her—men and women, pubescents and fit—
go with her to the rer to which the groom belongs.26
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 Slavery was widespread in Somalia until 1904. The actors involved in 
slave marriages were different than among free people, as the network of 
social responsibilities in the former case involved the masters. Many mas-
ters arranged their slaves’ weddings. Masters of women slaves received the 
bridewealth for giving their slaves in marriage, and they retained owner-
ship of the offspring of the marriage.27 Presumably, the masters also paid 
for the genital labia cutting and infibulations of the women slaves.28
 After emancipation in the early twentieth century, some former slaves 
maintained relations of dependence and protection with their masters. 
Wedding practices were recorded among freed slaves of the Somali Abgal 
in 1919: the groom first entered the house of the woman he liked; served 
the parents of the girl; built a hut; prepared the beds and the domestic 
tools; and thereafter forced himself, often violently, into the house of the 
woman he wanted. The man symbolically beat his bride with a stick while 
she was in the hut.29
 Great diversity also existed in the female initiation practices of slaves 
as well as ex-slaves in southern Somalia. Slaves and ex-slaves who had 
been integrated into the main Somali clans over many generations adopted 
the clans’ customs, including the ritual female genital cutting of girls be-
fore puberty; some escaped slaves did not adhere to this practice. Many 
ex-slaves who were more recently enslaved kept their own traditions as 
opposed to those of their masters. The Zigula and the Makua, for instance, 
lived in Gosha and did not infibulate women but instead cut a piece off 
the top of their clitorises.30 The njanja, many of whom lived in Gosha vil-
lages during the early twentieth century, practiced a completely different 
form of initiation in which a namkungwe (ritual teacher) taught gender 
habits, discipline, and sexual practices.31 To this day, the njanja of Mozam-
bique and Malawi impose labia minora stretching on adolescent women, 
ostensibly in preparation for erotic practices.32 The denial of feminine sex-
ual pleasure, therefore, was not as common among slave women as it was 
among free Somali women who were infibulated. Both the Yao and the 
njanja were matrilineal, and husbands did not control wives in a manner 
commonly associated with patrilineal groups. Among matrilineal people, 
such as the the Makua of Mozambique, slavery and marriage of women by 
abduction was quite common and gave rise to a peculiar, if inferior, status 
within the lineage of the master to the children of the slave woman. But 
within some generations, the entire lineage, stemming from the woman 
kidnapped and enslaved as a concubine/wife, might reverse its status.33
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 At the turn of the twentieth century, the area of Gosha in the Lower Jubba 
was inhabited mainly by descendants of escaped or freed slaves of a wide 
variety of origins. customs involving initiations and marriages were there-
fore quite diverse and varied according to the degree of dependence such 
groups and single people had maintained with their masters after emancipa-
tion. Freed slaves, for instance, who belonged to slave lineages and who were 
integrated into the main clans, often lost their original languages and assim-
ilated many Somali customs. In contrast, slaves who had emancipated them-
selves and rejected their former masters were more likely to transmit to their 
descendants the customs of their groups of origin, such as the Yao, njanja 
(there referred to as niassa), Zigula, and Makua.34 The Zigula and the Makua, 
who in the 1980s spoke Kizigula, initiated their girls with mphambula and/or 
gango, which were different stages of buinda (female initiation) celebrations. 
These initiatory celebrations involved divinatory dances, attended exclusively 
by women in the case of the mphambula, which followed a period of seclu-
sion at home of the pubescent girl.35 The Yao, who at the time spoke the Maay 
Maay version of Somali, held some puberty initiation rituals in which masks 
of lions would appear in the village during the period of seclusion following 
a girl’s first menstruation. Some villages held schools of initiation in which 
age sets of adolescent girls and boys were assembled, divided by gender, and 
taught under the leadership of the namkungwe (ritual leader).36
 In the 1930s, weddings in the largely ex-slave villages of Gosha in-
volved considerable diversity among those of different ethnic origins. The 
groom’s family had to collect goods and wealth to convey to the family 
of the bride. Then and now, the exchange of goods that sanctioned those 
wedding was an occasion for exchanging prestige goods among the wom-
en’s network of the mother of the bride.37
 earlier Italian observers of the Gosha seemed to have imposed stereo-
typical Western notions on the matrimonial and sexual habits of the people 
they encountered. They seemed rather unaware of the criteria underlying 
the marriage transactions. In the next section, I highlight how their argu-
ments were mainly driven by the need to devise possible ways to control the 
labor force and channel it into industrial and agricultural development.
the southern soMaLi coLony Labor Force and sexuaL habits
Two large rivers, the Shebelle and the Jubba, cross the southern area of the 
Somalia colony, formerly known as Benadir, and provide fertile ground for 
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agricultural production. Gosha is the southernmost territory of the region 
then called Benadir. Until 1905, the administration of the Benadir region, 
which comprised the port of Uarsheikh and the three coastal towns of 
Mogadiscio, Merca, and Brava, was an Italian protectorate. colonial gov-
ernment operated by concession and was, in contemporary parlance, out-
sourced to private companies—first the Società Filonardi and later, from 
1898, the Società Anonima commerciale del Benadir.38
 One of the more problematic aspects of this “privatized” colonial 
administration model emerged via a scandal about the persistence of 
slavery in the colony.39 Slaves cultivated productive areas, and domestic 
slavery was widespread and not truly prohibited during the rule of the 
private companies. In a narrative that mirrored that of the contempo-
raneous congo Free State, the two companies were accused of having 
ignored the international resolutions mandating the abolition of slavery 
in all African territories. Specifically, the companies did not impede the 
inland trade of slaves from the western hinterland—and actually col-
luded with slave traders—by collecting taxes on the trade in slaves, as 
demonstrated by transactions recorded in the qadi’s register, containing 
the records of the civil cases dealt with by Muslim judges.40 International 
pressure, a public scandal in Italy, and subsequently a  parliamentary 
inquiry ultimately ended private contracts and thrust the territory under 
formal colonial control. Investigations into these abuses provide import-
ant information about the conditions of slaves and the role of African 
labor in the agricultural development of the colony.
 The productive farming areas along the Shebelle river were culti-
vated with the labor of slaves until the turn of the nineteenth century. Two 
large communities of freed or escaped slaves existed, hawai and Gosha. 
escaped slaves and slaves who were freed by the colonizers either went 
there on their own initiative or were sent there by the Italian officers. The 
officers regarded the farms surrounding these communities as not fully 
exploited and asserted that only a new reorganization of the labor force 
could allow a productive agricultural policy. reporters envisioned a labor 
force drained from Gosha, along the Jubba river, and ushered toward the 
farms of the Shebelle.41
 The Italians conducted two investigations about the presence of slav-
ery in the colony: the first by members of Parliament republican Gustavo 
chiesi and ernesto Travelli on behalf of the Società del Benadir, and a 
second by Luigi robecchi Bricchetti for the Società Antischiavistica. In 
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spite of their differing political and economic agendas, both investigations 
recommended that slavery not be abolished by decree. The reports ob-
served that southern Somali society was so deeply based on slave labor 
that freeing all slaves at once would create uncontrollable disorder among 
former slaves and the current Somali employers/masters. Indeed, the 
1904 Somali Bimaal revolt was at least partly prompted by rumors that 
the Italians wanted to abolish slavery immediately.42 The southern Somali 
of Benadir depended on the labor of slaves’ lineages, and a flourishing 
slave trade originated not only from seaports but also from the hinter-
land. Slaves were seized from among the Oromo. Somali farm owners had 
vested interests in keeping their slaves, and tribal and clan leaders insisted 
that they had only tolerated the Italian presence in their country because 
they were promised they would not be deprived of their slaves.43 Many 
Somali leaders maintained that they would not be able to survive without 
slaves: they feared that their farms would be abandoned and that nobody 
would shepherd their herds.44 To be sure, both private companies accepted 
these general principles on their arrival in the region.
Land and Forced Labor
chiesi’s study recommended to the Italian Parliament that three factors 
had to be taken into account if adequate modalities were to be created to 
make the region agriculturally productive—namely, land, capital invest-
ment for infrastructure, and labor. With respect to land, chiesi suggested 
that for specific experimental purposes, such as cotton production, some 
land concessions should be acquired from the natives who held nominal 
tenure.45 Later, however, he asserted that all land of the colony was to be 
declared state owned (demaniale); thereby, some of it could be distributed 
to customary owners so that the greater part could be allocated by the state 
to investor concessions.46 In eritrea, the Italian defeat at Adwa, ethiopia, 
pointed to the riskiness of large dispossessions of land, but in Somalia, this 
policy was proposed for the most fertile areas of Somali Benadir.47
 Advocates of colonial development encouraged private investment. 
capital investments were to be solicited from private investors for the pur-
pose of building infrastructure. The final and crucial aspect of colonial de-
velopment rested on the control and management of African labor. chiesi 
argued that development depended upon the capacity “to regulate and 
discipline the habits” of the people to the point that they became adequate 
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to the tasks involved in the future agricultural development of those areas. 
he expressed concern that certain habits might “render sterile and parch 
the biological sources of the race,” and he suggested controls on “the im-
moral behavior,” including the “promiscuity of the polygamic customs.”48 
Polygyny was thus identified as “the big, the true plague of Gosha.”49
 The republican argued that freed slaves or escaped slaves performed 
little in the way of work. he also exaggerated their sexual habits, which he 
saw as characterized by a sort of polyandry. Such behaviors, he believed, 
hampered the reproductive capacity of that population and spoiled the 
“race.” chiesi thought that some marriages were not properly institu-
tionalized; for instance, he asserted that “no special commitment rules 
the weddings of the Wa-Goscia—a man takes a fancy of a woman—it 
does not matter if she was or still is of somebody else—he attracts her to 
him, she is his wife for as long as his crush lasts.”50 no agency whatsoever 
was accorded to the woman in the choice of husband. his description as-
sumed that men managed the interchangeability of couples.
 chiesi drew on useful information regarding this type of marriage 
from officers’ reports on a nearby hawai community. he wrote,“In hawai’s 
population there is a scarcity of women [and] with the exception of a 
few chiefs who take advantage of their own authority and also have two 
wives, only half of the men [are] married and, therefore, it is rather hard 
to pursue the objective of increasing the population number.”51 The scar-
city of women among the emancipated communities of hawai was thus 
a common lament.52 Supposedly, female scarcity was a problem in Gosha 
too, in spite of it being a much older settlement.53 To be sure, the scarcity 
of women, together with the matrilineal habits of many of the ex-slaves, 
may have been among many factors that fostered women’s opportunity to 
choose their husbands and to change husbands relatively easily, despite 
the lack of agency accorded them in chiesi’s description.
 Why were there more men than women in these communities? One 
reason might have been an increased number of male slaves in those com-
munities. It is likely that most slaves who were freed or who were declared 
free by the government after presenting themselves to the Italian authorities 
were males. They were usually sent to either the hawai or the Gosha com-
munities.54 chiesi counted approximately twenty-five hundred individuals 
who had arrived in hawai in the last decades of the nineteenth century.55 
however, reading between the lines of the report, it may well be that 
women freed by the Italians were not sent to the communities in equally 
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large numbers. Some Somalis chiesi interviewed were convinced, rightly 
or otherwise, that emancipated women were bought by Italian officers as 
concubines and not actually freed,56 and it was indeed a habit of some 
officers to organize orgiastic events with them.57 Moreover, women with 
dependent children would have little reason to move to a freed slave area, 
especially if they had to leave their children with their former masters. 
They would likely have employed different strategies after emancipation.
 The experience of domestic slavery was deeply gendered.58 As I have 
argued elsewhere, in southern Somalia slave women and men had differ-
ing chances for social mobility.59 A suria (concubine) who gave birth to a 
master’s child could raise her status and gain access to a relatively better 
standard of living. And even if she did not bear her master a child, escaping 
may well have meant abandoning her own children, since most women 
became pregnant shortly after menarche (which was also the age of their 
marriage). As such, women above sixteen or seventeen years of age may 
have preferred not to flee from slavery or their masters. It was quite differ-
ent for male slaves, who had little claim on their own children and left them 
behind with their mothers. Some slave women actually might have had 
vested interests in remaining slaves if only to have their children supported 
by their masters. Some former slave women migrated to urban areas where 
their lives may have been somewhat easier than for women who remained 
with their former slave husbands on remote farms. Other former female 
slaves chose to live as masuria (pl. of suria) on farms of wealthier lovers 
where their living standards might be significantly improved.60
 It has been asserted that in certain Swahili contexts and in the Mauri-
tanian context described by Ann McDougall in this volume, the word suria 
may not be translated directly as “concubine,” for once the owner had en-
tered into such a relationship with his woman slave, he could no longer sell 
her as a slave and upon his death she became free.61 Masuria had different 
prerogatives depending on the juridical school respected in a specific area. 
however, entering into an intimate web of dependence with a master could 
afford a woman more security than marrying an emancipated slave, with 
whom she would have to flee and farm in a remote area; living on a farm in 
an area of inconsistent precipitation; or working as a prostitute. For example, 
the records of the qadi of Brava report a slave woman at the turn of the twen-
tieth century who, having been kidnapped and sold as a slave among the 
Mobileen, escaped and returned to her owner in Brava rather than eman-
cipating herself in one of the communities of freed slaves or requesting a 
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manumission certificate, for which she would have felt in debit toward those 
who awarded it.62 In other words, women had different sorts of roles than 
slave men, and they were likely to return to the domestic slavery circuit. 
hard manual labor on a master’s farm was more easily expected from men 
than from women, and hence, the men had a stronger incentive to escape.
 Slave women were often more fully integrated into their masters’ 
households. Farther south in Mombasa, slave women participated in their 
masters’ weddings.63 We do not know enough about such practices in 
the Benadir coast, but as late as 1988 in Mogadishu and along the coast, 
women of ex-slave lineages performed erotic dances at weddings of their 
Somali former masters, while “noble” Somali women did not dare to dance 
themselves, as it was considered shameful to mimic coitus. In the Benadir, 
however, former female slaves who maintained close relationships with 
women of their masters’ families did not diminish class distance as hap-
pened in Mombasa.64
 At the same time, Italian authorities were deeply concerned about freed 
slave women. The government tried to restrain the movement of women 
without husbands, especially when this could lead such women to work on 
their own rather than for somebody else or even for the government. On 
December 2, 1903, around twenty women, some of whom were slaves asking 
for manumission certificates, went to the government offices to request per-
mission to accompany the caravan of the explorer Ugo Ferrandi from Brava 
as far as Bardera.65 The officials denied them the certificates on the grounds 
that caravans were forbidden to travel with women and that such women 
could only have one intention—to practice prostitution. The women wanted 
to travel closer to their own original homelands in the Boran, where they 
had been caught as slaves. The Italian officials rejected their petition. The 
officials held that that Oromo-speaking Boran area was continuously raided 
by slave traders active in the Mobileen and the Audegle markets and, there-
fore, unsafe. In short, leaving aside the scorn with which these women were 
treated, they were denied the right to travel to Bardera.66
 The report justified the denial in this way: “none of those domestic 
slaves had reasons to complain about the respective masters, because they 
earn enough, by carrying water and construction material for the Govern-
ment, and they could earn much more if, rather willingly, [they] would 
not abandon their work to dedicate themselves to gluttony and guzzling.”67 
The argument demonstrates that granting manumission papers had very 
little to do with offering individual “freedom” to these women; rather, it 
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was a matter of controlling their movements, labor, and bodies. That these 
women wanted to set themselves free and to return to their own country, 
even if it meant exchanging sexual services for protection in the caravan, 
was not seen as a legitimate concern.
 At the heart of this incident was the female slaves’ desire to control 
their own sexuality. As slaves, the women could be forcibly taken as con-
cubines by their masters, who could obtain their sexual favors without 
payment. But the possibility of offering sexual services for payment, rather 
than being obliged to have sex without earning money, may have been an 
attractive option.68 In Zanzibar and Pemba islands in 1902, many freed 
women slaves dedicated themselves, sometimes temporarily, to prostitu-
tion.69 And when prostitution provided a good income and autonomy, it 
might also give rise to envy and revenge on the part of men and previous 
owners.70 In Brava, an appeal was made to the court to regulate the extent 
of ownership of a woman slave who also sold her body occasionally.71 This 
activity was certainly more remunerative in urban or densely populated 
areas than in remote farming ones. But prostitution could also be engaged 
in occasionally on an ad hoc basis to earn money, which the Italian resi-
dent in 1903 did not allow.
 In short, the Italians sought to organize the transition from slavery 
to “freedom” as a way of transferring the labor force from one owner to 
another, whereby the latter was in fact the colonial state. Women’s bodies 
were also considered property whose ownership was to be regulated by the 
state regardless of the women’s own wishes. The law proposed by Gustavo 
chiesi and ernesto Travelli to favor a transition from slavery to paid work 
underscores this. It explained that freed slaves, once they received their 
manumission certificate, would be required to live for five years in the 
place assigned by the governor (or on his behalf by the resident of the sta-
tion); further, they would be obliged to supply work under the conditions 
and compensation established in predetermined contractual forms. Arti-
cle 22 called for the habitual vagrancy of freed men and the prostitution of 
women to be punished with imprisonment for two months, with an extra 
month for each recidivist action.72
ProMiscuity and Labor
chiesi recommended that most of the workers should be chosen from the 
Gosha area, which was more densely populated than hawai, in part to 
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impose some order on that community, given its lack of work discipline.73 
The republican argued that once freed—or left to their own devices—the 
Gosha did not work as before. If they obtained a good harvest, they re-
fused to work for others and only engaged in libertine pursuits and sexual 
promiscuity.74 In the economic interests of the colony, which needed “a 
numerous and healthy population of workers,” attention was to be placed 
on “disciplining the present infinitely free marriage consuetude.”75 Despite 
this alleged sexual freedom in Gosha, there was no scarcity of women.76 
In contrast, in hawai, which was ruled by a strict work regimen, men out-
numbered women.77
 chiesi thus linked his labor policy to a moral reorganization in this 
part of the colony, designed to prevent a degradation of the race and thus 
improve the labor force. A new law was to be immediately promulgated, 
in line with Muslim precepts, obligating men to work in order to prepare 
a dower for their bride or brides; it would remain with the woman in case 
of repudiation without fault. chiesi believed that such a law would prompt 
men to work in order to accumulate the necessary wealth for this dower 
and would serve as a deterrent to the circulation of wives from one hus-
band to another, a practice that constituted “a degrading polyandry, i.e. 
one of the main causes of sterility in the women.”78 Marriages had to be 
registered with the qadi with payment of a nominal tax.79
 In other words, polyandry was considered dangerous to the genetic 
reproduction of the group. Therefore, it was thought that polygyny 
should be fostered because it was more in line with the free Somalis’ tra-
ditional habits and served as a first step toward the longer-term objective 
of abolishing polygamy in all its iterations and establishing monogamy. 
For this purpose also, “moral propaganda through example and facts” 
and practical persuasion about “the advantages of constituting regular 
families” would have to be enacted.80 This was a prelude to the later pol-
icy in Gosha, between 1935 and 1937, whereby forced labor recruitment 
included the enforcement of monogamous unions, known as nikaax 
talyiani.81 This entire agricultural development effort was designed so 
that it could only be implemented by monogamous worker couples. 
Ironically, the best study analyzing the indigenous cultivation practices, 
conducted years earlier, had depicted the ideal farm labor force as being 
composed of a man, his wife, and their children.82 even with no direct in-
tention of imposing such a monogamous family structure, the agronomist 
study implied it was the best model.
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nikaax taLyiani
Among the many who advocated for planned farming in Somalia, it 
was agronomist romolo Onor, who traveled in the region’s farms and 
moved along the rivers to verify the feasibility of such plans, talking with 
local farmers, studying indigenous farming methods, and assessing the 
successes and failures of other farming experiments. Based on the data 
collected, he recommended a system of “colonia parziaria” or more pre-
cisely co-investment.83 Italian investors would share the risks of farming 
with their Somali laborers, variously investing in and working the land 
and together progressively improving indigenous methods. According to 
Onor’s assessment, the local conditions did not lend themselves to indus-
trial farming; animals could not be used to plow because of tsetse flies, 
infrastructure was nonexistent, and last but not least the available labor 
force was inadequate due to the abundance of land devoted to subsistence 
cultivation. When the need arose for intensive field labor on their own 
farms, workers would abandon salaried work to dedicate themselves to the 
family subsistence farms. And yet, even if people could be coerced to work 
on Italian farms (a policy already in place to a certain extent), their labor 
would be inadequate for the purposes of increasing the agricultural pro-
duction.84 Onor was, however, concerned that the state would supply labor 
for a handful of private Italian investors. Giacomo De Martino, governor 
of the Somalia Italiana between 1910 and 1916, as well as Governor carlo 
ricci disregarded Onor’s concerns, as did the Fascist senator and governor 
between 1926 and 1928, cesare Maria De vecchi. he decided to support 
the opposite policy, in which Italian investors were trusted to comprise 
the only real engine to enhance productivity on Somali farms. Land was 
to be given in concessions to Italians, who were to find agricultural man-
power among the local population of farmers, thereby endorsing a policy 
of coerced labor.
 In southern Somalia, local farmers preferred working on their small 
subsistence farms rather than working as paid laborers on Italian estates. 
Subsistence labor ensured food security even during slavery, when slaves 
were allowed to work in their fields daily or at least once a week.85 The only 
way to channel manpower to the Italian farms was to coerce the popula-
tion with forced labor mandates.86 Forced labor was accomplished through 
the farming contract, or Bertello, which compelled workers to labor for ten 
hours a day.87 Forced labor was to be provided by the villages closest to 
the Italian farms and assembled with the help of local recruiters paid by 
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the government. Local leadership was co-opted into the system with sala-
ries and through the benefit of being allowed to decide, to a certain extent, 
who could skip such forced labor.88
 To be able to supply sufficient labor for the Italian farms, the resident 
of Margherita (today’s Jamaame) applied new marriage regulations that 
were considered useful for improving worker output. Adolescent and 
adult males and females from Gosha were forced to work all week on Ital-
ian estates. Following chiesi’s ideals, the resident of Margherita believed 
that monogamous weddings would discipline and increase the produc-
tivity of both men and women, and they both would work on the Ital-
ians’ farms. The men would be more productive if they all had a wife in 
close proximity. Indeed, the colonial government assumed the presence of 
women would improve a number of aspects of male productivity: a man 
with a wife would not seek sex with local prostitutes, he would not need 
money to pay for prostitutes, and he would have a wife to cook for him. All 
of this would contribute to the “reproduction” of the labor force. Women, 
for their part, would be obliged to follow the men they married and work 
in the farms rather than in the villages. These new regulations, known lo-
cally as nikaax talyiani, allowed a man to choose a wife without obtaining 
either her own or her relatives’ consent.89 As stated by many who were 
interviewed in Gosha, a man could just go to the Italian district authorities 
and make his own choice of only one woman to be his wife. A man from 
the village of Mugambo in 1988 explained, “You could only request one 
woman and you were not allowed to divorce her. You were both slaves of 
the estates.”90 Yet even though consent was not requested from the bride 
and her family, the new regulation endowed individual men with a power 
they had never enjoyed before.
 Giving a man the authority to choose a wife without her consent (even 
if he was only allowed one wife) was definitely an incentive in a society 
in which the traditional procedure required a host of social relations: an 
agreement between families, a marriage contract, and a number of mar-
riage transactions whereby the man demonstrated his high esteem for his 
future bride. Arrangements for traditional marriages required time and 
determination on the part of the groom and his family, who also had to 
assemble the goods for the ceremony. The new  decree swept all that away. 
Any man could walk into the Italian resident’s office and indicate the girl 
he wanted; she then became his wife. Although identifying himself to the 
resident meant that the man could no longer avoid forced recruitment 
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into labor, which was not easy anyway, this strategy certainly drew to the 
estates men who otherwise might have resisted or revolted. Unrestricted 
access to one woman was the reward for compliance.
 nonetheless, this strategy gave rise to a number of conflicts within 
the Zigula, dividing the group from the inside. Some men embraced this 
type of marriage to exact revenge against families who had previously de-
nied them a wife. Sometimes, a man utilized this decree to marry a girl 
who had been refused to him and promised to another, just to spite the 
girl’s relatives and the promised husband.91 nikaax talyiani allowed men to 
skip the preparation of bridewealth for their spouses, as well avoid other 
responsibilities to the bride’s family. But women were left at the mercy of 
abusive relations, and many were deprived of the social guarantees pre-
viously offered by the arrangement of the marriage transactions through 
kin. In fact, in this context many girls were married before puberty. An 
elderly Zigula man remembered that some girls were taken in marriage 
when they were just six or seven years old.
 not only were many of the girls selected as wives under this system 
extremely young, they were also taken from the ritual seclusion of their 
initiation into adulthood on the occasion of their menarche, before the 
initiatory buinda ritual dance. Mame nthukano Mnongerwa recalled how 
she and two other teenage girls were taken from the seclusion of the 
buinda ritual:92
I was taken to the town of Margherita (Jamaame) to be handed over 
to the man who had requested me in marriage. As I was a mwali—in 
the process of being initiated—my head and body was covered with 
a white kaniki, that is, white cotton cloth. In Margherita, I was told 
that five men had chosen me as their wife and it was only when I 
was in the resident’s presence that he discovered that I was already 
married to Mze Mnongerwa. The resident recommended that my 
husband come to reclaim me as a matter of urgency, otherwise he 
would give me to another man on the spot.93
Mnongerwa arrived, and the resident released Mame nthukano. She also 
recalled, “Myself and other girls who had not yet passed our menarche 
were taken from home under the pretext of working on the estates. In-
stead, we came back home with the ndanga on our head.”94 (The danga 
madow is a black scarf used by married women.) In other words, some of 
the girls were taken away from their ritual space with the excuse that they 
italian weddings and memory of trauma: southern somalia, 1910–41 127
were to go to work but instead were forced to marry an unwanted man on 
the estate.
 Women who married this way did not receive any of the goods and 
commodities new wives usually acquired as a result of gift exchanges 
through the marriage transactions. Such goods not only were for domes-
tic purposes but also constituted a small sum of capital in the form of 
exchangeable commodities that new wives could sell or barter in order to 
gain prestige within the neighborhood and/or to purchase other kinds of 
commodities they wanted.95 The regulations thus fostered a gendered in-
teraction characterized by abusive male domination, and they also created 
chaos in local social organization, a fact remembered by both male and 
female oral informants.
 In contrast, nikaax talyiani enforced by colonial decree caused great 
social confusion and profound internal divisions. Male oral sources men-
tioned these results, but only women recounted the mistreatment and 
damage they suffered as a result of this decree. I collected oral histories 
of these experiences through female biographies. Although both genders 
recalled the chaos created by “the Italian wedding” as negative, men’s and 
women’s oral and written testimonies of the period produced very differ-
ent results. For instance, an anonymous report mentioned by K. c. Dower 
in 1944 asserted that during the Italian colonial period, “bachelors were 
forced to marry women who had been born and bred on the estate.”96 Men 
of the Jubba river area remembered not the imposition of marriage but 
rather the liberty of being able to choose a wife without the traditional 
political or familial constraints. Male informants also recalled that men 
would not have stayed on the estates the whole week if they did not have 
women to sleep with. Women remembered being married without their 
or their parents’ consent, before their menarche, and before they could be 
initiated; further, they did not receive any of the usual gifts presented to a 
bride by her mother’s friends and relatives.
 Taking both female and male oral sources into account produces a 
more complete picture of the cultural and institutional chaos created by 
the Italian regulations. Male sources tended to view continuities between 
kin-based arranged marriages and nikaax talyiani.97 If one listens as well to 
female voices, one has the impression that it was the brides who were hurt 
most by the Italian wedding law. Brides were forced to marry men who 
were willing to harass them as well as harm their relatives and ancestors. 
Moreover, the brides were obliged to establish permanent relationships 
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with men and thus give up the social guarantees usually supplied by the 
network of relatives assembled through the very process set up by the ex-
change of marriage transactions. And as a further offence to the brides’ 
families, mothers lost their daughters’ support in the domestic domain 
without having any voice in the matter. By putting into practice a policy 
of forced marriages, the Italians promoted a situation that led to abusive 
behavior, even encouraging and legitimating it in the eyes of local men. 
The policy certainly negatively empowered individual men over women 
as never before in their social group.
sLavery, FreedoM, and oPtions in Marriage
In this chapter, I have explored the differences between arranged mar-
riages and forced marriages in “Italian Somaliland.” Arranged marriages 
before the era of forced labor in Gosha offered the new spouses and their 
children entry into webs of social relations and familial protections. These 
marriages also clarified specific rights of heritage and an individual’s po-
sition within one or more lineages. By contrast, the colonial era’s nikaax 
talyiani was a method to ensure labor for private Italian farms by forcing 
marriages on women and in the process opening new chances for men to 
exploit the privileges accompanying their gender. More specifically, men 
were able to disentangle themselves from the ties of dependence within 
their respective social networks, ties they would otherwise have acquired 
by performing a traditional marriage. The Italian marriage arrangements 
eliminated the need to establish new connections and responsibilities to-
ward the family of the spouse, to exhibit respect for their own relatives, to 
assume responsibilities toward the offspring, and so on. In this way, men 
were offered a sort of “positive” freedom that allowed them to break the 
constraints and norms of responsibility within kinship relations.
 By intertwining sexual policies and forced labor in order to foster 
industrial agricultural production, the forced marriages of the colonial 
era empowered men to abuse their wives without social repercussions. 
even in situations where men were obliged to marry women born on the 
estate, they still had the ability to choose which women they preferred. 
Brides had no ability to consent to or decline these arrangements. colo-
nial forced marriages thus constituted a total subjugation of women. But 
in either case, individual “positive” freedom of choice in this context may 
not be the only criterion for describing choices in marriages because, as 
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one informant said, both husbands and wives were slaves in the farms. 
colonial era forced marriage fostered a new idea of masculinity. And yet, 
old women in 1988 were still traumatized by the unexpected abuse they 
suffered as adolescent brides on the colonial estates.
 The nikaax talyiani of the colonial era demonstrates the significant 
differences between customary arranged marriages and forced marriages. 
As outlined by Mariane Ferme in this volume, the Western legal emphasis 
on the rights of the individual misconstrues the choices individuals make 
within social environments shaped by scarcity. In such contexts, men and 
women often choose to invest in social networks that provide subsistence 
security and protections against abuse, even if it means they have less 
“choice” in marriage partners. Moreover, as discussed in the introduction to 
this volume, the concept of personhood underscores the embedded nature 
of individuals within social webs, rather than as autonomous rights-bearing 
individuals detached from kin and communities. The individualization of 
the self as a basic aspect of personhood is a specific cultural construction 
that is historically determined and located in certain contexts of Western 
society.98 Although the evolution of the self as progressively more individu-
alized is generally considered a crucial aspect of modernity, culturally con-
structed views of less individualized personhoods that entail cooperation 
among members of groups may be more adaptive in circumstances domi-
nated by specific constraints inherent in material poverty.
 We also need to be mindful about claims on tradition, as Bala Saho 
discusses in this volume. claims on tradition are most often political 
claims for maintaining hierarchies and privileges. however, moral claims 
to subsistence security and protections from domestic abuse also flow 
from invoking tradition. The Italian policy of forced marriage fostered the 
individualization and emancipation of the male subject from his commu-
nity as opposed to the acquiescence and submission of women, establish-
ing a new male-centered hierarchy of nonindividualized and dependent 
women in marriages that, at the time, was presented as promoting the 
health and moral improvement of colonial subjects.
notes
I wish to thank the three editors of this book for their incredible patience in 
going over the chapters and fruitfully discussing with me the best shape mine could 
take in interaction with the other contributors in this volume.
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Ukuthwala, Forced Marriage, and the Idea 
of Custom in South Africa’s Eastern Cape
eLIZ ABeTh ThOrnBerrY
Since 2008, a series of cases in which young girls had been abducted and 
forcibly married to much older men have come to the attention of South 
Africa’s national media. In some instances, the girls’ parents or family 
members were implicated in the forced marriages; in others, girls were ab-
ducted without the knowledge of their families. Participants and investiga-
tors in these cases, which have occurred primarily in the eastern cape and 
KwaZulu-natal Provinces, grouped them together under the heading of 
“ukuthwala cases” (where ukuthwala refers to a form of irregular marriage 
that can involve the abduction of women for the purpose of marriage). 
Police statistics show that 255 cases of ukuthwala were reported nationally 
in 2012–13.1 This number represents a small fraction of all such cases, since 
many young women face social and familial pressure not to report their 
experiences and indeed to stay in these unwanted marriages. even when 
complaints are made, however, they do not often result in prosecution. 
The 255 reported cases led to only 21 arrests.
 Public discussion of these abductions has revolved around the question 
of custom. Should ukuthwala be understood as a legitimate custom? And 
if so, do these particular cases meet the customary requirements of ukuth-
wala? More fundamentally, to what extent do the ethical claims of custom 
override those of human rights? For women’s rights activists, ukuthwala is 
a form of forced marriage and a “harmful traditional practice,” a label that 
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simultaneously accepts the customary status of the practice and rejects its 
claim to legitimacy.2 For many of the parents and would-be husbands involved 
in these abductions, however, custom serves as a defense of ukuthwala. Police 
often share this belief, which contributes to the low rate of prosecution.3
 however, representatives from the congress of Traditional Leaders of 
South Africa have asserted that such marriages are contrary to the actual 
custom, a claim that is also backed by several scholars of customary law. 
here, I will argue that the stakes in calling ukuthwala a custom or, con-
versely, insisting that such forced marriages are not properly customary are 
grounded in an ongoing struggle in contemporary South Africa over the 
locus of the right to determine the nature and content of recognized cus-
tom. At the same time, however, these debates are constrained by a shared 
commitment to a historical understanding of custom. Then I will explore 
what nineteenth-century (precolonial and colonial) understandings of cus-
tom, marriage, and ukuthwala might reveal about these contemporary de-
bates. I will contend that the practice of ukuthwala shifted over the course 
of the nineteenth century, both taking on a much more coercive form and 
becoming “customary” in a way that it had not been previously.
custoM and the idea oF history
In contemporary South Africa, the english phrase “it is our culture” is 
used by black South Africans to explain a variety of practices unfamiliar—
and occasionally distasteful—to their white, “colored,” and Indian fellow 
citizens, as well as to foreign researchers.4 The South African constitution 
provides that “persons belonging to a cultural . . . community may not be 
denied the right, with other members of that community, to enjoy their 
culture.”5 The claim that a practice is traditional or customary carries an 
ethical weight in less technical usages too, in english as well as in xhosa 
and its close relative Zulu—the most commonly spoken African language 
in South Africa and the lingua franca of the African population of the 
country’s largest urban center. In contemporary xhosa and Zulu, the word 
isiko is typically used to render “culture,” “custom,” and “tradition.”6 In 
twenty-first-century South Africa, claims about custom have become cen-
tral to a set of debates over the rights of women to access property and 
participate in politics within rural areas.7
 At least three sources of authority for the appeals to custom are at work 
in current discussions. First is the body of officially recognized custom that 
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was encoded in various ways during the colonial and apartheid periods 
and that continues to function as law in many areas despite its dubious 
legal status. This conception of custom has the vigorous support of some 
traditional leaders, who wish to ground their authority in a discrete set of 
customary powers rather than in the consent of those whom they govern. 
Second is the “living custom” that has been recognized as the appropriate 
source of legal authority in South African jurisprudence. Living custom 
is defined by the current practices and accepted standards of local com-
munities, and as such, it is much more heterogeneous and flexible than 
the versions of customary law that received official sanction in the past. 
Politically, it is invoked by people seeking to reject the blanket authority 
claims of traditional leaders, as well as by activists and academics seeking 
to reconcile the idea of custom with the rights guaranteed by South Africa’s 
constitution. Finally, people also use the term custom to refer to historical 
and particularly precolonial norms and practices. In xhosa, the word isiko 
has the connotation of historical continuity. Although not necessarily a ref-
erence to precolonial practice, the term often carries an ethical claim based 
on the rejection of the right of a government formed through colonial con-
quest to demand changes in the culture of the colonized. This last sense of 
custom appears in the invocation of African custom as a justification for 
acts that defy the norms of urban South African political discourse—in-
cluding, most sensationally, during the rape trial of President Jacob Zuma 
shortly before his election; it is also used as a bulwark against demands that 
custom be “developed” to comply with the constitution.8 Depending on the 
context, references to customary law—that is, the subset of custom that is 
enforced in legal venues, whether traditional courts or those run by the 
South African state—may invoke any of these three conceptions of custom.
 These three definitions of custom are irrevocably intertwined. Living 
customary law has been indelibly shaped by the official versions enforced 
over the past century and a half. At the same time, for many people the 
moral authority of even living custom rests on its claim to a strong conti-
nuity with historical practice. And of course, precolonial practice—itself 
unstable, flexible, and varied—contributed strongly to both the forms of 
custom that were enforced by colonial and apartheid governments and 
to the living customary law now practiced. nonetheless, recognizing the 
different valences that an appeal to custom can take on is helpful in iden-
tifying the stakes of the invocation of custom in the current debates over 
ukuthwala marriages.
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 From a strictly legal perspective, ukuthwala’s customary status is not 
relevant. The 1998 recognition of customary Marriages Act specifically 
requires the consent of both parties in order to validate a customary mar-
riage, and it sets the minimum age of marriage at eighteen.9 More recently, 
the 2013 Prevention and combating of Trafficking in Persons Act explic-
itly criminalized forced marriage. nonconsensual ukuthwala “marriages,” 
then, should receive no legal recognition, and the men involved are open 
to prosecution.10 Indeed, depending on the specifics of the case, men par-
ticipating in ukuthwala marriages can be charged with abduction, kidnap-
ping, assault, or rape; where women’s families participate in ukuthwala, 
they can be charged as accessories to the last three of these crimes.11 The 
ability of the state to modify or withhold recognition of custom is the sub-
ject of legal debate, given the constitutional protection of both customary 
law and the more general right to cultural practice.12 however, the consti-
tution subordinates both of these rights to the individual rights protected 
by the bill of rights, so a claim that the state must recognize ukuthwala 
marriages would be unlikely to prevail. The customary status of ukuthwala 
does, though, carry significant discursive weight in both local and na-
tional discussions of the practice. And even as the various voices in these 
discussions invoke different sources of authority for custom, they share a 
propensity to invoke past practice in their arguments.
 The attacks on the customary nature of ukuthwala as currently practiced 
prompt a number of specific critiques. Academics sympathetic to African 
customary law, including T. W. Bennett, have described the normative prac-
tice of ukuthwala as a “mock abduction” in which a young woman “would be 
expected to put up a show of resistance.”13 Although Bennett acknowledges 
that the ukuthwala custom carries the “potential for . . . violence and [rape] 
to force women into submission,” he considers that those who engage in such 
violent acts are “exploiting culture for their own ends” rather than engaging 
in a legitimate customary practice.14 In this view, the problem with current 
ukuthwala practices is that these are forced marriages, taking place against 
the will of the young women concerned. By contrast, in the “correct” form 
of ukuthwala, young women would merely feign their unwillingness to go 
along with the marriage. rhetorically, this critique has the advantage of elid-
ing any potential conflict between the rights of the young woman and the 
right to culture, since culture properly understood already accommodated 
the wishes of young women in marriage.15 The “true custom” as practiced in 
the past is carefully distinguished from the current, exploitative practices.
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 Major representatives of traditional leadership in the eastern cape have 
offered their own critiques of recent cases of ukuthwala. xhanti Sigcawu, a 
member of the xhosa royal family and a representative of cOnTrALeSA 
(congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa), differentiated between 
ukuthwala properly practiced, “[when] the families of the young man and 
the girl would meet and negotiate . . . [and] reach an arrangement,” and 
kidnapping, “when a husband takes a woman without interaction with 
her parents.”16 nangomhlaba Matanzima, chairperson of the eastern cape 
house of Traditional Leaders, drew a slightly different distinction, telling 
the South African Press Association that “they are taking children from 13, 
14. . . . That is not ukuthwala, that is not a custom. You can’t go for the little 
ones.”17 In these critiques, the problem with ukuthwala is not the young 
woman’s or girl’s lack of consent but rather the failure to gain the consent of 
the family or the breaching of the culturally appropriate lower boundary on 
the age of marriage. The advantage of this line of argument lies precisely in 
its avoidance of the issue of women’s consent to marriage. Traditional lead-
ers can condemn a practice that garners negative publicity and threatens to 
taint the entire realm of custom without undermining a broader claim to 
the authority of household heads over their dependents. These claims must 
also be understood as, at least in part, an assertion of the authority of tra-
ditional leaders to make decisions over what counts as proper custom and 
what does not. And again, current practices are condemned by reference to 
their departure from the correct customs of the past.
 Yet members of families implicated in ukuthwala cases, as well as 
some (certainly not all) other residents of eastern cape communities 
where the practice is prevalent, claim that ukuthwala as currently prac-
ticed is indeed customary. According to ncedisa Paul, who works for a 
local health nongovernmental organization (nGO), “People say that’s 
just the way it is—it is part of their culture, they say.”18 Similar turns of 
phrase recur in research on the issue. Kate rice’s ethnographic research 
has likewise found that people in the eastern cape view ukuthwala as 
“an older, more ‘traditional’ practice”—even, in the words of one man, 
as an example of “walking exactly on the culture.”19 And though many 
prominent traditional leaders condemn nonconsensual forms of ukuth-
wala, others defend it as customary. In 2012, Mandla Mandela, Thembu 
chief and grandson of nelson Mandela, called ukuthwala “a pure custom, 
which has not been diluted by european sensibilities,” implying that con-
sent itself is a european concept.20
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 All sides of this debate implicitly invoke history to assert the rightness 
of their own position. Those who claim that current forms of ukuthwala are 
customary—and conversely, those who assert that they violate customary 
norms—turn repeatedly to the past to provide evidence for their assertions. 
A history of ukuthwala cannot directly adjudicate between these compet-
ing claims, yet it can show how certain forms of the practice came to be 
broadly accepted as customary, whereas others are contested. What, then, 
is the history of ukuthwala in the eastern cape? Do current forms of the 
practice have deep historical roots, or are they perversions of a more benign 
practice? certainly, British perceptions of forced marriage as a problem 
predated the colonial conquest, when treaties between the cape colony 
and independent xhosa polities included provisions for the protection of 
christians who “refus[ed] to comply . . . with the Kafir customs of forcible 
abduction or violation of females.” And an 1870 set of regulations in what 
would become nqamakwe warned the area’s residents against “the forcible 
abduction and marriage of young women.”21 early descriptions of xhosa 
marriage “customs” (such as those found in John Maclean’s Compendium 
of Kaffir Law and Custom) do not reference the term ukuthwala or describe 
similar practices, but disputes over “irregular forms” of marriage that took 
place without the consent of a woman’s parents appear in the earliest extant 
colonial court records, beginning in the 1860s.22
 The term ukuthwala itself began to appear in public discussions of mar-
riage, as well as in both civil and criminal court cases, during the 1880s.23 
People used the word to refer to a variety of irregular forms of marriage that 
took place without the prior consent of a woman, of her father, or of both. 
In its early usages, then, ukuthwala included both the types of consensual 
mock abductions that contemporary commentators seek to assert as the 
“proper” form of the custom and also more violent abductions. The Tembu 
chief Matwa described it as follows: “The custom of ‘twala’ is after a girl is 
carried off by her sweetheart, the girl is followed up by her brothers, and 
then a marriage is arranged.”24 The reference to a girl’s sweetheart implies 
an ongoing, consensual relationship. however, the term was also applied to 
cases in which, for example, a father told the court that his daughter “was 
forced against her will to go to” the man who had taken her away and that 
“the messengers did not ask my consent to let them have the girl.”25
 The customary status of ukuthwala was also the subject of debate. Men 
accused of abduction sought to defend themselves by referencing the “cus-
tom of ukuthwala,” but one father retorted, “I call it stealing a man’s child.”26 
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In 1883, William Sigenu thought that the “modern custom” of ukuthwala 
was “becoming very general,” and the magistrate A. h. Stanford com-
plained that “of late years a custom known as ukuthwala has come much 
into vogue.”27 These descriptions contain something of a contradiction 
when read alongside contemporaneous definitions of isiko (custom) itself 
as “our fathers and progenitors did thus, and ruled thus, and handed down 
their manners and customs to us. These ancient customs are virtually un-
alterable, but . . . [may] imperceptibly become modified, or slightly altered 
by mutual consent.”28 In what sense, then, could one refer to ukuthwala 
(or anything else) as a “modern custom”? This uneasy language choice 
points to a deep tension in understandings of ukuthwala in the nineteenth 
century as well. Indeed, as I will argue, much of the current debate over 
the supposedly “customary” status of ukuthwala marriages—and over the 
proper form of this custom—can be traced to shifts in the economic and 
social context of marriage that took place in the late colonial period.
Marriage and consent in nineteenth-century xhosaLand
In order to understand these debates, we must situate ukuthwala within 
the larger context of the use of a discourse of custom to regulate sexuality 
and marriage. In the precolonial and colonial periods, xhosa household 
heads used the language of custom to assert control over the sexuality of 
their female family members. This control was a broadly accepted social 
norm, if far from universally adhered to. Families monitored the sexual 
lives of unmarried daughters through regular physical examinations in 
order to ensure that premarital sexual experimentation stopped short of 
penetrative intercourse. Young men and women were permitted to en-
gage in ukumetsha, meaning, in the words of one woman, “that men and 
women get together and go through all the performances of married peo-
ple save and except actual sexual intercourse and copulation.”29 Although 
european commentators considered ukumetsha an “unnatural connec-
tion,” it set strict limits on the forms of sexual play that unmarried young 
women engaged in. customary fines for the seduction of unmarried girls 
enforced these limits. John Knox Bokwe reported, “Seduction of virgins 
according to the customs of the Amaxosa ancients, generally got one of 
the heaviest fines inflicted over all the other crimes.”30
 The precolonial and early colonial discourse of custom extended fa-
milial control to the choice of marriage partner. The family of either the 
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woman or the man could initially broach the subject of marriage, and ne-
gotiations took place between representatives of the families, not between 
the prospective spouses themselves.31 A young woman was expected to as-
sent to her father’s or guardian’s decision. Ludwig Alberti reported in 1807 
that “a matrimonial alliance is agreed upon and concluded, without the 
consent of the girl being required, who in this matter is simply dependent 
upon the wish of her parents.”32 Women were not expected to approach 
marriage joyfully or with overt enthusiasm; rather, they were to exhibit a 
degree of grief over the transition from childhood home to marital family. 
even a much-desired marriage was a solemn affair for the bride, who was 
“lectured on her future conduct” by the groom’s family while “standing be-
fore them in perfect silence.”33 This discourse shaped the evidence of many 
of the African witnesses who testified before the 1883 commission on na-
tive Law and custom, which canvassed “experts” on xhosa custom across 
the eastern cape—including William Sigenu and A. h. Stanford, quoted 
earlier—in order to decide whether and how customary law should be ac-
commodated by the colonial state. Several witnesses who appeared before 
the commission affirmed that a woman
is not consulted; she is called to the kraal where the men are 
assembled, and they say to her, “You must smear yourself with red 
clay today, we are going to send you to so-and-so,” meaning her 
intended husband. She then gets herself ready, and the bridal party 
leaves accordingly. even if the girl says she does not wish to go with 
the man mentioned, she will be compelled to do so. If she goes to 
the chief, she would be ordered to obey her parents.34
The affective performance that weddings required of young women ac-
knowledged the subordination of personal desires to familial obligations.
 These ceremonies thus placed familial control over marriage within 
a broader framework of respect, obedience, and deference to custom. In 
the words of Thuka, an elderly ngqika xhosa man, “We train up our chil-
dren to obedience in order that when they marry they are good and obe-
dient wives. If we allowed them their own wills at the kraals where they 
were brought up, they might want to use their own wills at their husband’s 
kraal.”35 even xhosa men who opposed “forced marriage” agreed that “ac-
cording to the old custom, if a girl refused to go where her father wished 
her, she was beaten.”36 These senior men were speaking to a commission 
charged with deciding the future of customary law in the cape colony, 
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and they had every interest in staking the largest possible claim to au-
thority over their children. As I have argued elsewhere, the discourse of 
custom that men presented in such circumstances conceals the practical 
limits of these claims. Yet the claims did have moral authority, as mission-
aries residing in the eastern cape found out when they attempted to in-
tervene in disputes between young female converts and their fathers over 
the fathers’ desire to arrange marriages to non-christian men. In one case, 
the chief Gwashu “sent one of his daughters to be married to a man who 
had already one wife. The young woman was very unwilling to go in con-
sequence of an impression which she had that by so doing she should sin 
against God,” but go she did.37 These cases contributed to the missionary 
estimation that “a father has absolute authority over his daughter, and can 
dispose of her in marriage as he pleases. Sometimes a degree of attention 
is paid to the inclinations of the child but in general the predominant prin-
ciple with the father is to make the best bargain for himself that he can.”38 
When one Wesleyan convert rejected her family’s choice, missionary Sam-
uel Young recorded her family’s response: “She was then addressed by her 
uncle (a chief of considerable influence) upon the evils of disobedience to 
her father . . . and also upon the impropriety of a girl’s refusing to conform 
to a custom which had been handed down to them by their fathers.”39 The 
discourse of custom (amasiko) insisted that a young woman submit to her 
family’s choice of a marital partner.
coLoniaLisM and the conFLict over custoM
If the discourse of custom assigned control over women’s sexuality to their 
fathers and husbands, it also set the stage for disputes between men over 
sex and marriage. As Brett Shadle’s work in colonial Kenya reminds us, the 
interests of men themselves were not uniform, even within one generation.40 
As the interests of fathers were sometimes pitted against those of husbands 
or suitors, men also invoked amasiko (customs) to claim exceptions to 
the broad principle of familial control of women’s sexual and reproductive 
labor. These conflicts created opportunities for women to exert power over 
their own lives, but they did not disrupt the generalized claim that female 
sexuality should remain under the control of their families.
 Such conflicts of interest were perhaps most evident in marriage 
negotiations. Parental permission was an essential part of a valid marriage 
in nineteenth-century xhosaland; it was the passage of bridewealth that 
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made a marriage. The immediate payment of bridewealth, followed by a 
ceremony held at the homestead of the husband’s family, seems to have 
been widely recognized as a normative ideal. This form appears in most 
accounts by european observers, as well as in later works such as J. h. 
Soga’s The Ama-Xosa, that self-consciously narrate marriage “customs.”41 
In many—perhaps most—marriages, however, the passage of bridewealth 
was processual, more closely matching the transactions described by 
John comaroff in Tswana communities.42 Marriages might have begun 
with the payment of a few cattle, with the expectation that subsequent 
payments would bring the bridewealth up to the normative level of eight 
to twelve cattle, at which point a ceremony would ideally be held to mark 
the marriage. Such accommodations were particularly important in times 
of economic stress, as experienced in western xhosaland during the late 
1850s and 1860s—the period following the twin disasters of “lung sickness” 
(bovine pleuropneumonia) and a millenarian movement that called for 
the mass killing of cattle, both of which devastated cattle herds.43 The 
status of such marriages, however, was open to dispute if conflict arose 
between father and husband. In one 1861 case, for example, Jikelana told a 
colonial court that “plaintiff co-habited with my daughter from about the 
commencement of the lungsickness (1855) until last winter . . . they never 
had a dance [ceremony] . . . I allowed her to live with him until he could 
afford a proper dowry which I think would have been about ten head of 
cattle.” ntsabo, by contrast, considered that he had already completed his 
marriage to Jikelana’s daughter and owed no further bridewealth.44
 To come to a satisfactory arrangement, men who wished to marry—or 
to find wives for their sons—needed to persuade the women’s families to ac-
cept the bridewealth they could offer. Ukuthwala, whether it took place with 
or without the consent of the women involved, was one way for would-be 
husbands to exert pressure on women’s parents. The implicit threat that 
a couple might live together—or at least sleep together—without benefit 
of marriage provided an incentive to negotiate. Ukuthwala was effective 
in placing pressure on women’s families in part because of the tight con-
ceptual link that existed between sex and marriage. evidence from rape 
cases shows the degree to which having sex with a woman was seen as 
synonymous with marriage. In cases from the early colonial period, men 
invoked marriage both as a justification for nonconsensual sex—as when 
Mpaubani asked the father of the girl who accused him of rape, “how did 
I rape her when she is my wife?”—and as a reason to commit rape—as 
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when Kupiso confessed to the court in 1880 that “I wanted to steal nonto-
zonke and make her my wife . . . I woke her up for the purpose of asking 
her to be my wife.” When she refused and began to call for her father, 
Kupiso “threw her down and ravished her.”45 This link between sex and 
marriage remained an important part of understandings of rape into the 
late nineteenth century. In 1893, a woman’s assailant claimed, “I proposed 
to Mary and she accepted me” (which Mary denied), seeking to explain his 
presence in her family’s home as a part of courtship behavior.46 A woman 
assaulted on a footpath the same year recounted to the magistrate how 
she “asked [her assailant] if I was his wife.”47 The conceptual link between 
sex and marriage meant that marriage excused sexual coercion, and sex 
could—some men hoped—make a marriage.48 Ukuthwala marriages, 
whether coercive or consensual, traded on this same link.
 The claim that ukuthwala marriages had the sanction of custom, then, 
allowed young men to claim social legitimacy for their actions and to gain 
leverage within marriage negotiations that they did not otherwise have. 
The stakes of this claim were magnified by the recognition of customary 
law within the colonial legal system—a recognition that was formalized 
in the legislation annexing the “native Territories” of the Transkei and 
that was applied on an informal basis in the ciskei.49 colonial courts ap-
plied customary law in civil cases between African litigants. colonial rec-
ognition raised the stakes by advancing the claim that ukuthwala was not 
simply a practice but also a legitimate custom that the courts should rec-
ognize. By the 1880s, the practice of “abducting” one’s desired bride in an 
effort to force her father’s consent to the match was recognized in colonial 
courts as having the status of custom. As Justice of the Peace John verity 
explained in a letter to the solicitor general, “It is a [xhosa] custom to 
abduct (twala) a girl as a preliminary step to marriage.”50 This recognition 
in turn magnified disputes over what actions, precisely, this supposed cus-
tom legitimated.
 During the colonial period, the word ukuthwala was variously 
translated—and litigated—as “abduction” and “elopement,” the latter po-
tentially forming the basis of a civil claim of seduction. As an alternative 
route to marriage, the term encompassed a number of different departures 
from normative marriage practices. european witnesses assumed that 
these so-called abductions happened with the cooperation of the women 
involved, and this was often substantiated by evidence. As one woman 
told the magistrate, “he is my man, I term him my husband. I went away 
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with him. I never received my father’s consent. I went with him of my 
own free will.”51 One headman explained to the nqamakwe magistrate’s 
court in 1891 that ukuthwala cases were frequent and that the woman was 
“generally a consenting party.”52 And ukuthwala did work in many cases 
to persuade reluctant guardians to permit a marriage. In one bridewealth 
dispute, a woman’s brother told the court that “the plaintiff at first car-
ried off my sister under the custom of ‘ukutwala’ but subsequently paid 
four head cattle dowry and I consented to his marriage on condition 
that he should pay out 10 head in all. To these terms I still adhere.”53 
Although the men argued over the appropriate amount of bridewealth, 
the woman’s brother was willing in principle to assent to a marriage that 
had begun through ukuthwala. Some men also used ukuthwala to pres-
sure their own fathers to provide support for marriage; after Tshemerse 
“carried off one of Dilika’s girls,” his father agreed to pay the bridewealth 
necessary to convert this action into a marriage.54 By committing ukuth-
wala, a son could drag his father into negotiations over compensation 
payments, hoping that the father would see the wisdom of negotiating a 
marriage in the process. The contentious dynamics at work are evident 
in the way that the details of Tshemerse’s marriage entered the archival 
record: he was accused of assaulting his father, with whom he had not 
been on good terms since the ukuthwala.
 Despite its increasing recognition as a “custom,” however, ukuthwala 
remained controversial. Some fathers objected strenuously to young men’s 
efforts to bypass normative procedures and payments in forging a mar-
riage; as one told the court, “I call it stealing a man’s child.”55 The defendant 
in an 1889 nqamakwe civil case admitted to the court that he “know[s] it 
is wrong to ‘twala’ a girl. [Although] it is a crime among us in Tembuland 
to ‘twala’ a girl it is commonly done.” he justified his actions, however, 
by stating that “the woman was not a virgin when I ‘thwala’d’ her she had 
already had a child.”56 The recognition of ukuthwala as “custom” happened 
over the objections of men who tried to insist on its status as a wrongful, if 
common, act. These objections foundered, however, on the colonial state’s 
sharp delineation between enforceable custom and unenforceable prac-
tice; in the eyes of the state, ukuthwala either qualified as custom or did 
not, and its frequency in practice made its recognition as custom the path 
of lesser resistance for colonial magistrates. This elevation of practice to 
custom offers one way in which to understand the description of ukuth-
wala as a “modern custom.”
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 Yet while inscribing ukuthwala as enforceable custom, colonial ad-
ministrators were at pains to distinguish between “correct” and “incorrect” 
versions of the practice. In the former, which they insisted was normative, 
men staged mock abductions of young women who usually knew in ad-
vance and consented. In any case, the couple would not have sex before 
marriage negotiations had been concluded or, as A. h. Stanford put it, the 
woman “in the meantime not having been treated as a wife.”57 certainly, 
many cases of ukuthwala did follow this description—and the court re-
cords that contain the most detailed evidence on the practice necessarily 
oversample the more contentious cases. however, it is clear that through-
out the colonial period xhosa men and women used the term ukuthwala 
to refer to a broader array of practices, including instances in which young 
women were subject to significant violence and raped. even in the earli-
est extant cases, some men did push the limits of what was acceptable as 
part of an ukuthwala marriage. In one early colonial case, four men were 
accused of abducting a nineteen-year-old girl for one of them to marry; 
although they claimed that she was a willing participant, she told the court 
otherwise, and a witness observed them beating her to force her to coop-
erate.58 The insistence that such cases were not correct forms of ukuthwala 
did not eliminate them. If anything, the reconceptualizing of ukuthwala 
as lawful because customary provided increased rhetorical justification for 
men to engage in actions that increasingly departed from the normative 
form of ukuthwala.
 In a dramatic case that reached the eastern Districts court, Buti 
Swartbooi attempted to ukuthwala Martha after she objected to their en-
gagement and asked her father to return the bridewealth cattle that Buti 
had paid.59 According to Buti’s family, her father proposed that Buti thwala 
Martha, since he could not return all of the bridewealth. Martha’s father 
strenuously denied this suggestion, although Martha herself told the court 
that she had left her father’s homestead and was “running away from the 
marriage. My guardian was annoyed & fetched me back.” In any case, 
Martha was vehemently opposed to the union, and her abduction was a 
violent affair during which Buti’s friends beat her with a sjambok (a rhino-
saurus hide whip) to force her to accompany them. In handing down his 
conviction, the resident magistrate wrote,
To “twala” or carry off a girl is a custom of the natives though it is 
not usual where the marriage is to be by christian rites. It is done 
secretly by the lover assisted perhaps by one or two friends carrying 
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off the girl when found alone, the girl offering little or no resistance. A 
“twala-ing” in the manner it was conducted in the present case, even 
accepting the defence account, would certainly not be considered 
regular. If [the father] had consented it would have been the easiest 
thing possible to have arranged to carry off the girl secretly.
The case was appealed to the eastern District court, where the solicitor gen-
eral asserted that “this court will not recognize the barbarous custom of 
‘twalaing’ as a defence to a charge of assault which will be committed on 
a girl.” Buti Swartbooi pushed the bounds of what could be condoned as 
ukuthwala beyond the willingness of either Martha’s family or the colonial 
state. In east London, however, Pieter Soldaat was more successful in jus-
tifying abduction and rape through an appeal to custom. nomini told the 
court that she “had known Pieter for three years and we have been sweet-
hearts all the time.” She would have married Pieter “if my guardian is will-
ing,” but she “was not willing that Pieter should have sexual intercourse with 
me” without marriage. her brother and guardian had already arranged her 
marriage to another man, and he told the court that “it is a native custom for 
a man to take a girl away. Pieter was wrong in taking my sister away as she 
was about to be married to notoyi.” The complexities of this situation appar-
ently overwhelmed the solicitor general, who declined to prosecute Pieter 
for either abduction or rape, writing: “It is difficult to apply the technicali-
ties of our law of abduction to people whose custom it is to carry away girls 
from their home, and to give them moderate and acceptable compensation 
of a beast for such a wrongful act.”60 The colonial approach to custom could 
not comprehend that an act might be customary, in the sense of existing as 
an acknowledged practice in xhosa communities, without being considered 
acceptable. Because colonial officials did not think of custom as a subject of 
contestation but rather assumed that an entire community had to accept a 
custom for it to be valid, they could not reconcile an acknowledgment that 
ukuthwala was customary with a complaint against it. Men who committed 
ukuthwala without the consent of the women involved used the vagueness 
surrounding the act’s relationship to custom to legitimate sexual assault.
irreguLar Marriage and FaMiL iaL consent
As Buti Swartbooi’s case suggests, by the late nineteenth century the term 
ukuthwala was being used to describe instances of what would by the 
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twenty-first century be described as forced marriage. rather than young 
men or women attempting to increase their influence over their mar-
riages, household heads had begun to use ukuthwala as a tactic to (re)as-
sert control over women’s marriages. This shift had its roots in a broader 
set of changes in negotiations over marriage in the last decades of the 
century, as young men and women gained more power to choose their 
own marriage partners.
 As long as the norm of familial control over marriage remained 
broadly accepted within xhosa communities, the necessity of eventually 
winning fathers’ consent placed limits on the forms of ukuthwala that 
might end in accepted marriages. Although the threat of premarital sex 
played a role in convincing women’s families to recognize these unions, 
the need for recognition persuaded most men to remain within socially 
acceptable boundaries. It also meant that most (though not all) ukuthwala 
unions did involve the consent of the woman, since her implicit threat to 
remain with her would-be husband regardless of parental consent signifi-
cantly increased the pressure on families to assent to the union.
 Over the second half of the nineteenth century, however, interven-
tions by the colonial state threatened the hegemony of familial control 
over female sexuality. christian missionaries and colonial officials alike 
decried “forced marriage” and advocated for a mechanism to ensure fe-
male consent to marriage. Although proposals to resolve the issue by 
enforcing marriage registration on the model of natal were never imple-
mented, magistrates did order the dissolution of marriages when they de-
cided that women had been coerced. As robert Dick, special magistrate 
at Tamacha in King Williams Town, explained, there were still “a large 
number” of cases of forced marriage in his area. Women, he claimed, were 
aware that they could “appeal to the magistrate for protection,” but they 
“never avail themselves of the privilege.” Instead, a man and woman “live 
together for a short time, and then she comes up to complain of his harsh 
conduct.”61 The presence of magistrates’ courts thus changed the balance of 
power in the negotiation of marriages, reducing fathers’ abilities to control 
their daughters’ marriages. nathaniel Umhala agreed that forced marriage 
was becoming “very seldom” because people “begin now to see that it is 
unnatural and unkind, and the law stops them also.”62
 As revealed in the variety of testimony given on the subject of forced 
marriage to the 1883 commission, colonial influence on this matter was 
not uniform across the landscape of the eastern cape. christians, who 
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inherited the missionary concern for forced marriage as part of their gen-
eral concern for xhosa sexual depravity, were more likely to actively es-
pouse new models of female choice in marriage. Tshuka, an ngqika man 
living near the Presbyterian school at Lovedale, attributed the greater 
immorality that he perceived on mission stations to the fact that “their 
parents can no longer endisa (marry) them, and the girls themselves 
wish to exercise their own will with reference to marriage.”63 Opposition 
to forced marriage also was one way by which Fingo men distinguished 
themselves from xhosa. Mendela, a Fingo headman in engcobo district, 
maintained that “according to our old customs, a girl was not forced to 
marry a man but we got this custom among the [xhosa]. now, since we 
have come under Government, we have reverted to our old custom, and 
do not force a girl to marry against her wishes.”64 David Matomela, a Fingo 
headman in Peddie, related the rejection of forced marriage to the found-
ing myth of Fingo origins in a different way, telling the commission it was 
true that “in natal . . . a father [could] force a girl to marry without con-
sulting her wishes” and that “it was the same in hintza’s.” According to 
Matomela, Fingos began “to consult the girl’s wishes” only “since we came 
amongst the white men.”65 revealingly, George Mabandla, who testified 
along with Mendela, claimed that “among the Fingoes both systems are 
practised. The better class of men will not force their girls to marry, but 
the other class will force them against their will.”66 As Poppy Frye has ar-
gued, Fingo identity came into being alongside a new status hierarchy;67 to 
say that only the “better class” of Fingos rejected forced marriage suggests 
that such rejection was—along with agricultural innovation and christian 
conversion—a distinctive part of Fingo identity. Finally, the effect of colo-
nial interventions on marriage negotiations also varied from west to east 
in the eastern cape. In the west, where colonial intervention had a longer 
history, even non-christian headmen testified that parental control was 
on the decline. Pombani noted that “in former days we used to compel our 
daughters to marry the man we selected for them. now we have learned 
this is not right and the girls wishes are consulted.”68 Further east in the 
Transkei, by contrast, significant areas were still independent in 1883, and 
the colonial legal system was not yet a force in the social landscape.
 Across the region, however, there was a consensus that men’s ability to 
control their daughters’ marriages had declined over the last few decades of 
the century. In addition to the influence of christian doctrine, social and 
economic forces were eroding familial control over marriage. The rise of 
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labor migration provided young men with independent access to the cattle 
necessary to pay bridewealth and increased their leverage in marriage nego-
tiations; for some couples, this development also gave young women greater 
voice in the choice of their marriage partners. The livestock epidemics of the 
1880s and 1890s only accelerated this process, as homestead heads depended 
on the cash earned through migrant labor to replenish their herds. Perhaps 
most important, in the areas under colonial rule the possibility of civil mar-
riage at the magistrate’s office provided a means for couples to avoid the 
need for parental consent entirely—and by the 1890s, young xhosa men and 
women were taking up this option in significant numbers.
 This decline of familial control sparked a shift in ukuthwala marriages. 
The term began to be applied to marriages in which a woman’s husband 
and her family had colluded to thwala her in order to force her into a mar-
riage against her wishes. As long as the norm of familial control remained 
broadly accepted, this form of ukuthwala was unnecessary; a broad set 
of social and cultural pressures assured that most women would accept 
their family’s choice of husband. But as this norm shifted, fathers and male 
guardians turned to ukuthwala in an attempt to reassert their authority 
over the marriages of their female family members.
 Msitshana Mhaka sued for the return of his bridewealth after his 
wife—married through ukuthwala—left him and returned to live with her 
natal family. her father admitted during the trial that she had never de-
sired the marriage but “was forced against her will to go to Pl[ainti]ff ” 
In an attempt to convince the court to let him retain the cattle, he added 
that “the messengers did not ask my consent to let them have the woman 
. . . there was no marriage.” however, her aunt admitted that “we did not 
give any alarm.”69 When another man, Mnxeba, sued for the return of his 
bridewealth cattle after his wife left him, a witness told the court that “the 
girl refused to go to her husband at first but she was forced to go but she 
ran away subsequently. . . . Mnxeba eloped with the girl after the cattle 
had been paid.” her own father admitted that she had tried to commit 
suicide during the marriage, for which he had accepted nine head of cattle 
as bridewealth.70 These ukuthwala marriages would not have made much 
sense in an era of undisputed familial control over marriage, when broader 
social norms would have supported a father’s right to dictate his daugh-
ter’s marriage partner without the need to resort to irregular marriage 
forms such as ukuthwala. As that right came into dispute, however, fathers 
as well as would-be husbands found in ukuthwala marriages a means of 
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(re)asserting their power over marriage. As a result, the term expanded 
to include this new form of forced marriage, a development that further 
complicates the question of what forms of ukuthwala, if any, should be 
considered customary in the present day.
By the late nineteenth century, then, ukuthwala had transformed from 
an irregular if not uncommon practice to a more firmly accepted “cus-
tom.” The extent of the actions that could be justified under the frame-
work of custom, however, remained subject to debate. The legitimacy that 
the custom label afforded enticed some men to try to push the bound-
aries of acceptability. Others insisted that customary forms of ukuthwala 
should remain more narrowly circumscribed. Thus, when modern interest 
groups appeal to custom to defend their own preferred versions of ukuth-
wala, they all have some claim to accuracy. More important, however, the 
history of these debates suggests that ukuthwala itself became more com-
mon as other forms of familial control over marriage—including many 
situations that might merit the label of “forced marriage” in contemporary 
discussions—diminished. To insist that nonconsensual forms of ukuth-
wala are not “customary” is to ignore the broader customary validation of 
familial control over women’s marriage, in both the past and the present.
 In current debates over ukuthwala, therefore, the question should 
not be whether coercive forms of the practice are properly customary. 
(According to at least some definitions of custom, they are.) rather, re-
searchers and activists should focus on the underlying tensions and trans-
formations that have shaped the practice of ukuthwala. coercive forms of 
the practice appeared as a backlash against an increase in young women’s 
power to choose their own marriage partners. 
 Interventions against forced marriage must work to support young 
women’s autonomy in marriage. In some communities, doing so may re-
quire a further redefining of custom to explicitly exclude coercion in mar-
riage. coercive forms of ukuthwala may have been customary in the past, 
but as the changes in the pracice through history demonstrate, they need 
not remain so in the future.
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Concubinage as Forced Marriage?
colonial Jawari, contemporary Hartaniyya, and Marriage in Mauritania
e.  Ann McD OUGALL
“To marry one’s slave is as easy as eating a meal,” an elder named 
Al-hadrami explained to me in the central Mauritanian town of Atar in 
1983: “[Masters] marrying female slaves happens frequently. Islam only 
permits four wives. But to marry one’s slave is easy; it is like eating a meal. 
On this, the Qur’an is clear.” he went on to say that slave wives who mar-
ried their masters were called jawari (sing. jariya); children borne by them 
were especially valuable, for their metissage (mixed blood—in this case 
with blacks from the Sudan) was honorable, and they were treated just like 
their father’s other children.1
 Only in retrospect did I reflect upon the phrases “to marry one’s slave” 
and “on this the Qur’an is clear.” Al-hadrami understood jawari, or slave 
wives, in juxtaposition to wives. According to Islamic law (shari’a), the 
number of wives was limited (to four), but there was no limit set for the 
number of slave wives—shari’a specifically allowed for an unlimited num-
ber of concubines. For him, the association of slave wives with concubines 
was natural. The problem is that this part of his explanation was not con-
sistent with the Qur’an: shari’a stipulates that a free man cannot marry his 
own slave, and because a jariya was by legal definition a slave, it follows 
that her master could not legally marry her. concubines (slaves) could 
not be wives any more than wives (free women) could be concubines.2 
The metaphor of “eating a meal” was meant to emphasize the difference 
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between the easy relationship concubinage allowed and the not so easy 
relationship formal shari’a marriage demanded.
 Al-hadrami’s brief but revealing comments underscore two additional 
points. First, the reference to metissage implies a racial aspect associated 
with slavery in Mauritania—slaves are black (sudan), masters are white 
(bizan).3 Although this metissage, if really as common over time as he sug-
gested, would have physically diminished actual racial differences by the 
1980s, its ideological and cultural importance was firmly embedded in his 
vision of society. Second, jariya in Arabic simply means “female slave,” but 
in Mauritania, it specifically refers to “concubine.” Black, female slaves, 
property of their masters, had no voice of their own in the matter of this 
“meal,” easy or otherwise. In contemporary terms, one would surely argue 
that Mauritanian concubinage as practiced in the early 1980s was a form 
of forced marriage, one overlaid with both class and race.
 I see this interview as marking a kind of historical watershed. In this 
chapter, I first try to explain how and why we could have been having the 
conversation we were about slaves, concubines, and slave marriage in 1983, 
a reality not unrelated to the fact that slavery itself had only been offi-
cially abolished in Mauritania in 1980–81. Then I explore the evolution we 
see in those concepts over the next generation, essentially from the 1990s 
through to today. This is a discussion that draws us into intersecting dis-
courses of Islamic law, colonial narrative, and modern-day slavery, under-
stood against the backdrop of a modern democratizing, poverty-stricken 
Mauritania. What emerges is a picture of a Muslim society in which the 
institution of slavery as mediated by Islamic law had a long history among 
Mauritania’s bizan and in which a particular form of that slavery, concubi-
nage, emerged alongside marriage as an accepted social norm. historical 
evidence that might explain when, why, and how this occurred is rather 
thin, but at least one fatwa, or religious opinion, from the southwest region 
of Trarza attests to its presence in the early nineteenth century, and colo-
nial observations from the early twentieth century offer interpretations 
as to why it persisted.4 Interviews from several fieldwork trips in many 
regions of Mauritania, carried out between the mid-1980s and the first 
decade of the 2000s, confirm that concubinage was widespread and en-
trenched until very recent times, just as Al-hadrami claimed.5
 elsewhere, I have argued that the taking of slave wives is related to the 
Saharan practice of fattening (Fr. gavage, h. leblouh), the custom by which 
a bizan girl of marriageable age was force-fed until reaching extreme 
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obesity.6 This physical representation of the family’s wealth and status not 
only rendered a woman almost immobile but also reduced her fertility 
and interfered with her ability to carry a pregnancy to term. Slaves, by 
contrast, matured naturally, were generally active (they worked), and by 
all accounts were physically able to bear children normally.7
 A second explanation reflects another Mauritanian particularity, 
namely, serial monogamy. Islam’s permitting of four wives notwithstand-
ing, bizan women have traditionally required a contractual commitment 
to monogamy from future husbands; taking a second wife could thereby 
trigger divorce by the first.8 In this social and religious context, concubines 
arguably became substitutes for additional wives, as they required the for-
mality of neither divorce nor marriage—“as easy as eating a meal.” Although 
the tradition of monogamy persists today, legal slavery does not. What this 
means for marriage practice has yet to be fully explored. I will suggest that 
various concubine-like relationships, including something called secret 
marriage, have gained considerable currency as a consequence.
 Much of this story belongs to and is about bizan men and women, yet 
it must inevitably revolve around the experience of the slave wife, or jariya, 
herself. This is a more difficult voice to recover, but I draw upon interviews 
with former slaves (pl. haratine; m. hartani, f. hartaniyya) in an attempt 
to do exactly this. This effort found slave wives who were technically not 
concubines but remained the property of their masters while being mar-
ried (with his permission) to other slaves. These women delivered slave 
children to their masters’ families.9 But the relationship that emerged as 
central to the dynamic of concubinage as forced marriage was the one 
that allowed for a slave concubine to give birth to free children, simulta-
neously acquiring a special kind of freedom for herself. Shari’a stipulates 
that the progeny of concubines are born as free children of the master and 
that jawari acquire the status of umm al-walad (mother-of-the-child); they 
were not to be sold and were to be freed upon the death of the master, if 
not sooner. But this required that the master acknowledge paternity; if he 
did not, technically both mother and child remained slaves unless a legal 
challenge could be made on behalf of the child’s legitimacy.10 We will see 
that even umm al-walad status did not always bring the promised social 
elevation or freedom. Though I am discussing women of slave status in 
the past tense here, in the final section of the chapter I also argue that 
persistent and pervasive poverty among haratine today renders many har-
taniyya no less vulnerable to entering into such ambiguous relationships 
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with wealthier, well-placed bizan than their jawari mothers and grand-
mothers had been.
isLaM, coLoniaLisM, and sLavery
concubinage in the Qur’an
Al-hadrami was not wrong about the Qur’an or about its clarity on the 
question of marriage. The Surat al-nisa (“The Women,” 4:3) permits a man 
to take up to four wives, with the important stipulation that they be treated 
equally: “Marry such women as seem good to you, two, three, four; but if 
you fear you will not be equitable [just], only one, or what [those] your 
right hands possess.”11 “What your right hands possess” is a euphemism for 
female slaves; the option of “marrying” one or more female slaves rather 
than second, third, or fourth wives is clearly authorized here. Although 
the stated reason for this derives from the difficulty of ensuring equity be-
tween wives, the option equally lends itself to the situation of Mauritanian 
husbands restricted to monogamy.
 But the equity requirement was not the only issue that differentiated 
“concubine wives” from legal wives. All four major schools of Islamic law 
stipulate the need for marriage contracts between the bride’s and groom’s 
families; these include negotiations of bride-price, or mahr.12 Marrying a 
slave involved neither a marriage contract nor mahr; the master’s rights 
over the slave, including sexual rights, were considered to be purchased 
along with her person.13 The term marry, however, did have a recognized 
legal meaning: it was the exclusive right to sexual relations with the woman 
and to any progeny issuing from her. Thus, this marriage right was also ac-
quired through concubinage. These were the only legitimate ways a man 
could expand his lineage.14 The Surat al-mun’inum (“The Believers,” 23:5, 
6) states that believers are those “who abstain from sex (‘guard their pri-
vate parts’) . . . except with those joined to them in the marriage bond, or 
those whom their right hands possess.”15 As noted, children born of “those 
whom their right hands possess,” like those born “in the marriage bond,” 
were, in principle, free.16 As we can see from the wording of these surat 
(chapters of the Qu’ran), the association of jariya with wife (slave wife) 
and concubinage with marriage (“to marry one’s slave”) was not a difficult 
one to make in spite of the actual prohibition against such a relationship 
in Islam. It is in this context that Al-hadrami understood what he said 
to me in our interview; for him, there was nothing contradictory about 
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his words or his memorable metaphor. nevertheless, this explanation begs 
the more obvious question of why slavery, jawari, and the umm al-walad 
status were still social realities in 1983.
concubinage and colonialism
When the French conquered the territory that would become Maurita-
nia, between 1905 and 1912, they promised to respect the “customs, values, 
property and religion [Islam]” of the indigenous bizan.17 In 1918, the local 
administrator in Shinqiti wrote:
We have therefore recognized a situation of fact: the slaves stay in the 
family of their owner for whom they constitute the labor force . . . 
[as for slave trading] it can happen that in certain contracts between 
Moors, for the constitution of a bride-price for example, it is specified 
that a slave be given by the spouse. This is not, in my opinion, an act 
of slave trading—a slave whose condition we have already recognized, 
remains in the family. . . . This is not a loss for the masters. These are 
the only transactions [to] which we can close our eyes.18
Domestic slavery was to remain virtually untouched. And as male slaves 
were increasingly freed to become haratine and provide wage labor to the 
colonial economy, those left in domestic slavery were almost exclusively 
women and children. Masters attached special importance to controlling 
them because in 1929, the French affirmed their right to include slaves in 
customary inheritance settlements. Two years later, local administrators 
objected that most of these settlements allocated fractions of slaves, “above 
all women,” to different owners. Although they urged that these practices 
be modified, masters successfully resisted by arguing that “to receive 
even one-quarter of a female slave gives a possible profit of one or several 
children,” referring to children born of servile marriages. Shinqiti elder 
Mohamed Lemine ould habbot explained the principle to me in terms 
of a female slave’s “valuable fertility,” insofar as “her children augmented 
your slaves if you were her master and if your female slave was married to 
someone else’s male slave, the children also belonged to you.”19 Together, 
colonial officials and local masters ensured that domestic slavery, espe-
cially the role of female slaves in its reproduction, remained firmly embed-
ded in Mauritanian society.20
 Masters were also giving female slaves as wives to haratine working 
in adwaba (adabaye sing.—agricultural villages) that were often far away; 
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haratine from these regions recounted to a researcher in the late 1980s that 
these women did not always accept their situation and occasionally fo-
mented resistance against the masters.21 But in Al-hadrami’s town of Atar, 
a well-known hratani who had successfully exploited the colonial econ-
omy and become a slave owner himself, hamody ould Mahmoud, prac-
ticed both gender-specific manumission and arranged marriages. It is said 
that hamody bought “[male] slaves of quality” in order to free them but 
that he rarely freed his female slaves. he frequently arranged marriages 
between his haratine and slave women, descendants of whom were among 
my 2004–5 informants. They proudly claimed association with hamody.22
 What neither published colonial documents nor my field interviews 
addressed openly was a role for jawari in reproducing bizan society itself. 
however, a few comments unearthed in unpublished archives draw atten-
tion to this intriguing suggestion. In 1931, a pamphlet accusing French ad-
ministrators of allowing for and participating in the exploitation of female 
slaves provoked the following response: “Black servantes [are actually the] 
base of the Moorish family” and contribute in large part to its reproduction.23 
“Women of the Moorish race are often sterile [and were in any case], insuf-
ficient in number.”24
 In 1946–47, an observant French traveler linked concubinage to the 
same bizan marriage practices and the health issues I noted earlier:
Moors are monogamous and their women are not very fertile, 
much less than the negresses among the slaves. The acceptable 
usage of black concubines chosen from among the slaves—happy 
to find themselves thusly liberated [a reference to the umm al-
walad]—assured a minimal level of birthing, at the same time 
bringing “more vigorous blood” to a white people weakened by 
undernourishment and the Saharan climate [anticipating Al-
hadrami’s appreciation of metissage].25
This discussion provides important glimpses into the continuing role of 
concubinage in colonial Mauritania.
 concubinage was well masked by the French rhetoric of “domestic 
slavery,” which remained in place as late as 1948–50. At that time, local 
reports referred to servants (f. servantes) born in the household “as their 
slave parents had been before them” and also to masters who provided for 
them. And as had been the case since early in the century, domestic slav-
ery was  articulated in terms of religion: the Qur’an permits slavery, and to 
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oppose it is to oppose the “Musulmane religion” itself.26 French respect for 
the slavery inherent in Mauritania’s “customs, values, property and reli-
gion” remained intact throughout the colonial era.27 When combined with 
the changes brought about by the new colonial political economy and its 
policies opposing slave trading, this respect actually reinforced domestic 
concubinage; it assured bizan reproduction and the use of slave wives to 
sustain servile (slave and hratani) communities. If we were to look at this 
evidence through a contemporary prism, we would have to say that what 
had emerged were various iterations of forced marriage, significant for the 
social and demographic structures of both free and freed populations.
the isLaMic rePubLic oF Mauritania
Life histories of haratine
The first president of the postcolonial state of the Islamic republic of Mau-
ritania, Mokhtar ould Daddah, oversaw his nation’s ratification of the 
United nations Declaration of human rights in 1961. But he had no in-
tention of letting it affect domestic slavery, concubinage included. The 
life histories of contemporary haratine that I collected between 2009 and 
2011 confirm that the early decades of independent Mauritania knew lit-
tle change in this respect.28 A fifty-something informant from the eastern 
hodh (born around 1960) said his mother was jariya; another from the 
southern Brakna claimed the emir took jawari from his community as re-
cently as the 1970s.29 The latter was from an elite group of military haratine 
who were given their own slaves in reward for service. When asked if these 
masters ever took their slaves as jawari, he replied, “no never—but we 
took our own slaves in this way.”30 A third informant from the same region 
said his mother had been jariya in her master’s family for a long time and 
had had several children. he noted that “although she continued to work 
in the household pounding grain, making meals and cleaning—each time 
she had a child, it was born free.” She was freed when she could no longer 
bear children; one of her former master’s sons provided her with a sort 
of pension as acknowledgment of her position in his father’s household.31
 The complicated kin relationships that concubinage could sometimes 
create between masters’ families were illustrated in a life history from 
Trarza. Our informant’s grandmother, who was of one clan, had been 
taken as jariya by a master from a different clan; the informant identi-
fied primarily with that former master’s family, rather than with his 
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grandmother’s. Asked why, he explained that his grandmother’s master 
had “adopted” his father, and his family remained “very appreciative”; it 
had gradually been absorbed.32 Though his grandmother had been umm 
al-walad to her master and bore him free children, our informant’s father 
was apparently not among those children, hence his hratani status. Like 
the Brakna jariya mentioned earlier, she must have been freed before her 
master’s death, subsequently giving birth to the hratani son who fathered 
our informant. It is notable that the sense of kinship deriving from his 
grandmother’s umm al-walad status carries sufficient weight, even to this 
day, to keep his family tied to the former master’s clan.
 I conclude this section with reference to a very well known family 
whose history straddles both the Sahara and the colonial and postcolonial 
eras. M’barek ould Beyruk of the famous Beyruk commercial dynasty of 
southern Morocco was born and raised in Atar. his merchant grandfa-
ther arrived in Atar in 1913, shortly after the installation of the French; 
he took one of his slaves as jariya.33 he also had several wives from his 
own clan over the years.34 M’barek was descended from his grandfather’s 
jariya. Although he clearly distinguished between his grandfather’s wives 
and his concubine, he explained the importance of becoming jariya by 
conflating marriage and slavery: “A young female slave when she is mar-
ried as concubine changes statute [status?] completely—it is said that her 
stomach becomes ‘free,’ therefore all her progeny thenceforth are free.” 
Like Al-hadrami, whose words began this chapter, M’barek used the term 
married deliberately to suggest that a jariya anticipated becoming umm 
al-walad and, like a legal wife, giving birth to free children.
 M’barek went on to say that there was nothing unusual in his grandfa-
ther’s “marrying his slave.” however, it was also common in his family for 
a master who wished to terminate the relationship with his umm al-walad 
to “marry her off ” to a hratani:
[In this way] children of the master become the maternal brothers of 
haratine. . . . I know people who have half-brothers who are haratine 
and they are very attached to their brothers and half-brothers. This 
creates a lot of psychological pressure because they always regard 
their brothers as free. . . . They say: you cannot take my brothers as 
slaves; you must respect my brothers. This is a daily battle. [But] at 
the same time, it is a means of assuring attachment between haratine 
and their masters. This creates strong ties.35
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It is evident that a marriage to a jariya was forced, but the precise nature of 
a marriage with a hratani is not entirely clear. Technically, once freed and 
thanks to her service as umm al-walad, she should have had a choice in the 
matter. But M’barek’s characterization of masters habitually “marrying off ” 
such women suggests something more in line with hamody’s arranged 
marriages than the freedom anticipated with hartaniyya status.
 Although M’barek’s story looks back to the colonial past, it also 
abruptly brings us into the twenty-first century with its references to con-
temporary daily battles to negotiate respect for haratine brothers whom 
others would treat as slaves. even though slavery was abolished a gen-
eration ago first by proclamation, then by ‘law’ in 1980-81, the fact that 
many bizan families are in part shaped by relations established through 
concubinage and many hratani families owe their social position to such 
relations means that slavery cannot be easily forgotten. There has been 
much discussion in the media and among human rights activists about 
the failure of  abolition to change conditions for those living in slave-like 
circumstances, including women said to be subject to sexual exploitation 
by masters. But such cases are not addressed with any consideration for 
the history of taking slave wives or becoming jawari. how have people ad-
justed actual marriage and reproductive practices to respond to the legal 
prohibition of concubinage engendered by the ending of slavery? how 
have their own perceptions and representations of the institution changed 
given its deep roots in both their social and personal experience?
concubinage in “Postslave” Mauritania: A contradiction in Terms
M’Barek’s interview conflates the discourse of past and present but offers little 
insight into the legacies traditional concubinage has bequeathed to this osten-
sibly postslave society. A recent publication by anthropologist corinne Fortier 
on secret marriage may help in this respect.36 She argues that Mauritania is an 
unusually “aware” society in terms of shari’a law, especially as it concerns the 
family; even illiterate women learn orally from mothers and grandmothers 
about the religious rights they can exercise within the marriage contract. Be-
cause the ultraconservative Maliki law was enshrined in the country’s 2001 
Personal Status code, arranged marriages for minors—families betrothing 
children while they are still infants or toddlers—remain legal.37 however, 
the code stipulates eighteen as the age of majority; past this age, paternal au-
thority weakens in the face of the negotiated marriage contract in which the 
bride’s family usually insists on monogamy as a marriage condition.38
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 But as Fortier notes, this is also a society in which men, historically, 
were absent for long periods of time, as nomads following camel herds 
or as merchants in the trans-Saharan trade. In this context, men took ad-
vantage of Islamic laws that permitted forms of nonpermanent marriage, 
as-sirriyya or secret (sir) marriage being one. This type of marriage has no 
built-in expiration date, making it legal under Maliki law.39 The religious 
ceremony is the same as for an official marriage, although the contract 
is oral, not written; neither requires a qadi (judge), and both need wit-
nesses. Fortier compares as-sirriyya to temporary marriage in places such 
as egypt, but the better comparison is to misyar marriage, which literally 
translates as “traveling or ambulant marriage,” currently growing in popu-
larity (and controversy) in and around the Gulf States.40
 Secret marriage (like misyar) is nevertheless contentious. Many Ma-
liki jurists argue that to be legal, marriage requires public rituals such as 
an engagement celebration—in other words, the antithesis of secret mar-
riage. But recently, others have asserted with accepted authority that the 
required presence of two witnesses at the ceremony means the marriage is 
not really secret and therefore is legitimate.41
 Legality aside, other differences between the two types of marriage are 
important. Shari’a marriage requires negotiations between two families; 
as-sirriyya is strictly between the two individuals concerned. The former in-
volves providing gifts to and economic security for the wife; the latter entails 
neither. Lastly and significantly, children born within a shari’a marriage are 
assumed to be progeny of that relationship and are automatically legitimate; 
those born of a secret marriage must prove their paternity. As Fortier puts it, 
their legitimacy depends “entirely on the goodwill of the father.”42
 From our perspective, the most significant questions Fortier discusses are 
why these marriages occur and with whom. The very success Mauritanian 
women have had in writing monogamy into marriage contracts means that 
men who wish for sexual relationships with women other than their wives and 
who could, as Muslims, take second or third wives actually risk divorce if they 
do so. Secret marriage provides them with licit access to such relationships. 
historically, according to Fortier, the secret was “generally well-guarded” and 
was only revealed if the husband had a child with his “secret wife.” Yet such a 
child was sometimes the reason the man contracted as-sirriyya:
In Mauritania, generally when a man cannot have children with his 
wife, he will choose to contract a secret marriage with a woman of his 
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choice, usually of inferior social status such as a descendant of a slave 
(hartaniyya), rather than repudiating his wife and remarrying. . . . 
Because the secret marriage is considered by the Moorish jurists to be 
legal, a child born from this union is legally recognized as legitimate.43
What is so striking about as-sirriyya is its similarity to jariya marriage: 
both involve licit sexual relations outside the permitted four wives, the 
production of legitimate children for the master, the requirement that 
such children be acknowledged by the father, and the lack of formalities 
such as written contracts and public announcements.
 There is one key difference, however. Fortier argues that a man will 
seek out this secret relationship in order to have legitimate children, just 
as one might argue men took slave wives historically. But a jariya had no 
rights to her children, for she was reproducing the master’s family and 
not her own, whereas a secret wife—a free woman—should have the same 
claim to children as a shari’a wife would. In other words, in order for the 
man to claim these children as his legitimate progeny, would he not have 
to officially marry their mother? Fortier indirectly addresses that question 
when she notes that wives who have been unsuccessful in giving birth 
sometimes recognize the legitimacy of their husbands’ other children 
rather than risk divorce, or they may choose to live in formal polygyny.44
 We also need to take into account why women enter into as-sirriyya. 
Though love may lead some women to accept being secret wives, Fortier 
argues that economic reasons are more compelling. Secret marriage still 
requires the payment of mahr, so there is a financial gain involved. “Secret 
marriages, therefore, involve primarily women of inferior social status.” 
Such women are often hartaniyya. When the woman is under eighteen 
and therefore still subject to her father’s authority (as per the Personal Sta-
tus code), “it is often her family that forces her to contract a secret mar-
riage with a wealthy man for economic reasons.”45 In such circumstances, 
both the woman’s social status and her economic situation would mitigate 
against her successfully launching a legal challenge for rights to her chil-
dren. In any case, if Fortier’s analysis is correct, the woman’s motivation 
for entering into this relationship is quite different from the man’s—hers 
being one of socioeconomic betterment, not progeny.
 considering this situation in the context of Mauritania’s extreme pov-
erty, Fortier’s conclusion that the institution is declining is surprising. 
elsewhere, the opposite has been asserted: “clandestine Marriages on the 
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rise in Mauritania” was a lead article in al-Arabiya on June 24, 2010.46 Like 
Fortier, the author of the article notes that men are avoiding restrictions 
on polygamy written into contracts as well as circumventing unhappy ar-
ranged marriages. And the author also underscores the role of economic 
hardship: “In order to lure the bride’s parents into accepting the marriage, 
the husband pledges to support them financially throughout the duration 
of the contract. Peasants in the countryside, recent immigrants to the city, 
or girls from nomadic tribes are the main target of the suitors, who take 
advantage of their dire conditions.” But young girls sometimes voluntarily 
enter these relationships to help support their families. A woman who 
claims to have been in two such marriages is quoted as explaining that 
“the girl agrees to live in the shadow because of the money the groom pays 
not realizing that [she] is falling victim to her family’s ignorance and her 
husband’s selfishness.”47
 For all the understanding of the economic context expressed in this 
article, there is little appreciation of Mauritania’s social structure or its his-
torical development, and the wives in these marriages are characterized 
exclusively in terms of their “poverty and ignorance.” Fortier, by contrast, 
is fully cognizant of the fact that most of these poor, ignorant women are 
hartaniyya from hratani families. Though it may be unclear as to whether 
we are seeing an increase or decrease in as-sirriyya, which by nature of 
its secrecy is difficult to document, it must surely be significant that, like 
traditional relations of concubinage, such marriages are largely defined by 
bizan men looking to satisfy their sexual and reproductive desires with 
descendants of former slaves. In fact, information about contemporary 
marriages from my interviews with haratine conducted at about the same 
time these publications appeared suggests that what we may be seeing is 
the morphing of the traditional master-jariya relationship into a form or 
forms of modern as-sirriyya.
 earlier, I referred to a hratani from Brakna who spoke of the emir 
taking jawari from his community as recently as the 1970s. equally re-
vealing was the continuation of this person’s response, the story of a local 
hartaniyya who had given birth to the emir’s daughter but remained with 
her child in the hratani community. The informant referred to this situation 
as a marriage, but its inclusion in his discussion of jawari, as well as the 
fact that neither the daughter nor the mother was taken into the emir’s 
camp, is suggestive of something “other.” Moreover, he had responded 
positively to the question, “Was there concubinage between the emir and 
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your hartaniyya?” in spite of the inherent contradiction (that is, that since 
a hartaniyya is not a slave, she cannot be a concubine). A neighboring 
Trarza informant suggested that it is still normal for male children to go 
with the father, whereas girls remain with their hartaniyya mothers in the 
village because “sometimes the father wishes to hide his marriage.”48 Are 
these two strikingly similar situations a form of as-sirriyya in which we 
are also seeing gender preference—a willingness to reveal the relation-
ship when its outcome is a son who contributes to the family lineage but 
not when that progeny is a daughter? Is this perhaps a reflection of how 
concubinage operated in practice as distinct from principle—were boys 
normally the ones acknowledged as free, rendering the women umm 
al-walad, whereas girls remained enslaved along with their mothers?49 
Building on this, was our Brakna informant’s response to the concubine/
hartaniyya question a reflection of how he and his community under-
stood what was happening, irrespective of its illegality, precisely because 
of its continuity with past reality?
 These are tenuous speculations, but they tend to be supported by infor-
mants from Gorgol and Guidimaka, two heavily populated southern agri-
cultural regions where close relations exist between bizan clerics and their 
haratine. In each region, we were told that the clerics did not marry their 
slaves—they “married hartaniyya”; in Gorgol, it was claimed that “all bizan 
clerics had hartaniyya mothers,” and in Guidimaka, “most” did. In Gorgol, 
mothers and children of these marriages continued to live in the hratani 
community, as we saw in Brakna (though our informant implied both male 
and female children remained). But both responses raise the issue of what 
exactly marriage means in these communities.50 even taking into account 
the likelihood that the percentage of bizan clerics with hartaniyya mothers 
was exaggerated by the informants, the larger picture here seems to show 
that the concubinage we know historically has persisted well into recent 
times. Only by being sons of jawari could these men technically be born 
bizan.51 Our fifty-something informant from the hodh, who was dark-
skinned and had grown up in a hratani adabaye, brought this point home 
vividly. he immediately asserted that he was the son of a jariya as a way of 
telling us we were mistaken in thinking him to be hratani.52
 Between 2009 and 2011 (unlike in 1983), the term jariya appeared to 
belong to the past; contemporary discourse spoke of hartaniyya and mar-
riage. Informants knew the difference in reality, however. In Guidimaka, 
for example, the informant specified that bizan married their daughters: 
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“Yes, that happens here. One of our marabouts [a French colonial term 
for cleric] claimed that the wife was his slave; although he did not say 
this, it was clear. A second marriage took place for which we celebrated 
the engagement but this is a natural marriage.”53 In the first instance, the 
terminology of marriage was used, including wife, but based on how the 
so-called marriage took place (“it was clear”), the informant knew that the 
bizan regarded this as concubinage and his wife as jariya. The point was 
underscored by contrasting this with a second marriage involving a pub-
lic engagement, a requirement of shari’a marriage (which he called “natu-
ral”), distinguishing it from concubinage, as-sirriyya, or some conflation 
of the two. What is notable is that the informant spoke of these two types 
of marriage as occurring in the present tense.
 To be sure that this was not an anomaly, we can return to the Trarza 
informant who earlier spoke of a father wishing “to hide his marriage.” he 
was the only one to address a contemporary change in marriage practice 
and the critical aspect of choice. In this, he was perhaps the most import-
ant commentator on the issues raised by our earlier discussion of secret 
marriage. “In the past,” he recounted, “hratani marriage had to be guar-
anteed by the Moorish master who had to accept it [it was not legitimate 
unless approved by the master], but the situation has changed now”:
now, marriage does not depend upon tribal belonging [a reference 
to the master’s authorization], you find marriages mixed between 
tribes. You can also find Moors who marry hartaniyya wives, 
sometimes because they consider them like their slaves—Abid, 
which is comparable to concubinage, commonly called Tjowri 
[jawari] and sometimes as a natural marriage.54
Like our Guidimaka informant, he clearly differentiated between the 
two types of marriage, interestingly also using the term natural to mean 
“shari’a,” or “legal.” But he went on to describe the “marrying” of hartani-
yya as often being “comparable to concubinage,” even going so far as to use 
the local term jawari. And he went one important step further: he gratu-
itously observed that “hartaniyya appreciate very much being married by 
a Moor. On the whole, marriage here is a question of agreement.”55
 These last comments bring us back to the issue of forced marriage 
and our discussion of as-sirriyya—but this time from the perspective of 
a hratani patriarch. It is difficult to say to what degree the daughters in 
his community truly appreciate marriage to bizan and to what degree this 
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is the perspective of the community’s male family members. historically, 
these hartaniyya’s mothers, aunts, and grandmothers—often jawari and 
umm al-walad in these same bizan families—might indeed have enjoyed 
the elevated status and appreciation promised by Islam and implied in 
some life histories. But the contemporary overlay of poverty seems to have 
blurred some of those kinship linkages and religious concerns. More local 
fieldwork that probes individual family histories while bringing to bear 
awareness of the socioreligious customs that may have structured rela-
tions within those families is necessary to further understand such devel-
opments, including secret marriage.
Legacies oF sLavery: the hidden dynaMics oF 
conteMPorary Forced Marriage
contemporary human rights and gender equity reports looking at forced 
marriage and child marriage reflect many of these realities, even if they 
are not explicitly analyzed as such. Fortier draws a comparison between 
as-sirriyya and neighboring Morocco’s fatiha (“The Opening”) marriage, 
for example.56 In early 2011, fatiha marriages were described as “under-age 
marriages” of girls of twelve and thirteen years, with payment being made 
up front for betrothals to even younger girls who might not be marriage-
able for several years. Although contracted in the name of tradition (the 
part of formal marriage wherein the contract is signed and the man recites 
the Sura al-Fatiha—hence the name; it can precede the public wedding 
party by some time and for numerous reasons), the report concluded, 
these marriages were clearly attempts to escape poverty.57 The 2012 Gen-
der Index on Mauritania documented instances of “early marriage” and 
“minors being forced into marriage,” echoing the Moroccan report.58 And 
information on forced marriage among Mauritanian women published 
by the Immigration and refugee Board of canada in 2012, generally for 
the purpose of determining refugee status, identified three “prevalent 
types.” The first, “cousin marriage,” involved ensuring that women were 
well supported. Although not clarified in the document, this referred in 
particular to bizan; cousin marriages would account for many of the un-
happy arranged marriages the al-Arabiya article (discussed in some detail 
previously) held responsible for what it argued was a rise in “clandestine 
marriage.” The second type involved girls from poor families being forced 
to marry rich men “who they do not love.” Again, though not identified 
174 e. Ann mCDougAll
in Mauritanian social terms, most of these girls were almost certainly 
hartaniyya marrying rich bizan. Leaving aside the questionable relevance 
of marrying for love, this would seem to be the most likely scenario to 
generate as-sirriyya or forms thereof. And the third type referred again 
to poor girls, in this case being forced into polygamous marriages with 
wealthy and influential men. The direct opposite of secret marriage, this 
also would appear to be the least likely type to become more prevalent, 
given the contract stipulations on monogamy among wealthy and influ-
ential bizan families.59
 What is notably common across these three types of forced marriages 
and instances of underage betrothal/marriage is the economic hardship 
faced by the bride and her family. It would be easy to conclude then, as the 
media generally does, that forced marriage relations in hartani communi-
ties today are being driven almost exclusively by poverty. Without denying 
the importance of that factor, it must be remembered that this conclusion 
obscures the long history of concubinage and slave marriage that lies at 
the heart of and still unites many Mauritanian bizan and hratani families. I 
would argue that adding these historical, social, and religious perspectives 
to how we think about and shape our research on forced marriage will 
produce a significantly deeper understanding of the realities influencing 
marriage in general in Mauritania today.
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Challenges and Constraints
Forced Marriage as a Form of “Traditional” Practice in the Gambia
BAL A SAhO
nbaa niŋnfaa Mummy and Daddy,
niŋ a ye a tara, ali be nii la, If you wish to give me away in marriage,
Ali si nkili, ali ye n ñininka. call me and seek my opinion.
Saayiŋ tiloo, nowadays,
Moo te nte nii noo la, no one can force me to marry,
Fo ali maŋ a je, Don’t you see,
Buŋ jaŋo loota n ñe. I am on top of a skyscraper?
 Teenage Mandinka girls usually sing this song while they play in vil-
lage squares under moonlit skies, contemplating their lives and relation-
ships. In the song, the girls are pleading with their parents not to forcefully 
give them away in marriage without their consent because they have their 
own dreams and expectations about life. The girls are cognizant of the fact 
that these days, they cannot be married without their consent, and they 
are calling on their mothers and fathers to be attentive to their wishes. 
The metaphor of a tall building symbolizes an expectation of a life far be-
yond village squares and huts to high rises and sprawling urban centers, 
representing the changes taking place as a result of rural-to-urban drift 
since the establishment of colonial rule. As populations move from rural 
areas to urban centers, many customary practices are transplanted, but 
they are simultaneously being questioned and challenged by the younger 
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generations. Importantly, the song reveals that forced marriage is a com-
mon occurrence in these communities and that the young girls are 
condemning the practice.1
 In a recent assessment of the legal status of women and children 
in the Gambia conducted by the Female Lawyers Association−Gambia 
(FLAG), one is struck not only by the incidence of forced marriages but 
also by the impact and influence of tradition and custom in the con-
summation of marriages in this former British colony.2 The concepts of 
tradition and custom are complicated because of their endless journey 
in time and because they are endlessly debated. Some of the debates in-
volve ways in which colonial administrators in Africa went about re-
configuring African traditional practices for the functioning of colonial 
enterprise and how African leaders used it to their own advantage. For 
example, for Terence ranger, the British colonial administrators in-
vented African traditions for Africans through codification, thereby 
transforming flexible custom into hard prescription. Martin chanock 
sees tradition as devices employed by rural elites to enforce the claim on 
labor of elders over the young, of husbands over wives, and of property 
owners over domestic slaves.3
 Thomas Spear also argues that tradition remains critical in under-
standing historical processes of social change and representation.4 In this 
way, linking to certain traditions can validate groups and individuals who 
maintained such traditions. When individuals, families, communities, or 
nations act in a “traditional way,” we need to ask, as elizabeth Thornberry 
does in chapter 5, in whose interests it is to act this way. Also, because 
human societies are dynamic, so too are their traditions. This raises the 
question of why the customs and traditions about forced marriage and 
the related practices of early marriage persist to this day. Is it possible that 
some of the young girls act in their own interest by accepting early mar-
riages for prestige and for social and economic reasons—to increase their 
chances of getting support from their husbands due to the prevailing dis-
advantageous position of women in this particular society? For example, 
in the Gambia, 65.8 percent of adult women are illiterate compared to 51.4 
percent of men, and the lives of over 90 percent of Gambian women are 
subject to the shari’a and/or customary law, which could infringe on the 
development of women.5 In short, it is difficult to determine where tradi-
tions begin or end. nonetheless, for the purpose of this chapter, I use the 
term tradition to refer to practices passed down from earlier generations 
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to the present generation and specifically the traditions and customs of 
arranged and early forced marriage practices.
 A recent case involving a girl named Mariama illuminates the prob-
lems of the persistence of the traditions regarding arranged marriages 
in the Gambia. In 2009, at age fourteen, Mariama was forced to marry 
a man older than her father. She became the third and youngest wife of 
the husband, as under Islamic law, a man may marry up to four women. 
no matter how much Mariama protested, the marriage proceeded. Then, 
her husband mysteriously died. The man’s elderly wife was arrested and 
detained at a police station on suspicion of having poisoned him, charges 
she denied. After three days of reflection, Mariama walked to the police 
station and revealed that it was she who poisoned the husband because she 
had been forced to marry him.6
 Mariama’s story corresponds with a case investigated by FLAG. The 
police had arrested Kura, then a fourteen-year-old girl, because they sus-
pected that she had poisoned her husband. The police alleged that the man 
died after drinking green tea that she prepared. however, several others 
also drank the tea and did not die. Kura was initially detained by the police 
and then put in prison, where she remained for nearly three years without 
charge. After FLAG’s intervention, the court declared her detention un-
lawful, and she was released.7 
 These cases reflect how some girls and young women respond to tra-
ditional marriages that involve coercion and force. Driven into untenable 
relations because of various social, cultural, and economic issues, some 
will resort to murder to escape them.
 In this chapter, I investigate two types of traditional or customary mar-
riage practices and their implications for forced marriage, bearing in mind, 
as Brett Shadle does in chapter 3, that in the Gambia, forced marriage al-
most always involved a young girl below the age of consent. According to 
the convention on the rights of the child, the term early marriage refers 
to any marriage of a child younger than eighteen years old; it is recognized 
as a violation of a child’s rights.8 A forced marriage is defined as a marriage 
that is conducted without the valid consent of one or both parties and that 
involves duress, whether physical or emotional.9 Like forced marriage, an 
arranged marriage is conducted by parents and family members without 
necessarily obtaining the consent of the bride and groom: it is the family 
members who make the important choices. As richard roberts argues in 
chapter 1, an arranged marriage is essentially a forced marriage because 
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the bride and groom cannot say no to their relatives’ choice. This practice 
questions the age of consent or the age at which a girl should be married. 
In the Gambia, this is usually after first menses, which can be at thirteen 
or fourteen for some girls. 
 I examine the cultural and traditional meanings of marriage practices 
and trace difficulties surrounding the interpretation of forced marriage, 
especially with regard to the tradition of arranged marriages. I argue that 
in order to understand the complexities of forced marriage—in which 
parents determine whom their children should marry, an arrangement 
that is sometimes made when the children are infants—the sociocultural, 
economic, and traditional norms and values as well as the livelihood prac-
tices of the people concerned should be understood. In other words, there 
is a need to investigate more thoroughly how forced marriage may be seen 
as an institution essential for preserving the economics of a way of life. For 
this chapter, I have used archival and secondary sources as well as oral in-
terviews I conducted between 2010 and 2013. In particular, I asked elderly 
men and women of the central and south bank regions in urban and rural 
areas of the Gambia about cultural norms and values, about marriage 
practices, and about the question of forced marriage.
discriMination against woMen
The song quoted at the outset of this chapter and examples from FLAG 
and several nongovernmental organizations attest to the fact that early 
and forced marriages have deep roots in Gambian society, and these mar-
riages persist despite the harm they do. In fact, the song is particularly 
revealing because it is a form of protest against the persistence of forced 
marriage at the village level. The village squares provide platforms for 
girls to express their desperation about such practices. In the same vein, 
Mariama’s readiness to face punishment by openly admitting to poisoning 
her husband illustrates that young girls are indeed challenging the insti-
tution of arranged and forced marriages and not merely by song. In ex-
treme cases, girls forced into marriages refuse to have babies to protest 
against the union. caroline h. Bledsoe and her colleagues suggest that 
young women in forced marriages use contraceptive injections to prevent 
pregnancy in the hope that their husbands, discouraged by their failure to 
conceive, will decide they are sterile and free them to marry men of their 
own choosing.10
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 numerous scholars have studied the subject of forced and arranged 
marriages in Africa.11 Mariam Ouattara and others have demonstrated that 
in some West African states, such as Benin, Ivory coast, and Burkina Faso, 
early marriage is a common practice, whereby girls as young as ten to 
thirteen are kidnapped from their families and taken to their husbands. 
These authors have also shown that girls are betrothed at or before birth by 
their parents, based on friendships or on a system of exchanging women 
between ethnic groups within the community. The husband-to-be and his 
family may have given presents (dadaho) or provided services (glodian) to 
their future in-laws according to custom. Parents feel a strong obligation 
to respect the pledge, forcing the girl to marry the man they have chosen 
for her. It is not unknown for a desperate girl, unwilling to marry a man 
she does not know or love, to commit suicide.12 My findings in the Gambia 
are consistent with these conclusions.
 The effort to reform marriage dates to the early colonial period. co-
lonial officials were also concerned about violence against girls and made 
attempts to stop the practice of forced marriage. Most of the colonial era 
debates centered on what officials saw as early forced marriage in the Gam-
bia colony and protectorate and what measures should be taken to redefine 
marriage practices, especially the age at which a girl should marry (the age 
of consent). Toward those ends, the officials promulgated a series of mar-
riage laws. In 1862, one of the first of such laws, the Marriage Ordinance, was 
enacted. The ordinance provided that in the case of a person who was under 
twenty-one and wished to contract a marriage, the consent of the parents 
or guardians or a judge of the Supreme court was necessary. This law was 
supposedly meant to curtail child marriages.13 Unfortunately, the legislation 
did not have much impact on the status of women, as it was impossible 
to implement due to opposition from the Muslim community. nowadays, 
the nongovernmental organizations, in particular women’s rights organi-
zations, are working to raise awareness and to encourage the government 
of the Gambia to enact and implement laws prohibiting the discrimination 
against girls and women.14 The Gambia is a signatory to various interna-
tional instruments on human rights, which form the basis for the protection 
of human rights, especially the rights of women and children (the Interna-
tional Bill of human rights, the African charter on human and People’s 
rights, the commission on the Status of Women [cSW], the convention 
on the elimination of Discrimination against Women [ceDAW], and the 
convention on the rights of the child [crc]).15
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 The government of the Gambia has taken some positive steps since 
the 1970s to ratify these instruments, to address issues of discrimination 
against women, and to promote women’s access to education. For example, 
section 27 of the 1997 constitution provides that marriage shall be based 
on the full consent of both parties and “complete and equal respect” be-
tween men and women, and it should be entered into voluntarily by men 
and women of “the requisite age and capacity.” Section 28 underscores the 
rights of women, providing that “women shall be accorded full and equal 
dignity of the person with men.”16 however, enacting and implementing 
effective laws in the interest of women and young girls has been problem-
atic for many reasons.
 Although the 1997 constitution prohibits any discrimination based 
on gender, it also explicitly proclaims the need to preserve traditions and 
customs. For instance, the authorities have on several occasions since 1997 
taken a stand against female genital cutting (FGc), but they have often 
argued that this practice is part of Gambian culture and that the govern-
ment cannot prohibit it. As a result, the Gambia has shown reservations 
regarding most of the international and regional conventions that it has 
ratified.17 By invoking tradition, officials prefer not to offend those who are 
interested in maintaining customary practices of the population, rather 
than implementing the law. Sally e. Merry argues that governments in-
voke culture in international forums as an excuse for their failure to act 
energetically to promote gender equality and the values of autonomy and 
choice that are at the heart of the human rights system. Transnational 
women’s human rights activists maintain that governments’ claims to re-
spect the particularities of local cultures, traditions, or religious practices 
are forms of resistance to their efforts to promote women’s equality.18 The 
ceDAW report of 2003 states that the Gambia has not integrated the legis-
lative and legal provisions contained in the conventions it has ratified into 
its legislation. Its internal law is therefore in complete contradiction to the 
convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, especially those articles concerning marriage and divorce.19 The 
president of the Gambia Bar Association, Justice Loubna Farage, recently 
reminded participants at a workshop on gender-based violence that two 
bills—on sexual offense as well as domestic violence—have not yet been 
ratified despite being in the pipeline for a long time.20
 Another factor that hinders progress to enforce legislation prohibit-
ing discrimination against women is the traditional preference for boys. 
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Although boys are generally encouraged to be high achievers, girls are 
mentored to become housewives and to be obedient to their husbands. 
When a family is presented with a choice to send one of their children to 
school, it is the girl who most often remains at home. early school leav-
ing has significant repercussions for the future success of these children. 
Whereas a boy can remain unmarried for many years, an unmarried girl 
is soon labeled as “too old to marry.” What is striking about these kinds of 
attitudes is that they are anchored in everyday speech and proverbs. One 
of the popular sayings is “Niŋ I ye miraŋo koyoo je suntukunŋoto, I si a loŋ 
ko feŋ ne keta a la” (If you see a clean calabash at a cesspool, know that 
the bottom has a hole). This supposedly means that if a girl has remained 
unmarried for many years, something must be wrong with her. It is im-
portant to grasp the social consequences of these traditional practices and 
explain why they persist in the Gambia.
diMensions oF Forced and arranged Marriages
In the Gambia, tradition and custom play a vital role in the arrangement of 
a marriage between a man and a woman. Many of these traditional prac-
tices involve elements of force and coercion, since the marriage is arranged 
without the consent of the young people and especially without the consent 
of the young girl. claude Meillassoux reminds us that in domestic com-
munities, control of marriage is linked to control of political power as a 
mean to control the mechanisms of social reproduction: access to wives, 
land, and personhood.21 In the Gambia, parental obligations and controls 
are strictly adhered to, especially in matters pertaining to marriage. Parents 
usually make a final decision on a traditional marriage arrangement. On 
many occasions, the bride and groom may never have met; no courtship 
would have taken place between the two members of a future couple. These 
preconjugal arrangements often involve immediate parents and distant 
kin groups. One reason that these arranged marriages persist is economic. 
Under custom, the groom has to either perform several years of labor for 
the prospective bride’s father (helping him on the farm and performing 
tasks such as mending fences) or pay bridewealth. Bridewealth can be 
money or services transferred to the girl’s parents by the parents of the 
husband-to-be, in kind or cash, before a marriage can take place. Bride-
wealth compensates the bride’s kin for the resources that the girl’s parents 
spent in her upbringing and for the loss of her future labor and children, 
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which will be lost when the girl leaves the household. Among some groups, 
such as the Fulani, Wolof, and Mandinka, arrangements take place several 
years before the intended girl reaches the age of marriage.
 One of these traditional arrangements is known as londiroo (to make 
it stand; wait; betrothal) or bulu mutoo (to hold hands), whereby the girl 
is tied to, allocated to, or arranged to marry a cousin or any other person. 
Among the Mandinka, this practice is essentially regarded as an arranged 
marriage. It is a situation in which little girls are betrothed at tender ages.22 
In this arrangement, when both sets of parents agree a piece of cloth is 
symbolically tied to the little girl’s arms—hence, the terms londiroo or bulu 
mutoo. This practice has long-lasting implications for the girl and the boy’s 
parents. When seen as an investment, the husband-to-be and his parents 
assume the costs of raising the child and helping her parents. The tradi-
tional bond of londiroo guarantees that when the girl reaches the age of 
thirteen or fourteen, she will become the bride of the groom. In such cases, 
the girl has very few choices, since she has been betrothed for many years.
 Abduction (musu suñaa) is another form of marriage common in the 
Gambia as well as many other parts of Africa.23 Musu suñaa is a traditional 
practice that empowers husbands to abduct their new wives, with or with-
out advising the wife first and usually against her will. In some cases, this is 
done with the knowledge of the parents of the husband or of the girl. Musu 
suñaa is carried out mainly in two ways. In a situation where the marriage is 
consummated between a boy and a girl and the boy has failed to pay or has 
taken too much time to complete the payment of the bridewealth, the girl’s 
parents also drag their feet in letting the girl transfer to her husband’s home. 
In such cases, the husband may, with the approval of his parents, organize 
his friends in an expedition to snatch the girl. Once abducted, the girl finds 
it hard to go back to her parents, and the husband can dictate the mode of 
payment of the bridewealth.24 A girl named ramatoulie expressed the tradi-
tion well when she recollected how she was kidnapped by a group of young 
men from her village in the Upper river region of the Gambia:
In the evening, my husband and some of his friends, four of them 
came to visit me and my parents. After hours of conversation, my 
mother asked me to see them off. The village was quiet by then. As 
soon we were out of earshot, I was seized. My mouth was covered 
with cloth so I could not cry for help. They carried me off and I am 
still here. now it is too late to try to return because of my children.25
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All the elderly women at my interview with ramatoulie corroborated her 
story. They were in the village when it happened.
 The women added that even if the girl tries to return, it comes to no 
avail because the husband uses spiritual means to force the woman to 
stay.26 I asked the interviewees to explain further.
Q:  What kinds of spiritual means do men use to force girls to stay in 
such marriages?
A:  (laughter) Oh! They have means. Go talk to those men sitting 
over there. One of the ways is to use an amulet. When the 
husband comes into the compound and finds you sitting, he 
would call your name and press the amulet. he would call your 
name aloud; “ramatoulie, you are sitting?” Once you answer to 
him in the affirmative, he would press the amulet and you would 
never think of running away.
Q:  Do you know anyone who has been forced to stay in her 
marriage?
A:  Yes, some years ago, one lady committed suicide by jumping into 
a well. It was sad because we knew that she never wanted to stay 
with her husband.
Q:  Why do you think men kidnap their wives?
A:  You know, usually, people who do that are not wealthy and we 
tend to spend wealth in marriage. It is cheaper to carry your wife 
in this way than paying for bridewealth at once and spending lots 
of money for the marriage ceremony.
Other interviews provided further insights into the practices of forced 
marriage in the Gambia.
 In an interview with two elderly women in the village of Fula Bantang 
in the Upper river region, Awa Baldeh and Konkon Baldeh revealed that 
when men marry girls, women have no say in it.
As a mother, you cannot decide who should marry your daughter. 
Men make the decision and the girl cannot refuse. You cannot reject 
men’s decisions; you will be flogged out of your sense. There have 
been occasions here where girls were unwillingly taken to their 
husbands and this has resulted in bad consequences for the girl.27
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nfamara Jatta, an elderly man of Janjanbureh, told me that he had some of 
his daughters married without their consent, and he explained that economic 
reasons were the motives for doing so. “In marrying your daughter, you need 
to be sure whether the husband to be can afford the basic needs for your 
daughter and her children.” he continued to say that his kin group attempted 
to give away one of his daughters in marriage without her consent, a move 
he did not support. his refusal was based not on the legality of the act but on 
the fact that the kin group wanted her to marry a man who was poor or, as 
he puts it, “a buloo maŋ a koo beŋ” (a man who cannot make ends meet).28
 Scholars who study marriage in northern nigeria, such as Barbara Gal-
laway, underscore Jatta’s economic concerns about the subsistence obliga-
tions in marriage: “A man has not only moral but legal responsibility for the 
support of his family. The remedy for non-support for a woman is divorce, 
which is granted by an Islamic court and generally is not difficult to get.”29
 Another way in which the practice of musu suñaa is executed is by 
forcefully carrying a girl to a man with whom no particular kind of ar-
rangement has been made. In this case, the girl does not know the husband 
to be. Thus, both parents make the arrangement without the knowledge of 
the girl or the boy. Dado’s story is an example:
In 1993, in the town of Jarra Soma, Gambia, Dado, a young girl at 
the age of 13 was kidnapped by three youths on the orders of her 
parents. She was bundled in a vehicle bound for Guinea conakry. 
Dado was being forced to marry her cousin. After two years in 
Guinea, Dado came back to Soma with a baby girl, apparently 
having eloped with her boy-friend. The parents made no further 
effort to return her to her husband.30
 early and forced marriage further speaks to the economic situation of 
parents. Jatta insists that poor parents are likely to marry their girls early 
to ameliorate their economic conditions. As a result of high bridewealth in 
some parts of the country, fathers demand significant resources for their 
daughters.31 early marriage is also a means to prevent girls from getting 
pregnant out of wedlock—a matter related to the issue of saving face.32
Maintenance oF “tradit ionaL” Marriage
In placing emphasis on the maintenance of tradition in marriage, we 
must again ask, in whose interest are certain traditions being upheld and 
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preferred over others? Scholars have already examined the subject of tra-
dition, and it is clear that traditions can be selective. For instance, in Af-
rica some Muslims invoke a lineage to the prophet Muhammad and Arabs 
to legitimate themselves and their positions among fellow Muslims. Also, 
many Africans are quick to reference relations to past legendary figures 
as efforts to communicate and validate themselves and their ethnicity. In 
the process, control of certain traditions, including marriage, becomes the 
monopoly of elderly men.
 According to Meillassoux, two basic ways to control social power are 
by controling women and controling tradition.33 In a discussion with Kan-
tong Suwareh of ndanka village, north Bank region, I asked him why 
many young boys and girls are being married. he responded with a ques-
tion. “Why do you think these young boys prefer to stay in this remote 
village, far from the main road, no electricity, no running water and with 
farm labor? It is because of these young girls and without controlling the 
girls, I doubt if we can control these boys.”34 For Kantong, having control 
of the young boys and girls is important because he will have access to 
their labor while they study the Qur’an. In the Gambia, with the advent 
of peanut production in the mid-nineteenth century, child labor was re-
newed because more land was required than ever before for the cultivation 
of the crop. In this way, young boys and girls are encouraged to marry 
early, which, as Meillassoux reasons, is to the benefit of elders implicitly 
for labor expectations.35
 The interest in the perpetuation of traditional marriage goes beyond 
labor requirements to the circulation of goods and the solidarity it cre-
ates. According to Meillassoux, the control, subordination, and direction 
of pubescent women into alliances are defined by their community’s ob-
ligations, so that procreation takes place in the context of male relations 
of descent.36 In such traditions, elderly men maintain their authority in 
the family and community. Also, maintenance of tradition can represent 
efforts by elders to keep the norms and values of society together, so that 
each person acts in the common interest of the group, and that, of course, 
benefits the elderly men in authority.
 here, it is essential to underline the “traditional thinking” that con-
stitutes norms of practice and fundamental principles and guidelines for 
members of society to continue to live together—a pattern of thinking that 
holds in reverence certain kinds of hierarchical systems to protect a way 
of life. In most African societies, adhering to the voices and judgments of 
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elders is the societal norm, even if their words or rulings are disadvanta-
geous to some individuals in the society. In words and practice, the ethic 
is: “This is how our forebears did it, and this is how we will do it. This is 
how we lived, and we are going to continue to live this way.” This ethic is 
commonly expressed by the Mandinka as foroya mu kaŋo le ti (honoring 
one’s word is noble), which is deduced from a generic principle of ad-
herence to society. In such a society, those who obey orders, abide by the 
penalties, and honor authority are regarded as having been brought up in 
a cultured family. They have honor.37
 consequently, if a father agrees to marry his daughter to someone, it 
must be done even if the girl does not consent because it is better to save 
face than to be ashamed in society. In other words, if an individual is to live 
with honor, it is the society that bestows that honor—but the individual 
must first claim it.38 Alhagi Sunkare Marakong of Wassu in central river 
region showed happiness and pride that he was able to decide whom his 
two daughters were to marry. he emphasized his role as the family head 
and stressed that all the children were abiding by his rules. For Sunkare, 
obedience was what would bless the marriage of his children because it 
was by obeying his parents that his own marriage was blessed.39 Such re-
solve cannot be divorced from the cultural context and livelihood prac-
tices of people such as Sunkare, whose life revolves around community, 
farmwork, and religion. The key issue for the persistence of tradition can 
vary. Thus, obedience is pivotal for Sunkare, but for Jatta and Suwareh, the 
economic value of bridewealth and access to labor, respectively, are key. 
These stories illustrate the complications of forced marriage, especially 
when marriage is seen as a cultural practice with important and direct 
impacts on the livelihood of the families involved. In addition, these ex-
amples show the continuation of the tradition of forced marriage not only 
because of an unthinking pride or resistance to change but also because it 
is seen as a most effective way of dealing with specific aspects of fast-paced 
economic and social upheaval.
consent and FaLse consciousness: are arranged 
Marriages the saMe as Forced Marriages?
Gender equity advocates, such as Isatou Touray, insist that forced mar-
riages almost always involve young girls who have not reached the age of 
consent. Touray’s view is that when a girl is forced to marry at a young age, 
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her mother lives in continuous fear because the girl is too young to endure 
the trials of marriage. In Touray’s work with numerous women around the 
Gambia, she has found that mothers whose daughters marry early in life 
live with stress and anxiety.40
 “Luŋ-wo-luŋ, nbuloo be n kuŋoto. I ye a futundi le, a koo kiloo maŋ 
meŋ” (every day, I cry ‘my hands are on my head.’ They married her but 
her backbones are not yet strong). how can a girl be married at the age of 
thirteen or fourteen? Touray asks.41 By chance, a few days before my inter-
view with Touray I met a fourteen-year-old girl who was already married 
and was on her way from a village in the central river region to join her 
husband in the city. She expressed happiness and a willingness to join him. 
every time I asked whether she was happy with the choice she made, she 
would nod her head and smile.
 Touray’s concerns and the fourteen-year-old girl’s eagerness to get mar-
ried raise a number of central questions. What is the age of consent in the 
Gambian cultural context? At what age is marriage appropriate and accept-
able to society? What other factors necessitate early or forced marriage in 
a patriarchal society such as the Gambia’s? here, it is important to under-
score not only why these marriage practices have continued over time but 
also the broader effects of the practices on young girls, their parents, and 
the society at large. It is necessary to discuss ways in which some of these 
marriages are arranged—ways that may amount to compulsion. At what 
point do arranged marriages become forced marriages? Or can all arranged 
marriages be classified as forced marriages, since it is almost always young 
girls who are put through the trials of these marriages? For instance, in 
discussing the complications surrounding issues of early forced marriage, 
Sundari Anitha and Aisha Gill note that consent and coercion in relation 
to marriage can be better understood as two ends of a continuum, between 
which lie degrees of sociocultural expectation, control, persuasion, pres-
sure, threat, and force.42 To understand the practice of forced marriage, it 
is therefore vital to look at the multiple meanings and implications of mar-
riage as an institution sanctioned both by tradition and by religion. 
 First, in the Gambia, when viewed through a cultural lens, marriage is 
not about the girl and her husband as described earlier but about society. 
The act of marriage can improve social networks, reinforce kinship ties, 
and also affirm group identity.
 Second, we need to examine the impact of Islam, the religion of the ma-
jority of Gambians, on the country’s cultural traditions. Since the arrival of 
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Islam centuries ago, most Gambians have adopted both Islam and Islamic 
culture. In many instances, customary laws and Islamic laws coexist. This 
means that Gambians subject themselves to Islamic law, or shari’a, and Is-
lamic traditions (hadith and sunnah), especially when it comes to marriage. 
The Gambia legally recognizes four types of marriage—christian, Mus-
lim, customary, and civil. civil marriage is not compulsory, nor is there 
a minimum legal age for marriage, which means that the law does not 
explicitly prohibit the marriage of children.43 Therefore, age of consent is 
not a matter critical to the arrangement of marriage.
 Although Islamic commentators and various legal schools differ on 
the age at which a girl should be married, there is a general consensus that 
they should marry at the age of puberty.44 essentially, marriage can only 
take place when the girl has had her first menstrual cycle, but of course, 
the problem is that girls first menstruate at different ages. Moreover, be-
cause the girl’s father has the right to marry her to whomever he chooses 
without consulting her, he can betroth his daughter at birth, as in the case 
of londiroo described previously. Londiroo is clearly against the spirit of 
Islamic law, which favors the idea that girls should make their own deci-
sions when it comes to marriage. This notion of choice is enshrined in one 
of the most popular hadith, which tells that a girl went to the Messenger 
of Allah and reported that her father had forced her to marry without her 
consent. The Messenger of God gave her the choice between accepting the 
marriage or invalidating it.45 Qadi Alhagie Masamba Jagne of the Banjul 
Muslim court reasoned that whenever the girl child does not consent to a 
marriage, that marriage should be abandoned. In his view, both members 
of a couple must be prepared to undergo the trials of marriage because it 
makes no sense to create a union that will not last.46
 however, in societies such as the Gambia’s where bridewealth is an 
important economic exchange, divorce can be difficult and problematic, 
especially if a woman initiates it. When the woman seeks the divorce, she 
has to return the bridewealth that the husband paid at the time of marriage, 
and this is usually wealth already spent or consumed. In other words, when 
a woman wants a divorce, she and her parents must find ways to refund 
the money. Jane Guyer notes that in most places, both British and French 
colonial legal practice increasingly favored marriage by bridewealth, which 
combined the features of marital stability, limiting women’s ability to be 
“capricious” with male authority, and clear public markings of the inter-
family contract.47 hence, the economic challenges of returning bridewealth 
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oblige women to bear the ordeals of forced marriages. Women also find 
that tradition and culture can be barriers to leaving unhappy marriages.
eFForts at discouraging Forced Marriage
Some women’s groups in the Gambia maintain that early and forced mar-
riage is tantamount to controlling women’s sexual and reproductive rights, 
a view that has been gaining the attention of the Gambian government. 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, the government has increased its 
efforts with regard to girls’ education. It has created “girl-friendly schools” 
that encourage the education of females and a “girls’ education desk” in 
the Ministry of national education. It has also established free, state-run 
primary schools, which has encouraged poor families to educate their 
daughters. Meanwhile, local women’s organizations are making strenuous 
efforts to translate international instruments to the national level.
 Women’s rights activists insist that forcing girls to marry against their 
will undercuts their ability to reach their full potential as women. They 
argue that these girls will not be able to have a proper education once 
they become child mothers. And their physical and mental growth will 
be stunted. Most important, a forced marriage conditions the girl to be 
dependent on her husband and the husband’s kin group for financial and 
economic support.48 Added to these are issues of male patriarchy, whereby 
the girl’s father can decide when she is to get married and to whom with-
out her consent. Traditionally, women have been supposed to be subservi-
ent, obedient, and faithful to men.49
 Tradition empowers the elderly to feel they can size up the younger gen-
erations and determine the path their lives should take without realizing 
that cultures are changing and shaping people in new ways. Generational 
changes in economic and social differentiations result in new forms of rela-
tionships, which can influence young people to make their own decisions, 
including what kinds of marriage arrangements they want. Social mobility 
can open up ways in which people with different cultural and social back-
grounds can meet, making issues of marriage more complicated in a society 
where marriage is regulated by tradition and religion.
 Amira Mashhour, in her work on parts of northern Africa, observes:
Although women’s rights in non-Muslim societies are not totally 
fulfilled, oppression of women’s rights in Muslim societies is unique 
Challenges and Constraints: “traditional” Practice in the gambia 193
in that it is primarily done in the name of Islam. These communities 
claim that certain discriminatory practices are congruent with 
shari’a law and that their personal status laws, for instance, are 
based on Sharia law. By doing so, Muslim societies create a sacred 
justification for any discrimination or inequality already in existence 
or that could be stipulated in the future.50
The disadvantaged social position of women in a patriarchal society such 
as the Gambia’s can make young women vulnerable to being forced to 
marry early and/or without their consent. culturally, marriage is viewed 
as primary and sacred, the institution on which the family is constructed. 
It is a moral duty for Muslim men and women to enter into and honor the 
marriage contract. As Touray observes, to Gambian mothers customary 
marriage and forced marriage revolve around what is regarded as honor 
and shame: “how would society judge me and my unmarried daughter?”51 
For many parents, compulsion is preferable to living in disgrace and with 
the fear of facing a single life. Many parents fear that their daughters, if 
left to their own devices, will have children out of wedlock, become pros-
titutes, or decide not to have children in their lives. Also, as demonstrated 
in the introduction to this volume and in the chapter by Mariane Ferme, 
the arranged marriage often tends to have parental consent (even if out of 
a social or cultural pressure) with all its cultural fanfare. It is imperative to 
view forced and arranged marriages against the backdrop of the livelihood 
practices of the communities involved if we are to attempt an understand-
ing of all its implications.
 There are, however, encouraging signs that the tradition of forced 
and early marriage is changing. In 2011, a human rights campaign group 
noted a decrease in the abuse of young women in the Gambia. While 
delivering his speech on behalf of the Sare ngai Steering committee on 
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) during the minideclaration of another 
twenty-five communities within the Wuli West, Wuli east, and Sandu dis-
tricts at Sare ngai village in Upper river region, Mr. Jawneh noted their 
data have shown that forced marriage has dropped from 82 percent to 12 
percent and that early marriage has also declined, from 66 percent to 8 
percent, between 2007 and 2010.52 In fact, Gambian lawmakers recently 
passed with a unanimous vote the Domestic violence Bill 2013 during the 
fourth meeting of the national Assembly in the 2013 legislative year, as a 
measure to address both gender and domestic violence.53 Yet even though 
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progress has been made in some areas, more actions need to be taken to 
end discrimination against girls and women. In the same vein, more work 
is needed to investigate how Gambians understand these changes and how 
they reconcile tradition and change.
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Resisting Patriarchy,  
Contesting Homophobia
expert Testimony and the construction of Forced Marriage in African Asylum claims
BenJAMIn n.  L AWr Ance AnD chArLOT Te WALKer-SAID
Allegations of forced marriages and attempted forced marriages cited 
by African refugees as grounds for asylum in the United Kingdom and 
the United States highlight a central contradiction in postcolonial Africa. 
In some respects, many postcolonial African states continue to make 
strides toward clearly proclaiming gender and sexual rights by providing 
greater civil and social protections. But in other regards, the ideologi-
cal underpinnings in many postcolonial African democracies—notably, 
religious views and a reified understanding of “innate” or “natural” Af-
rican cultural practices—have led to the persecution of particular com-
munities. Some targets, such as women exercising their rights to higher 
education, family planning, or political expression, may be viewed as 
part of a rich historical pattern of gender oppression and intolerance for 
female autonomy. Other targets, such as gay men, lesbians, bisexuals, 
transgender and intersex people, and other sexual minorities represent, 
in many ways, a new dimension of another historical tradition vilifying 
difference, “alterity,” and perceived deviance.1
 refugee claims constitute a unique and discrete entry point into the 
lived experiences of contemporary African women, men, and children. 
The narratives supplied by refugees provide firsthand oral accounts of 
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exploitation, abuse, persecution, and social and private life. Like many 
forms of legal petition, they are deeply structured by their context. not-
withstanding these considerations, however, they offer an unusually vivid 
and personalized vantage point from which to examine the changing 
structure of African family life in the context of the transformative forces 
of globalization; such forces include information technology, interna-
tional travel and migration, internationalized rights discourse, and gender 
and sexuality equity practices and resistances.2 In this manner, they may 
be viewed as a contemporary parallel to the rich tradition of African his-
torical research in the precolonial and colonial past, anchored by personal 
oral testimony.3
 As the introduction to this volume argues, forced marriages may be 
regarded as part of a larger intellectual apparatus investigating gender sub-
ordination, sociolegal regulation, resistance, and liberation in Africa. But 
forced marriage refugee claims are both similar to and qualitatively dif-
ferent from other descriptions of persecution and gender-based violence, 
for several reasons. On the one hand, as many scholars and activists have 
observed, both the 1951 convention relating to the Status of refugees and 
the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of refugees entirely omit gender 
as a category of persecution, and decision makers fail to account for the 
gendering of politics and the relationship between gender and state prac-
tice.4 On the other hand—unlike with rape, forced impregnation or ster-
ilization, sexual slavery, domestic violence, or female genital mutilation 
(FGM)—there continues to be, as Kim Thuy Seelinger observed in 2010, 
“no precedent establishing forced marriage per se as a form of persecu-
tion” consistent with the definitions emerging from the convention and 
from the protocol or its domestic iterations throughout north America, 
europe, and Australasia.5
 Likewise, attention has only recently been paid to examining forced 
marriage’s viability as a distinct crime of international law.6 As a result, in-
dividuals alleging forced marriage or attempted forced marriage are com-
pelled to dismantle their claims and reassemble them into what Seelinger 
calls “more concrete” or “component” harms, using terms with which ad-
judicators have some familiarity, such as trafficking, rape and sexual as-
sault, physical beating, domestic violence, and FGM.7 The rearticulation of 
forced marriage narratives can further occlude the sociocultural contours 
of forced marriage practices.8 refugees fleeing forced marriages inhabit a 
“forced marriage paradox” insofar as they remain deprived of a consistent 
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set of definitions yet struggle to describe their often violent experiences 
and constraints without employing terminology that seemingly validates 
illegitimate actions and further erases their agency.9
 Because experts assist in rendering refugee narratives comprehensible 
to adjudicators, their experience provides an avenue for exploring the im-
pact of the dismantling and reassembling of narratives and for observing 
both how a claim centered on forced marriage originated and how it was 
rearranged for presentation before an adjudicator. Although many forced 
marriages and attempted forced marriages may include extreme violence, 
our experience serving as expert witnesses for dozens of women and men 
supports Seelinger’s contention that many, if not most, are “quieter, subtler 
affairs.”10 recognizing various forms of harm to bodily integrity and limits 
to individual agency is thus a sensitive task and requires a disentangling of 
self-identity and actual harm from social or cultural influences concealing 
forced marriage components.
 This chapter examines the dynamic nature of forced marriage asylum 
claims from the perspective of the expert witness. We argue that one con-
sequence of the omission of forced marriage, qua gender, from the in-
ternational language of refugee protection is that asylum advocates are 
ultimately compelled to reformulate or “squeeze” forced marriage narra-
tives into recognizable concepts and established frameworks. In our expe-
rience as experts, we have found that legal counselors are cognizant that 
judges and adjudicators may more easily understand or appreciate familiar 
concepts such as patriarchy, patrimonialism, sexism, and homophobia but 
shy away from complex terms or multivalent concepts that span a num-
ber of interrelated practices.11 As witnesses to the conditions and lifestyles 
lived by claimants, experts have the capacity to establish new paradigms 
for recognizing the persecutory harm, such as forced marriage, based on 
broader principles of human dignity, autonomy, and consent.12 But our 
experience suggests that lawyers, many of whom are outcome driven, rou-
tinely adopt a more conservative approach and prefer to articulate a need 
for protection based on existing precedents of gender-based violence.
 We have served as expert witnesses in more than two dozen refugee 
claims from women and men from West Africa alleging various forms of 
forced marriage. Based on our experience, we contend that two distinct 
trends have emerged with respect to the framing of the claims vis-à-vis the 
description of the practices and the identity description of the survivors’ 
persecutory harm. In cases where women flee coerced unions or attempted 
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forced marriages and describe bride-price, contracts, dowries, slavery/inden-
ture, and gender expectations, asylum claims are framed as flight, whereby 
women defensively resist patriarchy and “traditional” expectations for mar-
riage and family life. In the three specific instances from more than twenty 
lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) claims we examine here—wherein lesbian, 
gay, and bisexual individuals are escaping heteronormative marital regimes 
(we have not personally encountered transgender or intersex cases to date)—
asylum claims are framed as affirmatively contesting homophobia.
 As a form of legal mediation, whereby the vernacular content and idi-
omatic nature of the refugee narrative is translated into a context governed 
by precedent and jurisprudence, the experience of expert witnessing offers 
an important new, albeit narrow, window into the lives of Africa’s most vul-
nerable individuals. When forced marriages are dismantled and reassem-
bled as either resisting patriarchy or contesting homophobia, opposite-sex 
and same-sex practices embedded within forced marriage narratives are 
inaccurately situated as oppositional. The conservative, outcome-driven 
representation of claims erases the “newness” and capacity for legal inno-
vation, with the unfortunate consequence of reifying African cultures as 
primitive, primordial, backward, and rights-violating. In our conclusion, 
we suggest that individuals involved in African forced marriage practices 
should more accurately be represented as sexual minorities and their iden-
tities understood as part of a gender-sexuality continuum.
 Although many asylum cases include a forced marriage claim embed-
ded within a larger set of rights violations, it rarely features as a “central 
criterion for any refugee claim.”13 Whereas James hathaway argued co-
gently in 1990 that forced marriage should be understood as persecutory 
harm, the difficulties outlined by Seelinger with respect to establishing the 
context of persecution remain.14 Asylum narratives, an underutilized van-
tage point for evaluating what has heretofore been shrouded in legal and 
humanitarian analyses, are “rich documentary archives tethered to dis-
crete legal contexts” that speak to “analytical categories, constructed iden-
tities, and personal narratives of fear, trauma and violence.”15 This chapter 
thus presents the voices of asylum seekers in order to better understand 
the basis for this legal claim of persecution and the history of forced mar-
riage as persecution in various countries; it also provides a hypothesis for 
estimating the likelihood of future jeopardy. In what follows, we draw on 
our experience serving as experts in forced marriage cases from camer-
oon, Togo, Sierra Leone, Benin, and Ghana.
resisting Patriarchy, Contesting homophobia: African Asylum Claims 203
exPert testiMony and Forced Marriage asyLuM cLaiMs
resisting Patriarchy
The most common form of asylum claim we have reviewed alleging forced 
marriage or attempted forced marriage is rearticulated as defensively re-
sisting patriarchal authority and perceived or imagined ideals and norms 
of traditional marriages. In such cases, attorneys adapt language used rou-
tinely to describe arranged marriage and domestic violence—including 
defenselessness, vulnerability, victim, and survivor—to particularize as 
well as develop conventional understandings of gendered violence.16 This 
language establishes the exceptionality of the victim’s experience com-
pared to that of his or her peers, and it reveals the crucial dimensions 
in order that the persecutory harm of so-called forced marriage becomes 
clearer. Fleeing a forced marriage is thus reassembled as a defensive action 
of self-preservation. The concepts of patriarchy, misogyny, gerontocracy, po-
lygamy/polygyny, and bridal contracts constitute the foundational archi-
tecture of these claims. Such concepts are instantly recognizable to many 
adjudicators and immigration officials, not that this necessarily guaran-
tees claims will be accepted and asylum granted—far from it. But such 
terms resonate with adjudicators’ knowledge of and imaginings about life 
in contemporary Africa.
 Many countries have civil codes and marriage laws requiring that both 
parties enter marriage of their own free will. Yet country of origin infor-
mation research demonstrates that forced conjugal association appears to 
know no geographic or political boundaries.17 Two examples are illustra-
tive. Although illegal in cameroon and criminalized under section 356(1) 
of the cameroon Penal code, “compelling another person to marry” re-
mains a prevalent matrimonial practice.18 In a report from the United na-
tions high commissioner for refugees (Unhcr), an official from the 
Ministry of Women’s empowerment and the Family indicated that forced 
marriage is a “common form of violence against women and girls both in 
the northern and southern regions of cameroon.”19
 Similarly, in Togo a legal marriage requires the consent of both parties, 
a minimum age, and the registration of the marriage at the État-Civil (civil 
tribunal). Law no. 2007–005 of 2007 specifically prohibits forced mar-
riage. Title 2, chapter 2 specifically bans a narrowly defined form of forced 
marriage. Article 11 accords all Togolese “the right to freedom and secu-
rity of the individual,” including the right to sexual reproduction, health, 
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and legal protections. Women are specifically protected against “mariages 
forcés, et/ou précoces” (forced and/or prepubescent marriage). Article 16 
states that every individual, at legal maturity, has the “right to chose freely 
. . . to marry or not to marry.” But in reality, gender discrimination exists in 
the 1980 Family code (Le code des personnes et de la famille), which creates 
the context for forced marriage. The code recognizes, among other things, 
polygamie (polygyny), difference in ages for marriage for men and women, 
and the supremacy of the father or husband in all matters. Parental au-
thority (l’autorité parentale) is the subject of article 101, wherein le mari est 
le chef de famille (the husband is the head of the family).” Levirate (widow 
inheritance) also exists, subject to article 54, which states that in the event 
of the death of the husband, levirate is only prohibited if the marriage had 
been “dissolved by divorce.”20 Since the passage of the law, there have been 
no prosecutions or convictions of individuals attempting to force others 
into marriages. Furthermore, there is no evidence of government imple-
mentation of the 2007 law.
 As Bala Saho’s and Francesca Declich’s chapters in this volume demon-
strate, claims about tradition are often really political claims embedded 
within language seeking to maintain existing hierarchies and established 
privileges. To be sure, the long history of the ways in which women’s 
bodies are connected to nation-state formation is situated firmly at the site 
of marriage and reproduction as moral and material struggles.21 What is 
often missing from these accounts, however, is the degree to which larger 
patriarchal and customary struggles take place at the local, familial level. 
Women in forced marriages or attempted forced marriages constitute part 
of a politically polarized arena: the local community. Individuals coerced 
into marriages are routinely compelled to uphold family confederations 
that are presumed to be critical to the functioning of their society, how-
ever small or “local” it may be.
 The cases we will describe all concern adult women who have been 
coerced into unions but whose cases were reassembled by attorneys in a 
manner considered optimal. each case highlights the workings of a par-
ticular social system in which forced marriage fulfills a specific function. 
Importantly, each of the cases demonstrates the salience of long-standing 
cultural practices as well as the adaptability of local values to economic 
and religious changes, proving that cultural specificities are mutable and 
respond to new incentives. Forced marriages serve as a lens through which 
to view the convergence of religion, moral standards, and socioeconomic 
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attitudes in the realm of gender, family, and marriage. Based on demo-
graphic surveys and human rights reports, as well as our anecdotal survey 
of asylum claims, forced marriage appears widespread throughout West 
Africa and all ethnosocial communities.22 The most prevalent forms of 
forced marriage we have encountered include early betrothal, arranged 
marriage, and the practices of levirate and sororate (by which a woman 
marries her sister’s husband, in case of childlessness or death of the sister). 
Acting as the keystones of multiple and overlapping alliances, the follow-
ing examples of women from cameroon, Togo, and Benin demonstrate 
how attorneys reassemble women’s actions within the frame of defense 
against the gendered and political relations of community and society, 
such as lineage-based alliances, polygamy, and inheritance in the context 
of traditional religion.
 In 2010, Aissatou, a cameroonian woman with a degree in typing and 
accounting, was compelled to divorce her chadian husband and remarry 
a Fulani man from the northern cameroonian region surrounding Ad-
amawa in order to fulfill her family’s political pledge to their local Fulani 
community.23 Aissatou was educated and considered herself free to marry 
the chadian she met while working in an office in a city far from her 
hometown. her first marriage to a social and political “outsider” threat-
ened her family’s political and economic status, since her father and his 
relatives were tied by blood and marriage, as well as by a loyalty pledge, 
to their local Fulani lineage in Adamawa. As such, they were compelled 
to make visible and profound gestures that demonstrated such loyalty 
through intracommunity marriage alliances of their daughters and sons. 
Although Aissatou’s first husband shared her religion—Islam—as well as 
ethnoregional commonalities (he also spoke Fula), he was not a member of 
the socioeconomic cohort of her extended family in the Adamawa region 
of cameroon, and the marriage could not seal the bonds on which her kin 
depended. In order to stabilize relations between her father, uncles, and 
other relatives and the Fulani leadership, Aissatou was forced to separate 
and remarry a “local.”
 Aissatou’s local community considered marriage an unambiguous 
political and economic commitment. Descent and family and ethnosocial 
group membership remained inextricably tied to relations of power and 
economy, which made marriage a strictly guarded ritual and form of as-
sociation. Though intercommunity marriage had become a “tradition,” 
Aissatou could not place its origins in long-established historical practice 
206 BenjAmin n. lAwrAnCe AnD ChArlotte wAlker-sAiD
but rather in precedents that were roughly two generations old. “My un-
cles kidnapped me and held me until I agreed to marry the man to whom 
they had promised me,” she recounted. She continued, “They believed my 
marriage was null because it had never been sanctioned by them and they 
had agreed to no wedding contract and had received no gifts. I did not 
even get a legal divorce. I simply never returned to chad, separated from 
my husband, married my new husband in a new town, and began a new 
life.”24 There were no accounts of “traditional” ceremonies or long-venerated 
religious rituals or customs enacted as part of her new marriage. rather, 
Aissatou’s marriage, though ostensibly enforced as part of an enduring 
code, was intended to fulfill very recent provisions.
 critically, Aissatou attested that based on the way inheritance laws 
were conceived and enforced in her Fulani community in the Adamawa 
region, her father and uncles could be disinherited by their extended kin 
and economically excluded from their society if Aissatou did not fulfill 
the expectations of matrimony that cemented the alliances within the 
lower-level lineage. As she articulated, “Our shops, mosques, businesses, 
and farms operate through the families and everyone must assist in doing 
the work. There is no sharing with outsiders. Those who do not contribute 
are cut off from the surplus.” Those on the lowest rungs of the lineage—the 
unmarried or childless daughters, sons, and grandchildren of the higher 
orders—were expected to fulfill their elders’ pledges to maintain the bonds 
of the Fulani social unit, where economic networking and mutual assis-
tance defined collective identity.
 In this particular social system, forced marriage imposed commit-
ments upon kin and community using the rhetoric of tradition, but it 
fortified exclusionary boundaries defining the distribution of resources in 
a time and place of scarcity, thereby fulfilling a very contemporary func-
tion. Thus, in their successful representation of their client, Aissatou’s 
advocates strategically reframed her flight from cameroon to the United 
States as withdrawal from a form of indenture to her family and to the 
connective structure of the lineage with which it was related and associ-
ated. rather than simply refusing an “arranged marriage”—which could be 
construed as an everyday practice of all citizens and thus a benign cultural 
norm—Aissatou’s resistance was reassembled as escape from networked 
dependencies that demanded allegiance and effected serious vulnera-
bilities. In cameroon, divorce from the man whom she was coerced to 
marry was not only socially proscribed, it was also an economic liability 
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for her entire immediate and extended family. The moral burden of re-
sponsibility—not to mention the threat of death or bodily harm should 
she disavow her responsibility—required a dramatic act of emancipation, 
that is, escape from cameroon and the filing of an asylum claim.
 The case of a Togolese woman who fled an attempted forced marriage 
and sought refuge in the United Kingdom demonstrates how attorneys 
dismantled and reassembled her claim to foreground the polygyny com-
ponent of her persecution, effectively downplaying other grounds for asy-
lum. Konda had fled Togo, and with her initial application for asylum, 
focused on her political involvement with an opposition party, she was 
granted temporary protection because she was a minor. After attaining 
maturity, she again petitioned for asylum but included developments pre-
dating and postdating her flight, notably, her parents’ attempt to lure her 
back to Togo and marry her off. Whereas the political grounds for the first 
ruling still held true, Konda’s second attempt to remain permanently in 
the United Kingdom was reframed by the forced marriage dimension. The 
concept of polygamy is familiar to adjudicators, and Western audiences 
generally view the practice with revulsion, although attitudes are chang-
ing.25 It is also important that in the United Kingdom, forced marriage 
receives considerable public policy attention in part because of the belief 
that UK families duplicitously “arrange” marriages between UK residents 
and foreigners, against the will of one or both parties, in order to evade 
migration controls; in fact, the UK home Office has a division entirely 
focused on exposing “fake” marriages.26 Konda’s lawyer, however, made 
a calculated decision to prioritize polygamy because of the nature of the 
evidence in her case.
 Konda’s risk of forced marriage was certainly an original basis for 
her flight to the United Kingdom. In her first interview, she explained, 
“I fled Togo owing to a number of political problems and also because I 
was pressured to marry a man who was already married with four wives.” 
But in her initial account of her claim, presented when she was a minor, 
the man’s three existing unions were viewed by immigration officials as 
an indication that he was a morally and legally upstanding citizen, thus 
diminishing Konda’s credibility. The alleged perpetrator was assumed to 
be a law-abiding and upright man; more important, because Konda was a 
minor the adjudicators did not need to decide the case on its merits. After 
she reached legal maturity and her case was again reviewed, her lawyers 
considered her political activities important but possibly insufficient for 
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asylum status. consequently, her claim was expanded and reframed: her 
parents’ attempt to coerce her into a union was presented as a mechanism 
with which to ameliorate the damage her political actions had allegedly 
caused her family.
 In their attempt to coerce Konda into marriage, her parents arranged 
for a story to be published in a Togolese biweekly newspaper that gave the 
impression she was “lost” (perdu) and needed “help” (assistance). Their 
narrative portrayed her as a misguided girl who had fallen in with bad 
company and needed rescuing. The story was carefully and intentionally 
designed as a means of entrapment, whereby an unwitting bystander or 
resident seeing Konda could possibly take pity on her plight and bring 
her whereabouts to the attention of the authorities and her estranged fam-
ily. The article featured an image of Konda in full hijab (headscarf), in 
the manner of a betrothal photograph—the type of image produced by 
parents to facilitate the arrangement of a marriage. The photograph was 
genuine: Konda explained that her parents had required her to sit for it 
some time before she fled Togo, although she had not, at the age of fifteen, 
understood that the photograph was a mechanism for eliciting marriage 
proposals. Together, the newspaper article and the photograph conveyed 
an unmistakable message to an urban Muslim readership, namely, that 
Konda was a runaway bride. Whereas her political grounds for asylum 
had been questioned by the UK Border Agency, the potential persecution 
awaiting her upon her return in the form of a coerced polygynous mar-
riage was undeniably embedded in the betrothal photograph and accom-
panying text, and this assured the success of her claim.
 A final example, from Benin, illustrates how attorneys highlighted 
the means whereby affiliates of a traditional religious network mobilized 
inheritance practices to influence vulnerability in order to constrain or 
enforce participation, adherence, and compliance. Dopé, originally from 
the village of cové, was an educated, married woman living in the coun-
try’s economic capital, cotonou, who fled to the United States after a 
harrowing experience. She claimed she was kidnapped as an adult by the 
adherents of a vodou priest (bokono) and taken to his atikevodou (heal-
ing vodou) shrine of Sakpata (Xapata), where she was imprisoned and 
repeatedly raped.27 Dopé believed her experiences as an adult were the 
result of her betrothal as a child to a vodou as a form of indebted inherited 
slavery (trokosi)—a punishment exacted on her mother for her alleged in-
fidelity. Dopé’s lawyers made the strategic decision to reframe her claim 
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by documenting broadly misogynistic forced marriage practices and child 
abuse, including vodou, child slavery, and the widespread belief in wife 
inheritance or levirate.
 Dopé’s narrative was extremely difficult for the lawyers to grasp, and 
they feared no judge would consider it plausible or credible. Dopé ex-
plained that her predicament was the result of her public disavowal of the 
trokosi (ritual enslavement for punishment) obligations when she reached 
maturity. She had been raped and abused by her kidnapper’s brother mul-
tiple times as a child. But when she reached maturity, she simply walked 
out of the compound and moved to cotonou and began a new life. The in-
dividual to whom she was betrothed had made no attempt to entice her to 
the shrine, but after his death, the brother of the deceased dispatched men 
to kidnap her in accordance with his understanding of levirate practice. 
The primarily Yoruba settlement of cové, in the Zou department, is the 
location of a powerful religious community called egungun. The many re-
ligious communities in the area are all tied to the Yoruba religion, and they 
share many values, preeminent among them being the honoring of spir-
its (vodoun). cové is the site of multiple sects, most famously the Gelede 
secret society. ritual enslavement for punishment, a form of female re-
ligious bondage necessitated by debt obligations, is of decreasing preva-
lence in parts of Ghana, Benin, Togo, and nigeria, particularly among the 
ewe-speaking communities. Trokosi, literally meaning “wives of the spirit 
Kosi,” is one form of vodounsi, or bondage to a vodoun. Although the ori-
gins of the institution are somewhat unclear, purportedly egregious cases 
of exploitation in the 1990s highlighted by local and international human 
rights organizations brought renewed attention to this form of slavery and 
sexual abuse.28
 ritual enslavement and vodou may have puzzled an adjudicator, but 
defensively resisting slavery, kidnapping, rape, and imprisonment—in 
a country where vodou is publically sanctioned and where the state has 
designated national voodoo Day—enters established grounds for social 
group persecution.29 The constitution and the statutes of Benin prohibit 
many practices attendant to slavery, but importantly, they make no men-
tion of trokosi and vodounsi, sexual slavery, forced marriage (mariage 
forcé), and sexual assault in the context of marriage. revisions to the 
Family code in 2004 repealed many discriminatory aspects of the 1931 
Coutumier du Dahomey (Benin customary code). But even though 
customary law is no longer recognized by the courts, many women 
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“continue[d] to be subject to the ‘coutumier du Dahomey’ which 
treat[ed] them as legal minors and accord[ed] them limited rights in 
marriage and inheritance.”30
 At the time of Dopé’s hearing, the practice of levirate was documented 
in Benin.31 Aspects of her forced marriage narrative may have been illegal 
under the 2004 revision of the Family code, but the practice of levirate re-
mained quasi-legal insofar as it was not specifically prohibited.32 The 2004 
Family code explicitly prohibited forced marriage, but there was no evi-
dence of enforcement.33 And though the governments of Ghana and Togo, 
from the mid-1990s, made concerted efforts to stamp out the remaining 
vodounsi, including trokosi, and mediate the relocation and retraining of 
individuals, Benin passed no similar law.34 Dopé’s legal team thus success-
fully reassembled her narrative as that of a woman fleeing multiple back-
ward, traditional, and misogynistic practices, at the center of which was 
a very violent form of forced marriage for which there was no plausible 
expectation of state protection.
contesting homophobia
A second group of three separate claims from the more than twenty we 
have evaluated—of forced marriages, attempted forced marriages, and 
assertions citing a fear of forced marriage—are routinely dismantled 
and reassembled by attorneys as affirmatively contesting homophobia. 
Although many of the specific forced marriage acts evidenced in the first 
category are also present here (such as bride-price, contracts, rape, and 
threats of ostracism), lawyers reframe the narratives of LGB refugees as 
part of a larger (qua global) struggle against homophobia and homopho-
bic violence. African LGB refugees, part of a rapidly expanding refugee 
class, are represented as resisting homophobia, and the rights violations 
they experience are described in language that resonates with minority 
rights discourse.35 In these cases, sub-Saharan African nations are repre-
sented as rights violators and “behind the curve” in terms of the global 
evolution of human rights as experienced by and embodied in LGB indi-
viduals. From our experience, we discern a crucial but subtle distinction 
in the affirmative framing: though some adjudicators may not necessar-
ily embrace sexuality as a human right and others may struggle with the 
concept of heteronormativity, in denying such an asylum claim a judge 
risks being marked by the discourse of explicit sexual discrimination and 
suspicion.
resisting Patriarchy, Contesting homophobia: African Asylum Claims 211
 Attorneys representing men and women alleging forced marriages and 
attempted forced marriages increasingly categorize their clients as victims 
of homophobia—not (or not only) because they face an “exceptional level 
of violence” based on their nonnormative sexual or conjugal status but 
rather (or also) because they are political and economic agents as a result 
of their sexual and conjugal roles; further, their agency is uniquely vul-
nerable to cultural, social, and religious criticism and retribution based 
on their sexual, conjugal, or familial behaviors, over which the forcibly 
married have little control. On the personal level, LGB forced marriages 
are no less onerous and stigmatizing than the first category discussed ear-
lier. But LGB refugees face the added dimension that the home commu-
nities from which they have fled embody the hegemony of a version of 
gender normalcy. In this way, society-wide persecution and prosecution 
contextualize LGB asylum claimants and ground them as members of a 
social group in order to meet the refugee convention’s definition of refu-
gee. LGB individuals implicated in forced marriages are subjected to the 
stigmatizing and constraining practices of a heterosexual marriage that 
commits them to a life of double accommodation. These individuals must 
gratify social and communitarian demands to serve the collective interests 
in the marriage and conform to expectations of heteronormative conju-
gality. Three cases illustrate how dismantling a claim and reassembling it 
as affirmatively contesting homophobia can be based on real experiences, 
hypothetical or imagined risks, or generational and historical practices.
 christelle, a lesbian from Douala, was hastily forced to marry a family 
friend following her arrest for “homosexual activities.” She worked as a hair-
dresser and salon owner and interacted with gay and lesbian cameroonians 
in the professional spheres of fashion, styling, and art. christelle met and 
fell in love with a woman, and thereafter, they spent the majority of their 
time together, broadened their network of homosexual friends, and began 
to appear in public together more often. After a raid on a “homosexual 
party” in which police observed christelle kissing a woman, she was ar-
rested, tortured, and imprisoned until her father came to retrieve her from 
new Bell Prison.36 Although she was never charged or tried for a crime, 
her family believed she was at severe risk of police surveillance and pos-
sible rearrest, torture, and imprisonment. The marriage to a family friend 
was ostensibly arranged to protect her.
 christelle never consented to the marriage, but she knew that her life 
was in danger because of the threat of having a public identity associated 
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with homosexuality. cameroon is one of the world’s most homophobic 
countries; there, intolerance of same-sex conduct is widespread, and mur-
ders of and threats against sexual minorities are met with official inaction.37 
The police had her status on record, but more importantly, because cam-
eroonian society widely rejects homosexual acts and identities, she would 
be at risk for social and political retribution by everyday citizens.38 Fac-
ing the possibility of a long sentence should she be arrested again or mob 
violence, social ostracism, and community exclusion, christelle conceded 
that her security was worth a sham marriage.39
 The cameroonian citizenry’s severe antipathy toward homosexual in-
dividuals and homosexual acts (and nonnormative sexual acts and iden-
tities in general) is well established. But LGB individuals in cameroon 
are afforded a modicum of leeway in certain circumstances—specifically, 
if the persons in question hide behaviors, relationships, and identities that 
are offensive to the law and citizenry from full public view or if the homo-
sexual community discreetly operates on the margins of society. This kind 
of leeway is conditional, however, on general social peace. The moment 
that political sentiments are stirred and scapegoats are needed or if social 
or economic tensions arise and there are pressures to isolate or avenge 
or placate leaders and demagogues, sexual minorities become a focus of 
violence. During the 1990s, demands for democratization and economic 
change caused cameroon’s authoritarian regime, under President Paul 
Biya, to allow a certain level of public political discourse.40 conservative 
christian leaders in cameroon’s political sphere rose to prominence by 
speaking out against moral crimes, ostensibly attacking the government 
for immorality but also criticizing the wider populace. Allegations of ho-
mosexuality became a means of attacking the elite while working within 
acceptable modes of discourse.41
 The specter of homosexuality looms large in public discourse because 
it is framed as “foreign,” “corrupt,” and “elite”—the embodiment of all the 
malaise in cameroon.42 Thus, antihomosexual sentiment in the country is 
largely the result of relatively recent political participation and the public 
expression of resentment for those perceived to be at fault for cameroon’s 
poverty and corruption, notably, the wealthy, decadent, degenerate, and 
effete.43 christelle’s forced marriage to a man contravened her sexual ori-
entation and obligated her to assume a position and status that offered 
her the only pathway to personal security in cameroon. But her attor-
neys privileged the broad social ostracism and political scapegoating of 
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homosexuals—potentially resulting in bodily harm or death—as the root 
cause of christelle’s persecutory harm. coercion took place at the level of 
the nation-state and public citizenry, rather than at the family and com-
munity level. expectations to uphold a normative order can be localized, 
but they can also be broadened to include an entire citizenry, as in the case 
of antihomosexual sentiment in cameroon. Although the national threat 
was prioritized in legal proceedings and was indeed a legitimate basis of 
fear of persecution, it overshadowed the parallel and coordinated threat 
of the immediate family who would not join her in countering the public 
menace but rather sought to suppress her individual will as a coextensive 
reaction to her homosexuality.
 In contrast to christelle’s legal team, lawyers representing Taziff from 
Sierra Leone reassembled his case as affirmatively resisted hypothetical ex-
posure to homophobia by reference to analogy and hearsay. Taziff first fled 
Freetown after being forcibly conscripted into a militia and then escap-
ing, but he subsequently sought asylum in the United Kingdom because 
he began to self-identify as gay once he was residing in London. Taziff ’s 
fears were not misplaced. Like cameroon, Sierra Leone is a deeply ho-
mophobic country, and antigay violence there is widespread and endemic 
and family members coerce LGB individuals into marriages.44 The United 
nations human rights committee observed that Sierra Leone lacks any 
constitutional or statutory provision expressly prohibiting discrimination 
on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, and it criticized the 
widespread prevalence of stereotypes, prejudices, and reported acts of vi-
olence against LGBTI persons.45 The US State Department noted that ho-
mophobia is rooted in an 1861 statute prohibiting male-to-male sexual acts 
(“buggery” and “crimes against nature”), which carries a penalty of life im-
prisonment for “indecent assault” upon a man or ten years for attempted 
assault. Lesbians were victims of “planned rapes” initiated by family mem-
bers seeking to “change” their sexual orientation.46
 Taziff feared homophobia based on what he heard from other Sierra 
Leoneans while residing in Freetown and what he has learned from exiles 
living in europe. he explained: “If I were in Sierra Leone and am asked 
out by a man some part of me would always be afraid that when I were 
to say yes, I would be putting myself at possible risk. I would still take 
this risk despite my fears because I cannot lie about who I am.” Taziff ’s 
narrative almost appears to be influenced by recent european Union and 
British jurisprudence underscoring that for adjudicators to expect that gay 
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men or lesbians ought to remain in the closet to safeguard their personal 
well-being constitutes a human rights violation.47 Taziff stated, “If I were 
to hide who I was I would feel angry, frustrated and upset. I just cannot 
even begin to imagine not telling the truth, even though my life would be 
in danger.” his hypothetical risk was initially at least firmly and proudly 
grounded in a new awareness that it was his human right to be out.
 For Taziff, as news of his petition for asylum spread, the threat of re-
turn to Sierra Leone was increasingly encumbered by the expectation that 
he had to marry and have children. In this regard, his refugee claim was 
hypothetical and contingent; although he was never openly gay in Sierra 
Leone, his expectations for how he would be received were he forced to 
return were tied to the experience of others. he “remember[ed] seeing 
a man being attacked for being a gay” when he was ten. rather than 
imagining his own forced marriage, however, he should, his legal counsel 
advised, narrate an experience he witnessed as a child. Taziff explained:
I was living in the town because I was attending school there. I 
was at home when I heard a lot of noise and so I came outside to 
see what was going on. everyone in the area appeared to have left 
their house to see what was happening. I saw a man being attacked 
by a group of people. I knew what was happening because I heard 
people talking. They were saying he was “homo.” I later learned 
that this was a serious allegation to make as people do not believe 
that you can be gay. I think that the man was almost killed, as he 
was bleeding from head to toe when an ambulance came and took 
him away. The police stations and hospitals were not very active 
during the war, so I do not know if he survived. At the time I was 
frightened to see what had happened to him. he was in a terrible 
state, bleeding and so on. I had seen rebels attack people and at first 
I thought that a rebel had been captured. It was only when I went 
to see what was going on that I found out it was a man accused of 
being “gay.” This was the only time I had seen something like this.
Taziff ’s witnessing of homophobic violence became the center of his 
refugee claim, but the attack was presented as an echo of earlier po-
litical violence. This intentional slippage frames how the Sierra Leonean 
state not only provides no protection against homophobia but also is often 
complicit in homophobic persecution, much as state actors were impli-
cated in crimes against humanity during the civil wars.
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 rather than speculating about the prospect of a forced marriage, 
Taziff anchored his reassembled narrative with concrete incidents he had 
witnessed firsthand. his ostensible jeopardy was contingent on a forcible 
return and buttressed by an account of a beating he saw as a child. Build-
ing on this deep-seated homophobic foundation, Taziff added vague and 
overlapping claims about possible abuse. he described social attitudes 
that he heard expressed “on a number of occasions,” including how men 
would “talk about gay men in a negative and insulting way.” he narrated 
a climate of homophobia employing Krio colloquialisms, such as “batty 
men.” And then he turned to what would become of him if he were forced 
to return, recounting the mixture of pressures and threats family and 
friends had made via text message, e-mail, and standard mail. Instead of 
concrete rights violations per se, his stories of how his brother had “found 
a wife for him” and how his “mother wants grandchildren” became prox-
ies for backward and regressive social values. The final part of Taziff ’s 
narrative turned to the intense psychological damage done to LGB indi-
viduals forced to conform to familial expectation. Taziff noted that once 
he “knew” he was gay, he “felt bad inside” when he overheard friends or 
family members plot a solution, that is, a forced marriage. his emotional 
spectrum included shame, revulsion, anger, and guilt. In this way, Taziff ’s 
forced marriage narrative resonated with adjudicators because it was re-
assembled as a narrative of “surviving” homophobic violence; the specu-
lation of future persecution in the form of forced marriage was merely a 
coda. Taziff had no personal experience of beating or rape, and his claim 
was represented as an opportunity for an immigration official to ensure 
that he never would.
 A final example, from Ghana, demonstrates how a forced marriage 
claim may be dismantled and reassembled as a historical and generational 
struggle affirmatively contesting homophobia. Ali is a young man from 
a chiefly lineage near Bolgatanga in the Upper east region of northern 
Ghana, and until recently, he was a practicing Muslim. As a child, he wit-
nessed his parents fighting, and his father beat his mother in regular acts 
of extreme violence. Then suddenly, while he was still a child, his father 
disappeared from the village. Several months later, he learned that his fa-
ther had fled Ghana to go to the United Kingdom with a British man and 
now lived with him. From that day onward, Ali was subject to abuse from 
his extended patriclan. he was kicked and beaten, and although he lived 
with his paternal aunt’s family, he was denied food, forced to sleep in the 
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streets, and routinely subjected to verbal abuse. his father’s family ostra-
cized him, calling him sick, weak, and mentally ill. People flung excrement 
at him in the streets. even though he himself had never expressed any 
same-sex attraction or emotion, he was treated as if he were gay and sent 
to a “healing camp” and subjected to traditional cures.
 Later in his teenage years, Ali returned to his village from the so-called 
healing camp and tried to catch up with all the schooling he had missed. 
he exceeded all expectations and was sponsored by one uncle to attend a 
private college. he graduated first in his class and moved on to a univer-
sity in Accra. There, he met a man named Usama, and they fell in love. 
Ali began to recognize his feelings and identity, and he started to identify 
as a gay man. But he felt he could never be happy. he could never tell his 
family. And he had no knowledge of his father’s whereabouts. Ali went to 
the United Kingdom to attend a professional conference and stayed with 
an uncle in London. he met a woman at a party, and they married hastily 
in 2012. But after some time, she discovered his private journal and read 
it. She confronted him about his sexuality, “outed” him to his family in 
Ghana, and then sought the dissolution of the marriage.
 Ali’s claim for asylum was centered on evidence that he would be sub-
ject to horrific violence, forced imprisonment, and widespread societal 
homophobia if forced to return to Ghana; the persecutory harm of the 
threat of forced remarriage to his former wife was sidelined entirely, and 
indeed his lawyers felt his previous marriage weakened his claim.48 LGBTI 
individuals suffer intense personal and group discrimination in Ghana, 
including violence perpetrated by both private individuals and agents 
of the state. homosexuality is criminalized under Ghanaian law via the 
criminal code of 1960, chapter 6 (Sexual Offences), article 105. Ghanaian 
statutes are not relics of colonial law but rather are actively enforced and 
publicly supported.49 The head of Ghana’s commission for human rights 
and Administrative Justice, emile Short, ruled out any idea of the com-
mission advocating for gay rights, since homosexuality is frowned upon. 
Short claimed that in countries where there was an antidiscrimination 
section in the law, gay rights could be described as human rights, but this 
did not apply in Ghana.50 Ali’s lawyers also presented evidence to demon-
strate how the majority of Ghanaians considered mentally ill are subject to 
extreme human rights abuses, including chaining and beating.51
 Ali’s case is instructive because it speaks to how lawyers prefer to ele-
vate homophobia above forced marriage in LGB asylum claims even when 
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there is rich evidence of a familial legacy and multigenerational practice 
of forced marriage. Once Ali’s secret identity emerged, details of his fa-
ther’s experience percolated once again among the community, and Ali’s 
narrative resonated with his chiefly lineage as an echo of his father’s expe-
rience of being forced to remain with Ali’s mother in the semblance of a 
union, no matter the physical or emotion cost. Ali’s lineage was described 
as cursed. In his first asylum narrative, he explained that whereas he had 
indeed married a woman to hide his sexuality, the marriage and subse-
quent divorce were his own choices. But if forced to return to Ghana, he 
asserted, he would be pressured to remarry the woman or marry anew, 
ultimately to produce a chiefly heir, in much the same way as his father 
had been forced to marry and sire a male heir several decades earlier. But 
in the lawyers’ representation to the court, evidence of widespread public 
persecution and private prosecution of LGBTI individuals marginalized 
multigenerational forced marriage practice.
Forced Marriage survivors as sexuaL Minorit ies?
Forced marriage is a complex site for refugee adjudicators who must de-
termine claims based on conventions and protocols that make no mention 
of gender. So it is hardly surprising that patterns have emerged in the man-
ner in which attorneys frame the narratives of their clients. In our expe-
rience, narratives that are clearly forced marriage claims at their core are 
routinely separated into two groups—defensively resisting patriarchy and 
affirmatively contesting homophobia—that gesture toward the violence 
of particular “component” claims, including rape, kidnapping, polygyny, 
torture, or sexual enslavement, rather than addressing forced marriage as 
a distinct and primary condition. Although it should be appreciated that 
an outcome-driven rationale inherently lends itself to conservative argu-
mentation, as experts we are uncomfortable with the flattening and eras-
ing that take hold when narratives are forced into tropes that reinscribe 
prejudices about Africa.
 Throughout the regions of Africa in which we work and from which 
forced marriage testimonies have emerged, forced marriage is prevalent in 
both rural and urban areas. In cases alleging forced marriage in-country 
or by those who have already fled, the marriage in question was often 
principally a means of cementing intragenerational ties and preserving 
continuities that link the past with the current era. Of course, there are 
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often secondary justifications at work, including wealth transfer, political 
and social stabilization, cultural punishment, or even procuring justice 
or vindication, yet it is the obligations that frame the bonds or linkages 
that shape a marriage “tradition.” And together, these factors threaten the 
bodily integrity and personal autonomy of the individual in the forced 
marriage. As is evident in all the cases described in this chapter, family 
heads and other lineage leaders, as well as local elders and officials, nego-
tiate the terms for young brides and grooms, widows and widowers, and 
other family members who have little say in the beginnings or endings of 
their marriages.
 In the cases we have described here—and in our wider experience 
working with persons coerced to marry—forced marriage does not prin-
cipally create a servile position within the household; rather, it renders 
a spouse or spouses captive to an interlacing web of codependent mem-
bers. The forced marriage refugees whose cases we have evaluated may 
indeed have benefited from having their narratives reassembled accord-
ing to “components” with jurisprudential traction, but we will never know 
how their claims of forced marriage would have been adjudicated had they 
been left intact. evidence of the continuum of gender and sexuality in Af-
rica was erased when their claims were dismantled to meet the exigencies 
of convention and precedent.
 But what if refugee claims pertaining to forced marriage were adju-
dicated on their merits alone, wherein the majoritarian violence of co-
ercion was front and center? What patterns might we discern if men and 
women seeking refuge from forced marriages were viewed as a distinct 
social category worthy of protection because of their subordination to ma-
joritarian sexual and marital frameworks and norms? Perhaps it would be 
worthwhile to view forced marriage refugees as a distinct group of “sex-
ual minorities,” namely, individuals whose sexual and social lives are sub-
jected to a dominant “sexual majority” with decision-making powers that 
implements a normative conjugal order.
 Scholars and lawyers often view men and women in forced marriages 
as distinct from LGB individuals because those in forced heterosexual 
marriages appear to conform to heteronormative gender and conjugal 
configurations that would ostensibly entitle them to social inclusion and 
political acceptance. however, this is not necessarily—and in fact rarely 
is—the case. Those in forced marriages nearly always carry political and 
economic obligations that limit their power over their own bodies and 
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reproductive capacities and their authority over their progeny. They are 
also subordinated to dominant marital and sexual prescriptions and 
privileges, which make them sexual minorities as they represent an “ori-
entation” as a dimension of social inequality with implications for bodily 
integrity, social and political outcomes, and personal vulnerability. The 
recognition of both heterosexuals and LGB individuals in coerced unions 
as sexual minorities acknowledges the minority status of the social vulner-
ability of those who are subject to the tyranny of majoritarian coalitions 
that seek to preserve continuities via heteronormative marriage and sex-
ual life. Denial of a marriage of choice, gay or straight, is still ultimately 
subjection to a majoritarian sexuality.
 Those in forced marriages become sexual minorities because in the 
forced marriage process, they transform from autonomous individuals (or 
equal members of a single community with coherent expectations) into 
subordinate members of multiple communities to whom they must fulfill 
reciprocal and competing duties, particularly when their home commu-
nity changes their expectations in light of the altered marital status of its 
member. Furthermore, communities in Africa often resist acceptance of 
LGB identities and lifestyles among their members for the same reason 
that they reject actions against forced marriage: they are seen as threats 
to the community’s sense of social stability, moral integrity, and financial 
prosperity. Where social and familial ties are bound—and economic and 
political responsibilities and obligations contracted—little individual au-
tonomy is possible. This orientation toward networked obligations, which 
require sexual and conjugal duty as well as financial and political respon-
sibility, demands recognition as a particular legal status as well as a status 
that must be identified within a broadened category of “sexual minorities.”
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c h a P t e r  n i n e
Consent, Custom, and the Law in 
Debates around Forced Marriage at the 
Special Court for Sierra Leone
MArIAne c.  FerMe
This chapter analyzes concepts and evidence brought to bear on the crimi-
nalization of forced marriage at the Special court for Sierra Leone (ScSL) 
in the aftermath of the 1991–2002 civil war, against the backdrop of mar-
riage practices and attitudes toward sex crimes outside the conflict setting. 
Differences between forced and customary marriages were critical to court 
arguments about the former’s criminalization. My analysis highlights ten-
sions between notions of individual and collective consent, which in some 
instances mimic gender biases in customary law. I argue that the crim-
inalization of forced marriage at the ScSL had paradoxical consequences 
for women’s rights at the time because it appeared to be predicated on es-
tablishing some forced relations as crimes against humanity while accept-
ing others as “customary.” Witness testimony and ethnographic evidence 
examined in this chapter offer a more complex understanding of women’s 
experiences of marriage in Sierra Leone.
 My goal is in part to explore the messy terrain between notions of 
agency and consent in marriage emerging in international humanitar-
ian jurisprudence and among ordinary Sierra Leoneans.1 I do not seek 
to resolve the tension that inevitably exists between these different and 
to some extent incommensurable arenas; rather, I want to examine the 
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configurations of power/knowledge it produces, particularly around the 
figure of the “bush wife.”
 Forced marriage was added to the roster of crimes against humanity 
at the Special court for Sierra Leone—which was established to try war 
crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the 1991–2002 civil 
war—first as precedent in the appeals phase of the Armed Forces revolu-
tionary council (AFrc) trial and then as a successful article of indictment 
in the revolutionary United Front (rUF) consolidated trial. Scholars writ-
ing or testifying in court in favor of establishing this new crime drew on 
anthropological scholarship on normative forms of customary marriage, 
as well as on wartime ethnographic evidence, to highlight the sui generis 
and harmful nature of forced marriage in war.2 The juxtaposition was 
prompted by the apparent mimicry between the crime of forced marriage 
and arranged marriages in peacetime because in the latter, too, a wom-
an’s consent was absent. Additional evidence offered here, particularly on 
Sierra Leonean marriage practices and on the treatment of marital and 
sexual breaches in customary courts, provides a richer context for debates 
surrounding forced marriage in Sierra Leone and elsewhere.
 In what follows, I argue that the focus at the ScSL on a more robust 
prosecution of sexual crimes in war was predicated on varying degrees of 
erasure of peacetime violations of women’s human rights in marriage, since 
these risked undermining the case in favor of criminalizing forced mar-
riage. Furthermore, the “forced marriage” terminology euphemistically 
aligned a sexual crime with ordinary conjugality, which did not have the 
stigmatizing resonance of “sexual enslavement,” particularly in the collec-
tive imagination of an older generation in postconflict Sierra Leone that 
experienced the social humiliation of domestic slavery within recent his-
torical memory. Ambivalent attitudes toward the forced marriage termi-
nology even at the court gained the upper hand during the charles Taylor 
trial—the final case heard at the ScSL—in which, despite the absence of 
indictments on this count, the judges held that forced marriage should “be 
considered a conjugal form of enslavement.”3
advancing jurisPrudence and  
understanding victiMs’ exPeriences
Debates around the criminalization of forced marriage illustrate the pro-
cess of “enriching the jurisprudence” in international humanitarian law, 
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which is among the key goals of war crimes courts, and an aspect of their 
knowledge-production work.4 According to the court’s first chief prosecu-
tor, the American David crane, the ScSL’s notable achievement was making 
“gender crimes the cornerstone” of its indictments and contributing to the 
criminalization of forced marriage in particular.5 Both women in the three-
judge chamber at the AFrc trial discussed at length instances of sexual en-
slavement and rape prosecuted in the International criminal Tribunal for 
rwanda (IcTr) and the International criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia (IcTY), together with the applicability of those precedents to the Si-
erra Leonean case. In part through their efforts, sufficient novel thinking was 
introduced in the AFrc trial to set precedents and secure convictions for 
the new crime of forced marriage against the revolutionary United Front.6
 court arguments about forced marriage at the ScSL also suggest, 
however, that the process of enriching the jurisprudence does not follow 
a linear progression; it is characterized instead by sometimes discordant 
developments. For instance, only in the rUF trial was evidence of sexual 
violence perpetrated against men and boys discussed at any length, even 
though, conceptually, the move to put “gender crimes” at the center of 
the court’s agenda—Prosecutor David crane’s opening manifesto—would 
have called for including from the beginning a critical stance toward the 
automatic “feminization” of their victims.7 This move also made visible 
the ways in which the complementary masculinization of aggressors had 
masked abuses committed by female combatants.8
 Feminist legal activists and scholars greeted with enthusiasm crane’s 
plans to vigorously prosecute crimes against women at the ScSL.9 But in 
practice, the court got off to a rocky start in the area of gender crimes: 
during the first consolidated trial, involving three leaders of the civil De-
fense Militia (cDF), evidence about sexual violence was excluded from 
the trial on procedural grounds.10 In this placement of “expediency and 
efficiency before the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence,” critics saw 
an instance of the court’s excessive emphasis on the rights of the accused 
at the expense of those of the victim-witness—a problem also noted in the 
war crimes tribunals of the 1990s, particularly the IcTr.11
 Aware of the fact that the trials were unfolding in a country where or-
dinarily customary marriages took place without the consent of the bride-
to-be, ScSL staff sought to highlight differences between the practices 
they aimed to criminalize and those accepted as normal by the surround-
ing population. In one instance, the office of the prosecutor instructed an 
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expert preparing a briefing paper “to create a clear distinction between 
the custom of arranged marriage and the crime of forced marriage. With-
out this distinction, the court might also declare arranged marriage a war 
crime, and that is something the prosecutor did not want.”12 Though forced 
marriage encompassed rape and sexual enslavement, debates at the ScSL 
about its specificity as a crime tried to capture, too, a broader range of 
harms, including the “distinctive status” conferred by being considered a 
“rebel” or “bush” wife. Attention was also given to the lasting stigma de-
riving from having borne “rebel babies,” who would live on as reminders 
of the violence in which they were conceived.
 A key expert witness for the prosecution in the Armed Forces revolu-
tionary council trial, Zainab Bangura, testified in 2005 about her encoun-
ters with bush, or “junta,” wives who had been abducted and forced into 
marriages that, though mimicking (in the words of a judge summarizing 
her testimony) “peacetime situations in which forced marriage and ex-
pectation of free female labour are common practice,” carried with them 
a stigma that permanently ostracized the women from their communities, 
along with any offspring conceived during the relationship.13 In various 
ways, therefore, the court came to accept “common practices,” even when 
harmful to particular individuals, because of the legitimating and sup-
portive roles played by collectivities—in this case, the extended families 
contracting a marriage.14 Thus, perhaps to further the goals of advancing 
the rights of individuals and protecting them from harm, the ScSL in this 
instance chose the legal strategy to privilege the rights of collectivities over 
the interests of individuals—particularly women. This position appeared 
to contradict arguments for the criminalization of forced marriage, in 
which the absence of an individual’s consent was of central importance. 
elsewhere, I have argued that this naturalization of what is, in effect, a 
logical contradiction has to do in part with implicit assumptions in some 
transitional justice thinking about the benign nature of familial, residen-
tial, and other “communities” that were problematic in the context of a civil 
war that highlighted deep divisions precisely within such collectivities.15
 During the AFrc consolidated trial, the prosecution’s indictment ini-
tially called for forced marriage to be considered under the rubric of “sex-
ual slavery,” established as a crime against humanity at the International 
court for crimes (Icc), with the first, precedent-setting prosecutions 
taking place at the IcTY in the Kunarac case.16 But as the cases unfolded, 
arguments were advanced for making forced marriage a distinct crime 
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under “other inhumane acts,” to shift the focus from sexual elements to 
the totality of the violent experience. The prosecution was unsuccessful in 
making this argument and failed to secure convictions in the AFrc trial.
 The presiding judge, Julia Sebutinde, reprised Zainab Bangura’s ob-
servation of the similarities between the violation of women’s rights in 
arranged marriages in peacetime and forced marriage in wartime. In her 
opinion, she wrote that though the former were surely violations “under 
international human rights instruments,” such as the 1979 Un conven-
tion on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(ceDAW), they were not recognized as crimes in international humani-
tarian law. By contrast, she wrote, forced marriage in wartime “is clearly 
criminal in nature and is liable to attract prosecution”—even as she found 
that the prosecution had been unsuccessful in proving its case in this par-
ticular trial.17 Judge Sebutinde favored classifying forced marriage as a 
form of sexual slavery, but in her partly dissenting opinion, Judge Teresa 
Doherty argued for distinguishing them because the former posed greater 
obstacles to the ability of victims “to reintegrate to society . . . thereby 
prolonging their mental trauma.”18 In the end, her argument won the day: 
the appeals chamber found that the trial judges had “erred in law” and 
that forced marriage should be considered “not predominantly sexual,” 
“distinct from the crime of sexual slavery . . . [and] amount[ing] to other 
inhumane acts under Article 2(1) of the Statute.”19
 Thus, from the beginning there were concerns about the mimicry 
between forced marriages in wartime and in peacetime. Yet arguments 
proposing criminalization of forced marriage insisted on its value as an 
umbrella term that encompassed multiple harms. One article of legal 
scholarship that circulated widely among the lawyers working at the ScSL 
in 2008 and whose language echoed in arguments at the court asserted:
none of the other crimes against humanity that comprise forced 
marriage describe the totality of the perpetrator’s conduct or the 
victim’s experience. enslavement describes the loss of personal 
freedom, but obscures the sexual violence inherent in the crime. 
Sexual slavery describes the loss of personal freedom and the 
sexual violence, but does not speak to the forced domestic labor, 
childbearing, childrearing, and degradation of the institution of 
marriage. Torture, rape, and forced pregnancy do not address the 
victim’s loss of personal liberty and individually may not be present 
in all cases of forced marriage.20
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The authors went on to argue that forced marriage was “a profound 
deprivation of individual autonomy” and “the denigration of an import-
ant and protected social and spiritual institution.” But the very fact that 
forced marriage could capture the totality of a complex experience for 
some was seen by others as a troubling lack of specificity and redundant 
in the face of prior charges of sexual slavery—an already established 
crime against humanity.21
 Judge Doherty added the element of time in her arguments in favor 
of using a distinct indictment for the crime of forced marriage. The con-
ferral of this status on a captive, she argued, resulted in trauma well into 
the future of a victim’s life, in part because “the label ‘wife’ may stigmatize 
the victims and lead to their rejection by their families and community, 
negatively impacting their ability to reintegrate into society and thereby 
prolonging their mental trauma.” This was due partially to the lasting and 
equally stigmatizing legacy represented by any children conceived in vi-
olence.22 here and in earlier arguments, the IcTY and IcTr precedents 
informed the concern for future harms. Furthermore, the marriagelike 
practice, it was argued, also enabled a perpetrator to continue abusing his 
victim over time. In other words, temporality—in the form of duration 
(of violent abuses) and of a future orientation in considering social stigma 
and traumatic consequences—was another key element in the conceptual 
apparatus supporting the criminalization of forced marriage.
 Although the ScSL “entered the first-ever international criminal con-
victions for the crime against humanity of sexual slavery” in the rUF trial 
and “solidified” its definition in international humanitarian law, the juris-
prudence on forced marriage, in the end, had more ambivalent outcomes.23 
On the one hand, the precedent established in the appeals phase of the 
AFrc trial set the stage for its criminalization and led to calls for prose-
cuting instances of sexual enslavement and forced marriage elsewhere. On 
the other hand, some legal practitioners and scholars argued that the con-
ceptual foundations for establishing forced marriage as a crime were shaky 
at best, given that nothing resembling a “marriage” could be said to have 
taken place in cases examined at the ScSL Thus, already at the charles 
Taylor trial, it was proposed that “conjugal slavery” better described what 
elsewhere had been labeled “forced marriage.”24
 contestations over terminology were in part centered on its euphemis-
tic and nonspecific nature: “The difficulty with labeling what is otherwise 
sexual slavery, rape, enslavement, and torture as ‘marriage’ is that it distorts 
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and conceals the nature of the victim’s experience.”25 Put another way, for 
those criticizing the introduction of “forced marriage” as an article of in-
dictment, the very terminology that for its proponents captured the total-
ity of harms suffered by victims ended up masking them. In the arguments 
presented at the Icc to add sexual slavery to the roster of crimes against 
humanity (and their subsequent deployment at the IcTY), many critics 
saw more solid legal foundations for prosecuting gender crimes committed 
in Sierra Leone. Already, they pointed out, the debates and jurisprudence 
around the criminalization of sexual slavery had moved away from the mor-
alizing tone of earlier legislation against “enforced prostitution” in war, in 
which offenses against “human dignity” loomed large. Instead, at the Icc 
and IcTY, the central concepts in debates over sexual slavery were consent, 
personal freedom, and the exercise of elements of ownership by perpetra-
tors over victims.26 Among other things, my objection to the use of marriage 
terminology to describe this complex of crimes had in part to do with the 
ambiguous meanings of the word wife among Mende speakers.
arranged and Forced Marriages and the question oF consent
One of the reasons for the discursive weakness of forced marriage in the set-
ting of international humanitarian criminal institutions of the twenty-first 
century is that for most of its history, forced marriage was not clearly dis-
tinguished from arranged marriage. This historical slippage perhaps con-
tributes to the mimicry observed by legal experts and practitioners in the 
ScSL setting, who nonetheless point to the fact that even though a wife’s 
consent is not necessary in customary marriages, sometimes “the parties 
consent to the parents’ choice.”27 Thus, forced and arranged marriages over-
lap partly because of the historical displacement of the former term by the 
latter. For some scholars, arranged marriages may have different connota-
tions than for human rights advocates. For the former, the matter of con-
sent may rest with the extended family, even though it ideally involves the 
wife’s assent—a more appropriate term (normally associated with the lim-
ited consent of jural minors) because most women have no legal standing 
in customary courts and male relatives must “speak for them.” But since 
this search for assent is optional, it hardly constitutes a robust distinction 
from a marriage to which contracting parties have not consented. This also 
suggests that practices violating individual but not familial rights are some-
how less harmful to the person affected than those that violate both.
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 The issue of consent and agency emerges from the testimony in court 
of victims of forced marriages. A witness identified as TF1-016, who testi-
fied in the rUF trial, insisted on the illegal nature of her being “given to a 
man” because she was already married.28 Other witnesses also used the ob-
jectifying, passive language of “being given” to combatants but described 
more complex experiences; one such witness, TF1-023, at the AFrc trial 
was only sixteen when she was “handed over” to a rebel combatant and 
forced to have sex with him. however, she refused to perform other do-
mestic duties, such as cooking, and she could demand services from her 
captor’s subordinates and their female captives.29 In most women’s tes-
timony, the terms in which they referred to themselves as objects being 
given or handed over mirrored those attendant to marriage transactions 
in peacetime, when members of the groom’s patrilineage would beg the 
family of a prospective bride to “give” her to them. Thus, part of what 
emerged from court testimony about forced marriage was the subjection 
of women in a manner consistent with their position in customary mar-
riage negotiations.
 The ScSL’s position with respect to the consent of families and other 
forms of “community” appears to contradict the increasing focus on 
rights-bearing individuals, often to the detriment of rights-bearing col-
lectivities that is a distinctive feature of the expansion since the 1990s of 
humanitarian jurisprudence and international criminal institutions.30 
concurrently, there also has been a tendency to individualize responsibil-
ity for war crimes, even when this contradicted situations where violence 
and abuses in war were experienced as collective phenomena. One of the 
consequences of this focus on “personal responsibility” and narrower 
definitions of individual accountability higher up in chains of command 
in war crimes tribunals was that those targeted for prosecution were less 
likely to be the actual perpetrators of brutalities. Part of the reason for this 
was that—unlike the international tribunals of the 1990s—the “hybrid” 
tribunals encompassing the ScSL were supposed to have a complemen-
tary relationship with national courts, where perpetrators further down 
the chain of command could be prosecuted. This had not happened in 
Sierra Leone when these debates took place.
 Feminist activists and legal scholars had great hopes for the ScSL, feel-
ing that its unique, hybrid structure “and its location in-country could have 
potentially huge implications for the rights of Sierra Leonean women.”31 
This was because crimes against women, such as domestic violence and 
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rape, were sometimes weakly prosecuted in local and national Sierra Leo-
nean settings, and the exemplary performance of their prosecution in a 
tribunal supported by international structures such as the United nations 
was seen as a possible model for reforming enfocement and legal norms 
at the national level. Instead, the ScSL did not immediately have this im-
pact although sexual crimes did come to be prosecuted more vigorously.
Although accusations of rape, sexual enslavement, and eventually forced 
marriage were listed as articles of indictments, these did not always result 
in convictions.32
Lost in transLation: the variet ies oF Marriage
Testimony at the ScSL and other reports on violence against civilians con-
firmed that women of all ages were subjected to brutal rapes, forced con-
scription as fighters, and forms of enslavement—particularly between 1997 
and 1999. This period coincided with the May 1997 coup carried out by 
the rUF rebels allied with rogue members of the military comprising the 
Armed Forces revolutionary council, bringing them to power until their 
defeat some nine months later. Though pushed back at that time from the 
capital city, the AFrc-rUF junta remained in control of other parts of the 
country, and it attacked Freetown in January 1999. During this time, there 
were reports of women being taken as “wives” by combatants or allocated 
by them to their subordinates.33 In one instance, witness TF1-016 testified 
that she was “given” by an rUF commander to his local palm wine tapper, 
who kept her and raped her for fifteen months; this suggests that noncom-
batants, too, took advantage of the war to perpetrate sexual crimes.34
 These forced unions with nonconsenting women were sometimes re-
ferred to as “bush marriages,” and “bush wife” became a common way to 
refer to the women trapped in them in the reports of expert witnesses to 
the ScSL, in proceedings of the Truth and reconciliation commission 
(Trc), and in other documents.35 Yet the expression was not used nearly as 
much among the wider population in Sierra Leone, including combatants, 
as it was in postconflict transitional institutions and in english-speaking 
circles. Witness DBK-113 testified at the Special court that he had never 
heard the expression “bush wife” during his time as an AFrc captive, and 
the prosecution’s key expert witness in this trial admitted that only in 1999 
did she become aware that combatants abducting women and taking them 
as so-called wives was “common practice.”36
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 In Sierra Leone, the bush is secondary forest growth, as distinct from 
a human settlement, cultivated farm, or mature forest. The bush is, for hu-
mans, an interstitial, liminal place that is crossed when traveling between 
village and farm or visited in order to hunt animals or harvest wild foods. 
even in the daytime, the boundaries between bush and town are places 
governed by social norms.37 Some activities associated with settled town 
life are proscribed in the bush—among them sexual relations including 
extramarital ones carried out during the daytime. The combination of lo-
cation and temporality—the bush, which offers more privacy than the vil-
lage, and the daytime, when people are supposed to engage in productive 
farm labor rather than dally in sexual liaisons—made this one of the cir-
cumstances in which customary law intervened to punish transgressors.38
 In ordinary rural parlance before the civil war, referring to something as 
being “bush”—for instance, clothing or the solution to a problem—meant 
that it was makeshift and temporary, lacking the resources one might have 
in the village. In this sense, then, securing a bush wife or husband was simi-
larly temporary, in a time when all social norms were disrupted by war.
 Some witnesses at the ScSL testified to having been taken as what was 
translated as wives by male combatants, and the fact that female victims 
themselves used this terminology was key to arguments for criminalizing 
forced marriage.39 however, the term translated as “wife” carries even more 
ambiguous connotations than “bush.” In Mende, nyaha means “woman” 
as well as “wife.” It also signals the fact that a person has been initiated into 
the women’s Sande (or Bundu) society and is thus a social adult—ready for 
marriage and childbearing.
 children in Sierra Leone become adults through initiation into the 
Sande society, for women, and the Poro society, for men. Both are secre-
tive (for the opposite sex and the uninitiated) and hierarchical institutions 
that cut across familial and other social groupings. Sande rituals transform 
girls into marriageable, fertile, and adult members of the society, and the 
women responsible for this transformation gain lifelong control over the 
marriage prospects of their initiates; historically, they have turned their 
position to political advantage.40 In discussions at the ScSL, the legitimacy 
of arranged marriages was linked to family participation, but in fact, other 
institutions, such as secret societies, were equally important. consequently, 
when one breaks down the ill-defined “community” whose legitimacy 
and consent were invoked by the court, one finds among its components 
powerful, hierarchically organized religious institutions whose political 
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and economic interests crosscut those of secular institutions and of the 
family. These competing demands on members of collectivities are exer-
cised in a context in which the young and unmarried of either sex—and 
women throughout their lives—are most fully embraced when they are 
“for” somebody—when they are tied by relations of dependence to a “big” 
person who, among other things, speaks for his or her dependents in cus-
tomary courts.41
 historically, slavery was a key element in this system of interdepen-
dence, and marriage mediated relations between the free and the en-
slaved. Though domestic slavery was outlawed in Sierra Leone in 1927, 
the discourse of domestic and debt enslavement still haunts and poten-
tially stigmatizes contemporary prewar rural and urban social relations. 
In particular, such discourse is used in connection with marriages that 
were supposed to “ransom” individuals from certain forms of indebted-
ness; therefore, it is at the core of a politicized perspective on marriage 
as an institution mediating but also potentially emancipating individuals 
from relations of inequality.42 This is in part why I hold that the crime of 
sexual slavery “translates” much better than the more euphemistic forced 
marriage in the broader Sierra Leonean context, and thus offers more ro-
bust legal, historical, and socio-cultural grounds from which to mobilize 
on behalf of  women’s rights in Sierra Leone.
 Ultimately, the context in which gender and intergenerational rela-
tions in Sierra Leone must be understood is one in which the (unequal) 
interdependence of members of familial, social, and political collectivi-
ties is valued—and even the powerful are beholden to those who depend 
on them. Individuals who seek autonomy from webs of mutual obliga-
tions usually do so in favor of alternative ones. In marriage, this means 
that family authorities tend to want some indication that their female 
relative is interested in a potential match before finalizing arrangements 
and accepting bridewealth, for if she dislikes her prospective husband, 
she might in future seek a divorce with the support of other kin. This, 
in turn, would force the wife’s family to return marriage payments at a 
time when financial circumstances might make that a hardship. Though 
the collectivity is valued, then, and the language of hierarchical familial 
bonds is paramount in social and political rhetoric, the group’s hold on 
any individual is, in some ways, quite fragile without a measure of ex-
plicit compliance. Individual agency is not eclipsed by familial interests: 
it hovers on the margins and is continually enlisted. In general, prewar 
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and postwar conjugal arrangements tended to increase the possible range 
of unions that went under the rubric of “marriage,” rather than drawing 
sharp distinctions. And the range of familial relationships women or men 
could draw upon to legitimate the preference of certain affective bonds 
and residential patterns over others was rather expansive, so as to offer 
alternatives to individuals who found themselves trapped in unhappy af-
final, kin, or other relations.
 The question of consent and violence in some of the unions formed 
during the war is similarly ambiguous. In one instance, a young woman 
I knew, whom I will call Moinyaha, was taken during a rebel incursion 
in her home village. I was told that she was approached by a rebel who 
“liked her” and had not been seen since. The ambiguity of the language 
used did not exclude the possibility that Moinyaha had some voice in the 
matter. Though she was married when the war broke out, her husband 
had never been around much, and she was a relatively junior wife strug-
gling to support an infant. Then, her child died, so by the time the rebel 
leader who “liked her” arrived in the village, Moinyaha was, in some 
ways, a single woman.
 In discussing her departure, villagers focused on the fact that her ab-
ductor “said he liked her . . . [so] we gave her to him.” I asked whether 
she had agreed, according to the formula customarily employed during 
marriage negotiations whereby relatives turn to a prospective bride, point 
to money and goods brought to the meeting by would-be in-laws, and ask 
her whether they should accept them. It is the moment closest to what 
one might define as consent in the ScSL’s sense of the term, in which a 
prospective bride moves from being a subject defined by her ambiguous 
acquiescence with the proceedings to having a more active voice. On this 
score, the villagers’ responses were vague.
 Other stories of so-called bush wives were less ambiguous: for instance, 
trial transcripts told of the woman who was swept up in a raid, raped, and 
then offered the protection of an exclusive relationship with a particular 
fighter, whose “woman/wife” she thus became.43 In cases where forced mar-
riages resulted in pregnancy and childbirth, the relationships were more 
likely to last beyond the war, as fathers sought to regularize their position 
and hence their claim to their children.44 In one case, a woman and her ab-
ductor sought to formalize their relationship after the war and secure his 
status as the father of their two children, but her family refused his mar-
riage offer. having opted for her family’s support, the woman separated 
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from her husband, only to have her suspicious relatives still shun and mis-
treat her, driving her into prostitution to support her children.45
 Though horrible crimes were committed against women during the 
1991–2002 civil war, the forced marriages that joined rebels to kidnapped 
women sometimes ended up being better matches than the equally forced 
marriages that had preceded them in peacetime, particularly because 
they tended to be between individuals who were closer in age than those 
selected by families to improve their socioeconomic prospects. But the 
homogeneous characterization of all such unions as “crimes against hu-
manity” did not reflect the full range of wartime experiences, which in-
cluded the transformation of an original violence into a familiar bond. 
This possibility was addressed by Judge Doherty in the AFrc opinion; she 
wrote that “a decision to remain in the forced marriage or its transforma-
tion into a consensual situation does not retroactively negate the original 
criminality of the act.”46
 contrary to the ScSL, where gradations of violence and consent were 
subordinated to legal arguments for criminalizing forced marriage, the 
responses to this practice varied across the country at large. In Kailahun 
near the Liberian border, which was the last place where elements of the 
AFrc-rUF junta were demobilized, bush wives were less stigmatized. But 
in Pujehun District, where some of the earliest war violence had unfolded, 
they could be suspected of collusion with the enemy and often mistreated.47
 A different perspective on forced marriage can be gained from Sierra 
Leonean representations of even the most ordinary marriage as a form 
of aggression. Among Mende speakers, wife-takers are called “splitters” 
(mbela, the literal translation of “in-law”), for taking a lineage’s women 
and their future offspring. If a bush husband who was brought back by a 
woman from her war captivity sought to formalize their union, he would 
face “wife troubles” (nyaha monε), referring to the labor, expenses, and gift 
giving for in-laws that accompany marriages throughout their duration. 
Patrilineages remind in-laws of their residual hold on their women’s 
progeny beyond the jural rights exercised by their fathers by participating 
in all major decisions affecting their lives, particularly through their broth-
ers. historically, mother’s brothers had the power to place sisters’ children 
in debt servitude, a condition avoided through matrilateral cross-cousin 
marriage. Indeed, the rhetoric of slavery and ransom colors matrilateral 
cross-cousin marriage negotiations to this day in Sierra Leone.48 Thus, an 
overlooked aspect of customary marriage practices in debates at the ScSL 
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is the extent to which they are informed by contentiousness and explicitly 
political negotiations even in ordinary times.
 Mende speakers refer to wife troubles as an intrinsic aspect of the re-
lationship between wife-takers and wife-givers, and they recognize that 
at marriage, a man enters a form of lifelong indenture to his in-laws, in 
exchange for his wife and her future offspring. In a sense, then, even or-
dinary customary marriage encompasses social transactions centered on 
reparation for losses. A more nuanced understanding of cultural construc-
tions of marriage and of the political and social negotiations that accom-
pany its arrangement—which is a continuous process rather than a single 
event—might provide insights into ways of dealing with at least some of 
the unions formed in wartime, by framing their aftermath within a differ-
ent logic of punishment and restitution than the incarceration meted out 
at the ScSL.
sexuaL criMes in generaL and custoMary Law
Transitional justice institutions, particularly the ScSL and the Truth and 
reconciliation commission, became the main context in which Sierra 
Leonean women could openly testify to being raped, while often remain-
ing silent about the occurrence of rape in ordinary life in local and na-
tional legal settings.49 Outside the exceptional, conflict scenario of forced 
abduction—and the settings of the ScSL and Trc—denouncing sexual 
violence remained fraught with stigma and exposed the victims to further 
trauma. The fact that victims of forced marriage could testify to it in the 
rUF and AFrc trials but not in the cDF one made even the ScSL less 
than a model for changing local thinking about consent in marriage more 
generally, not to mention making rapists legally accountable.
 So what is the status of sexual crimes in customary law? “Woman 
quarrels”—litigation cases involving women—have long been among the 
most common in rural Sierra Leone, taking up the bulk of the time and 
efforts of family and chiefly courts at various levels.50 But these are not gen-
erally cases of sexual violence. Instead, most involve adultery charges made 
by husbands against other men, sometimes in collusion with their wives. 
Lodging such charges can be a strategy for older men to secure the labor 
and “judicial serfdom” of younger men, who, once found guilty of adultery, 
must pay heavy court fines or do farmwork until the debt is extinguished. 
Indeed, some have seen in this form of debt servitude an important source 
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of intergenerational grievances that fueled the 1991–2002 civil war and—if 
not addressed—a potential source of future conflict in agrarian settings.51
 In the context of marriage, sexual violence is not recognized in custom-
ary law, but in practice, it can become the basis for divorce proceedings. But 
customary courts do intervene in cases involving sex with an unmarried 
virgin, which in Krio—a national lingua franca—are known as “virgin-
ating” cases. These are described as rape cases, and during the 1991–2002 
civil war, evidence emerged that some combatants deliberately preyed on 
young virgins.52 But in the cases prosecuted in areas where I did research 
before the war, this charge could also apply to consensual sexual relations 
between a man and any girl or woman who had not been initiated into 
Sande. The fines in such cases were so exorbitant—because they affected 
the woman’s marriage and bridewealth prospects—that one prominent 
member of the village where I was living left the chiefdom permanently to 
escape the jurisdiction of its courts.
 Many of the crimes examined at the ScSL fell within the categories of 
sexual crimes that were familiar in the customary legal landscape of Sierra 
Leone. however, though the ScSL drew liberally on customary law regu-
lating marriage in debates, the court did not analyze its treatment of mari-
tal and sexual crimes. Perhaps this was because cases involving damage to 
women as well as virginating cases appeared to essentially reproduce the 
status of women as objects in conflicts among men. nonetheless, because 
this was not done in a “hybrid” court that sought to move international 
humanitarian law closer to its intended beneficiaries, the opportunity to 
translate for the broader population the implications of prosecuting sexual 
crimes at the ScSL was missed.
A holistic approach to the traumatic afterlife of forced marriage—one 
truly dedicated to understanding the totality of the experience for those 
affected by it—needs to go beyond seeking justice for its victims and ac-
countability for its perpetrators in courts of law. The fact that after the war, 
some victims of forced marriage tried to remain with their captors suggests 
that, over time, an original act of violence could be transformed.53 Labels 
such as Stockholm syndrome—the attachment traumatized victims form 
with their captors—are not especially helpful in a broader context where 
the lack of a woman’s consent is the norm in marriage, even in peacetime.54 
Giving attention to temporality—to the aftermath of harms suffered in 
war—was among the signal contributions of the ScSL to international 
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criminal jurisprudence, particularly the focus on the lasting stigma of 
sexual violence, including the ways in which so-called rebel babies could 
hamper future reintegration of forced marriage victims within communi-
ties of belonging. But even though the aggravating effects of time were ex-
plored, evidence of the mitigating force of the passage of time was elided; 
for example, some wartime abductions had given way to familial units that 
offered a possibility of alternative remedy. The case of the woman shunned 
and driven into prostitution by a family that refused to recognize her bush 
husband suggests that further harm may result from such elisions, just as 
much as they could from overlooking other aspects of the totality of war-
time experiences.
 The Mende discourse of wife troubles and ransom brides suggests, too, 
that prewar customary marriage could be fraught with tension, evoking as 
it does relations of indebtedness between in-laws, obligations imposed on 
husbands, and even the historical legacy of enslavement. In this, the Sierra 
Leonean case underscores the relationship, drawn by other contributors to 
this volume, among marriage, property transfers, debt, and slavery in Af-
rican social history. The role of key members of extended families in me-
diating these relations, which entail labor burdens and the deprivation of 
freedom even as they forge alliances, is at odds with the ScSL’s finding that 
this collectivity’s consent legitimates marital unions even against the will 
of prospective spouses. harm, restitution, and the balancing of gains (alli-
ances) with losses (a lineage’s woman lost to another)—more than love and 
romance—are part of the conceptual and affective apparatus of marriage in 
this context. For a woman, marriage choices often center around relative 
food security and respectful partnership at the margins of subsistence, es-
pecially in urban poverty or agrarian settings. In this setting, submitting a 
former abductor to the trials of in-law obligations and of wife troubles in the 
process of legitimating the union with his bush wife might offer more read-
ily recognizable forms of justice to families touched by the war’s violence.
 At the same time, the case discussed earlier of a young abducted 
woman who could not refuse to have sex with her captor but did refuse to 
cook and wash clothes for him suggests that within the totality of experi-
ences of sexual enslavement, there were also spaces where consent could 
be denied and minor forms of control exercised. In the end, forced mar-
riage—as a war crime—is best understood under as “sexual slavery,” given 
the ways in which its juxtaposition with peacetime unions that also lack 
women’s consent raises paradoxical implications for women’s rights.
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Between Global Standards  
and Local Realities
Shari’a and Mass Marriage Programs in northern nigeria
JUDITh-Ann WALKer
Kano State has an estimated population of 11.4 million, making it the 
largest of nigeria’s states. Yet it currently receives the lowest per capita 
share in federal government allocation to states, and 58 percent of the pop-
ulation lives in poverty.1 Though famous for its precolonial history as the 
center of the Saharan kola, indigo-dyed textile trades, and Islamic scholar-
ship, more recently the state has gained notoriety for ethnoreligious con-
flict, an Islamicist insurgency, and the disproportionate burden of poverty 
borne by women and children.2
 hausa and Fulani cultural traditions and an Islamic value system that 
permeates every facet of life deeply shape social reality in Kano State. The 
social value system has its roots in historical alliances between the state 
and the religious/traditional authority structures dating back to the colo-
nial period, which conspire to exercise direct and complete control over 
the lives of youth, the working classes (or talakawa), girls, and women. 
Whereas the working classes emancipated themselves through the revo-
lution of the northern elements Progressive Union and the People’s re-
demption Party of the 1960s, the youth rebellion engulfing current-day 
northern nigeria is largely due to young males struggling to claim space 
and chart a separate course; the vicelike grip of control over women and 
girls is still intact in this region.
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 The fact that women and girls in the north remain under the con-
trol of the state, socioreligious, and familial power structures and are still 
compelled to fulfill cultural expectations as tolerant cowives and fertile 
mothers of large, servile, and faithful families is noted in the literature 
on women in northern nigeria.3 Much is known about the impact of the 
subordinate status of women and girls on their reproductive health, po-
litical participation, landownership, employment opportunities, and edu-
cational status, but few in-depth studies explore the complicit role of the 
state in their subordination.4
 When governments in northern nigeria do make policies restricting 
the agency of women and girls, it is worthy of in-depth exploration. A case 
in point is the 2005 road Traffic Law, enacted by the Shekarau govern-
ment, that banned women from riding commercial motorcycles, the main 
form of affordable public transportation in the state. The closed nature of 
shari’a governments in northern nigeria makes it difficult for researchers 
to study the policy debates informing such decisions. Thus, little is known 
about the processes that take place within the state as male politicians and 
bureaucrats debate problems and justify policies that circumscribe and, 
in some cases, violate the rights of women and girls. This chapter exam-
ines one such case, whereby Kano State government’s attempt to solve 
a perceived social problem—namely, the proliferation of poor and vul-
nerable single, widowed, and divorced women—set the stage for “state- 
sponsored” marriages through a provincial statutory policing authority, 
the hisbah Board (or, alternatively, hisbah commission or Kano State 
hisbah corps).
 The Kano hisbah Board was established by the state government in 
2003 with the institutionalization of formerly local and privately main-
tained hisbah security units.5 hisbah, an Arabic word meaning an act per-
formed for the good of the society, conveys an Islamic religious concept 
that calls for “enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong on 
every Muslim.”6 The Kano board operates as a virtual Islamic government, 
with responsibility for upholding morality, social norms, peace, and jus-
tice in the state in accordance with the tenets of the shari’a criminal code.7
 The Kano board’s marriage program is widely regarded in northern ni-
geria as a success story and a model for addressing poverty among women 
and girls. Between 2011 and 2012, delegations from state governments in 
Gombe, Zamfara, and Sokoto visited and studied the Kano hisbah Board’s 
mass marriage “solution,” and they have replicated similar programs in 
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their respective states. The “Kano model” has also come to the attention of 
the global media.8 This chapter examines the extent to which global norms 
on the rights of girls (and women) and the responsibility of the state to 
protect their welfare shaped the decisions when implementing the mass 
marriage program. From my perspective as a practitioner with several de-
cades of experience in the region, I examine how the structure of the mass 
marriage program responds to global standards and local realities and 
employs a public policy-making framework to explore the competing in-
fluences in shaping governments’ actions on issues of age of marriage and 
consent.9 To make sense of the puzzling situation wherein forced and child 
marriages persist in modern-day northern nigeria—despite the existence 
of international human rights standards and in spite of the fact that states 
are subordinate to the constitutional and legal framework of the nigerian 
state as a federal entity—it is helpful to reflect on the colonial policy on 
girls in the northern region.
historicaL Patterns in the treatMent oF girLs and 
woMen in the northern region
Some historians and political sociologists present the situation in nigeria’s 
northern region as a classic case of a political system where global colonial 
civilizational values gave way to an alternative local reality, in the interest 
of maintaining the political status quo. In what Paul Lovejoy refers to as 
the “accommodation” between the British and the Sokoto caliphate, in-
direct rule served to maintain the status quo and consolidate traditional 
authority over women and girls under colonialism.10 Missionaries and 
mission schools between 1842 and 1888 expanded educational opportuni-
ties for girls in southern nigeria by teaching arts and crafts and developing 
a female labor force to support a menial role in the colonial economy, 
but in northern nigeria, they were prohibited from implementing similar 
programs.11
 The deep-seated historical practices in the Sokoto caliphate and 
in Maliki madhab hausa society broadly—practices that marginalized 
women and girls and minimized consent and autonomy, as described by 
Kari Bergstrom among others—were perpetuated by colonial rule.12 De-
cisions related to the lives of girls and women remained firmly under the 
control of the political establishment.13 Against a background of margin-
alization, the expansion of education for girls in the north was minimal 
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and selective; this was part of a broader process, described by cather-
ine coles and Beverly Mack, whereby women balanced the demands 
of Islamic expectations and emerging ideas of choice as hausa society 
transitioned from Maliki precoloniality via British colonialism to the 
inclusivity of the modern nigerian nation.14 Though some colonial offi-
cials lamented the conditions of women and girls under “Mohammedan 
Marriage custom in the northern provinces,” the colonial administra-
tion stopped short of advancing solutions that would shake the tight grip 
of hausa tradition and Muslim ideology.15 not surprisingly, despite the 
prolific debates that took place under colonial rule about the age of mar-
riage for “Mohammedan infant-brides,” colonial deliberations over the 
special circumstances of the Muslim religion resulted in ratification of a 
very early minimum age of marriage—nine years—for northern girls in 
the early twentieth century.
 The colonial position at times even trailed behind some emirs calling 
for legislation to prohibit this practice. According to the colonial secretary 
of the northern provinces,
The argument adduced by the respectable Moslem in support of 
child marriage, as of purdah, is that it is the only way to protect 
a girl’s chastity in the present atmosphere of sexual promiscuity 
amongst the youth of the country. . . . The emir of Gwandu recently 
brought a case for the notice of the Divisional Officer in which 
a girl-bride was prematurely forced and died of the resultant 
hemorrhage: her parents considered this an act of God calling for no 
human retribution. The emir asked for legislation prohibiting infant 
marriage. . . . A minimum age, say 14 years, for lawful marriage 
would require to be fixed by nigerian legislation since such does not 
at present appear in the laws.16
In 1954, the British colonial administration in northern nigeria enacted 
a law that gave native Authorities the power to legislate issues related to 
“regulating child betrothal” and regulating and controlling the movement 
of children and young females from or within the area.17 renee Pittin, 
who has written extensively on the historical roots of state/traditional in-
stitution accommodation to explain the conditions of girls, argues that 
the state “whether pre-colonial, colonial or post-colonial, has never been 
neutral. . . . Thus, for example, the state has tended to support continued 
control over women via marriage.”18
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the PoLicy context oF decision Making  
about Forced Marriage
Public policy making may be viewed as a dynamic process of decision mak-
ing, which aims to address a public policy problem in which the state is the 
central actor. The decisional space of the state to select one policy option 
over another is a political process that involves multiple actors from the 
private and public sectors, as well as from the local and global domains.19 
As important as the policy content may be, it is the context of policy mak-
ing that engages scholars in comparative public policy and administra-
tion, challenging them to explain competing influences of global and local 
forces as they shape the decisions of states.20 The policy context consists 
of environmental factors including comparative and historical precedent 
and knowledge, which impinge on the definition and understanding of 
the policy issue and shape policy options considered by decision makers. 
notions of the decisional space of governments are underpinned by as-
sumptions of an autonomous state that is free to choose among competing 
policy options from local or global contexts, subject only to technical dic-
tates of policy making and political considerations from lobbyist groups. 
This ideal liberal pluralist notion is far removed from the reality of policy 
making in the developing world, where the state is often embedded in 
traditional power structures within civil society and is unable to consider 
policy options from both local and international contexts when they come 
into conflict with the roots of state power.
 Policy demands from the global policy environment are particu-
larly difficult to entertain to the extent that they are often based on uni-
versal values, norms, and standards that conflict with the value system 
of powerful local interests. With regard to questions of forced and early 
marriage, global standards emerge from international conventions and 
guidelines, whereas the local realities embodied in tradition, custom, and 
in many cases customary laws may or may not be codified. This plurality 
of legal systems creates a parallel context, components of which govern-
ments sometimes seek to balance in making decisions related to girls and 
women. Global conventions on forced marriage that appear to impinge 
on national and local-level decisional space include, among others, the 
convention on the rights of the child (crc), the Universal Declaration 
of human rights, and the convention on the elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (ceDAW).21 African regional standards 
shaping the decisional space of national governments and substate entities 
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include the African charter on human and Peoples’ rights, the African 
charter on the rights and Welfare of the child, and the Protocol to the 
African charter on human and Peoples’ rights on the rights of Women 
in Africa (also known as the Maputo Protocol).22
 research on the persistence of forced marriage practices in the Global 
South routinely explains a government’s capacity or lack thereof to make and 
enforce minimum marriage age as a reflection of a balance between local cul-
tural forces and normative orders with global norms and conventions. A 2006 
United nations Population Fund (UnFPA) study noted, for example, that
governments are often either unable to enforce existing laws, or rectify 
discrepancies between national laws on marriage age and entrenched 
customary and religious laws. This is because of the “official tolerance 
of cultural, societal and customary norms that shape and govern the 
institution of marriage and family life.” In general, there is seldom 
political will to act when it comes to women’s and girls’ human rights.23
When customary laws—or in the case of shari’a, religious laws—exist side by 
side with international law, some see a type of legal pluralism extending into 
the political and judicial realms.24 But regardless of how we might classify the 
complex legal terrain of Maliki hausa culture in Kano, much like the situa-
tions in Sierra Leone and South Africa discussed in this volume by Mariane 
Ferme and elizabeth Thornberry, respectively, the human rights of girls—their 
freedom to choose a marriage partner, their right to access education, and 
their right to be protected from harmful traditional practices such as forced 
marriage—are circumscribed by contested customs and by the existence of 
distinct and equally powerful legal practices at community and state levels.25
the state and the issue oF Forced  
and earLy Marriage in nigeria
Forced marriage practices are difficult to characterize and generalize in the 
Global South. Geetanjali Gangoli, Khatidja chantler, Marianne hester, and 
Ann Singleton, along with the authors in this volume, call into question the 
simple legalistic explanation of forced marriage as marriage without con-
sent of the intended spouses, where duress is exercised over free and full 
will, leading to the violation of a number of international human rights 
instruments and standards. These authors interrogate the concept of con-
sent, citing studies “where it is argued that women’s ability to consent can 
be mediated by factors such as poverty,” and they raise the issue of context 
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in the coercion/consent debate.26 Sundari Anitha and Anisha Gill call for an 
awareness of “the socio-historical, political and cultural context of women’s 
lives, and their location at the intersection of several vectors of inequality,” 
arguing that this is “crucial to understanding the relationship between con-
sent and coercion.”27 This formative scholarship and activism on forced mar-
riage, elaborated in the introduction to this volume, provoke us to rethink 
global standards and the definition of forced marriage.
 research on the persistence of forced and early marriage of girls and 
women in nigeria points to the complicity of the state in general and male 
political officeholders in particular, as they fail to enact, uphold, and en-
force laws that treat these practices as violations. They opt instead for the 
silence of inaction and the preservation of tradition and customary laws.28 
In this regard, the nigeria nGO coalition on ceDAW notes:
Under customary law, women do not have rights to enter into 
marriage, decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing 
of their children. There still exist cases of forced marriage, child 
betrothal, wife inheritance, and widowhood practices across 
nigeria. In nigeria, the man is viewed as the “head of the family” 
and as the provider of food, shelter and clothing for the family. This 
gives the man greater rights to exert authority in the family even 
where he fails to provide or the woman earns a higher income.29
In northern nigeria, where the median age of first marriage is fifteen 
years—the lowest in nigeria and virtually unchanged over the past sixteen 
years—forced marriage is seen as coterminous with child marriage.30
 A recent study by the Zaria-based centre for Islamic Legal Studies 
acknowledged that
it is true that some parents force their children to marry husbands 
of their parents’ choice. This practice still persists in some parts of 
northern nigeria. Parents who do this rely on the jurisprudential 
ruling of Imam Malik to the effect that a father may compel his 
previously unmarried daughter to marry a man he chooses for her. 
The right of compulsion, where it exists, can only be exercised by the 
father, who is also qualified to be a guardian on the assumption that 
his care and compassion for his daughter are ordinarily taken for 
granted. This fatherly power is known as ijbar. Public morality and 
the individual’s own integrity take priority over personal freedom 
when they come into conflict.31
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the treatMent oF girLs and woMen  
in conteMPorary northern nigeria
The military regime of General Ibrahim Babangida took the first step to 
protect women and girls in 1991, with the ratification of the United na-
tions convention on the rights of the child. The crc was domesticated 
in the form of the child rights Act (crA), passed into law in September 
2003 under President Olusugun Obasanjo. The crA represented a brave 
attempt by the Obasanjo administration to harmonize existing laws and 
provide clarity on the minimum age of marriage, as well as issues of con-
sent, coercion, and the illegality of forced marriage. The act improved 
upon the existing laws, such as section 3(I)(e) of the Matrimonial causes 
Act of 1970, which rendered a marriage void where either of the parties 
was found to be not of “marriageable age” but failed to define the term 
marriageable age.
 Under the crA, eighteen was mandated as the minimum legal age of 
marriage, with no allowances being made for parental, guardian, or com-
munity leaders’ consent for marriage under that age. Two sections in part 
III read as follows:
[Section] 21. no person under the age of 18 years is capable of 
contracting a valid marriage, and accordingly, a marriage so 
contracted is null and void and of no effect whatsoever.
[Section] 22. (1) no parent, guardian or any other person shall 
betroth a child to any person.
(2) A betrothal in contravention of Subsection (1) of this section is 
null and void.32
 Since the passage of the federal crA in 2003, efforts of the Federal Min-
istry of Women’s Affairs, the United nations children’s Fund (UnIceF), 
the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and the canadian 
International Development Agency (cIDA) to domesticate this law in the 
northern states have been frustrated: eleven of the twelve states in nigeria 
that have yet to pass the complementary state crA are in the north. De-
spite the efforts of UnIceF to build consensus for the act by organizing 
study tours for Islamic scholars to egypt and despite the initiatives of Ger-
man funding agencies in Borno State to present the benefits of the act in 
terms of its potential to halt child trafficking, northern officials continue 
to reject statewide domestication.
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 The Kano State speaker of the house of Assembly describes that act 
as being “against the wishes of Kano and the entire northern part of the 
country as it is against our religion and culture.”33 Similarly, the president 
for the Supreme council of Shar’’a in nigeria, Dr. Ibrahim Datti Ahmed, 
described the act as “a conspiracy against Islam . . . and a direct attack on 
Islam,” adding, “no Muslim will obey this law. It doesn’t matter who passes 
it.”34 The sticking point for northern political and traditional leaders relates 
to sections 21 and 22 of the act, which outlaw consent to marriage by fam-
ily members and only recognize spousal consent. This is widely viewed as 
being an affront to hausa and Muslim marriage customs.
Marriage and consent in hausaLand
Several factors limit the extent to which girls are able to exercise free will 
and give consent to marriage in hausa society. The ideal standard for Is-
lamic marriage is a union in which consent is a mandatory requirement 
and without which any such marriage is void or voidable. however, in 
hausa culture coerced marriage is the prevailing practice, whereby the 
father or even a wealthy elder male relative decides on behalf of the child 
bride without or against her consent or choice. even in cases where the 
marriage is voluntary and possibly based on love, the father is the one to 
communicate consent. Thus, the father has a significant and undue influ-
ence on the girl’s “choice.” The paternal power to give consent or select a 
husband for his daughter is mostly legitimated using the Maliki doctrine 
of ijbar (fatherly authority). According to this Islamic principle, the fa-
ther has the power to choose a husband for his “virgin daughter.”35 Though 
women do have great autonomy to marry a partner of their choice in sec-
ond, third, or subsequent marriages in hausa culture, the younger the girl 
is, the greater the likelihood that she will be married without or against 
her consent. Luigi Solivetti explains thus:
hausa tradition . . . gives the father authority over his daughter’s first 
marriage, whatever her age; he does not even have to consult her. 
The essential social fact is clear: marriage is a manifestation of the 
families’ will, not of the will of the couple getting married.36
With close to 60 percent of Kano’s population living in poverty, the father’s 
consent for marriage serves as an important mobilization strategy for the 
family and community to provide financial support for wedding festivities.
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hisbah and civiL society MobiLization against FeMaLe Poverty
The poverty of Kano in particular and the northern zone in general has 
been widely cited ever since a landmark study by the World Bank in 1993.37 
Using largely quantitative methods, this and other subsequent studies 
stopped short of exploring the causes of female poverty, however. It was 
left to ethnographic studies, mapping high-risk behaviors of vulnerable 
women and girls in northern nigeria, to examine the female experience 
and implications for public health. Family health International (FhI) 
commissioned two studies between 2000 and 2008, and research was con-
ducted by the Kano-based nongovernmental organization (nGO) known 
as the development research and Projects centre (drPc). A 2004 Poverty 
Knowledge and Practice study, funded by the Institute of Development 
Studies (IDS) and conducted by the drPc, also explored the meaning of 
poverty in Jigawa State.38
 The FhI studies revealed the abject nature of poverty for widows and 
divorcées in northern nigeria and showed how women were forced to en-
gage in commercial sex work for cash and in-kind consideration simply to 
feed themselves and their children. This situation was particularly trou-
bling in the traditional cities of Kano State. It was not surprising that a 
local nGO, the voice of the Widows and Divorcees of nigeria (vOWAn), 
with a membership of poor females, sought to alert policy makers to the 
plight of women. The group called on the government of Governor Ibra-
him Shekarau, to enact a law that would “stipulate [a] heavy penalty on 
any man found to have unjustifiably divorced his wife.”39
 vOWAn constituted the first significant challenge to the then popu-
lar Shekarau administration, which came to power in April 2003. That ad-
ministration displaced the progressive regime of Governor rabiu Musa 
Kwankwaso, which was widely regarded as vacillating on the important 
question of shari’a. The masses, the traditional institutions headed by 
the emir and the emirate council, and the ulama (those recognized as 
scholars or religious authorities) class embraced the new governor, who 
himself was also regarded as an ulama. By the time of his reelection in 
2007, Shekarau had consolidated a new elite power base, comprising tra-
ditional and modern Islamists, an Islamically oriented bureaucracy, and 
the Kano royal house. With the exception of the Muslim Sisters Orga-
nization (MSO), most women’s groups and even the women’s wing of 
the ruling party were excluded from this inner circle. conflict between 
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the Shekarau administration and the vOWAn came to a head with the 
group’s decision to hold a Million Women March in 2009. vOWAn 
abandoned the march after the intervention of the Kano State hisbah 
Board, the provincial Islamic machinery for policing morality. Kano’s 
hisbah Board was established under edict no. 4 of 2003, as amended in 
2004. The board was constituted as a virtual Islamic government with 
responsibility for upholding morality, in accordance with the shari’a 
criminal code. The hisbah Board has powers of enforcement, adjudica-
tion, and incarceration.40
the adMinistration oF governMent-sPonsored  
Mass Marriage
A new Kwankwaso administration, reelected to office in 2011, replaced the 
Shekarau-led All nigerian Peoples Party (AnPP). Kwankwaso maintained 
the hisbah Board as an agency of government but expanded its moral po-
licing functions to include social welfare, child protection, and marriage 
counseling. Kwankwaso’s win was secured with the strong support of youth 
and women, especially grassroots women’s groups. Immediately upon tak-
ing office, the second Kwankwaso administration initiated policies viewed 
as prowomen, including women’s economic empowerment programs, girl 
child education support initiatives, conditional cash transfer projects, and 
microfinance. The mass marriages program was envisioned as one of these 
prowomen interventions. To what extent was the state government’s 
policy response on mass marriages guided by global standards or dictated 
by local factors of culture, religion, and tradition?
 The political nature of this program may be viewed as a legacy project 
of the executive governor and a form of payback to the women of the state 
for their political support. The state government and the hisbah Board 
allocated public revenues and mobilized funds and in-kind contributions 
from rich merchants to pay the bride-price, finance wedding ceremonies, 
provide brides with equipment for their economic survival, supply food-
stuffs to the married couples, and offer pledges of postmarriage payments. 
Bridewealth items included cloth, beds, bed linens, sewing machines, and 
victuals such as rice and eggs (see Figures 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4). Against 
this backdrop, the mass marriages program transmuted into a popular 
poverty-reduction strategy and grew beyond the initial focus on widows 
and divorcées.
F I G U r e  1 0 . 1 .  Former Kano State governor (now federal senator) rabiu Musa 
Kwankwaso talks to unidentified bride as hajiya Amina Sambo, former second lady, 
and other women look on. June 2014. Photo credit: Hassan A. Karofi © 2014.
F I G U r e  1 0 . 2 .  hajiya Amina Sambo, former second lady, hands sewing machine to 
unidentified brides. hajiya Baraka Sani, special adviser on school agriculture to former 
president Goodluck Jonathon and former Kano State women’s affairs commissioner, and 
scholar Sheikh Aminu Abubakar look on. June 2014. Photo credit: Hassan A. Karofi © 2014.
F I G U r e  1 0 . 3 .  Kano State hisbah Board delivering furniture, sewing machines, and 
victuals as bridewealth for mass wedding, outside Kano Government house. June 
2014. Photo credit: Hassan A. Karofi © 2014.
F I G U r e  1 0 . 4 .  Grooms inspecting bridal trousseau donated by Kano State govern-
ment. Kano, 2013. Photo credit: Aisha V. Hashim © 2013.
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 A total of 2,461 women and girls were matched with husbands in the 
mass marriage program, in several cohorts between May 15, 2012, when 
the first one hundred brides were married, to the end of 2014. The first 
cohort consisted mainly of mature, divorced, and widowed women, span-
ning a wide range of ages, with most aged twenty to thirty.41 By July 2012 
when a second cohort was married, the state government responded to 
pressure from parents of younger girls who could not afford to marry off 
their daughters, and the cohort included previously unmarried girls. The 
second cohort therefore consisted of a disproportionately larger number 
of younger and previously unmarried girls, rather than widows and di-
vorcées. Brides I interviewed at the time of the mass marriages admit-
ted to being as young as sixteen years, although they had no evidence of 
their dates of birth because the majority of female births are not registered 
in Kano State. With the third cohort—comprising one thousand couples 
married in April 2013—equal numbers of young girls, widows, and di-
vorcées were married. To be sure, many of the divorcées were also under 
the minimum legal age for marriage.
 By August 2013, when preparations were being put in place for the 
fourth cohort of mass marriages, the hisbah “commandant general,” 
Sheikh Aminu Ibrahim Daurawa, revealed that 1,111 couples were to be 
married (see Figures 10.5 and 10.6) and that 50 slots were reserved for 
christians. In his words:
We decided to include christians in the state since we are living 
together in the same environment. And just as we do not want to 
see our children engage in prostitution, we also do not want theirs 
to engage in it . . . we will allow them to go and do their weddings 
in their churches. We will only share the marriage bouquet 
(walima) together.42
In all cohorts, elaborate administrative procedures were put in place by 
the hisbah Board to ensure strict compliance with the regulations and 
rules of the mass marriages program.
 Administrative procedures covered screening for pregnancy, hIv/
AIDS, and other sexually transmitted diseases, as well as background 
character checks and investigations to determine the marital status of the 
bride and groom. These measures were ostensibly to ensure that brides 
and grooms were disease free, that the bride was not pregnant and was 
legally unmarried at the time of the screening, and that both bride and 
F I G U r e  1 0 . 5 .  Unidentified brides and grooms, among 1,111 cou-
ples, sitting under canopies at the Kano State Government house 
compound on December 19, 2013, as part of a mass wedding for 
divorcées and widows organized by the Kano State hisbah Board. 
Photo credit: Aminu Abubakar © 2013.
F I G U r e  1 0 . 6 .  Unidentified brides and grooms exit Kano State 
Government house on December 19, 2013, after a wedding feast. 
Photo credit: Aminu Abubakar © 2013.
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groom were known in the community. There was no rule against a married 
man being considered as a suitable groom for a new wife in a polygynous 
union; indeed, the desire to take another wife was seen as evidence of the 
husband’s sense of responsibility and maturity. hisbah Board members 
were among the grooms taking brides as second and third wives. There 
was also no requirement for christians participating in the mass marriage 
program to convert to Islam.
 no explicit rule set a minimum age for participation in the mass mar-
riage program. The first step in the long administrative process of the 
program occurred at the community level, where the ages of the bride and 
groom had to be provided on an application form. In most cases, however, 
date of birth information was either left incomplete or provided but not 
verified.43 Moreover, in the screening process that followed, the hisbah 
Board did not use age as a criterion to disqualify girls under eighteen years. 
Indeed, in hausa-language newspapers reporting on the second cohort of 
marriages, cases of underage marriage were discussed. For example, one 
item read: “Shafa’atu Ibrahim Gaida is a 17 year old and she has never been 
married. She said the person she just got married to is the one who took 
the form to the hisbah Board . . . this is not his first marriage.”44
 The process of the state-sponsored marriage involved several steps. 
With respect to consent, interviews with community members at the local 
government level and at the hisbah Board revealed that formal provisions 
were put in place to register the consent of both bride and groom insofar as 
both were expected to sign separate application forms.45 It reality, however, 
field interviews revealed that it was often a male head of household, a liter-
ate community member, or the prospective husband who completed and 
signed the forms for the prospective bride, often without her knowledge. 
By the time of the third cohort, prospective husbands were increasingly 
taking over the responsibility of fathers by filling out and signing applica-
tion forms for younger brides. Once complete, the forms were acknowl-
edged and in some wards formally approved by the religious or traditional 
leader; they then moved upward to the central hisbah office. The next step 
was for the potential bride and groom to undergo medical screening and 
counseling; the marriage was subsequently contracted if the outcome of 
these processes was successful. When this process was complete, executive 
consent for the sponsored marriages was given from the governor.
 It is difficult to gauge public attitudes to the phenomenon accurately. 
Interestingly, though the foreign media has remained silent on the issue 
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of coercion it has been hotly debated in the local media, causing the his-
bah Board to explain its procedures in detail. Analysis of news reports 
and interviews with brides revealed that despite their ages, prospective 
brides were generally happy to be married and were not troubled about 
whether or not they signed their application forms personally. What 
was of concern to them was that they should not be matched randomly: 
that is, they should be married to the same men who identified them, 
completed their forms, moved them through the system, and had begun 
bringing gifts to them. The future husbands’ willingness to negotiate the 
hisbah Board bureaucracy may be consider a de facto expression of con-
sent by girl brides and their families. Brides who were rematched with 
different grooms were most dissatisfied with the particular husbands 
chosen for them. This was especially true when some prospective brides 
were rematched as a result of the screening panel’s rejection of a first or 
second choice of a husband. In such cases, the hisbah Board was accused 
of being a party to forced marriage.
 The hisbah Board addressed the allegation that girls were being 
forced into marriage in the official organ Hisbah Today, stating that 
“hisbah is not going to harm or force anyone but is going to enlighten 
according to the Sharia.”46 In support of its claims, members of the board 
gave examples of how they prevented forced marriages on a daily basis 
in hausa communities. The hisbah Board documented one such case in 
the local hausa newspapers:
This couple brought themselves to the Board seeking support as 
the bride’s parents refused to marry her to the person she loves. . . . 
After carrying out investigations, the commander of the hisbah 
Board Mallam Aminu Ibrahim Daurawa agreed with the couple and 
married them. . . . An official of the Board Mallam Musa Tanko said, 
they have witnessed many of such problems and have solved them 
successfully.47
however, on the issue of age of marriage, the hisbah Board members de-
fended their practices by explaining they were simply responding to the 
requests of parents to marry off their daughters. They pointed out that it is 
the parents who actually initiate the decision to marry their daughters. As 
the hisbah Board explained, “Parents come to us for assistance concern-
ing their children’s marriages. . . . This is because some girls at fifteen years 
have been exposed; their eyes are opened.”48
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 In its assessment of the Kano State mass marriage program, the Gombe 
State Ministerial committee reached a similar conclusion:
The successful implementation of two phases of Zawarawa 
(divorcées) and Spinsters marriages in Kano state has endeared 
other states in the north worthy of emulation. . . . Parents and 
guardians with low income earning are eager to get their wards 
married through the program.49
 The Gombe State committee concluded its report with the recommen-
dation that the Kano State program be replicated but with the proviso that
emphasis be placed in building consensus between parents and 
their child/wards in selecting spouses particularly, choice of a 
husband. . . . This is in realization of the fact that the practice of 
forced/unilaterally, arranged marriages (hausa: auren dole) is a 
major cause of broken marriages in the north.50
the Future oF Mass Marriage
In implementing its mass marriages program, Kano State seems to have 
been guided by the local reality of poverty that propelled parents to marry 
off fifteen-year-old girls. The government was working within a cultural 
context in which male authority figures, not the girl brides in question, 
were expected to give consent to marriage. however, we must not too 
hastily conclude that the mass marriages program reinforced the patriar-
chal value system of the local environment and rejected global standards. 
It is important to note that the conservative ulama class in Kano strongly 
opposed the program for its attempt to introduce “innovation” into Is-
lamic obligations associated with marriage.
 The ulama iterated a number of concerns, including the state gov-
ernment’s insistence that the prospective bride and groom be tested for 
sexually transmitted infections (STIs), that the bride be examined and de-
termined not to be pregnant, that a marriage certificate be issued to the 
couple, that the procedures for divorce be formalized and made to con-
form with Islamic precepts, and that the hisbah Board would monitor the 
marriage to ensure that the new bride was happy and not abused. More-
over, the dates set for the marriages were troubling to the ulama class, as 
they coincided with global reproductive health days rather than locally 
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preferred days that were significant in the Islamic calendar. For instance, 
the first cohort was married on May 15, which coincided with the Interna-
tional Day of the Family, and the second cohort was married on April 7, 
coincidentally World health Day.
 The experience of the mass marriages program of Kano State suggests 
that notwithstanding the constraints posed by culture and poverty on the 
decisional space of governments (and families), decision makers are able 
to select from among a menu of global prescriptions that protect women 
and girls and adopt initiatives despite resistance from local custodians of 
culture. To conclude that the mass marriages program in Kano State is yet 
another example of state complicity in the violation of the rights of girls 
and women in the Global South is to fail to appreciate the influence of so-
cioeconomic context as well as to undervalue the power of state agency in 
advancing the rights of women and girls through incremental and unorth-
odox initiatives. It is this potential that must be exploited as development 
impact investors seek to encourage states in the Global South to act to 
protect girls and women.
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c h a P t e r  e L e v e n
Dreams of My Mother
Good news on ending early Marriage
MUADI MUKenGe
With the heightened attention on the rights of the girl child globally, the 
conversation about early marriage as a human rights violation is also grow-
ing louder within and outside of the academy. Since 2011, at least three 
international conferences have examined the problems of early marriage. 
Outside of academia, as discussed in the introduction to this volume, the 
prevention of early marriage has been a priority in sectors such as public 
health, maternal health, international development, child rights advocacy 
groups, and the women’s rights movement. This chapter will highlight the 
actions of women’s rights associations that have organized to reform so-
cial practices that lead to early marriage, one of the key drivers of deaths 
among adolescent mothers.1 The analysis adds the dimension of mothers 
who act to give their daughters the opportunities they themselves did not 
have, partially by delaying marriage, extending formal education, and pro-
moting vocational training that can offer livelihood options. The “dreams 
of my mother” are, therefore, the twin dreams of acquiring an education 
and being married in a context where the union bestows greater status 
upon the woman. efforts to enlist mothers as allies in program interven-
tions are crucial to changing long-established social practices.
 The recent focus on forced and early marriage among governments, in-
ternational organizations, and funders has tended to take place at the level 
of Un resolutions, foreign policy discussions, and high-level advocacy 
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such as the Girls not Brides campaign. This chapter and the examples 
contained herein offer an important reminder that local organizations 
in Africa have been wrestling with this problem for a long time, and they 
have extensive expertise and experience in programming to address issues 
of age and consent in regard to marriage. Although it is beyond the param-
eters of this chapter to delve deeply into the sociopolitical history of each of 
the four countries discussed, the case studies offer the reader a novel view 
from the perspective of an informed funder in the area of women’s and 
children’s rights. Further, this chapter supports the thesis that low levels of 
socioeconomic development along with other social norms that are barri-
ers to the investment in girls’ human capital are decisive risk factors in early 
and forced marriage. With programs to mitigate these factors, the organi-
zations described in this chapter are engaged in promising community- 
based initiatives.
 Global Fund for Women (GFW) has been a major funder since the 
mid-1990s to African women’s organizations working to increase the age at 
first marriage in their countries. Through an analysis of the grantees’ pro-
grams, we are able to see some of the promising programs in communities— 
programs that empower girls, engage parents and community leaders, and 
try to address underlying causes of early and forced marriage such as pov-
erty and limited livelihood options for young women. These examples are 
interesting contemporary comparisons to the colonial social engineering 
projects discussed in earlier chapters of this volume. As we have seen in 
other contexts and in other time periods, legislation alone does not change 
behavior and attitudes. Further, some programs may change behavior with-
out necessarily changing minds; an example can be found in cases of direct 
transfers of school fees to schools for specific girls. This may in fact keep girls 
in school and delay the age of marriage without changing the parents’ beliefs 
about marriage, age, and consent. Other programs, however, may change 
both behavior and attitudes, such as empowerment programs through girls’ 
empowerment organizations and other peer support groups.
 I begin this chapter with a brief survey on the prevalence of early mar-
riage in sub-Saharan Africa, followed by an overview of legal frameworks 
and global campaigns that address early marriage in an attempt to curb the 
practice. next, I examine several examples of the work of grassroots wom-
en’s organizations in Benin, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and the Democratic 
republic of congo (Drc) that are working at multiple levels to address the 
complex factors that combine to perpetuate the practice. I end the chapter 
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with a range of recommendations directed at government, donors, civil 
society, and families to reflect on their potential roles to make sustainable 
contributions that would enable strong economies to emerge—economies 
in which young girls can reach their potential, consider complementary 
life choices, protect their health, delay the age of marriage, and form 
healthy families as adult women. I invite practitioners and advocates for 
child rights to focus more significant attention on the structural factors 
that cause deep inequalities and chronic poverty in communities, thereby 
limiting economic options. In these settings, such as northern nigeria (as 
discussed by Judith-Ann Walker in the previous chapter), child marriage 
continues to be the most pronounced.
earLy and Forced Marriage in aFrica
Sub-Saharan Africa has the second-highest rate of early and forced mar-
riage in the world, and more than one-third of girls in this region are 
married before they reach eighteen.2 Some countries in Africa are among 
those with the highest proportion of early marriage in the world, includ-
ing Burkina Faso, niger, chad, Mali, Guinea, central African republic, 
Mozambique, and Malawi. In the countries where the rate of early and 
forced marriage exceeds 70 percent—niger, chad, and Mali—adolescent 
fertility and maternal mortality rates are also very high. (See table 11.1.)
Table 11.1   countries with the highest ProPortion oF girLs 
ages 15 to 19 who Married beFore age 15 (M)  and ProPortion 
who gave birth beFore age 15 (b) ,  oF those with surveys
  M (%)  b (%)  M (%)  b (%)
Sub-Saharan Africa                                       South Asia
1998 niger 27 4 2004 Bangladesh 26 6
1999 Guinea 20 7 1999 India 14 2
2001 Mali 19 5 2001 nepal   9 0
2004 chad 18 6 Afghanistan Probably high
2003 nigeria 16 3   
1995 central African rep. 16 4 Central America
2000 ethiopia 14 1 2002 Dominican republic 10 3
2001 Mauritania 13 3 2001 nicaragua   9 2
Source: Demographic and health Surveys, USAID DhS Program, available at http://www 
.measuredhs.com, STATcompiler.
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 numerous research studies suggest there is a strong correlation be-
tween additional education for girls and a delayed age of marriage.3 In fact, 
this variable seems to be the strongest factor distinguishing rates of early 
marriage in developing versus developed regions, as sub-Saharan Africa 
and Asia lag behind north America and europe in girls’ educational at-
tainment. Urbanization and expanded roles for women are additional 
factors that enable this shift to occur in a sustainable manner.4 Gordon 
Dahl documents the socioeconomic developments that compelled the law 
in the United States to evolve from allowing marriage at age twelve for 
girls before the twentieth century to increasing it to the ages of fifteen to 
twenty-one in the early twentieth century.5 Dahl argues that the combi-
nation of compulsory education, marriage laws, and labor laws played a 
role in decreasing early marriage prevalence rates. As the country grew 
economically, women had more employment options. The United na-
tions Population Fund (UnFPA) documents that though the prevalence 
of early marriage in Africa has not changed dramatically since the mid-
2000s, countries such as cameroon, Zimbabwe, ethiopia, and Tanzania 
have witnessed marked declines—but with significant variations between 
urban and rural areas.6
norMs on earLy Marriage
Scholars of marriage as an institution must recognize both the statutory 
and the customary norms regulating marriage. Particularly in sub- 
Saharan Africa, marriage holds significant importance and bestows sta-
tus on women. not being married is a stigma in some respects: a never- 
married woman stands out in societies where the family structure is deeply 
revered.7 Statutory norms about marriage emerged with the colonial pe-
riod but have collided with customary norms, some of which have their 
origins in strong traditions that govern human behavior across the African 
continent, and which were later influenced by colonial administrations.8 
A number of contributors to this volume discuss the conflicting concepts 
of personhood, subjectivity, and responsibility found in colonial and cus-
tomary ideologies of consent, as well as contemporary local and interna-
tional norms. Over time, as statutory norms have increasingly evolved to 
raise the minimum age of marriage, customary norms, by contrast, some-
times allow girls to marry while still adolescents. The section that follows 
provides an overview of legal frameworks on marriage at international, 
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national, and customary levels, including descriptions of advocacy cam-
paigns that have aimed to raise the visibility of early marriage as a human 
rights violation.
International conventions relating to early Marriage
The Universal Declaration of human rights is one of the most significant 
documents, globally recognized as extending inalienable rights to all indi-
viduals—rights that supersede cultural norms and have relevance across 
all traditions. Theoretically, this declaration and the two international 
covenants that make up the International Bill of rights should protect 
girls around the world facing early marriage. Other conventions that are 
more specific to the rights of women and children include the conven-
tion on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(ceDAW), the United nations convention on the rights of the child, the 
African charter on the rights and Welfare of the child, and the African 
Union Protocol on the rights of Women in Africa. Developed to provide 
global protections and to set international and regional standards, these 
conventions appear to have little resonance in communities where eco-
nomic pressures and social norms collide to perpetuate the marriage of 
girls who are fifteen to eighteen years old.
national Laws relating to early Marriage
In countries where the legal age of marriage differs by sex, the age for 
women is always lower. In Benin, cameroon, Gabon, Mali, niger, and the 
Democratic republic of congo, the legal age of marriage is eighteen for 
males and only fifteen for females. In recent years, women’s rights coali-
tions have worked to reform the family legislation that regulates many so-
cial relations, including marriage. Mali failed to reform its Family code in 
2009 in the face of massive conservative protest, only to pass a regressive 
version in 2012. The Drc continues its efforts to harmonize its discrimina-
tory Family Law with the more progressive 2006 Sexual violence Law, but 
enforcement remains problematic. And it is premature to appreciate the 
impact of the promising children’s Law of Liberia, enacted early in 2012. 
nevertheless, the introduction of national laws is vital to demonstrate that 
states recognize the need to regulate certain aspects of social behavior. 
It often takes years for pressure groups to succeed in their campaigns to 
pass laws, particularly those on the rights of women and girls, and there 
are many lessons to learn regarding the complexity of strategies employed 
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over the years to bring the concerns of women onto the national stage. 
even with national laws regulating the age of marriage, social practices 
often disregard these legal requirements, and enforcement remains elusive.
customary norms relating to early Marriage
customary norms, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, place a heavy em-
phasis on marriage as a woman’s ultimate destiny, but more significantly, 
they recognize the family as the most “important institution.”9 Though girls 
themselves may dream of establishing a family and having children via 
marriage, the pressure for early marriage is exerted by elders. Such elders 
usually express a desire to preserve certain values by promoting marriage 
when a girl reaches fourteen or fifteen. These values include a desire to 
maintain the family honor by assuring that pregnancies do not take place 
outside of marriage.10 This proclivity to “protect” girls by placing them in 
marriages is a strong one, particularly in settings where young people have 
few life options and where economic constraints do not enable parents 
to afford to pay school fees for their children, as in the northern states of 
nigeria, discussed by Judith-Ann Walker, or in the Gambia, as analyzed by 
Bala Saho. In many African settings, the choice is to educate boy children 
and to assure that daughters get married.11
 Strategies to curb early marriage must address the fact that in such cul-
tures, marriage has a higher priority than the education of girls. how does 
one present alternatives that offer girls and communities choices for their 
future? An additional factor that is common in communities where early 
marriage is prevalent is women’s economic dependence on male partners. 
In contexts where marriage enables economic security and family stability, 
early marriage becomes an incentive to mitigate poverty for current and 
future generations.12 This reality makes the enforcement of legal statutes 
on the age of consent for marriage challenging. In fact, exceptions to legal 
statutes are often made for religious laws or customary practices.
 even without the parallel systems, laws regulating minimum age at 
marriage may be ignored or avoided. In many African settings, it is the 
traditional ceremony that formalizes a union and that holds the most 
importance. couples almost always participate in a traditional mar-
riage ceremony, and they may or may not register with civil authorities.13 
Furthermore, the lack of state services (especially in rural areas) or the 
minimal influence of formal state services assures that traditional norms 
persist. Indeed, the power of traditional norms over the state must not be 
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underestimated. elected leaders across the African continent thus often 
hesitate to interfere with traditional practices.
US Advocacy
Building on the existence of international conventions, significant advo-
cacy efforts are under way to end early marriage. US legislation signed into 
law on March 7, 2013, renews and strengthens an almost twenty-year-old 
law designed to prevent and respond to violence against women—the vi-
olence Against Women Act (vAWA). however, the 2013 version reaches 
beyond the American population to the world community in an attempt 
to prevent the marriage of children under eighteen. The new provisions 
of vAWA compel the secretary of state to develop and implement a plan 
to prevent child marriage, promote empowerment of girls at risk of early 
marriage, and target countries where a high prevalence of child marriage 
is known to occur. Advocacy groups such as the center for health and 
Gender equity (chAnGe) applaud vAWA as it mainstreams ending vi-
olence against women best practices into all foreign assistance programs 
and clearly defines early marriage as a form of violence.14 Unfortunately, 
a separate bill uniquely identified to end child marriage overseas died in 
committee.15 Other countries, including canada, have added child, early, 
and forced marriages as priorities in their foreign policy portfolios.
Un Advocacy
In 2012, the United nations launched a global campaign to abolish child 
marriages. Led by the UnFPA, the launch also marked the first Interna-
tional Day of the Girl child—October 11—as designated by the General 
Assembly in order “to recognize girls’ rights and highlight the unique 
challenges girls face around the world.”16 A unique way to engage par-
ticipation around the world was to set up the virtual Girls’ Summit—by 
which girls’ empowerment groups around the world could organize their 
own activities and share them online globally.17 Of note is the elaboration 
of the Girl Declaration—a declaration drafted by girls around the world, 
with the support of twenty-five development organizations, to give input 
into the next iteration of the Millennium Development Goals, with the 
intent to prioritize girls’ human rights. Another strategy is the 11 Days 
of Action—a commemoration of the International Day of the Girl child 




Girls not Brides is a global partnership founded in 2011 to end child mar-
riage, bringing together governments, multilateral organizations, and 
nongovernmental organizations (nGOs) that work to tackle child mar-
riage at the grassroots, national, and global levels.18 Girls not Brides now 
has over three hundred members across more than fifty countries, devoted 
to leveraging research, public education, advocacy, and community mo-
bilization to create public conversations about child marriage as a human 
rights violation. Innovative strategies are included in the campaign, such 
as inviting girls to write about their future aspirations, asking them to in-
terview their mothers about their experiences as adolescent brides, or fo-
cusing on families by extolling the benefits of supporting a girl through 
her secondary education. Girls not Brides has a heavy online presence 
and has engaged high-profile sponsors such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu 
and several heads of states. In partnership with the campaign, the Ford 
Foundation has pledged $25 million over five years for interventions in 
India, nigeria, egypt, central America, and broader West Africa.19 The 
aims of these global initiatives are encouraging, but they must link with 
the change efforts grounded in communities through the initiative of local 
women’s groups. The next section will explore this level of work, which is 
most closely linked to girls facing early marriage.
earLy Marriage and girLs’  heaLth
According to the International Women’s health coalition, child marriage 
is the major cause worldwide of pregnancies before age fifteen. In most de-
veloping countries, 90 percent of girls who give birth before age eighteen 
are married. Because the bodies of young brides (bone structure, pelvis, 
and reproductive organs) are not yet fully developed, girls who are four-
teen and younger run a very high risk of complications in pregnancy and 
childbirth compared with older adolescents.20 Prolonged and obstructed 
labor, which is common among pregnant young adolescents, can lead to 
hemorrhage, severe infection, and maternal death. Those who survive 
may suffer from obstetric fistulas, which cause chronic incontinence; as an 
example, the Fistula hospital in Addis Ababa, ethiopia, operates on twelve 
hundred girls per year to correct fistulas.21 Girls who give birth between 
the ages of fifteen and nineteen are twice as likely to die from pregnancy 
and birth-related causes than women in their twenties, and for girls under 
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the age of fifteen, the risk is five times higher.22 In fact, according to the 
International center for research on Women, pregnancy is the top cause 
of death for females between fifteen and nineteen.23 One may well ask why 
early marriages continue to persist in the face of this reality.
dreaMs oF My Mother
Women’s rights organizations have engaged thoughtfully with customary 
leaders and influential community members to exert pressure toward pre-
venting early marriage. economic deprivation on the continent, the lack 
of economic opportunities for women, and the reality of paying fees for 
secondary school often combine to cause families to sacrifice girls’ edu-
cation in exchange for the perceived economic security of marriage. As 
educational opportunities have increased across the African continent, 
parents have recognized the livelihood options available to girls with an 
education. Yet even though mothers dream of giving their daughters a 
better life than they have had, the pressures for marriage often compete 
with access to education. Furthermore, the considerable prevalence of 
pregnancies among female students provokes a high rate of school aban-
donment and limited livelihood options as a result. Indeed, school is not 
always a safe environment for teenaged girls. 
 nevertheless, the following examples of intervention program suc-
cesses are worth noting as ways to decrease factors that have led to gen-
erations of feminized poverty across Africa. I would recommend that 
these community-based initiatives be integrated into the broader regional 
and global campaigns that have gained stronger profiles and seek to bring 
about transformation in the everyday lives of girls.
Burkina Faso
Many families in Burkina Faso pay for their sons to study but believe that 
the consequences of not educating a daughter are not serious, given her 
assumed role as a mother-to-be and not someone who will be involved in 
substantive roles outside the home. In fact, girls are taken out of school 
to provide labor on family farms, contributing to the reality that only 
about 13 percent of girls enroll in secondary school. early marriage is the 
norm for over half of Burkinabé adolescent girls.24 The majority of mar-
riages across the country are polygynous unions. Interestingly, Burkina 
Faso has progressive laws on marriage rights, women’s land rights, and 
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criminalization of violence against women. It is also a ceDAW signatory. 
The government has established structures such as the Women’s Bureau 
to ensure women’s development, and the country has a gender policy 
to express a high priority for gender equality. Yet these measures fail to 
bring women and girls out of their current status of marginalization and 
subordination, including vulnerability to early marriage. These laws have 
also not translated into significant changes in attitudes and practices that 
can make a difference in women’s everyday experiences.
 Across the country, 85 percent of the population is engaged in sub-
sistence agriculture as the primary economic activity. Women do not 
own or inherit land but instead are permitted to till land belonging to 
male relatives. Women produce crops for household consumption, in a 
region that is susceptible to recurrent drought and famine. Growing food 
is therefore about survival, and women are beholden to male relatives for 
the land on which to grow the food they eat. Burkinabé women’s lack of 
secure access to land, capital, and state services, along with their low liter-
acy rates, continue to fuel the feminization of poverty and undermine the 
realization of women’s rights. When families are worried about survival, 
a girl’s education takes a back seat to economic security, such as that ex-
pected within marriage.
 One of the earliest key platforms that emerged to encourage stake-
holders to address the negative consequences of early marriage in Burkina 
Faso was the Forum on Marriage and the rights of Women and Girls, 
held in 1998. One outcome of this forum was the Ouagadougou Declara-
tion on early and Forced Marriage, signed by Burkina Faso, Ghana, the 
Gambia, Mali, nigeria, and Sudan in 2003. This declaration calls upon Af-
rican governments to end child marriage. The host organization for this 
initiative was the Foundation for Women’s health, research and Devel-
opment—FOrWArD—an African diaspora women’s charity registered in 
the United Kingdom. FOrWArD was formed in 1983 to advance sexual 
and reproductive health and rights, particularly in regard to female geni-
tal mutilation (FGM). In 2003, it incorporated other issues allied to FGM, 
especially fistulas and child and forced marriage. FOrWArD was instru-
mental in launching the Forum on Marriage and the rights of Women 
and Girls in november 1998, to share research and program work on 
forced and early marriage. Through a global network, the forum aims to 
promote best practices and develop common strategies. FOrWArD has 
programs in several African countries to address violations of the rights of 
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girls and contributors to child marriage. In northern nigeria, it has estab-
lished clinics to treat girls and women with obstetric fistulas, and it runs 
income-generating projects and other initiatives to improve their social 
and economic status. Lessons learned from this program have highlighted 
the importance of a holistic approach to addressing child marriage, neces-
sitating integrated education, health, economic, and participatory com-
munity development efforts.25
 In 1998, the group Pugsada, a Global Fund for Women grant recipient, 
launched its “support centers for girl brides” in Burkina Faso. As a local 
nGO, Pugsada works with three catholic religious centers that shelter 
girls who have run away from forced or early marriages. Pugsada, in con-
junction with the centers, provides the girls with vocational training and 
mediates between the girls and their families. The engagement with moth-
ers is key, as they can become stronger advocates to protect the rights and 
dreams of their daughters.
 Association Dawla Séno was established in Dori, Burkina Faso, in 1992 
to increase rural women’s economic development, civic participation, and 
literacy rates. Its activities also aim to eliminate gender-based violence and 
harmful traditional practices such as FGM and early marriage. The group 
provides literacy classes in French and local languages via ten literacy cen-
ters; workshops in improved animal husbandry, agricultural methods, and 
health; and microcredit for women entrepreneurs.
 Association Dawla Séno works in Burkina Faso’s northeastern Sahel 
region where desertification, conservative cultural norms, and lack of in-
frastructure combine to leave few options for the empowerment of women 
and girls. As of 2011, Dawla Séno has provided over eight hundred women 
with literacy training, and it has supported a cadre of its members to be-
come certified literacy trainers. The group received GFW support in 2001 
and 2002 to finance its literacy classes and seed its microcredit program. 
It also received GFW funding in 2009 for literacy classes and reproductive 
health campaigns in fifty-three villages. Over 92 percent of students grad-
uate from the class. Dawla Séno received renewal funding to expand its 
literacy program in 2011. Its students include adolescent girls, some mar-
ried and some facing pressure to marry. Literacy skills have provided a 
tool for women to use in negotiating their rights and pursuing livelihood 
options that were previously closed to them. This development enables 
girls to dream of a life that was not available to their mothers—a new life 
where economic dependence does not drive one into early marriage.
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 The Association pour la Promotion Féminine de Gaoua (APFG) was 
created in 1990 and works in seventy villages in southwestern Burkina Faso. 
With four hundred members, its overall objective is to combat ignorance, 
economic dependence, and female subjugation. APFG’s work has made a 
significant dent in the areas of women’s access to land, enhancing food se-
curity, expanding women’s citizenship rights by accessing administrative 
documents such as identification cards and marriage certificates, and re-
ducing female genital mutilation. It has also created a women’s leadership 
forum to lobby for gender-sensitive practices in customary and civil law.
 APFG brings together chiefs, circumcisers, religious leaders, local au-
thorities, and nGOs to develop strategies to end harmful practices. This 
strategy is critical in a context where the Burkinabé fiercely hold on to 
their traditions, even if they discriminate against women. APFG broad-
casts radio programs and performs community theater to raise awareness 
on human rights issues and highlight the negative implications of certain 
customary practices on women. It combats early marriage, widowhood 
rites, and wife inheritance, and with the help of eighty paralegals, it en-
sures that women have a thorough understanding of legal instruments 
such as the Burkinabé Family code. To expand livelihood options for 
women, it conducts training in business management skills and provides 
support and loans for the implementation of business projects, such as the 
soap-making business where women transform shea butter into various 
skin care products. APFG also runs an Internet café and provides train-
ing and subsidized equipment to enhance farming and animal husbandry 
and to promote food security, including via composting. It also negoti-
ates for farmland to enable rural women to plant a range of vegetables. 
With recent GFW funding, APFG has undertaken food security programs 
and trained fifty community-based organization leaders who then be-
come community trainers on women’s rights, family planning, and ending 
early marriage. With this range of program offerings, young women can 
acquire skills that lessen their dependence on men, thereby giving them 
some leverage to use in resisting early marriage. APFG has become very 
influential in its community, enabling women to turn into advocates for 
their daughters, and creating opportunities for women to earn income to 
pay for their daughters’ education.
 L’Association KOOM pour l’Auto Promotion des Femmes du Burkina 
(AKAFeM/BF) was established in Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso, in 1999 to 
promote rural women’s empowerment, enhance hIv/AIDS awareness, 
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and eliminate female illiteracy. With a membership of over three thousand 
rural women spread over four provinces, AKAFeM/BF provides business 
development training for women, organizes campaigns against harmful 
traditional practices such as forced marriage and FGM, and mobilizes 
communities for reforestation campaigns. It also engages in policy advo-
cacy for women’s empowerment.
 Accomplishments of the group include providing over fourteen thou-
sand women with literacy training and/or skills training; promoting ado-
lescent girls’ access to education; and organizing comprehensive advocacy 
campaigns on harmful traditional practices, hIv/AIDS, women’s repro-
ductive health, gender-based violence, and women’s civic rights. In 2008, 
the group received GFW funding to support the building of its first lit-
eracy center, which also serves as a community center to conduct work-
shops, and to organize conferences and meetings. The center also serves 
as a space to provide vocational trainings to school dropouts and girls 
fleeing forced marriages. In 2010, AKAFeM/BF received renewal funding 
to promote women’s citizenship rights via assisting two thousand women 
to obtain national identification cards and marriage licenses; organize 
a community civil marriage for rural women; and cover administrative 
costs. civil marriages lead to rights for children and opportunities for 
schooling, including possibilities for girls to develop their potential by de-
laying marriage. In essence, Association KOOM’s programs enable girls to 
expand their horizons and explore other options besides marriage.
 Burkina Faso ranks among the world’s poorest countries (173 out of 
175 on the United nation’s human Development Index). Few women have 
birth certificates or marriage certificates, and few obtain birth certificates 
for their children. consequently, women remain outside the reach of pub-
lic services, their children cannot attend school, and they are excluded 
from electoral processes. AKAFeM/BF provides literacy training and ob-
tains formal identification for women, which enhances their citizenship 
rights, allows greater access to social services, and protects them from los-
ing their inheritance upon becoming widows. Widowhood without inher-
itance represents another risk for women, whose female children are the 
first to be taken out of school and become susceptible to early marriage.
 Lastly, it is important to note interventions undertaken by multi-
lateral partners. These include the UnFPA and United nations children’s 
Fund (UnIceF) campaign from 2008 to 2011, with the Ministry of Social 
Affairs and national Solidarity. That campaign leveraged $1.6 million in 
282 muADi mukenge
twenty-four villages, targeting girls from the ages of twelve to nineteen 
in an intervention called “eliminating child Marriage in BF: A Plan for 
Protection, empowerment and community Action”—a multisectoral 
approach to social change. The campaign goals were to build a culture 
of human rights and respect for women rights via engagement with one 
hundred community leaders; to give 50 percent of girls the opportunity to 
stay in school or access economic resources; and to offer peer education 
and vocational training for married adolescent girls and improve maternal 
health services. At the end of three years, the initiative realized the follow-
ing outcomes: (1) it trained leaders and reached two hundred thousand 
via film screenings, drama, and radio to create enabling environments; (2) 
it supported five hundred at-risk girls with school fees and employment 
(thirteen literacy centers were built); and (3) it created a support network 
of “mother educators” for married adolescent girls and improved maternal 
health services.26 These outcomes are significant, given the desire to space 
the future deliveries of first-time mothers such that they can develop other 
capacities and not put their health or the health of a newborn at risk by 
another birth while the mother is still an adolescent.
 Because this chapter makes reference to structural reforms as pivotal 
factors in reducing early marriage in Burkina Faso, it is worth mention-
ing that the country’s recent national development strategy, the Strategy 
for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development 2011–15 (ScADD), 
includes promising focus areas such as diversifying the economy, intensi-
fying cotton exports, and increasing budget allocations in priority sectors 
such as health and education. Added to the community-based interven-
tions described earlier, it is hoped that an analysis of early marriage in the 
next decade would yield favorable trends due to an enabling environment 
for a strong economy and social development options that can create 
opportunities for girls.27
Benin
According to UnIceF, about 50 percent of girls in Benin enroll in primary 
school, and only 11 percent continue on to secondary school. It is therefore 
not surprising that only 30 percent of Beninese women ages fifteen and 
older are literate.28 Women’s rights groups report that a considerable num-
ber of girls choose to drop out of school because they are sexually harassed 
by teachers and are unaware of ways in which to address this violence. 
Women’s rights groups have succeeded in drafting a family code that could 
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improve the status of women and children under the law. however, it has 
not been enforced. As sexual harassment perpetuates truancy and drop-
ping out, it makes female school-leavers vulnerable to early marriage.
 The Beninese nGO SIn-DO works in rural communities to promote 
women’s rights, improve women’s literacy, build the entrepreneurial skills 
of women, and facilitate access to financial resources for poor women. It 
defends the rights of the girl child through its antitrafficking program and 
sexual harassment prevention initiative in schools.
 Over the course of a decade, SIn-DO received GFW support to grad-
ually develop an initiative that combines women’s literacy and economic 
empowerment with girls’ education. Over several years, SIn-DO under-
took a GFW-funded grant supporting women’s literacy and microfinance 
and girls’ education. The first phase of the latter component included pay-
ment of school fees and produced results such as boosting the rate of girls’ 
enrollment from 31 percent to 39 percent, decreasing the dropout rate from 
51 percent to 21 percent, and increasing girls’ passing rate from 55 per-
cent to 78 percent. In the second phase, beginning in 2004, GFW awarded 
SIn-DO a larger grant to conduct a comprehensive initiative addressing 
sexual harassment in two pilot schools by developing preventive and pu-
nitive measures to protect the psychological and physical well-being of 
girls. The grant enabled the documentation of cases of violence, as well as 
the formation of girls’ clubs designed to build self-confidence and knowl-
edge in human rights and reproductive health. A committee at the com-
munity level brought attention to cases of gender violence, including early 
marriage, rape, and child kidnapping. The advocacy strategy included 
radio programs and meetings with police, elected officials, courts, school 
officials, and local chiefs.
 SIn-DO received a final grant of $25,000 in 2009 to expand the sexual 
harassment initiative to eight schools and challenge a pervasive climate of 
abuse against girls. The program aimed to implement a 2006 law criminaliz-
ing sexual harassment and to raise awareness about its existence in rural 
communities. The group was able to obtain important results in girls’ en-
rollment between 2000 and 2009 in six of twelve districts of the country. 
results revealed that
1. More than 2,000 girls were supported with school fees via credit 
extension to 1,351 women (a total of 8,022 girls were reached via 
awareness workshops, girls’ clubs, school fees, and other assistance);
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2. In some districts of the project, primary school graduation rates 
climbed from 45 percent to 79 percent over six years;
3. More than 400 teachers were trained on preventing gender 
violence;
4. There was a fivefold increase in girls’ reporting of sexual 
harassment in some districts; and
5. Local governments now contribute financially to girls’ empower-
ment via offering girls’ scholarships and summer classes for girls.
There is more work to be done, but these strategies are important to fur-
ther develop girls’ intellectual capacity and stem the pressure to “protect” 
them via early marriage. The initiative also demonstrated to the commu-
nity that, with the appropriate support and enabling environment, girls 
can succeed academically on an equal level with boys and have additional 
life possibilities outside of marriage. Such improvements develop life skills 
and lessen female dependence on males, while also decreasing rates of 
early marriage. The country case studies cited earlier are informed by 
grantees’ self-reporting and communications with GFW staff. however, 
GFW commissioned a formal evaluation of SIn-DO by an external evalu-
ator, who presented the detailed analysis shared here.
Democratic republic of congo
In a country where 50 percent of young people do not attend school, it is 
not surprising that a high rate of early marriage exists. Poor school enroll-
ment is a direct consequence of congo’s protracted war, and some local 
traditions have encouraged early marriage as a means to avoid out-of-
wedlock pregnancies and also to affirm social ties and economic security. 
The urban areas of the congo have witnessed an increase in girls’ marriage 
age, but in rural areas, early marriages are more pronounced. As the wom-
en’s movement has evolved in the congo, women’s groups have therefore 
begun to tackle this phenomenon. Débout Fille de Fizi (Stand Up, Girls of 
Fizi [DFF]) was formed in Fizi, in eastern Democratic republic of congo, 
in 2005 to promote girls’ rights and to prevent gender-based violence and 
harmful traditional practices such as early marriage. It aims to address all 
violations facing girls in rural communities and to raise awareness of girls’ 
legal rights. DFF challenges sexual harassment in schools, forms girls’ 
clubs, and provides assistance in cases of rape within schools.
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 The group provides public education in an effort to change attitudes 
and behaviors and to enable women to overcome their subordinate status. 
It promotes girls’ education as a human right and organizes girls’ clubs 
(Girls’ Parliaments) that champion girls’ human rights. It has held aware-
ness campaigns and workshops on early marriage prevention, reproduc-
tive health, the complications associated with unsafe abortion, and the 
prevention of gender-based violence (GBv) in multiple communities, di-
rectly reaching thousands of in-school and out-of-school rural adolescent 
girls. DFF has received two GFW grants since 2009. In 2009, GFW sup-
port facilitated the establishment of girls’ clubs to combat sexual violence 
in thirteen high schools and to train seventy-eight student peer edu-
cators, who then offered regular update sessions. The Girls’ Parliaments 
are also mechanisms to support girls in the continuation of their studies 
by building self-confidence and providing career advice and leadership 
experience. A renewal grant from GFW in 2010 enabled a scaling up of 
the initiative.
 To further develop its approach, DFF received renewal support in 2012 
for its reproductive health and GBv initiative for adolescent girls in twenty 
schools, designed to break the taboo on sexuality education for adolescent 
females. Activities included training thirty adolescent peer educators on 
sexual and reproductive health and women’s rights, offering reproductive 
health and women’s rights education in schools, and organizing teachers 
and parents to train other parents. Sexuality education goes a long way in 
providing girls with tools to manage their sexuality and avoid unplanned 
pregnancies. As an unplanned pregnancy is often a precursor to early mar-
riage, this strategy is paramount. In fact, to avoid the shame that comes 
with an out-of-wedlock pregnancy, some communities in congo force the 
young couple to immediately marry. Upholding the family “honor” is a 
constant refrain when relatives discuss girls’ early entry into family life.29
Uganda
The Pastoral Women Alliance to Break cultural chains (PWABc) was 
created in 2003 in Kiboga District about 100 miles northwest of Kampala, 
Uganda. With a membership of over two thousand women organized into 
thirteen village groups, the network advocates for pastoralist women’s 
socioeconomic and political rights by reforming cultural practices and 
traditions that discriminate against women. The group works with male 
community leaders and elders to advocate for women’s rights and cultural 
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reform. It links with lawyers, law enforcement, and local government of-
fices to enhance its community education work.30
 PWABc pursues three main objectives: to increase awareness among 
pastoralist communities of women’s human rights; to enable grassroots 
women’s groups to raise their voices and demand their rights; and to influ-
ence government officials, elders, men, and policy makers to develop and 
support legislation and practices advancing pastoralist women’s rights. ex-
amples of its activities include forming ten school clubs to address human 
rights and cultural reform, training seventy-five human rights defenders 
to provide support at the community level, providing urgent assistance 
through its village Alert rescue committee to women and children need-
ing either counseling for domestic violence and hIv/AIDS or rescue from 
abduction into marriage by male suitors, offering adult literacy classes, 
performing live theater on women’s reproductive rights, and airing radio 
shows on women’s rights issues.
 With GFW support in 2006, PWABc launched its community initia-
tive to end forced marriage and other harmful traditional practices; it also 
facilitated community awareness workshops for ninety people. Similarly, 
in 2009 PWABc received a GFW renewal grant to train fifty-eight women’s 
rights paralegals, train thirteen community groups and eleven school man-
agement committees on the importance of girls’ education, produce media 
programs in local languages on the need for cultural reform, and conduct 
skills training for hIv-positive and disabled women. The strategy of em-
powering community members to become advocates for social change is a 
significant one to assure sustainability of any cultural reform process.
 PWABc received a third grant in 2011 to (1) conduct a three-day legal 
rights training session for fifty police, local authorities, church leaders, and 
youth representatives of school clubs to build an understanding of consti-
tutional law, especially around women’s rights and GBv, and (2) produce 
radio programs on women’s rights in local languages.
 Pastoral communities typically reside in dry regions of Uganda and 
regularly move around in search of water for their animals. PWABc states 
that such a lifestyle has relegated women to a status below that of valued 
animals. PWABc describes a range of practices in the local culture that 
treat women as sexual objects and violate their rights, including prevent-
ing girls from attending school and instead using them as commodities to 
exchange for cows, in order to pay the dowries that enable male children to 
marry; promoting forced and early marriage; practicing wife inheritance; 
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and denying inheritance rights for women. The training in legal rights by 
community groups such as PWABc introduces constitutional norms such 
that women have tools to defend their rights, for instance, by delaying 
marriage and by insisting on a civil marriage when they are ready to wed.
recoMMendations
An African Women’s Decade (AWD) 2010–2020 was declared by African 
governments through the African Union and aims to enforce the regional 
and global commitments on gender equality and women’s rights. In the 
AWD era, the women’s movement has several tools at its disposal to make 
a case for challenging entrenched patriarchy and to enhance the human 
rights of women and girls. The chapter has discussed the legal frameworks 
that women’s groups are seeking to leverage so that they can exercise their 
rights. here, I will briefly present additional recommendations at both the 
local and national levels to enable further structural change—change that 
will enable the dreams of mothers across Africa to become sustainable.
community-Based Initiatives
Programs by local groups reach girls who are most impacted by social 
norms that determine their future options. The contributions of wom-
en’s groups have revealed the importance of holistic, community-based, 
bottom-up approaches to ending early marriage. Women leading efforts 
from these communities know how to engage with parents and elders in 
a culturally appropriate way. Local groups have also successfully lobbied 
schools and school districts to reverse expulsions of pregnant girls. There 
is a need to expand policies that enable teen mothers to reenroll in school 
and reach their potential.
 With the cost of secondary education beyond the reach of many par-
ents in Africa, rather than pushing out-of-school adolescent girls into 
marriage the emphasis should be placed on enhancing the recruitment of 
girls into national vocational training programs. There is an opportunity 
to advocate for the funding of programs that expose girls to nontraditional 
careers that can offer them economic independence so they will not have 
to revert to marriage for economic security.
 With regard to legal options, activists can promote a greater investment 
in training paralegals who can conduct local awareness-raising programs 
on new laws that relate to social norms and human rights. Paralegals play 
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an important part in efforts to simplify complex texts and popularize them, 
and they often accompany clients who need formal legal support. however, 
practitioners and the government must develop a deeper understanding of 
the effects of harsh legal measures that may push early marriage and other 
customary practices underground. This reality has been observed with the 
punitive measures taken against FGM—measures that have driven the prac-
tice underground, sometimes pushed it across borders, and even extended it 
to babies—all of which make such practices harder to detect.
 Finally, community-based initiatives must reach mothers in order to 
build their capacity to advocate on behalf of their daughters. The SIn-DO 
case study and other programs across the continent reveal the effective-
ness of this method.
national and regional Advocacy
Positive trends at the national and regional levels and across the African 
continent create space for an enabling environment to address ending 
early marriage in strategic ways. civil society groups, including women’s 
groups, have experienced some successes in calling for citizenship rights 
for women who previously held no identification papers. Strategies that 
remove financial barriers for obtaining identification documents are very 
significant in that they are a prerequisite for accessing public services, 
including education in public schools. This leads us to another level of 
structural reform that will propel the continent to new heights, given the 
requisite political will. expanding free secondary education will liberate 
parents from having to pay school fees, much like parents in the United 
States and europe, so that they do not have to neglect schooling for their 
daughters due to a lack of funds. The current wave of state-sponsored free 
primary education is not enough for Africa to make significant develop-
ment gains and prepare the next generation for productive roles in society.
 Another recommendation to the women’s movement and other 
human rights coalitions is to take advantage of the opportunity to conduct 
advocacy with African governments to meet obligations to which they 
have signed (the African Union Protocol on the rights of Women, the 
convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, and so forth). The African Union has recently appointed a good-
will ambassador on child marriage, and the committee on the rights of 
Women has seized on the topic. The conventions contain language on the 
rights of girls and, in particular, on ending early marriage. Stimulated by 
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increasing public discussions of these issues, there is new momentum for 
the implementation of these conventions, and pressure is building to com-
pel influential actors to ally with women’s rights coalitions and enforce 
these rights. In much the same way, activists can raise the visibility of cam-
paigns such as the International Day of the Girl child and the African 
Women’s Decade to pressure governments to meet their obligations.
 I am convinced that a systemic shift is necessary in order to comple-
ment the important efforts to end child marriage. By continuing foreign 
debt forgiveness initiatives and thereby enabling state savings to be allo-
cated to free public education, this policy shift can benefit girls facing early 
marriage stemming from family poverty. The availability of free secondary 
education will present an opening for girls to pursue further studies en 
masse instead of being pulled out due to their parents’ lack of income to 
pay school fees.
 In addition, activists may conduct advocacy with donors to allocate 
a greater percentage of their annual budget to women’s rights groups in 
rural communities. The groups that champion ending child and forced 
marriage do so with very modest funding but a great deal of passion. 
Financial support to meet their institutional needs will provide critical 
resources to maintain qualified staff, conduct outreach efforts in hard-to-
reach communities, and cover communication and other operating costs. 
Donors must commit to support groups working in rural communities 
where the majority of early marriages take place.
 Finally, ending early marriage requires promoting donor support for eco-
nomic growth initiatives that benefit African communities and enable job cre-
ation that will also benefit women. Increased economic options for women 
open opportunities in the labor force that provide livelihoods for economic 
security, thereby removing a driver of early marriages in many parts of the 
continent.31 This final recommendation is an invitation for stakeholders to 
think big on supporting an enabling environment where girls can grow into 
adulthood and have meaningful educational and livelihood options.
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c h a P t e r  t w e Lv e
“To Be Taken as a Wife Is a Form of Death”
The Social, Military, and humanitarian Dynamics of Forced Marriage  
and Girl Soldiers in African conflicts, c. 1990–2010
STAceY hYnD
even though the relationship was generally framed in terms 
of bush “wife” and “husband” or even “lover,” the actual 
relationships had little in common with the notions of a 
traditional relationship between consenting adults.
—Republic of Liberia, Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission Final Report1
Forced marriages have been documented within armed groups in many 
recent African conflicts, most notably in Sierra Leone, Liberia, rwanda, 
and northern Uganda. These coercive relationships, formed without the 
valid consent of the female and her family, encompass the forcible ascrip-
tion of conjugal status and usually involve the provision by the female 
of domestic labor, sexual relations, and sometimes reproduction. These 
“marriages” are not recognized under civil or customary law. Significantly, 
the majority of these forced marriages occurring in modern African con-
flicts involve girls as so-called wives: figures for Sierra Leone’s Truth and 
reconciliation commission (Trc) indicate that 50 percent of “sexual 
slaves” with documented ages were fifteen or under; in northern Uganda 
among Joseph Kony’s Lord’s resistance Army (LrA), some 27 percent of 
abducted girls became “bush wives,” and most were between eleven and 
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seventeen years old.2 Forced marriage within modern warfare is an issue 
of children’s rights as well as women’s rights, and it is closely linked to the 
mobilization of children as combatants in African conflicts.3
 This situation is a product not only of military strategies and patterns 
of violence but also of gendered and generational tensions within Afri-
can societies. Over 120,000 children are estimated to have fought in recent 
African conflicts, and studies suggest that girls constitute some 30 to 40 
percent of these child combatants.4 Surveys indicate that 2,000 to 3,000 
girls were recruited into armed groups in Sierra Leone, and the LrA has 
abducted some 25,000 child recruits, with girls constituting around a third 
of that number.5 The figure of the child soldier has often been taken as 
evidence of the depoliticization and criminalization of modern warfare 
in Africa, of the “new barbarism” and extreme violence that apparently 
marks contemporary civil conflict.6 It is also linked to the “civilianization” 
of contemporary warfare, whereby ordinary civilians, male and female, 
have been the targets of military violence and are increasingly drawn into 
fighting themselves.7 Forced marriage, from this perspective, is part of 
the wider militarization of girls’—and women’s—lives and labors during 
contemporary conflict.8 however, “new war” theories do not accurately 
depict the logics of violence behind children’s involvement in warfare or 
the forced marriage of girls. The social, legal, and humanitarian structures 
that shape girls’ experiences of conflict and how these are reported and 
tackled on a world stage also need to be taken into account.9
 The mobilization and exploitation of children in African conflict 
emerge out of the crisis of the postcolonial state and the youth revolutions 
facing African societies.10 Marriage has proven to be a key site of social 
tension through which disenfranchised young men and women seek to 
attain adult status, on one hand, and adults look to control youth status 
and labor, on the other, with such struggles played out in war zones.11 So-
cially marginalized and vulnerable children are often the first to be drawn 
into conflict, and girls are no exception to this pattern; some enter armed 
groups after fleeing potential early marriage or domestic violence at home, 
and others are forcibly recruited as potential wives.12 Although histories 
of girls’ experiences of conflict were previously marked by “silences and 
empty spaces,” girls are now well represented in child soldier narratives.13 
Academic studies have consequently shown that girls participate in almost 
every facet of military life, with many individuals fulfilling multiple po-
sitions, sometimes simultaneously: fighters, sex slaves, mothers, porters, 
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cooks.14 Sixty percent of girls involved with fighting forces in Sierra Leone, 
for instance, acted as wives, a role that involved sexual, military, and do-
mestic labor.15 Girls’ experiences in war, however, have predominantly en-
tailed “victimisation, perpetration and insecurity,” with their bodies used 
as figurative and literal sites of combat.16 Sexual abuse and exploitation 
seem to be pervasive and nearly systematic across Africa’s conflicts—for 
both civilian and combatant girls.17 rape and sexual violence should not, 
though, be read as a material fact of women’s lives but as a “grammar of 
violence” that is shaped by particular contexts of conflict and society.18 
consequently, the questions this chapter explores regard what function 
the practice of forced marriage serves for various armed groups and in-
dividuals and how this type of marriage relates to other forms of sexual 
violence and gender inequality.
 Debates on forced marriage demonstrate the intersection of local and 
global gender norms and constructions of childhood. childhood is not 
a universal category but rather a historical and cultural construct.19 The 
twentieth century saw the imposition of middle-class Western concepts 
of childhood—which read children as innocent, nonsexual beings who 
should be protected from labor and a too rapid transition to adulthood—
onto colonial and global societies, creating new globalized notions of the 
“child,” notions that bear little resemblance to the lived realities of many 
African youths.20 Girls, in particular, are taken symbolically as the quintes-
sential victims.21 In transnational political discourses, these constructions 
of the child have served as a global disciplinary tool and moralizing prac-
tice, aiming to impose Western liberal norms on the developing world.22 
The emergence of the girl soldier is therefore a product not only of shifting 
patterns of warfare and African societies but also of liberal humanitarian-
ism and its entanglement with international political and legal discourses 
of rights. historians must question how far discourses and descriptions of 
forced marriage have changed over the past decades and how far actual 
practices have shifted. campaigns by organizations such as child Soldiers 
International, the United nations children’s Fund (UnIceF), and human 
rights Watch have pulled child combatants into the international spot-
light.23 Although these campaigns have crafted boys’ participation in physi-
cal violence into a narrative discourse that lends weight to their accounts, 
girls’ experiences of war are primarily recounted through narratives of 
sexual abuse and exploitation, foregrounding their victim status.24 Follow-
ing this focus on sexual violation, many commentators have argued that 
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girls’ abduction, exploitation, and rape comprise a form of sexual slav-
ery.25 The concept of forced marriage, which combines sexual abuse with 
domestic labor and inverts the socially desirable status of marriage and 
motherhood, presents a more complicated picture of girls’ experiences, 
highlighting the clash between local and global attitudes to girls’ sexuality 
and sexual violence.
 Testimonies drawn from Trcs, humanitarian reports, memoirs, and 
academic investigations form the main body of evidence here. Wider 
empirical research is needed on historical and contemporary patterns 
of girls’ experiences in conflict to present an accurate comparative pat-
tern of forced conjugality. nonetheless, this chapter offers a preliminary 
discussion of forced marriage and its relationship with child soldiering 
in humanitarian discourses, as well as of the rationales for its practice in 
contemporary African conflicts. Some studies have suggested that the in-
cidence of forced marriages in conflict seems to be highest in Africa—if 
this is indeed the case, then why is this so?26 Is this related to patterns of 
warfare, structural gender violence, customary patterns of marriage, and/
or histories of forced labor and slavery? Is forced marriage in conflict part 
of a wider militarization of female labor and sexuality driven by the civil-
ianization of conflict in Africa? This chapter suggests that forced marriage 
emerges from historical patterns of structural gender violence that have 
shaped generations of girls’ lives, as well as immediate military instrumen-
talities. It is molded by patriarchal desires to control girls’ (and women’s) 
bodies to impose a certain version of social order; further, it is a tactic 
geared toward military survival and victory.
LegaL and huManitarian discourses oF Forced 
Marriage in conFLict
The prosecution of gendered and sexual offenses as war crimes or crimes 
against humanity is a recent development in international humanitarian 
law, with the 1998 Akayesu case at the International criminal Tribunal for 
rwanda establishing the first conviction for rape as a war crime.27 Driven 
by a growing focus on women’s victimhood in civil war, charges of sex-
ual slavery and forced marriage have increasingly appeared in lists of war 
crimes.28 In 2001, the International criminal Tribunal for the Former Yu-
goslavia became the first court to recognize forced marriage as a prosecut-
able crime in armed conflict.29 Within Africa, the Special court for Sierra 
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Leone recognized forced marriage as a crime against humanity in the 
2004 Armed Forces revolutionary council (AFrc) case, as described in 
Mariane Ferme’s chapter in this volume. however, the focus has been on 
the gendered dimensions of these crimes, and their relationship to child 
combatant experience is yet to be rigorously explored. Outside the legal 
arena, the systematic analysis of forced marriage has been slow to emerge. 
The 1996 report on children in armed conflict prepared by Graça Machel 
for the United nations, a foundation text in the study of children in con-
temporary warfare, investigated sexual exploitation and gender-based 
violence. But its primary focus was on rape, prostitution, and sexual ex-
ploitation during war and in refugee camps and disarmament, demobi-
lization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDrr) camps rather than on 
sexual abuse within armed groups.30 There was no explicit discussion of 
forced marriage or sexual slavery apart from a passing reference to “bush 
wives,” which is perhaps surprising considering that field visits for the re-
port included Angola, Sierra Leone, and rwanda.31 nonetheless, there was 
sufficient international concern about the abuse of girls in coerced rela-
tionships that forced marriage was explicitly detailed in the definition of 
child soldier outlined by the 1997 cape Town Principles:
[A child soldier is] any person under 18 years of age who is part of 
any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any 
capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers, 
and those accompanying such groups, other than purely as family 
members. It includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced 
marriage.32 (my emphasis)
 This shift in the late 1990s was driven by a confluence of emerging 
concerns about child rights, child soldiering, women’s rights, and sex-
ual violence in international political, humanitarian, and human rights 
discourses, alongside the aforementioned developments in international 
humanitarian law and the prosecution of gendered war crimes. Graça 
Machel’s 2000 review on children in armed conflict notably engages more 
explicitly with questions of forced marriage than its predecessor had, and 
a growing number of humanitarian and feminist studies have highlighted 
sexual violence and forced conjugality in Africa’s wars.33 But despite these 
discussions, forced marriage and sexual slavery have, until recently, been 
surprisingly sparsely reported in general accounts of conflict, and most 
frequently they are referenced as symbolic markers of the “barbarity” of 
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African conflict rather than analyzed in detail. Part of the problem is the 
compartmentalization of humanitarian discourses and campaigns—one 
recent report on forced marriage and gender inequality in postconflict 
South Sudan barely mentions the country’s long-running civil war and its 
impact on gender relations and incidences of sexual violence.34 The issue 
of forced marriage also presents a complexity that existing humanitarian 
and legal narratives struggle to account for effectively. As this volume ar-
gues, existing legal debates have focused on whether these offenses are 
better prosecuted under existing crimes against humanity such as sexual 
slavery or under a new heading such as forced marriage, without fully 
analyzing the experiential differences encompassed within these terms.35 
Moreover, international humanitarian norms and postconflict recon-
struction are both highly gendered and based around an idea of conjugal 
order that seeks to return girls and women to the “correct” spaces and 
family structures based on liberal norms. In such structures, marriage is 
supposed to be the solution to girls (re)integration into society, not the 
problem.36 Forced marriage corrupts and perverts the social institution 
of marriage, creating a form of conjugal disorder that threatens society. 
Although international humanitarian discourses have brought the issue of 
forced marriage to a global audience, there is much that still needs to be 
done to contextualize and facilitate understanding of the rationales under-
pinning this practice, as well as the wide variety of girls’ experiences that 
have been categorized under this heading.
Forced Marriage and the Logics oF v ioLence
In order to combat forced marriage effectively, we must analyze it as a 
social and military, as well as legal, category. It has been suggested that 
the militarization of girls’ labor and sexuality can be read as part of the 
civilianization of contemporary conflict. But women have always played 
a significant role in African warfare, as victims, fighters, logistical sup-
port, and commentators.37 With conceptions of marriage, consent, gender 
roles, and women’s rights shifting over time, it is difficult to trace histor-
ically the category of forced marriage. Yet as Sierra Leonean legal expert 
Joko Smart notes, “There was, in the olden days, marriage by capture. . . . 
Such a wife was, however, regarded as a slave.”38 early colonial militaries 
also awarded captured women as wives to their African soldiers, including 
forces in Sudan, Uganda, and the congo Free State.39 Forced marriage is 
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not simply a tactic of barbaric new wars; rather, it is a result of particular 
“logics and modalities of violence,” with contemporary conflict bearing 
striking similarities to precolonial patterns of total economic warfare in 
terms of its appropriation and exploitation of female labor and bodies.40
 Forced marriage is neither a straightforward form of sexual violence 
nor a substitute for rape: some groups, such as the revolutionary United 
Front (rUF) of Sierra Leone, used mass and gang rape as well as forced 
marriage, whereas others, such as the LrA, do not systematically use rape 
as a military weapon against their opponents.41 The institution of forced 
marriage is about power, the enforcement of masculine control, and the 
logics of violence within an armed group rather than simply about sex. 
In some conflicts, the evidence suggests there is an instrumental use of 
forced marriage by senior commanders and leaders of armed groups. 
Forced marriage appears to function as a tactic of warfare to terrorize pop-
ulations, maintain discipline, and secure the necessary labor and logisti-
cal support to sustain the war effort, especially for nonregularized, mobile 
forces. As well as tearing apart local communities, the abduction and forc-
ible marriage of young girls also quickly increases the numerical strength 
of an armed group, as girls tend to be more vulnerable and less able to 
escape after abduction.42 In Angola alone, some thirty thousand girls may 
have been abducted during the civil war.43 The rUF notably increased its 
coercive recruitment of so-called wives after it was nearly wiped out in 
1993.44 According to Zoe Marks, within the rUF marriage was promoted 
as an antidote to the destabilizing effects of mass and gang rape on the 
armed group: “marriage” allowed men a socially legitimate form of sexual 
access, at least in the eyes of the rUF, and aimed to prevent competition 
between fighters for women.45
 In northern Uganda, forced marriages have been an integral aspect of 
Joseph Kony’s attempts to discipline and develop the LrA, described as an 
effective tool for building control and discipline in an “ideologically com-
mitted (essentially charismatic) armed force.”46 Analysis of the group sug-
gests that coerced relationships have been highly regulated and controlled 
by the LrA’s top leadership, with senior commanders selecting wives for 
themselves based on their physical and educational attributes, drawing on 
cultural norms that encouraged polygamy by powerful men as a marker of 
high status. commanders have then dictated the “marriage” of remaining 
girls to lower-ranking fighters.47 The LrA is a highly mobile force that can-
not rely on popular support from within its locales.48 Thus, discipline was 
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essential to the operation of mobile units, and it was maintained through 
the screening and socialization of recruits, harsh punishments, strict codes 
of behavior, and a puritanical creed. The centralized distribution of wives 
assisted discipline by acting as a system of privilege and remuneration 
within the group.49 Wives were distributed as compensation and status 
markers for soldiers in the absence of material goods, and families were 
fabricated to create bonds among soldiers while fostering dependence on 
the LrA.50 children born of these relationships would then themselves 
become fighters for the group. On a more prosaic level, the recruitment of 
wives facilitated the provision of essential logistical support and domestic 
services, such as porterage, locating food and water, and cooking, to keep 
the group functioning. The selection of sexually inexperienced adolescent 
girls and “virgins” also served the purpose of limiting the transmission of 
sexually transmitted diseases, which became a concern after a number of 
senior commanders died of hIv/AIDS.51
 In addition to immediate military instrumentalities, the political econ-
omy of forced marriage must also be considered. With historical struc-
tures of child labor, domestic slavery, and forced/coerced labor in many 
areas of Africa, both gender dynamics and labor patterns can predispose 
armed groups toward the use of sexual slavery and forced marriage.52 As 
Meredith Turshen argues, the “control of women’s productive labor is one 
of the gains from rape and abduction in civil conflicts,” not just for the 
armed group but also for the individual “husbands” involved.53 Young men 
who are unable to pay bridewealth and find legal marriage partners may 
also be attracted to insurgency as a way of gaining access to women. re-
cent research from Sierra Leone has highlighted that “woman damage” 
(adultery) became a divisive issue in agrarian communities in the years 
preceding the conflict. Poorer young men who were unable to enter into 
formal marriage contracts, due to an inability to pay bridewealth or be-
cause polygyny limited the availability of girls, would often enter into “girl 
friend” relationships with the young wives of elder men. The elder in such 
an arrangement would then demand labor from the paramour; if this was 
not paid, he would take the paramour to court and sue for “woman dam-
age.” In this context, the rUF’s practice of forced marriage offered young 
men a new source of marriage partners, allowing them “to break free from 
a restrictive customary institution.”54
 During the rwandan genocide in 1994, thousands of Tutsi girls en-
dured forced marriages to Interahamwe members. A 1996 human rights 
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Watch report described these girls not as wives but as “captives, looted 
possessions of the militiamen, held in slavery.”55 In some instances, rwan-
dan militias used these forced relationships to disguise rape as sanctioned 
intercourse between husband and wife; the purported marriage was then 
used to legitimate the seizure of land, which was a significant point of 
tension during rwanda’s civil war due to the high population density.56 
A wife’s labor, however, varied according to her status and where she was 
held. Though some females were forced to farm and cook, others were 
“women of the ceiling” and were hidden to avoid being targeted by other 
hutu génocidaires (persons who committed genocide) and to provide 
sexual services for their captors. One girl, “nadia,” who was eleven years 
old at the time of the rwandan genocide, recounted how her family was 
hacked to pieces in front of her before she was taken as a wife by one of 
the militiamen. “he only came to rape me, he never brought any food. 
he came about five times. he would say, ‘lie down or I’ll kill you.’ So I 
was afraid. I would just go to the bed.”57 For many wives in rwanda, the 
relatively short duration and the static nature of these marriages limited 
the domestic services entailed and meant that sexual violence dominated 
their experiences. In other testimonies from former bush wives, the inter-
connection of their sexual and domestic labors is clear. Grace Akallo, one 
of the 139 Aboke schoolgirls infamously abducted by the LrA in October 
1996, recalls in her memoirs how Kony gave her to one of his commanders, 
“a man older than my father. his eyes were so hard that my sweat made 
a pool. he seized me and forced me to bed. I felt like a thorn was in my 
skin as my innocence was destroyed.”58 But Grace’s account of her captivity 
appears to suggest that what affected her at least as severely at the time was 
the physical hardship she experienced in marching, going on raids, and 
searching for food, followed by the fear of severe punishment if she did 
not perform her labors adequately: “I didn’t know what he would tell me 
now that I had come back with nothing from the raid. he might be the one 
to kill me that day.”59
 Still, the question remains: why do armed groups choose to pursue the 
particular strategy of forced marriage? Their instrumental military, logis-
tical, and sexual requirements can be met through forced labor and sex-
ual slavery, so why do they introduce the element of conjugality? Forced 
marriage is a form of symbolic warfare in seeking to control female bodies 
and their reproductive labors, but it can also be an aspect of armed groups’ 
political desire to “reorder” society. During the rwandan genocide, the 
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forcible marriage of Tutsi women to hutu men was part of efforts to estab-
lish hutu dominance of the nation at both micro- and macrolevels; simi-
larly, the LrA’s use of forced marriage for reproduction has been identified 
as part of a larger plan to “populate a new Acholi nation.”60 According 
to Krijn Peters, many wives were held in the rUF’s bush camps—spaces 
where a youth underclass tried to forge a new meritocratic Sierra Leone.61 
These attempted reorderings of society were based on strictly patriarchal 
power structures. Marks argues that rUF laws governing gender relations 
were “strident perversions of pre-existing social norms,” reconfigured to 
socially alienate women and limit their agency within marriage, building 
dependence on husbands and the armed group.62
 In Somalia, al-Shabaab instituted forced and early marriage as part of 
the group’s efforts to impose its version of shari’a. A recent human rights 
Watch report argues that these marriages were not simply the actions of 
individual fighters but a more organized practice by which al-Shabaab 
preached marriage of fighters to schoolgirls and abducted and detained 
girls under the group’s auspices for this purpose.63 As a seventeen-year-old 
boy from Mogadishu pointed out: “Usually they [al-Shabaab] were in 
town and when they would see girls from school they would find one, 
confront her, say they want to marry her. Sometimes they would go to the 
parents but if the parents refuse they just take her. I saw it all the time.”64 
The line between forced marriages and “arranged marriages” was some-
times blurred, but it is clear that girls or families who refused marriages 
faced considerable reprisals: “Girls were taken at gunpoint and forced to 
become wives of combatants. One parent who protested was killed. One 
girl said she could not go and al-Shabaab shot her in the forehead in front 
of my class.”65
 recent humanitarian efforts to combat rape and sexual violence in 
the Democratic republic of the congo (Drc) have highlighted that early 
and forced marriages among civilian populations are common in some 
areas.66 numerous accounts of sexual enslavement have been reported 
in Goma, Bukavu, and Uvira in the Drc, with girls and young women 
abducted by combatants and taken to bases in the forest where they were 
forced to provide sexual services and domestic labor, sometimes more 
than a year. But these situations were apparently not initially termed 
“forced marriages” in humanitarian reports.67 It was noted that some girls 
joined armed groups to escape arranged marriages at home.68 Maï-Maï 
forces tended to hold girls in common; other groups more frequently 
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allocated abducted women to individuals, although the designation of 
these captive women as wives in a “bush marriage” did not routinely 
occur.69 In these regions, rape was also widely used as a weapon of terror 
to maintain control over the civilian population, so perhaps the forced 
relationships there lacked more overtly conjugal elements and were 
closer to sexual slavery because they were more focused on meeting the 
immediate sexual, domestic, and labor requirements of armed groups, 
many of which appear to have had no clear political aim of ruling local 
populations or establishing new social orders. In contrast, former girl 
soldiers from the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in ethiopia 
have reported that rape or sexual abuse was rare and severely punished, 
stressing that within their units, “there was no forced sexual relationship 
with males. The male fighters did not force us to do anything without our 
interest. The male had no feeling of superiority over the female”—a situa-
tion they contrasted starkly with civilian life. Marriage and children were 
seen as distractions from the goal of overthrowing the Derg and were 
therefore rejected by the TPLF’s hierarchy.70 In this situation, a combina-
tion of Marxist-Leninist political ideology, clear military goals, and close 
cooperation with local communities, with the ultimate aim of controlling 
the nation, appear to have limited the use of sexual violence and coerced 
relationships within the TPLF.
 Girls’ experiences of conflict are shaped by wider long-term patterns of 
structural gender violence as well as patterns of warfare. West and central 
Africa, where wartime forced marriage seems to have been most common, 
also have some of the world’s highest rates of early marriage, with 74 per-
cent of girls being married before the age of nineteen in the Drc and just 
under half of the girls in Sierra Leone and Uganda being married by age 
eighteen.71 In many societies, unmarried women and unattached girls have 
long been regarded as a destabilizing force and a “social evil.”72 This con-
text helped forced marriage to become a socially normalized institution. 
Across Africa, there are also historically high levels of domestic violence 
and rape.73 In Mozambique, “rape and the use of slave-wives is rather seen 
by renamo soldiers as simply the rights of access to women, and a key 
perk of the job, not a direct tactic of war.”74 A former girl soldier from the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan felt that her three 
“marriages” were conducted to justify and legitimate the rapes she suffered 
within local social and moral codes.75 There are examples of girls joining 
armed groups to escape an arranged marriage or domestic sexual abuse, 
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only to find themselves drawn into similar structures of violence within 
the group. “Josephine” from Masisi, Drc, stated that she chose to join the 
national congress for the Defense of the People (congrès national pour la 
défense du peuple, cnDP) to escape an arranged marriage. “I joined the 
cnDP to avoid revenge from [the man who was to be] my husband, [it] 
would give me protection,” she recalled, but she left the group after being 
raped by several commanders and giving birth to a child.76
 One question that requires further research involves the relationship 
between early and arranged marriage in peacetime, and forced marriage in 
conflict. The chapters in this volume demonstrate that “customary” prac-
tices of marriage contained varying levels of coercion and were histori-
cally highly contested, so there is no simple link between early marriage, 
customary marriage, and forced marriage in conflict. vivi Stavrou notes 
that in Angola, girls were drafted into the revolutionary Youth of Angola 
(Juventude revolucionário de Angola, JUrA), the youth wing of the na-
tional Union for the Total Independence of Angola (União nacional para 
a Independência Total de Angola, UnITA), at adolescence, when it was 
permissible for them to be involved in regulated sexual activity and enter 
into marriage.77 The Sierra Leone Trc suggested that forced marriages 
were customary marriages in extreme situations, but the Special court 
for Sierra Leone refuted these claims, highlighting the dangers of “mak-
ing straightforward links between complex social practices of arranging 
marriages between kin groups, international conceptualizations of forced 
marriages and the coercion of women into being ‘bush wives’.”78 The Spe-
cial court drew a clear distinction between the customary practice of early 
marriage and bush marriage, the difference lying in familial and individ-
ual consent, as well as adherence to recognized religious ceremonies sanc-
tifying and validating the union.79
 Although humanitarian narratives tend to stress girls’ victimhood, re-
cent academic investigations have emphasized the “constrained” or “tac-
tical agency” that many individuals display in their navigation of wartime 
environments.80 chris coulter notes that in Sierra Leone, “as the idiom of 
marriage was applied to intimate relations between men and women in the 
bush, perhaps sexual coercion in this context was considered by the girls 
and women, if not normal, then to be expected.”81 Some wives saw forced 
marriages as a strategy for minimizing sexual violence and thus condoned 
it.82 “I wouldn’t say that I was taken by force,” one wife said, “I did it to save 
my life. he was my husband . . . we call these men our husbands. But they 
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were not a true love. I hated this man.”83 For some girls, accepting the sta-
tus of wife offered a form of limited protection:
At the beginning I was raped daily. At least one person would come 
to me for sex . . . I was every man’s wife. But later, one of them, an 
officer, had a special interest in me. he then protected me against 
others and never allowed others to use me. he continued to [rape] 
me alone and less frequently.84
It should be noted that women’s use of the term wife does not necessarily 
denote acceptance of their status but rather its normalization.
 Blurring the boundaries between consent and coercion, some former 
girl combatants from UnITA in Angola who were forced to become the 
“war wives” of elders in their units noted that marriage allowed them to 
avoid forced labor and marches:
Some, when they look at the others, who are pregnant or have 
children, then they begin to think that if I do that then perhaps the 
suffering will be less because the others who are pregnant or who have 
children do not go anywhere. They do not go to the marches to collect 
food. . . . I accepted the father of my child because of that suffering.85
Stavrou demonstrates that sex work was regarded as a routine part of their 
labor during the war, but girls frequently distinguished between forced 
unions with elders, rape, strategic unions for protection, and free sexual 
relations for love:
Well some were forced, they tell them, and from now on you must 
marry this man. Others are the girls themselves who decide, they 
see an old man, even really old, but because he has a little bit (food, 
clothes) and she doesn’t have to go on missions, she accepts to live 
together with him.86
 The duties and treatment of a wife depended on her status and that of 
her husband, as well as the nature and location of the armed group. One 
woman explained:
On our arrival we were assigned to the wives of commanders and 
later given to commanders or fighters to be their bush wives. As a 
bush wife, my duties were to provide for him anything he requested, 
including sex at any time of the day. I was used as a sex slave for 
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each commander when they came to our camp, especially because 
my bush husband was not a senior commander.87
 Forced marriage was also shaped by interfemale dynamics rather than 
simply by victimhood. Some marriages were polygynous, raising tensions 
between the elder wife and the new war wives.88 Wives of senior officers 
or those who gained status as fighters themselves could “adopt” other, 
younger children to carry out domestic duties. The experiences of girl 
wives were shaped not just by luck, chance, individual agency, and their 
husbands’ or cowives’ personalities but also by the structure of the armed 
group and the nature of the conflict.89 Girls’ experiences of forced mar-
riages are also shaped by their postconflict lives. Although submitting to 
these forced marriages was perhaps the only available strategy of survival 
for many of these young women, devastated communities subsequently 
interpret their “marriages” as signs of collaboration. As Justice Teresa 
Doherty stressed in her dissenting opinion in the Special court for Si-
erra Leone, the crime of forced marriage is not simply the sexual violence 
and labor exploitation experienced by the victim but also the “mental and 
moral suffering” imposed by the forced conjugal status—a status that has 
long-term repercussions for the girls as they attempt to reintegrate into 
their communities, particularly in cases where they are rejected by their 
families or encouraged to formally marry their husbands.90
Forced marriage is not a monolithic category: it varies in its instru-
mentality and symbolic function between different conflicts and armed 
groups and also by individual experiences within those groups—the ex-
periences of a bush wife and girl soldier in the rUF are not necessarily the 
same as those of a young war wife within renamo, or those abducted by 
Boko haram from schools in chibok in northern nigeria. More research 
is needed into the internal dynamics of armed groups, comparative as-
sessments of “marriage” across different groups, and historical patterns of 
women’s involvement in warfare in order to fully analyze the development 
of forced marriages as a tactic of war and as a crime of war.91
 Different forms of sexual violence in war have varying purposes, but 
the logic behind forced marriage is shaped by the normalization of gen-
der violence, sexual abuse, and the exploitation of labor in contempo-
rary African conflicts. It facilitates instrumental gains for armed groups 
in terms of providing regulated sexual release for male combatants, 
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creating internal loyalties to the group, providing logistical support and 
domestic duties through girl labor, creating dependence among forcibly 
recruited girls, social reproduction, and terrorizing civilian populations. 
Such factors are particularly significant for mobile, armed groups that 
lack strong civilian support, stable supply lines, and forms of material 
remuneration for the troops.
 It is significant that forced marriage also seems to be more common 
where existing cultural norms support or allow early marriage, as young 
girls are more easily controlled and retained. however, sexual slavery 
could just as well supply these military gains, so why is the element of 
conjugality introduced? The enforcement of so-called marriages and the 
resultant creation of new family units speak to a desire to reorder society, 
enforcing patriarchal control and providing access to key avenues of social 
maturation for young, disenfranchised fighters who were controlled by 
older generations in peacetime. Social tensions as well as military tactics 
drive the practice of forced marriage. Moreover, given the way forced mar-
riage has been presented in international humanitarian and legal debates, 
it is clear that a more nuanced understanding is needed in regard to both 
local African concepts of marriage (and consent) and local constructions 
of girlhood if the practice is to be effectively combated in the future.
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Historicizing Social Justice and the 
Longue Durée of Forced Marriage
eMILY S .  BUrrILL
At the time of this publication, we find ourselves working with a height-
ened awareness of scholarly topics that elicit stressful affective and psy-
chological responses from our readers and students, particularly topics 
dealing with trauma. Such topics are often referred to as trauma stressors 
or trauma triggers. The topic of forced marriage, like human trafficking 
and sexual violence, is a potential trigger. This increased sensitivity to trig-
gers partially reflects the scholarly community’s growing awareness of the 
silencing and destructive power that academic topics exploring suffering 
and violence may have on an audience. As a result, the trigger that ap-
pears in the classroom or on the written page often comes with a warning, 
preparing the reader or student to look away or disengage as an act of 
self-protection or even self-preservation. This is a good thing, to my mind. 
But triggers and their attendant warnings also require some of us to ap-
proach and engage, the way some might rush into a fire, in order to make 
sense of trauma, often with an eye toward preventing the trauma from 
occurring again. This is an act of scholarly social justice. Similarly, when 
we take a long view of trauma in society, we see that actors emerge along 
the historical landscape who may have “named the problem” and situated 
it within a milieu, identifying causes and suggesting correctives. Tracing 
such engagements with trauma over time tells us something about how 
actors and institutions perceived different forms of inequality as problems 
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to be solved, rather than elements of normative social order. This is the 
work of historicizing social justice. What makes this interdisciplinary vol-
ume so valuable is that it does both: it performs social justice in a scholarly 
realm, while also historicizing social justice as an enduring yet changing 
phenomenon. Forced marriage on the African continent is thus taken up 
as something to be situated and understood as a present-day predicament, 
but it is also a unit of analysis that helps us understand long-standing 
trends in gender-based inequality and the uses and abuses of conjugality.
no discrete MoMents: the LongUe DUrée  oF Forced 
Marriage
Far too often, stories that trigger, such as stories about forced marriage, 
are read as spectacular narratives or episodes that stand apart from what 
is normal or socially sanctioned. This spectacular quality pulls readers and 
listeners in, but it also suggests that the narrative stands alone, untethered 
to any enduring dynamic or normative pattern. In this way, the problem at 
the core of the spectacular story might be seen as exceptional, in a social 
sense (“we don’t do this”), a historical sense (“this has never happened 
before” or “this is unprecedented”), or both. One might be inclined, for ex-
ample, to isolate stories such as the 2014 Boko haram abduction of school-
girls in chibok, nigeria, for the declared purpose of forced marriage as 
an anomaly or a singular episode, something that cannot be explained by 
structural or processual analysis. The result is that stories such as these 
become spectacles without a history, moments that garner attention but 
eventually drift away as outliers. It can therefore be difficult to situate such 
predicaments within the fabric of humanity, so to speak, and apply 
analytical and theoretical lenses in order to understand how conditions 
develop to make such things possible. This is a challenge familiar to social 
justice scholars and to feminist historians in particular.1
 Literary scholar Debali Mookerjea-Leonard, in her analysis of schol-
arship on the wide-scale gendered violence that occurred in the after-
math of the Partition of India and Pakistan, makes a case for the use of a 
longue durée (long term) approach to understanding episodes of gendered 
and sexual violence. The longue durée, an approach to understanding his-
torical change offered by French historians of the Annales school (other-
wise known as Annalistes), de-emphasizes event-based history in favor 
of long-term structural change. Annalistes maintained that such a focal 
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point would shine light on old attitudes and resistant frameworks, reveal-
ing sites of conservation and enduring mores. Inspired by this approach, 
Mookerjea-Leonard shows that tracing legislative reform on the status of 
women over time throughout India’s colonial history reveals that laws on 
the status of Indian women (often anchored to “spectacular” problems, 
such as widow burning and child brides) were not “discrete moments” but 
rather points on a continuum that, when taken together, tell us much more 
about “women’s bodies as sites for discourse [and] . . . also sites of patri-
archal constraint and violence” in the struggle for colonial and nationalist 
narratives and anticolonial resistance.2 The longue durée analytic, then, 
flies in the face of the spectacle without a history, and it presses us to see 
the entrenched and even mundane elements of the stories that trigger.
 I find Mookerjea-Leonard’s suggestion that there is a longue durée of 
gender-based oppression useful because it emphasizes the fact that power 
has a practice that changes over time—it is both entrenched and socially 
constructed, on the one hand, and contingent, on the other. here, I pro-
pose that there is a longue durée of forced marriage, a continuum of plot-
ted episodes that are linked and embedded in their own social milieu. The 
longue durée of forced marriage that we see in this particular volume is 
not all that long in Braudelian terms, but it helps us sketch out transfor-
mations over time that point to slowly evolving structures. Moreover, it 
indicates an even longer-term history that extends further back than the 
contributions to this volume suggest. This challenges the idea that Afri-
can history over the past two hundred years was a period of accelerated 
changes—in many ways, it was, but in other ways, perhaps it was not.
 Uneven relationships of obligation and exchange underpinned mar-
riage in all of the African case studies examined here.This interwoven 
thread holds many of the observations in this book together. It is in this 
changing yet enduring dynamic of obligation and exchange where we lo-
cate forced marriage. This is not specific to African marriages, though—
arguably, it is something that describes the nature of global marriage in 
broader historical perspective, and more to the point, it describes one of 
the cornerstones of patriarchy. however, in this volume some chapters 
make very strong cases for the contextual specificity of the longue durée 
of forced marriage at work. For example, Ann McDougall argues that 
present-day discussions about the causes of forced marriage in Mauritania 
fail to fully acknowledge the deeper history of concubinage that connected 
the families of bizan (masters) and hratani (freed slaves). Unraveling family 
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histories in Mauritania reveals a localized Islamic legal interpretation of 
obligation and uneven exchange that perpetuated both poverty among 
hratani families and a notion of paternalistic privilege and obligation to 
provide for former slave families. This dynamic promotes the persistence 
of forcible marriage that stems from a longer history of concubinage.
 One factor that sets the uneven relationships of obligation and ex-
change in marriage apart in this book is the shared historical experience 
of european colonization. As many of the chapters show, the early colo-
nial encounter troubled practices of marriage and sexuality in Africa, in 
part because of the trappings of consent. In addressing consent, I am not 
talking about agreement in the simplest terms—certainly, agreement and 
mutual understanding underpinned exchange and marital arrangements 
in a number of different legal and customary frameworks—but rather, the 
specific post-enlightenment, new liberal category of consent that applied 
to legal and political action and philosophy. here, consent was tied to the 
sovereignty of the individual and the disavowal of preordained rights to 
governance and rule. It was not that european powers fully upheld this 
philosophical and political ideal in the colonies (or in the metropole, for 
that matter), but that it determined how regimes would measure African 
societies. however, at times colonial regimes themselves relied upon new 
forms of forced labor, though this was when the colonial regimes them-
selves were not necessarily invested in promoting a notion of democratic 
ideals at home. As we see in Francesca Declich’s chapter, forced marriage 
emerged as an element of the Italian empire in Somaliland, arguably 
giving men a certain type of freedom—but a freedom tied to labor in a 
colonial-capitalist context. Mariane Ferme describes how long histories 
of slave-based marriage in Mende societies in present-day Sierra Leone 
reveal a background of nonconsensual marriage that persisted well into 
the colonial period, which partially accounts for the emergence of “bush 
wives” in the Sierra Leonean civil war in the early 1990s. In most colonial 
contexts, however, consent was a bureaucratic and ideological guidepost 
for critiquing African masculinities as either too childlike or too brutish; 
it also became a way to measure the degree to which African women were 
in need of rescue.
 As the chapters in this book show, the evidence of forced marriage 
was quite often the spectacular story, which emerged from the record in 
some form of first-person testimony (oral narrative, life history, or court 
testimony) or as an outsider’s account of an observed event (ethnography, 
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travelogue, or journalistic reporting). In this sense, we still see the spectac-
ular story emerging from both the historical record and the present-day 
accounts. What each of the contributions in this book show us is that so-
cial justice actors frequently tried to make sense of these stories of trauma 
and wrongdoing by situating them within a larger social problem to be 
solved or addressed through political negotiation, legislative reform, or 
direct intervention. however, this is not to argue that social justice always 
comes from a position of unadulterated altruism. certainly, much of what 
we see is the development of justice within the context of colonial pater-
nalism and maternalism—social justice as the white woman’s and white 
man’s burden. This is not specific to Africa; for instance, this european, 
liberal dream of consent was at the core of what Gayatri Spivak was talking 
about when she wrote that in colonialism in India, “white men are saving 
the brown women from brown men.”3 We can thus understand consent as 
a defining tool of gender making and marriage reform of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries.4
 In historicizing social justice with an eye for long-term trends, the 
chapters in this edited volume sketch out a framework for an epochal his-
tory not only of forced marriage as practice but also of the social justice 
that developed around the practice of forced marriage. Though the book 
itself is organized in three parts, all of which correspond to a chronolog-
ical order, there are also thematic “ages” that emerge in the history of so-
cial justice on forced marriage in colonial and postcolonial Africa: an Age 
of contract that bleeds into—and overlaps with—an Age of consent and 
ultimately an Age of convention. This is not to argue for a whiggish or 
teleological interpretation of the history of forced marriage; rather, it is to 
suggest that there is a transformational history of a debate that emerges in 
the history of forced marriage. Arguably, these ages are not monolithic, 
and in fact, they have blurred edges. This is particularly the case when we 
consider the relationship between consent and contract. however, these 
ages tell us something about how the political stakes of forced marriage 
changed over time and how they were often tied to visions for colonial 
statecraft, postcolonial sovereignty, and present-day membership in a 
human rights community—the last of which is unfolding within a post-
colonial context as well.
 Despite the fact that bridewealth was regarded as problematic by early 
colonial administrators in French and British colonial Africa, colonial ad-
ministrators at times privileged marriages based on bridewealth exchange 
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over other forms of marriage. In my own work on the French Soudan in 
French West Africa, I discuss the Senufo practice of exchange marriage, 
which involved two families exchanging girls or young women from their 
families for marriage to men in the opposing families. This type of local 
marriage fell under heavy scrutiny in the early colonial period. The benefit 
of exchange marriage for Senufo families was that it tied them together in 
social and familial bonds and eliminated the exchange of labor or material 
bridewealth. however, in late 1905 the commandant in Sikasso, within the 
colony of the French Soudan, recommended that this practice be eradi-
cated and that Senufo families should instead “pay a bridewealth in cur-
rency, and renounce this practice.” he further stated that “such practice 
is sensitive, and in fact touches upon political issues as well.”5 Attempt-
ing to shift the practice of exchange marriage touched upon political is-
sues because administrators risked undermining relationships with local 
men of authority by potentially destabilizing a man’s wealth in people by 
emphasizing the value of material wealth and currency. Interfamilial re-
lationships of obligation and exchange were based on a certain economy 
of marriage, and changing the currency of that economy risked upending 
the flow of power and resources. Administrators on the ground under-
stood this, but they were also keen on attending to a broader politics of 
the civilizing mission, which rested on both respecting local practice and 
eradicating practices that were “contrary to civilization,” as richard rob-
erts’s chapter explains. This was a concern in French colonial contexts and 
in British colonial contexts as well.
 early forms of social justice, then, attempted to disaggregate bridewealth- 
based marriages from non-bridewealth-based marriages. So, even though 
ambiguity existed around the exchange of bridewealth in early colonial 
Africa, it was more desirable than other forms of marriage rooted in cus-
tomary practice—such as sister exchange; isinmo, or the forcible claiming 
of a woman, as we see in Olatunji Ojo’s chapter; and, as elizabeth Thorn-
berry shows us later in the volume, ukuthwala, or bride abduction. This 
was because bridewealth could be standardized and formalized so that it 
appeared to be a contractual agreement. In this way, we see the Age of 
contract emerging as a foundational stage of social justice and colonial 
marriagecraft in Africa.
 In part 1 of the volume, entitled “colonial Struggles,” the authors all 
address a common confusion that troubled colonial administrators and 
court assessors in the initial years of the colonial encounter in Africa. In 
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the early twentieth century throughout different parts of colonial Africa, ad-
ministrators were concerned about bridewealth: they were unsure of whether 
or not they were observing the sale of young women and girls or if such trans-
actions associated with marriage were rooted in the consent of the individual 
woman in question. In chapter 3, Brett Shadle explores this when he shows 
us how debates over early marriage in colonial Kenya—although they did 
not yield legislative outcomes—tell historians something about the effort 
to define early marriage in the first place. Shadle argues that even though 
colonial lawmakers and politicians were hesitant to interfere in matters 
of African marital customs, he can track a “language of girlhood” devel-
oping in the archive, which revealed a shifting consciousness concerning 
acceptable marriage and ideas of force. early marriage was identified as a 
problem to be solved beginning in the 1920s, but by 1950, it was apparent 
that there was no clear sense of how early was too early. Of the many dif-
ferent elements that contributed to the construction of a notion of early 
marriage, one involved the question of whether or not a girl could con-
sent. Ability to consent was determined by a few things: not only age and 
ability to reason in a mature way but also the obligation of a girl or woman 
to uphold her end of a marriage agreement when significant resources had 
been given to her family as gifts tied to her transfer to a new household 
in marriage. here is where we see a linked concern over bridewealth ex-
change and forced marriage. Indeed, what the part 1 chapters by roberts, 
Shadle, Ojo, and Declich show us is that quite often, discussions of the 
nature of bridewealth developed alongside questions about whether or not 
a marriage was forced or arranged. That is, arranged marriages, particu-
larly those brokered while the betrothed woman was still a young girl or a 
baby, reflected the interests and desires of the two families rather than the 
marital choices of the girl herself, apart from her family. In many ways, it 
was this lack of clarity over the difference between marriage by force and 
marriage by arrangement that animated early social justice efforts to cod-
ify marriage practices, including the transactions that underpinned bride-
wealth and gift giving, or prestation. Obligation between families—that is, 
the cultivation of social indebtedness—is what ensured social harmony, 
which was often manifested in arranged marriages. The social justice ef-
fort that we see in these four chapters rested on the predicament of estab-
lishing consent, while at the same time maintaining customary practices 
and values within indigenous societies. In this way, we see the Age of con-
sent emerging in the history of forced marriage.
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 The Age of convention unfolded in the late colonial period, mark-
ing the emergence of a self-conscious human rights community that is 
dependent upon state membership but that also sees itself as a watchdog 
or gatekeeper for rogue or compliant members. The Age of convention 
emerged from the Age of consent, and this is no better illustrated than in 
the 1962–64 United nations convention on consent to Marriage. As I have 
written elsewhere, it is not a coincidence that the convention on consent 
to Marriage was ratified on the heels of postcolonial independence for the 
majority of African states. Postcolonial sovereignty and membership in 
the international community were measured in part by a state’s investment 
in liberal marriage forms and the role that consent-based marriages would 
play in defining a postcolonial citizenry, at the very least in ideological 
terms.6 African states that are signatories to international conventions at 
times integrate certain ideals of postcolonial era conventions into their 
constitutions. Some of the chapters in this volume show us how the 1979 
convention on the elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (ceDAW) and the 1990 convention on the rights of the child 
have been particularly influential on postcolonial state constitutions. Bala 
Saho explores how the Gambian constitution and the Domestic violence 
Bill reflect some of the core values of consent, self-determination, and 
freedom from gender-based discrimination that stemmed from these con-
ventions, but he also points out that there are limits to the effectiveness 
of such instruments and language. All of these documents emphasize the 
enduring importance of custom, which, Saho argues, becomes a legal and 
ideological loophole that allows for forced marriage. however, what is en-
couraging to Saho is the fact that many local women’s and human rights 
groups in Gambia have successfully incorporated the language of inter-
national rights as we know it through conventions in local action—what 
Sally engle Merry refers to as the vernacularization of rights and justice.7
 however, just as possibilities emerge in the Age of convention, there 
are also limitations to both the concept of the convention and the conven-
tion’s reach. Benjamin Lawrance and charlotte Walker-Said, in their chap-
ter, point out that the 1951 refugee convention and the 1967 Protocol do 
not include gender as a category of persecution, and there is no precedent 
for using forced marriage as an example of persecution that qualifies a 
person for refugee status. As a result, complainants are required to repack-
age their own spectacular stories in such a way that new stories of trauma 
emerge that adhere to the standards of refugee conventions and asylum 
Afterword 321
qualifications. In this way, the promotion of standardization and best 
practices—and worst practices—in marriage defines the Age of conven-
tion, largely as an effort to identify and eradicate abuse—a social justice 
move, arguably—but it also creates the grounds for the erasure of intimate 
and individual experiences of forced marriage, which is a new layer of 
trauma altogether. As a result, some policy advocates and scholars, such 
as Lawrance and Walker-Said, argue for the creation of a new category of 
persecution that highlights “networked obligations,” to be applied in asy-
lum cases for victims of both forced marriage and violent homophobia. 
The emphasis on networked obligations in contemporary human rights 
laws and conventions brings us back to the longue durée of forced mar-
riage: what policy workers and social justice advocates in cases of forced 
marriage need today is an understanding of the deeply entrenched social 
practices of exchange and obligation that underpin marriage. As Muadi 
Mukenge notes in her chapter, “some programs” initiated to combat early 
marriage “may change behavior without necessarily changing minds.”
 Political, social, and economic changes come with the Age of con-
vention and result, paradoxically, in new forms of forced marriage. Stacey 
hynd describes how forced marriage in contemporary conflict zones, es-
pecially Sierra Leone and northern Uganda, form a central part of a milita-
rized strategy of social control and discipline of young—and often forcibly 
conscripted—soldiers. here, then, we see a deliberate strategy on the part 
of some warlords to draw on older connections between forced marriage 
and militarism. Indeed, the battles of colonial conquest throughout Africa—a 
period that defined the Janus face of the Age of consent in the history 
of social justice outlined here—were fought on the backs of forcibly con-
scripted African soldiers and the women who accompanied them in con-
jugal arrangements.8 The rise of so-called bush wives and forced marriage 
in militarized zones within Africa is modern and postcolonial, but it is 
also anchored in a longue durée structure of gender-based oppression and 
militarization, manifest in forced marriage. In a different iteration of this 
longue durée, Judith-Ann Walker writes of the 2011–13 state-sanctioned 
mass marriage program in Kano, nigeria, an effort deployed ostensibly 
for the protection of poor and unmarried girls and women. The Kano case 
was framed as a stabilizing reform, with marriage serving as a cornerstone 
of social harmony, but it was widely criticized by local Islamic authorities 
as a perversion of marriage. here, we see men of influence engaged in a 
struggle over the meaning of marriage and the deployment of righteous 
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paternalism. The Kano case of mass marriages emerged within the context 
of the Age of convention, and it is therefore another example of the 
limitations of the top-down convention approach to social justice efforts 
to combat forced marriage.
 In returning to Mookerjea-Leonard’s analysis, we are reminded that 
women’s bodies occupy the discursive and physical sites of patriarchal 
constraint and violence, factors that mark nationalist struggles and state-
craft. It is here that intervention is critical: contested political transforma-
tion and struggles over material and human resources almost invariably 
accompany forcible marriage. critical engagements with the past will aid 
in the creation of new policy categories that acknowledge the cultural em-
beddedness of marriage, as well as the ways forced marriage emerges from 
other types of debts and obligations.
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